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ABSTRACT	  
That	   painting	   is	   understood	   as	   being	   visual	   cannot	   really	   be	   contested.	   Even	   when	  Duchamp	  introduced	  his	  disavowal	  of	  painting	  and	  the	  schema	  of	  the	  chessboard	  to	  indicate	  an	  anti-­‐retinal	  strategy,	  the	  implication	  of	  visual	  imaginary	  was	  still	  in	  place.	  Indeed	  the	  link	  between	  knowing	  and	  seeing	   is	  not	  only	  at	   the	  root	  of	  metaphysical	  (the	  desire	  to	  know	  is	  the	   desire	   to	   see	   	  —Aristotle)	   thinking	   itself,	   but	   persists	   even	  within	   the	   disavowal	   of	   it	  within	  Late	  Modernity.	  
Currently,	  its	  presence	  does	  still	  persist	  and	  continues	  to	  fuel	  its	  relevance.	  This	  research	  develops	  as	  a	  speculation	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  an	  ontological	  understanding	  of	  the	  image	  and	  the	  ornamental.	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  usual	  understanding	  of	  ornament,	  the	  ornamental	   is	  elaborated	  as	  a	  force	  and	  process	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  forms	  out	  of	  forms.	  The	  arabesque	  is	  the	  structuring	  principle	  of	  this	  research	  and	  the	  figure	  it	  presents.	  
The	  revelatory	  force	  of	  the	  arabesque	  lies	  not	  in	  giving	  a	  schema	  of	  visual	  revelation,	  but	  it	  is	   touching	   upon	   a	   force	   that	   transforms	   and	   changes,	   the	   very	   ‘plasticity’	   (C.	   Malabou)	  inherent	   in	   every	   being	   and	   image.	   Through	   the	   recollection	   of	   the	   arabesque,	   the	  ornamental	  is	  invoked	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  drift	  and	  thrift	  in	  becoming.	  As	  a	  double,	  paradoxical	  device	  the	  arabesque	  enables	  a	  play	  between	  oblique	  and	  transparent	  things,	  between	  what	  can	  be	  said	  or	  known	  and	  what	  cannot	  be	  said,	  what	  remains	  unknown	  —and	  whatever	  lies	  in	   between.	   As	   a	   figure	   of	   thought,	   it	   sets	   out	   a	   play	   of	   plastic	   and	   graphic	   imminence.	  Characteristic	  for	  the	  Islamic	  culture,	  the	  arabesque	  is	  more	  a	  mode	  or	  an	  idea	  than	  a	  form	  or	  pattern,	  and	  it	  was	  formative	  for	  this	  culture	  from	  its	  very	  early	  ways	  of	  manifestation.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque	  is	  in	  and	  for	  itself,	  a	  ‘motor	  of	  thought’	  (C.	  Malabou).	  	  
The	  tension	  between	  representation	  and	  presentation,	  between	  symbolic,	  iconographic	  or	  legible	   meaning	   and	   a-­‐signifying,	   pre-­‐linguistic	   or	   ornamental	   meaning	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  understanding	   the	   image,	  which	   is	   a	  mode	   of	   being	   that	   is	   encountered	   in	   different	  ways.	  Through	  the	  ornamental	  as	  a	  force	  of	  mediation	  (O.	  Grabar)	  this	  understanding	  is	  infiltrated	  with	  an	  ethical	  dimension.	  
The	  route	   taken	   is	  one	  of	   conceptual	   risk,	  of	   invention	  and	   the	   fantastic.	  Method	   itself	   is	  addressed	   as	   something	   to	   be	   found	   —and	   not	   as	   something	   already	   given	   or	   pre-­‐established.	  	  
This	   research	   in	  painting	   inflects	  painting	   from	  within,	   from	   its	   relation	   to	  presence	  and	  the	  image.	  Caught	  in	  this	  by	  its	  inflammatory	  auto-­‐affection,	  painting	  explodes	  and	  de-­‐forms,	  it	  trans-­‐forms	  itself	  —	  it	  consciously	  receives	  and,	  simultaneously,	  gives	  form.	  The	  research	  itself	   is	  manifested	   as	   a	   concatenation	   of	   heterogeneous	   elements	   that	   belong	   to	   different	  registers	  such	  as	  written	  texts,	  show	  installation,	  and	  different	  technologies.	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PREFACE	  
By	  the	  time	  I	  was	   five	  years	  old,	   I	  could	  copy	  my	  three	  years	  older	  brother's	  scripts	   from	  his	  school	  notebooks,	   in	  German	  and	  in	  Romanian.	   I	  spent	  hours	  and	  hours	  daily	  playing,	   ‘writing’,	  doodling,	   drawing	   letters	   as	   I	   tended	   to	   believe	  would	   do	   a	   scribe.	  My	   table	  was	   an	   old	   door	  attached	  to	  two	  wooden	  boxes.	  I	  sat	  on	  a	  cushion	  directly	  on	  the	  floor,	  with	  the	  notebooks	  to	  my	  left.	  I	  used	  calligraphic	  notebooks,	  blue	  ink	  and	  a	  Reynolds	  fountain	  pen	  that	  my	  father	  brought	  us	   from	  his	  working	  trips.	  My	  right	   fingers	  got	  often	  stained	  with	  blue	   ink.	  Bored	  with	  writing,	  doodling	  and	  being	  a	  scribe,	  I	  would	  weave	  imaginary	  rugs	  as	  a	  nun	  in	  a	  nunnery.	  
Later	  on,	  in	  school,	  I	  continued	  to	  revel	  in	  my	  love	  for	  script	  styles	  and	  writing.	  I	  invented	  for	  each	   subject	   a	  new	  handwriting	   and	   a	  different	   character.	  However,	   style	   consistency	   for	   each	  individual	   subject	   was	   important,	   even	   if	   confusing	   too,	   for	   me	   and	   for	   my	   teachers.	   I	   was	  inspired	   by	   the	   strokes	   and	   patterns	   of	   other	   students'	   handwriting,	   of	   my	   parents	   or	   my	  teachers,	   and	   I	   appropriated	   the	   little	  details	   that	   I	   liked.	  As	  my	  hand	  writing	   styles	   started	   to	  develop	  their	  own	  character,	  quite	  a	  few	  of	  my	  teachers	  would	  deem	  my	  writing	  indecipherably	  beautiful,	   and	   would	   even	   refuse	   to	   try	   to	   read	   my	   'round	   drawings'	   —	   one	   of	   my	   history	  teachers,	  a	  very	  big	  fan	  of	  my	  brother,	  but	  less	  of	  mine,	  told	  me	  that	  even	  three	  pairs	  of	  reading	  glasses	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  decipher	  my	  unreadable	  arabesques	  good	  for	  hanging	  on	  a	  wall!	  I	  had	  to	  copy	  that	  essay	  (Fig.	  1)	  three	  times	  to	  pass	  his	  class.	  
If	  you	  were	  in	  the	  German	  School,	  you	  had	  ‘to	  think	  in	  German'	  and	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  to	  teach	  us	  this	  was	  to	  ask	  us	  to	  write	  a	  journal	  in	  German.	  It	  took	  me	  a	  while	  to	  accept	  the	  German	  language	  and	  culture	  as	  a	  constant	  part	  in	  my	  life,	  but	  since	  I	  had	  started	  to	  write	  my	  first	  doodling	  journal,	  in	  primary	  school,	  I	  didn't	  stop	  writing	  one	  until	  I	  was	  sixteen	  and	  decided	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  paint.	  With	   painting	   I	   stopped	  writing,	   but	  maybe	   painting	   was	   always	   an-­‐other	   form	   of	   writing,	   as	  writing	  is	  a	  form	  of	  painting	  now.	  	  
Writing	  a	   thesis	   in	  philosophy	  while	  having	  a	  daily	  studio	  practice	  confronted	  me	  again	  with	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  painting	  and	  writing,	  and	  I	  embarked	  on	  this	  project	  with	  this	  question,	  where	  does	  painting	  begin	  and	  where	  does	  the	  writing	  begin,	  pushing	  against	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  image	  and	  the	  ornamental.	  The	  final	  decision	  did	  involve	  also	  some	  practical	  reasons,	  but	  in	  the	  end,	   everything	   remained	   grounded	   in	   this	   instinctive,	   private	   and	   anecdotal	   desire,	   in	   this	  adolescent	  tumult.	  	  
The	   project	   goes	   also	   back	   to	   a	   series	   of	   paintings	   and	   the	   medium	   specific	   problems	   they	  brought	   about:	   shallowness	   of	   space,	   figure-­‐ground	   relation,	   decorative	   mark-­‐making	   and	   an	  ornamentalization	  of	  the	  female	  body,	  to	  a	  text	  on	  Matisse,	  and	  to	  my	  thesis	  in	  philosophy.	  But,	  from	  another	  perspective,	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  had	  been	  for	  a	  long	  time	  an	  obvious	  though	  latent	  welcoming	  disposition	  awaiting	  me	  to	  settle	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque	  and	  the	  ornamental.	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The	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque	  became	  the	  structuring	  principle	  of	  the	  project.	  My	  writing	  became	  a	  sort	   of	   ‘arabesque	   writing’	   (in	   the	   tradition	   of	   Barthes	   or	   Schlegel),	   and	   research	   itself	   an	  arabesque	  game.	  The	  desire	  to	  fictionalize,	  to	  paint,	  to	  write,	  to	  play	  led	  me	  to	  try	  and	  resist	  any	  scientific	  methodology	  and	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  how	  compulsory	  conventions	  can	  be.	  What	  I	   intuited	  as	  a	  child	  and	  played	  out	  in	  school,	  that	  we	  have	  always	  various	  doubles	  and	  that	  a	  fixed	  identity	  is	  a	  fantasy,	  I	  staged	  here	  through	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  split	  author	  and	  as	  a	  game.	  
What	  was	  this	  game?	  A	  simple	  and	  trivial	  invention	  played	  by	  any	  child.	  Through	  imagining	  a	  basic	   fictional	   structure	   and	   by	   doubling	   itself,	   a	   child	   invents	   a	   (multiple	   persons)	   game	   that	  allows	  her	  to	  play	  by	  herself	  and	  with	  herself.	  A	  game,	  whose	  rules	  are	  made	  along	  the	  way	  and	  not	  fixed,	  but	  changed	  whenever	  necessary.	  To	  deal	  with	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  this	  research	  project,	  to	  paint	  and	  write	  and	  research,	  I	  had	  to	  imagine	  such	  a	  fictional	  structure	  for	  myself.	  	  
Firstly,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  linear,	  traditional	  thesis	  in	  my	  research,	  because	  in	  painting	  there	  is	  no	  final	  meaning,	  and	  I	  saw	  it	  as	  an	  imperative	  of	  writing	  not	  to	  fix	  meaning,	  not	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  be	  definitive	  and	  essential.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  had	  to	  be	  meaning,	  as	  a	  constant	  emergence	  of	  meaning,	  a	  plasticity	  of	  meaning	  at	  once	  differential	  and	  collective,	  plural,	  ornamental.	  Which	  is	  what	  I	  discovered	  to	  be	  possible	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque.	  The	  arabesque	  was	  my	  grid	  around	   which	   I	   could	   permutated	   my	   research.	   Collective	   yet	   individual,	   finite	   yet	   infinite,	  absolute	  yet	  subjective.	  And	  the	  arabesque	  was	  simultaneously	  also	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  project	  itself.	  	  
The	  project	  had	  to	  be	  fragmentary	  and	  incomplete,	  like	  an	  arabesque.	  So	  I	  imagined	  (in	  order	  to	  smuggle	  myself	  through	  as	  many	  compulsions	  as	  possible)	  somebody,	  who	  was	  writing	  a	  novel	  of	  manners	   and	  who	  had	   lost	   the	   already	  written	   fragments.	   Una	   Joc,	   another	   fictive	   voice,	   an	  editor,	  found	  these	  fragments	  (or	  some	  of	  them),	  of	  what	  could	  have	  been	  a	  novel	  of	  manners	  and	  decided	  to	  use	  them.	  Like	  a	  child,	  I	  could	  now	  play	  a	  game	  by	  myself	  with	  myself	  as	  other.	  And,	  even	   better,	   I	   could	   re-­‐write	   along	   the	   way	   the	   game	   whenever	   necessary.	   A	   different	  handwriting	  and	  a	  different	  ‘I’	  for	  each	  subject,	  one	  for	  painting	  and	  one	  for	  writing,	  without	  the	  clarity	  given	  by	  a	  clear	  cut	  split	  or	  a	  readerly	  story.	  Painting	  and	  writing	  bleed	  into	  each	  other,	  intermingle,	  but	  remain	  distinct.	  Cristina	  Cojanu	  and	  Una	  Joc	  bleed	  also	  into	  each	  other	  and	  into	  the	  world.	  The	  world	  bleeds	  into	  them.	  Through	  them	  others	  are	  speaking.	  Some	  different	  voices	  are	  announced	  by	  obeying	  quotation	  conventions,	  but	  the	  clarity	  offered	  by	  knowing	  how	  to	  read	  such	   a	   text	   offers	   only	   a	   short	   relief.	   The	   reader	   is	   confronted	   with	   more	   and	   more	   round	  drawings,	  more	  curls	  and	  fringes,	  of	  thoughts	  and	  images	  circling	  around	  themselves	  extending	  with	  your	  help	  into	  an	  infinite	  rapport.	  Sometimes,	  as	  a	  reader,	  I	  get	  lost	  myself	  in	  the	  text,	  as	  one	  does	  in	  every	  child’s	  game	  that	  defies	  logic	  from	  the	  start.	  Other	  times,	  I	  am	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  blackmail	  of	  theory.	  As	  a	  reader,	  I	  too	  had	  to	  find	  my	  way	  through	  this	  arabesque	  and	  ended	  up	  each	   time	   with	   a	   new	   trail,	   which	   sustained	   my	   interest	   without	   losing	   my	   pleasure	   for	   new	  beginnings.	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FIGURE	  1:	  DETAIL	  OF	  MY	  OWN	  HANDWRITING.	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CLARIFICATION1	  
The	   pages	   which	   follow	  may	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   lay	   model	   of	   the	   type	   of	   seeking	   which	   is	  pursued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  previous	  finding;	  a	  finding	  of	  traces,	  as	  unforgettable	  as	  intangible,	  that	  maybe	  never	  existed	  —	  finding,	  almost	  inventing.	  However,	  for	  such	  a	  seeking	  and	  finding	  to	  be	  able	   to	   take	   place,	   there	   must	   be	   a	   system	   of	   waiting	   —	   waiting	   without	   abidance,	   waiting	  determined	   by	   nothing.	   Waiting	   as	   a	   simple	   intentional	   attitude,	   made	   up	   of	   wonder	   and	   a	  confused	  desire,	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  first	  form	  of	  finding.	  	  
An	   attitude	   of	   waiting	   could	   be	   the	   hypostasis	   of	   the	   adolescent	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   world.	  Adolescence,	   while	   not	   itself	   a	   fulfilment,	   is	   nevertheless	   the	   affective	   prelude	   to	   any	   future	  fulfilment.	   It	   is	   the	   age	   when	   the	   undifferentiated	   rumour	   of	   desires	   and	   aspirations	   pushes	  towards	  the	  peace	  of	  a	   form,	  towards	  a	  positive	  plasticity	  of	   life,	   towards	  that	  alone	  which	  can,	  when	  it	  takes	  shape	  at	  a	  later	  stage,	  bring	  that	  degree	  of	  stability	  which	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  speaking	  of	  a	  law	  of	  one’s	  own,	  and	  so	  of	  a	  personality	  and	  a	  destiny,	  a	  character,	  an	  individuality,	  an	  idea,	  a	  work,	  an	  image,	  a	  world.	  
Una	  Joc:	   ‘But,	   is	  this	  how	  WE	  wait?	  Are	  we,	  now,	  not	  waiting	  without	  time,	  without	  meaning,	  purpose,	   without	   dwelling?	   Our	   attitude	   of	   waiting	   is	   of	   exterior	   relations	   and	   scattered.	  Without	   sense,	   this	  waiting	   has	   no	   origin	   or	   arrival.	  Waiting	   determined	   by	   nothing	   is	   the	  emergence	  of	  meaning,	  day	  after	  day,	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  its	  emergence,	  with	  no	  future	  fulfilment.	  Emerging	  from	  being-­‐WITH	  in	  the	  world	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	   in	  a	  cohabitation	  that	  this	  world	  is.	  An	  attitude	  of	  waiting	  in	  excess	  of	  any	  referential	  ideality	  and	  dualistic	  structure.’2	  	  
Obliged	  to	  sense	  and	  impossible	  to	  (un)decide	  it,	  re-­‐posed	  into	  my	  mind,	  this	  waiting	  takes	  the	  form	   of	   cultural	   romanticism.3	  Cultural	   romanticism	   is	   the	   pubescent	   expression	   of	   the	   mind	  itself	  in	  crisis;	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  mind	  settled	  on	  an	  intelligent	  thought	  like	  the	  stucco	  decoration	  on	  the	  wall	  of	  a	  colonnade.4	  The	  awakening	  of	   the	  mind	  takes	  place	   in	   the	  ornamental,	  plastic	  and	  not	  historical	  space	  of	  culture;	  however,	  if	  it	  is	  projected	  onto	  a	  certain	  turbulence	  of	  the	  soul	  and	  perceived	   through	   the	   medium	   of	   violent	   and	   contradictory	   motions,	   in	   which	   one’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  chapter	  is	  appropriated	  from	  (Liiceanu	  2000:	  3).	  2	  For	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘sense’	  in	  Nancy’s	  thinking	  see:	  (James	  2006:	  91-­‐97).	  3	  Athenaeum	  Fragment	  55:	  “Romanticism	  is	  one	  of	  those	  classifications	  that	  are	  bad	  enough	  as	  classifications,	  but	  that	  have	  nonetheless	  dominated	  entire	  nations	  and	  epochs.”	  Its	  meaning	  in	  the	  passage	  above	  is	  not	  less	  equivocal.	  It	  is	  not	  used	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  category	  that	  evokes	  “a	  flowing	  sentimentality	  or	  foggy	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  past,”	  but	  it	  may	  refer	  to	  a	  historical	  category	  in	  opposition	  to	  classicism,	  as	  much	  as	  it	  could	  be	  a	  “theoretical	  romanticism”	  that	  points	  at	  the	  inaugural	  moment	  of	  a	  theoretical	  project	  and	  speculative	  thinking,	  also	  known	  as	  Early	  Jena	  Romanticism,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century.	  “Romantic	  —especially	  in	  its	  English	  provenance	  is	  the	  landscape	  before	  one	  feels	  the	  sentiment	  of	  nature,	  or	  the	  epic	  grandeur	  of	  the	  past,	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  both:	  ruins	  in	  wilderness.	  But	  romantic,	  as	  well,	  is	  the	  sensibility	  capable	  of	  responding	  to	  this	  spectacle,	  and	  of	  imagining,	  or	  better,	  recreating	  —	  phantasieren	  —	  what	  it	  evokes	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:1).”	  4	  Medieval	  Jewish	  saying	  from	  the	  book	  of	  Ben	  Sirach	  (Grabar	  1992:	  25).	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predestination	   is	   sometimes	   felt	   as	   glory	   and	   sometimes	   as	   failure,	   it	   cannot	   fail	   to	   take	   a	  romantic	  form	  —	  endangered	  to	  exhaust	  itself	  in	  the	  inability	  to	  grasp	  its	  own	  essence.	  This	  form,	  in	  which	   thoughts	   cannot	   yet	   break	   away	   from	  passions,	   so	   as	   to	   remain	   empowered	   and	   not	  blocked	  by	  them,	  is	  especially	  fertile	  and	  dangerous.	  	  
It	  may	  appear	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  miracle	  of	  adolescence	  that	  it	  holds	  encoded	  in	  its	  waitings,	  and	  so	  in	  its	  findings	  too,	  the	  future	  presence	  of	  a	  being	  who	  has,	  in	  turn,	  the	  capacity	  inscribed	  in	  its	  destiny	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  confused	  calling,	  and	  to	  liberate	  its	  own	  measure.	  It	   is	   in	  this	  way	  that	  she,	  at	  a	  later	  date	  —	  and	  quite	  by	  chance	  —	  could	  be	  found	  long	  before	  an	  encounter	  with	  her	  took	  place.	  When	  it	  did	  take	  place	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  simple	  recognition,	  and	  had	  that	  natural	  quality	  which	  a	  long	  and	  careful	  period	  of	  preparation	  and	  waiting	  gives	  a	  meeting.	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TO	  THE	  READER	  
This	  was,	  whatever	   this	  arabesque	  writing	   is,	   at	   some	  point,	   ABOUT	  a	   confluence	  between	  art	  and	  ornament,	  and	  ABOUT	  producing	  a	  relation.	  In	  this	  realm,	  of	  the	  ABOUT,	  we	  got	  distracted	  by	  disjunctive	   paradoxical	   places,	   parergonic	   relations	   to	   experience,	  marginal	   rapports	   to	   figure	  out.	  This	   joint	  between	  art	  and	  ornamentation	  was	  more	  about	  unity	   (which	   implies	  partition)	  than	  about	  unicity.	  And	  form	  is	  distinctive,	  but	  distinction	  is	  distinction	  plus	  its	  excess,	  that	  from	  which	   it	   is	   distinct.	   Not	   remaining	   in	   systematic	   structures,	   but	   living	   their	   rapport	   in	   their	  concreteness,	  was	  our	  intention.	  And	  the	  production	  of	  one	  stitch	  became	  the	  view	  of	  a	  lump,	  and	  the	  lump	  spread	  out	  quickly	  proliferating	  in	  high	  speed.	  How	  could	  it	  ever	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now,	   this	  energetic	   force	  of	   the	  ornamental,	  we	  started	  to	  ask	  ourselves,	   if	   it	  only	  made	  us	  wander	  around	  in	  circles,	  further	  and	  further?	  Our	  play-­‐off	  was	  an	  endless	  game	  of	  doubling,	  of	  kaleidoscopic	   shadows,	   shaking	   with	   disquieting	   fertile	   uncertainties	  —but	   how	   and	   for	   how	  long	   could	   we	   sustain	   this	   volume,	   this	   capacity?	   Were	   we	   the	   observers	   who	   had	   forgotten	  themselves,	  immersed	  in	  this	  fantastic	  game?	  
This,	  what	  you	  read	  now,	  in	  our	  common	  yet	  unknown	  presence,	  is	  not	  ABOUT	  something	  in	  the	  past	  nor	  ABOUT	  something	  that	  is	  to	  come	  in	  the	  future.	  This,	  whatever	  this	  is	  for	  us,	  for	  you,	  today,	  tomorrow,	   or	   the	  day	  before,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   recollection,	   nor	   anticipation.	   This	   is	   an	   ornamental	  production,	   a	   present	   practice,	   its	   expressions,	   its	   faces,	   and	   our	   experience	   of	   them.	   And	   if	   a	  present	  is	  not	  being	  opened,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  working-­‐out,	  no	  work,	  no	  image,	  only	  failure	  —the	  image	  of	  failure	  disguised	  as	  other.	  	  
The	  ornamental,	  here	  in	  this	  project,	  is	  “the	  becoming	  essential	  of	  accident”	  and,	  at	  once,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  in	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  “becoming	  accidental	  of	  essence”	  (Malabou	  2005:	  XII).	  The	  ornamental	  does	  not	  realise	  itself	  as	  ornament	  here,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  manifested	  (planar)	  surface-­‐embellishment,	  a	   tensely	  contracted	  figure-­‐ground	  collapse.	  The	  ornamental	   is	  here	   the	   activity	   of	   form	   itself	   that	   indicates	   the	   plasticity	   of	   body	   (mass).	   The	   “becoming	  essential	  of	  accident”	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  “the	  becoming	  accidental	  of	  essence”	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  receive	  and	  to	  produce	  form.	  Meaning	  as	  a	  constant	  emergence	  of	  meaning,	  infinitely	  deferring	  from	  ‘taking’.	  
‘So,	  what	   is	  ornamental	   space,	  ornamental	   temporality?	   Is	   it	   space	   that	  accommodates	  within	  itself	  non-­‐space,	  blank	  or	  gap,	  and	  non-­‐time,	  cessation?	  The	  fiction	  of	  what	  is	  not;	  the	  ‘what	  is	  not’	  that	   is	   real?	   The	   ornamental	   is	   here	   the	   imaginary	   production	   without	   a	   referent,	   a	   pure	  ontological	   creation,	   “the	   foreigner	   on	   the	   inside,	   the	   whole	   of	   the	  metabolic	   force	   that	   sleeps	  without	   sleeping	   in	  what	   is,	   the	  very	   face	  of	  being	   that	   concepts	   cannot	   say	  without	   losing	   face	  (Malabou	  2011:	  12).	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Plasticity	  implies	  change,	  difference	  (which	  is	  identified	  often	  culturally	  as	  pejorative	  form).	  But	  the	  ornamental,	  as	  an	  intermediary,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  mediation,	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  the	  ‘as-­‐well-­‐as’	  and	  not	  an	   ‘either/or’	  mode.	  It	   leads	  always	  to	  something	  other	  than	  itself	  and	  its	  mediation	  starts	  from	  the	  other	  and	  not	  from	  the	  norm.	  The	  ornamental	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  a	  fantasy	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  individuals	   to	  make	   and	   re-­‐make	   themselves	   (that	   leads	   to	   a	   crisis	   of	   arbitrariness),	   and	  more	  about	   being	   something	   (without	   identity	   and	   essence)	   in	   the	   in-­‐between,	   in	   the	   Spiel-­‐raum,	  between	  entities.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque	  is	  an	  avoidance	  of	  immediate	  and	  quick	  interpretation,	  of	  immediate	  and	  collective	  apperception	  of	  interpretable	  phenomena.	  Of	  what	  goes	  without	  saying,	  of	  the	  self-­‐evident,	   the	   obviousness.	   Visual	   perception	   is	   intensified	  by	   the	   excessive	   sensuousness	   of	   the	  interiorization	  of	  aesthetic	  experience.	  Complex	  and	  rich	  interlacings	  protect	  the	  mysteries	  and	  intimacies	  of	  thoughts	  and	  images.	  The	  fascination	  with	  the	  subtleties	  of	  detail,	  the	  elaboration	  of	  endless	  details	   are	  best	   explored	  and	  experienced	   in	  private.	   Confronted	  with	   arabesques,	   one	  has	  the	  feeling	  as	  though	  the	  creative	  impulse	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  compel	  the	  viewer	  or	  reader	  to	  withdraw	  within	  her/himself,	  to	  meditate	  on	  her/his	  own,	  to	  discover	  meaning	  for	  her/himself	  and	  for	  her/his	  own	  life.	  To	  allow	  oneself	  to	  get	  immersed	  in	  the	  myriad	  of	  details,	  to	  wander	   deep	   within	   intricate	   detours	   of	   visual	   entanglement,	   to	   wonder	   and	   wander	   with	  disbelief;	   to	   forget	  oneself	   in	   this	   SATURATED	   state;	   to	   loose	   sight	  of	   the	  horizon,	  of	   the	   I	   and	  of	  intuition.	  
The	   arabesque	   is	   not	   a	   schema	   of	   a	   visual	   revelation,	   but	   the	   perceptive,	   as-­‐well-­‐as	  intermediary	   of	   donation	   and	   reception	   of	   form	   in	   re-­‐presentation,	   that	   is	   in	   reality,	   in	  Wahr-­‐
schein-­‐lichkeit	   (a	   particularity	   of	   Islamic	   thought)—	   an	   invention	   on	   its	   flight	   home.	   The	  arabesque	   is	   here	   “[…]	   jene	   durch	   die	   Dichtungskraft	   hervorgebrachte	   Form,	   in	   der	   sich	   die	  unendliche	   Fülle	   ahnungsweise	   manifestiert	   (Pollheim	   1966:	   56	   in	   Kirves	   2012:	   23)”	   —	   the	  arabesque	  is	  that	  form	  that	  is	  brought	  forward,	  and	  exposed	  through	  Dichtung5,	  which	  is	  neither	  only	   fiction,	   nor	   only	   poetry.	   In	   this	   form	   the	   infinite	   plenitude	   of	   the	   one	   manifests	   itself	  suggestively	   (directly,	   not	   symbolically).	   The	   arabesque	   confronts	   sight	   with	   a	   kaleidoscopic	  challenge	  that	  no	  longer	  allows	  it	  to	  linger	  on	  details	  or	  individual	  forms,	  nor	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  in	  the	  whole	  image	  at	  once.	  It	  keeps	  any	  final	  meaning	  from	  ‘taking’	  (Barthes	  2010:x).	  
So	   we	   have	   to	   unlock	   difference.	   Not	   a	   difference	   between	   two	   (or	   more)	   distinct	   and	  completed	  termini,	  ideas	  or	  concepts,	  but	  the	  infinite	  game	  played	  out	  by	  the	  difference	  differing	  itself	  –	  the	  very	  processual	  proliferation	  of	  the	  ornamental;	  the	  plasticity	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  being	  and	  being	  as	  nothing	  more,	  nor	  less,	  than	  its	  own	  changeability	  (Malabou	  2011).	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  Darstellung	  and	  Dichtung:	  (Nancy	  2008:	  68-­‐90).	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CONFESSION	  
Painting	  as	  Gaze:	  On	  The	  Revelatory	  Force	  of	   the	  Arabesque	  was	   initially	   a	   provisional	   title6,	   a	  trail	  marking	  main	  points	  of	   repose	   in	  a	  way	  of	   seeing,	   some	   insistent	  knots	  of	   tension	  and	   the	  interstices	  in-­‐between.	  A	  pre-­‐text.	  What	  took	  off	  to	  call	  out	  a	  rhythm	  and	  pace	  of	  pondering	  on	  a	  flight	  home.	  	  
I,	   for	   one	   reason	   or	   another,	   always	   assumed	   that	   a	   title	   arrived	   belatedly,	   if	   it	  would	   be	   to	  emerge	  out	  of	  the	  work	  and	  its	  process	  —	  or,	  by	  surprise,	  unexpectedly,	  by	  accident,	  any	  time,	  at	  any	   time	  and	   from	  nowhere.	  And,	  written	  down	   in	   some	  notebook	   and	   remembered	   at	   a	   later	  date,	  it	  would,	  when	  ready	  to	  name	  self-­‐decide	  its	  own	  work.	  But	  this	  title,	  for	  which	  I	  feel	  I	  have	  to	  answer,	  came	  firstly	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  an	  accident	  or	  a	  surprise.	   In	   fact,	   I	  can	  easily	   find	  my	  way	  back	  to	  how	  it	  came	  about	  in	  first	  place	  as	  a	  trail	  of	  white	  pebbles	  marking	  my	  way	  home.	  From	  then	   on	   it	   restricted	   my	   endeavours,	   while	   simultaneously	   impinging	   me	   to	   push	   them	   open.	  Since	  its	  arrival,	  it	  continued	  to	  pull	  me	  back	  and	  to	  surprise	  me	  with	  unexpected	  resonances	  of	  its	  newborn	  flexibility	  that	  gave	  a	  measure	  and	  pleasure	  to	  my	  wandering.	  	  
Painting	   as	   Gaze:	   On	   The	   Revelatory	   Force	   of	   the	   Arabesque	   was	   the	   very	   FIRST	  WORK	   of	   the	  project	  —‘first’	  because	  it	  was	  the	  first	  to	  arrive	  in	  a	  sequential,	  both	  institutional	  and	  intrinsic,	  temporality	  of	  the	  project.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  temporality	  of	  the	  project;	  no,	  the	  project	  itself	  decentres	  such	  structures	  in	  great	  force;	  its	  beginning	  is	  its	  end	  and	  its	  end	  is	  its	   beginning.	   Not	   simply	   a	   title,	   not	   an	   origin,	   but	   a	  WORK	   that	   condenses	   in	   its	   succinct	   form	  (limit)	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  becoming	  project,	  while	  opening	   it	  up	   into	   its	  own	  groundlessness.	  
Painting	  as	  Gaze:	  On	  The	  Revelatory	  Force	  of	  the	  Arabesque	  is	  a	  title	  exceeding	  its	  function	  as	  title;	  that	  IS	  in	  excess	  of	  itself;	  a	  work,	  which	  unites	  while	  dissimilating	  itself,	  that	  retracts	  itself	  within	  itself	  by	  sharing	  itself	  out.	  Not	  simply	  a	  title,	  but	  a	  work,	  an	  IMAGE	  —	  a	  fiction,	  a	  fable.	  
Painting	  as	  Gaze:	  On	  The	  Revelatory	  Force	  of	  the	  Arabesque	  is	  the	  IMAGE	  OF	  the	  project:	  it	  is	  that	  within	  which	  WHAT	  IS	   and	  WHAT	  IS	  NOT,	  what	   becomes	   the	   project	   presents	   itself.	   Before	   I	   even	  begun	  the	  project,	  before	  I	  KNEW	  the	  project	  —	  how	  could	  I	  know	  it	  before	  seeing	  it?	  —	  I	  had	  a	  fantasy,	  an	  image,	  a	  title,	  private,	  provisional,	  not	  fully	  apprehended	  —	  an	  imaginary	  adventure	  of	  form	  and	  an	  unknown	  limit	  to	  ascend	  to.	  A	  desire	  —	  a	  motor	  of	  thought	  (Malabou).	  
The	   privilege	   of	   being	   the	   first	   form	   of	   finding	   is	   the	   evasion	   of	   the	   finality	   of	   mannered	  judgements.	   Being	   the	   first	   determination,	   before	  progress,	   purpose	   and	   law	  kick	   in	   (to	  which	  any	  research	  project	  is	  obliged	  to)	  means	  here,	  that	  whatever	  came	  before	  the	  actual	  obligation	  (if	   this	   is	   even	  possible),	   even	   though	   still	   a	  manifestation	   of	   the	   project	   itself,	  may	  be	   able	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  is	  the	  title	  of	  the	  entire	  project.	  Catch	  Sight	  of	  My	  Moving	  Image	  and	  Builded	  Body	  Borrowed	  (by	  others	  
written,	  knitted	  I	  spoken	  through	  me)	  are	  the	  titles	  of	  the	  works	  displayed	  in	  the	  statement	  show;	  and	  
Arabesque	  is	  the	  title	  of	  this	  work.	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resist	  the	  value	  system	  that	  pre-­‐determines	  a	  research	  project	  or	  a	  “Ph.D.	  by	  project”:	  dimension	  of	  production,	  an	  effectuation	  and	  a	  realization	  to	  value.	  What	  I	  just	  called	  “the	  value	  system	  of	  a	  research	  project”	   is	   in	   fact	  what	  Nancy	  calls	   “the	  schema	  of	  our	   late	   thought”:	   the	  obligation	  to	  sense	  (Nancy	  2008:	  125-­‐126).	  
In	   the	   end,	   the	   imminent	   threat	   to	   close	   down	   its	   sense,	   meaning	   and	   value	   upon	   itself,	  becomes	   more	   and	   more	   unavoidable.	   The	   title,	   an	   intermediary,	   will	   retain	   in	   its	   metabolic	  power	   a	   potentiality	   to	   thrive	   on	   its	   openings	   within	   itself,	   towards	   an	   individuality.	   The	  manifestation	   of	   the	   project	   remains	   one	   modality	   among	   others,	   to	   which	   the	   provisional,	  improvised	  title	  was	  merely	  an	  ornament,	  something	  that	  leads	  to	  something	  other	  than	  itself.	  By	  obligation	   the	   project	   claims	   to	   have	   a	   certain	   final	  meaning,	   but	   the	   title	   is	   not	   exhausted	   or	  completed	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  project	  manifests	  itself.	  Neither	  is	  the	  project	  by	  its	  title.	  And	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   project	   is/becomes	  what	   it	   is,	   cannot	   be	   concealed	   from	   the	   TRUTH	  of	   its	   own	  anecdotal	   nature	   and	   the	   artificial	   structure	   of	   its	   end.	   That	   things	   happened	   the	   way	   they	  happened,	  that	  they	  manifested	  the	  way	  they	  did,	  that	  they	  showed	  themselves	  the	  way	  they	  did,	  the	   meaning	   of	   all	   this,	   its	   sense	   and	   value,	   its	   significance,	   its	   “significant	   contribution	   to	  knowledge”	   lies	   in	   the	   (accidental)	   EXPERIENCE	   itself,	   of	   relations,	   of	   exteriority	   in	   a	   system	   of	  exchange;	  in	  the	  relational,	  plural	  character	  of	  being	  in	  our	  modern	  world,	  a	  “being	  in	  the	  world”	  that	  manifests	   itself	   also	   in	   the	   relations,	   affinities	   and	   co-­‐appearances,	   the	   co-­‐habitations	   that	  happened	  during,	  and	  that	  brought	  about,	   the	  project.	  These	  relations	  make	  their	  own	  sense	   in	  and	  through	  EXPERIENCE	  without	  pinning	  down	  a	  generality	  of	  sense	  to	  a	  prior	  universal	  origin.	  	  
Without	   a	   point	   of	   orientation	   for	   the	   production	   of	   its	   meaning,	   sense	   or	   value,	   without	  effectuation	  and	  the	  completion	  of	  value,	  but	  within	  its	  limit	  (peras)	  —this	  is	  what	  this	  Ph.D.	  by	  project	  should	  be,	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  modality	  that	  the	  improvised,	  provisional	  title	  has	  access.	  	  
We	  could	  SAY	  MORE	  and	  SAY	  IT	  MORE	  CLEARLY,	  why	  the	  title	  is	  a	  work	  and	  why	  it	  is	  an	  image,	  but	  it	  is	  with	   SENSE,	   that	  one	   refrains	   from	   this	   and	  withholds	   subjectivity	   from	  making	   itself	   into	   its	  own	  work,	   through	  a	  will	   to	   say,	  or	  a	  will	   to	   see,	  or	  a	  will	   to	  know	  everything	  absolutely.	  THIS	  PROJECT	  IS	  NOT,	  WHAT	  YOU	  CAN	  SEE,	  READ	  OR	  EXPERIENCE,	  NOR	  IS	  IT	  NOT.	  IT	  IS	  EVERYTHING	  YOU	  WISH	  IT	  TO	  BE	  AND	  EVERYTHING	  YOU	  KNOW	  THAT	  IT	  IS.	  IT	  IS	  EVERYTHING	  THAT	  IT	  IS,	  AND	  EVERYTHING	  THAT	  IT	  IS	  NOT.	  	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
‘Painting	   as	   Gaze’	   is	   a	   figure	   of	   speech,	   the	   short	   form	   of	   the	   translation	   of	   “painting	   as	  (An)Blick”	  (Heidgger1991:	  90-­‐113)],	  my	  actual	  private	  working	  title.7	  The	  purposeful	  use	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In	  the	  English	  text,	  Bild	  is	  translated	  with	  ‘image’	  and	  Blick	  with	  ‘look’:	  	  Bild	  kann	  zunächst	  heißen:	  der	  Anblick	  eines	  bestimmten	  Seienden,	  sofern	  es	  als	  Vorhandenes	  offenbar	  ist.	  Es	  bietet	  den	  Anblick.	  In	  der	  Ableitung	  von	  dieser	  Bedeutung	  kann	  Bild	  weiterhin	  heißen:	  abbildender	  Anblick	  eines	  Vorhandenen	  (Abbild)	  bzw.	  nachbildender	  Anblick	  eines	  erst	  herzustellenden	  Seienden.	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colon-­‐structure	  should	  be	  syntactical-­‐deductive.	  But	  what	  it	  presents	  is	  a	  logical,	  yet	  paradoxical	  consequence.	   First	   of	   all,	   there	   is	  maybe	   nothing	   that	   can	   be	   revealed;	   there	   is	   also	   no	   logical	  causal	  revelation.	  If	  painting	  is	  read	  historically	  from	  its	  traditional	  Western	  perspective,	  than,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  in	  opposition	  to	  Eastern	  painting,	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque,	  and,	  also	  in	  the	  end,	  to	  painting	   itself	   (in	  a	  move	   from	  one	  perspective	   to	  another).	  What	   follows	   the	  colon,	   the	   further	  explanation	  or	  consequence,	   “the	  revelatory	   force	  of	   the	  arabesque”	  cannot	  explain	   logically	  or	  
reveal	  “painting	  as	  (An)Blick”.	  “Painting	  as	  Gaze”,	  painting	  that	  becomes	  a	  look	  in	  first	  place,	  and	  simultaneously	  that	  looks	  and	  knows	  that	  it	  is	  being	  looked	  at,	  is	  painting	  in	  two	  ways,	  in	  a	  mode	  not	  of	  either/or	   but	   in	  one	  of	  as	  well	  as:	   that	  knows,	   absence	   in	  presence,	  or	  not-­‐not-­‐presence,	  and	  painting	  that	  becomes,	  presence	  in	  absence,	  presence	  of	  what	  withdraws	  itself.	  Thus	  painting	  is	  not	  really	  ‘painting	  as	  gaze’,	  but	  painting	  THROUGH	  the	  gaze;	  and	  also	  for	  itself	  as	  it	  is,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  other	  as	  it	  appears.	  The	  gaze,	  the	  look,	  the	  image	  is	  always	  and	  from	  ever	  passively	  given.	  Painting	   is	   given	   in	   reality	   (Wahr-­‐scheinlichkeit).	   The	   arabesque	   is	   not	   a	   schema	   of	   a	   visual	  revelation,	  but	   the	  perceptive,	  as-­‐well-­‐as	   intermediary	  of	  donation	  and	  reception	  of	   form	  in	  re-­‐presentation,	   that	   is	   in	   reality,	   in	  Wahr-­‐schein-­‐lichkeit	   (a	   particularity	   of	   Islamic	   thought)—	  an	  invention	  on	  its	  flight	  home	  (Mersch	  2009).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sodann	  kann	  aber	  „Bild”	  die	  ganz	  weite	  Bedeutung	  von	  Anblick	  überhaupt	  haben,	  wobei	  nicht	  gesagt	  wird,	  ob	  in	  diesem	  Anblick	  ein	  Seiendes	  oder	  Nicht-­‐seiendes	  anschaubar	  wird.	  Kant	  gebraucht	  nun	  in	  der	  Tat	  den	  Ausdruck	  „Bild”	  in	  den	  drei	  Bedeutungen:	  unmittelbarer	  Anblick	  eines	  Seienden,	  vorhandener	  abbildender	  Anblick	  eines	  Seienden	  und	  Anblick	  von	  etwas	  überhaupt.	  […]	  —	  First	  of	  all,	  image	  can	  mean:	  the	  look	  of	  a	  determinate	  being	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  is	  manifest	  as	  something	  at	  hand.	  It	  offers	  the	  look.	  As	  a	  variation	  of	  this	  meaning,	  image	  can	  also	  mean:	  the	  look	  which	  takes	  a	  likeness	  of	  something	  at	  hand	  (likeness)	  i.e.,	  a	  look	  which	  is	  the	  after-­‐image	  of	  something	  no	  longer	  at-­‐hand	  or	  a	  look	  which	  is	  the	  premonition	  of	  a	  being	  [yet]	  to	  be	  produced	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Then,	  however,	  ‘image’	  can	  also	  have	  the	  full	  range	  of	  meaning	  of	  look	  in	  general,	  in	  which	  case	  whether	  a	  being	  or	  a	  non-­‐being	  will	  be	  intuitable	  in	  this	  look	  is	  not	  stated.	  Now,	  in	  fact,	  Kant	  used	  the	  expression	  ‘image’	  in	  all	  three	  senses:	  as	  immediate	  look	  of	  a	  being,	  as	  the	  at-­‐hand,	  likeness-­‐taking	  look	  of	  a	  being,	  and	  as	  the	  look	  or	  something	  in	  general.	  Moreover,	  these	  meanings	  of	  the	  term	  ‘image’	  were	  not	  specifically	  taken	  up	  in	  opposition	  to	  each	  other;	  indeed,	  it	  is	  even	  questionable	  whether	  the	  specified	  meanings	  and	  ways	  of	  the	  Being	  of	  image	  [das	  Bildsein]	  are	  sufficient	  to	  clarify	  what	  Kant	  discusses	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  ‘Schematism’	  […](Heidegger	  1997:	  65).	  	  The	  chapters,	  from	  which	  this	  passage	  was	  quoted	  (page	  62-­‐80	  in	  the	  English	  text),	  are	  important	  for	  understanding	  Nancy’s	  concept	  of	  image,	  especially	  the	  ideas	  presented	  in	  the	  chapter	  entitled	  Masked	  
Imagination	  in	  The	  Ground	  of	  the	  Image	  (Nancy	  2005:	  80-­‐99).	  Because	  of	  modern	  and	  contemporary	  resonaces	  of	  the	  word	  ‘look’	  with	  style	  and	  fashion,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  ornament	  debate,	  and	  because	  of	  a	  personal	  acoustic	  preference	  I	  preferred	  the	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘painting	  as	  gaze’	  to	  ‘painting	  as	  look”.	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PRE-­‐AMBLE/FOR-­‐WORD	  	  
Kant	   defines,	   in	   the	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason,	   the	   character	   as	   a	   definite	   and	   specific	   relation	  between	  cause	  and	  effect:	  “the	  law	  of	  causality	  without	  which	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  cause	  at	  all.”	  The	  law	   of	   causality	   without	   which	   it	   would	   be	   no	   cause	   at	   all,	   its	   chemical	   decomposition,	   its	  definition	   (determination)	   is	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   elements,	   particles,	   forces,	   speeds	   and	  slownesses,	  of	  the	  affecting	  capacities	  and	  those	  for	  affecting	  that	  are	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  and	  form	  a	  complex	  relational	  nod,	  a	  MODE.	  
To	   commit	   to	   writing	   a	   NOVEL	   OF	   MANNERS,	   to	   a	   trivial	   form,	   when	   one	   has	   to,	   is	   expected,	  required,	   when	   one	   has	   obliged	   oneself	   and	   accepted	   to	   defend	   a	   doctoral	   thesis,	   to	   play	   this	  imaginary	   game,	   is	   to	   have	   a	   fantastic	   orientation	   towards	   reason.	   It	   is	   to	   put	   together	   with	  passionate	   engagement	   what	   I	   have	   been	   trained	   and	   asked	   to	   keep	   apart.	   To	   commit	   to	  LITERATURE	   is	   a	   grand	   counter-­‐act	   for	  which	  one	  has	   to	   answer	  —grand	  because	   it	   is	  blind,	   as	   I	  commit	   to	  what	   I	   don’t	  know,	   in	   the	  most	   literal	   and	  metaphorical	  way;	   grand,	   also	   because	   it	  offers	  very	   few	  points	   to	  hold	  on	   to;	   it	   is	  high	  risk.	  Counter-­‐act,	  because	   it	   is	  a	   form	  of	  working	  with	  resistance,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  unbearable	  paradoxes.	  
To	   turn	   to	   a	   fantasy,	   to	   experience	   its	   form,	   its	   content,	   its	   immersion	  —	   to	   commit	   to	   this	  entirely,	   is	   to	  engage	   in	  a	   form	  of	  working	  beyond	  failure.	  Most	  of	  all,	   I	  commit	   to	   fiction	  or	   the	  fantastic,	   so	   that	   I	   can	  work	  beyond	   (my)	   failure	   of	   sense.	   I	   cheat	  myself	  way	   out	   from	   certain	  TRUTHS,	  with	  good	  posture.	  Fiction,	  the	  fantastic	  or	  the	  imaginary	  are	  my	  spotters.	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FIGURE	  2:	  CAPLIN,	  A.	  R.	  (1864),	  HEALTH	  AND	  BEAUTY,	  PLATE	  I	  1.	  AND	  I	  2.	  
A	  form	  of	  writing	  beyond	  failure	  compels	  me	  to	  adopt	  my	  own	  cheating	  strategies.	  To	  do	  my	  forced	  reps,	  until	  I	  fail,	  to	  fail.	  To	  work	  beyond	  failure	  is	  to	  know	  that	  I	  will	  fail.	  This	  is	  fiction	  that	  has	  to	  remain	  fiction,	  but	  that	  is	  more	  real	  than	  reality.	  So	  that	  I	  can	  get	  beyond	  failure,	  I	  have	  to	  move	  the	  weight	  of	  sense	  beyond	  the	  sticking	  point,	  to	  fictionalize,	  to	  cheat,	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  failure	  of	  my	  self,	  beyond	  it,	  beyond	  my	  mind,	  my	  body.	  To	  exhaust	  all	  movement,	  to	  re-­‐arrange	  the	   harmony	   between	   motion	   and	   rest,	   speeds	   and	   slowness	   —	   of	   my	   body	   that	   is.	   This	  commitment	   that	   com(together)-­‐mitts(to	   put,	   send)	   to	   the	   language	   of	   my	   body	   is	   the	   only	  meaningful	  way	  I	  know	  how	  to	  move	  beyond	  signifying	  sense.	  Meaning	  working	  beyond	  its	  own	  failure,	  equivocal	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  must	  be	  ready	  to	  accept	  a	  spotter	  that	  secures	  this	  equivocation	  to	  an	  exterior	  shore.	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  work	  beyond	  failure	  without	  the	  engagement	  of	  my	  body	  (that	   is	  without	  painting,	  without	  writing),	  purely	  conceptually,	   in	   language,	   theoretically.	  Even	  the	   engagement	   of	  my	  body	   requires	   the	  patience	   of	   un-­‐learning	   and	  of	   finding	   ex-­‐pression	   in	  new	  points	  of	  contact.	  Yes,	  it	  is	  a	  process	  with	  direction,	  a	  function	  accepting	  unknown	  variables,	  which	  fictionalize,	  generate,	  proliferate,	  but	  also	  cut,	  break,	  tear	  apart.	  I	  can	  only	  cheat	  my	  body	  out	  of	  its	  habits,	  but	  not	  out	  of	  its	  surprises.	  I	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  able	  to	  control	  and	  alter	  its	  kinetic,	  even	  dynamic	  propositions,	   and	  succeed	   in	   the	  precision	  and	  sustainability	  of	   such	  modes,	  but	  ultimately,	   entering	   such	   arrangements	   will	   only	   highlight	   the	   uncontrollable	   and	   unexpected	  sense	  that	  my	  body	  is	  —	  and	  the	  processual	  character	  of	  this	  work,	  that	  might	  ultimately	  produce	  something	  completely	  alien	  to	  the	  process	  that	  it	  itself	  is.	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FIGURE	  3:	  CAPLIN,	  A.	  R.	  (1864),	  HEALTH	  AND	  BEAUTY,	  FIG.	  4.	  —	  SAWING	  EXERCISE.	  
But	  how	  is	  one	  to	  be-­‐friend	  the	  fantastic?	  —	  that	  is	  “unlocatable,	  undatable,	  and	  unthinkable”?	  —	  that	  gets	  displaced	  and	  is	  the	  nucleus	  of	  any	  form	  of	  change;	  this	  “motor	  of	  thought”	  (Malabou	  
2011:13)?	  
In	   The	   Heidegger	   Change,	   Malabou	   speaks	   of	   the	   fantastic	   as	   the	   point	   of	   access	   in	   the	  “ontological	  metabolism”	  and	  in	  “the	  triad	  of	  change”	  given	  by	  the	  three	  forms	  of	  change:	  Wandel	  (change),	  Wandlung	  (transformation),	  Verwandlung	  (metamorphosis).	  (Malabou	  2011:1).	  	  
Both	  the	  mode	  of	  visibility	  of	  ontological	  metabolism	  and	  the	  intelligibility	  and	  evidence	  
of	   the	  never	   seen,	   the	   fantastic	   ‘in	  philosophy’	  designates	  at	  once	  a	  kind	  of	  approach	   to	  
change	  and	  the	  very	  strangeness	  of	  what	  changes	  and	  is	  going	  to	  change.	  It	  also	  manifests,	  
by	  consequence,	   the	  uncanniness	  of	   the	   fantastic	   to	   itself:	   its	   irreducibility	  to	  a	  genre	  or	  
category	  of	  discourse,	  its	  resistance	  to	  every	  relegation	  of	  itself	  to	  a	  conventional	  domain,	  
to	   what	   Roger	   Caillois	   calls	   ‘the	   fantastic	   of	   principle	   or	   obligation’.	   The	   philosophical	  
fantastic	   is	   contemporary	   with	   the	   bringing	   to	   light,	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   of	   the	  
ontological	   difference	   and,	   by	   way	   of	   consequence,	   the	   possibility	   of	   thinking	   being	  
without	   beings.	   It	   never	   designates	   ‘an	   element	   exterior	   to	   the	   human	   world’	   (that	   of	  
‘composite	   monsters,	   infernal	   fawns,	   the	   irruption	   of	   demonic,	   grotesque	   or	   sinister	  
creatures’),	   but	   describes	   THE	  FOREIGNER	  ON	  THE	   INSIDE,	   the	  whole	   of	   the	  metabolic	   force	  
that	  sleeps	  without	  sleeping	  in	  what	  is,	  THE	  VERY	  FACE	  OF	  BEING	  THAT	  CONCEPTS	  CANNOT	  SAY	  WITHOUT	  LOSING	  FACE.	  	  Simultaneously	  a	  mode	  of	  visibility	  and	  manifestation,	  the	  fantastic	  here	  designates	  the	  phenomenality	   of	   ontico-­‐ontological	   transformations	  —those	   of	   man,	   god,	   language,	  etc.	  —which	  unveil	  the	  originary	  mutability	  of	  being	  while	  revealing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  being	  is	  perhaps	  nothing	  …	  but	  its	  mutability.	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	  mutability	   of	   being	   is	   not—not,	   that	   is,	   a	   being—its	   reality	   is	  necessarily	  imaginary,	  if	  by	  imaginary	  we	  understand,	  as	  Heidegger	  invites	  us	  to,	  a	  non-­‐objective	   modality	   of	   presence	   free	   of	   every	   reference	   and	   referent.	   […]	   As	   an	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imaginary	   production	  without	   a	   referent	   and	   pure	   ontological	   creation,	   the	   fantastic	  characterizes	   the	   apprehension	   and	   the	   regime	   of	   existence	   of	   what	   cannot	   be	  presented,	   of,	   that	   is,	  what	  can	  only	  ever	   change	   (Malabou	   2011:12-­‐13;	   italics	   by	   the	  author,	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  	  Fiction,	   the	   fantastic	   and	   the	   imaginary	   slip	   not	   only	   in	   amongst	   each	   other,	   but	   also	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  idealist	  referentialities,	  between	  thought	  and	  matter,	  and	  compose	  with	  something	  else.	  The	   imaginary	  production	  without	   a	   referent,	   the	   pure	   ontological	   creation,	   of	  meaning,	   is	   the	  limit	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   all	   systems	   of	   significations.	   It	   cannot	   be	   reached	   with	   revived	  significations	   through	   “the	   pure	   and	   simple	   suppression	   of	   history”	   or	   through	   “the	   dubious	  immortalization	  of	  what	   is	  given	   ‘contemporary	  relevance’,	   the	  far	  from	  innocent	  occultation	  of	  the	   present	   (Nancy	   and	   Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	   1988:	   15).”	   It	   is	   within	   this	   limit,	   peras,	   that	   this	  projection	  desires	  its	  own	  image.	  
This	   NOVEL	   OF	   MANNERS	   is	   an	   imaginary	   production	   and	   praxis,	   a	   gesture,	   an	   act	   of	  understanding,	  a	  basic	  motility,	  a	  point	  of	  access	   in	  the	  search	  for	  the	  RIGHT	  (abgestimmt,	  or	   in-­‐tune)	  form.	  A	  rhythm	  given	  by	  the	  inherently	  fantastic,	  ornamental	  metabolism	  of	  any	  form.	  ANY	  FORM	   (PERAS)	   IN	   ITSELF,	   AND	   THE	   SEARCH	   FOR	   A	   RIGHT	   FORM (in-­‐tune	   by	   affinity,	   by	   proximity,	   by	  relation) HAS	   AN	   ORNAMENTAL,	   FANTASTIC	   STRUCTURE.	   What	   could	   have	   been	   a	   novel,	   but	   is	   the	  foreigner	  on	  the	  inside,	  becomes	  visible	  and	  manifests	  itself	  in/through	  the	  fantastic	  as	  INVENTION.	  What	   has	   the	   obligation	   to	   have	   meaning	   and	   value	   is	   its	   own	   monster	   —that	   cannot	   be	  presented,	  that	  can	  only	  ever	  change.	  
And	  how	  is	  this	  fantasy,	  this	  abominable	  monstrosity	  that	  rejects	  its	  general	  law	  in	  search	  for	  its	   own	   in-­‐tune	   determination	   (characterisation,	   definition)	   supposed	   to	   work	   anyway?	   As	   a	  peaceful	   kingdom	   of	   absolute	   totality	   radically	   reigned	   by	   three	   kings	   —Theory,	   Work	   and	  Subject	   (or	   whatever	   is	   in	   its	   place)	   —	   sovereignly	   and	   infinitely	   thinking	   themselves?	   The	  compulsive,	  repetitive	  necessity	  that	  characterizes	  our	  naiveté	  is	  that:	  	  
[…]	   We	   are,	   still	   and	   always	   aware	   of	   the	   Crisis,	   convinced	   that	   ‘interventions’	   are	  necessary	  and	  that	  the	  least	  of	  texts	  is	  immediately	  ‘effective’	  […];	  we	  all	  think,	  as	  if	  it	  went	  without	   saying,	   that	  politics	  passes	   through	   the	   literary	   (or	   the	   theoretical)	   […]	  but	  we	  have	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  this	  repetitive	  compulsion	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:	  17).	  	  Nietzsche’s	   age	   is	   the	   age	   when	   all	   the	   projects	   of	   Humanity	   come	   to	   recognize	  themselves	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   ‘nihilism’,	   that	   is	   doomed	   from	   the	   outset	   and	   by	  essence	  to	  the	  exhaustion	  of	   their	  signification.	  The	  fact	   that	  this	  even	  happened,	  and	  that	   it	   is	   still	   under	  way	  …	   this	   inevitably	   delivers	   us	   over	   to	   another	   history	  which	  opens	  up	  before	  us	  beyond	  signification,	  a	  history	  whose	  meaning	  could	  never	  consist	  in	  a	  return	  of	  ‘meaning’	  (no	  more	  than	  Plato	  could	  make	  the	  meaning	  of	  Egypt	  return,	  or	  Christianity	  could	  make	  the	  meaning	  of	  Socratism	  return,	  or	  industrial	  society	  could	  make	  the	  meaning	  of	  Christian	  community	  return)	  …	  this	  [event]	  happened	  to	  our	  time	  as	  its	  destination	  (Ross	  2007:	  139).	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To	   invent	   and	  most	   particularly	   understanding	   invention	   as	   an	   event,	  means	  here	   to	  rediscover	  what	  was	  there	  without	  being	  there,	  both	  in	  language	  and	  in	  philosophy;	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  finding,	  yes,	  but	  of	  finding	  for	  the	  first	  time	  what	  was	  always	  there	  and	  what	   had	   always	   been	   there,	   to	   find	   again,	   almost	   to	   re-­‐find,	   something	   in	   its	  (contradictory)	  fusion	  and	  in	  its	  fission	  where	  it	  had	  never	  before	  been	  seen,	  to	  invent	  it	  almost,	  as	  one	  would	  invent	  a	  bomb,	  but	  to	  discover	  it	  also	  almost	  like	  the	  excessively	  obvious	   evidence	   of	   a	   purloined	   letter:	   never	   seen,	   never	   known,	   never	   waited	   for,	  never	  expected	  as	  such,	  while	  all	  the	  while	  only	  expecting	  it	  and	  not	  expecting	  anything	  but	  it,	  the	  unexpected	  (Malabou	  2011:	  68).8	  Characters9,	  narrative,	   text,	   in	  their	  material	  and	  ideal	  bodies	  are	  caught	   in	  their	  becoming,	   in	  perpetual	   change,	   in	  contact	  with	  and	  against	   standard	  determinations.	  They	  get	   infected	  when	  making	  sense.	  They	  resist	  and	  abide	  the	  senses	  that	  affect	  them.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  very	  act	  of	  inherent	  resistance	   and	   resilience	   that	   they	   transform	   and	   absorb,	   internalize	   the	   virus.	   Reception,	  donation	   and	   annihilation	   of	   form,	  which	   are	   positive	   creations	   of	   form,	   are	   as	   possible	   as	   the	  irrevocable	   formative	   creation	   through	  destruction	  of	   form,	   as	   “all	   suffering	   is	   formative	   of	   the	  identity	  that	  endures	  it”	  (Malabou	  2012:	  18).	  
What	  could	  have	  been	  a	  NOVEL	  OF	  MANNERS	   is	  not	  a	  novel	   in	  THAT	  sense.	  But	   it	   is	  a	  novel	   (in	  R.	  Barthes’	  tradition),	  and	  it	  is	  a	  novel	  of	  manners	  in	  that,	  in	  its	  being,	  it	  is	  an	  exemplary	  singularity	  that	  exposes	   its	  proper	  manner	  of	  being.	  The	  manner	  of	  rising	   forth	   is	   the	  mode	  of	  being	  of	   the	  RIGHT	  FORM,	  of	  the	  work,	  of	  the	  image,	  of	  the	  figure	  (Agamben	  2009:	  27-­‐29,	  Barthes	  2011).	  	  
The	  contextio	  is	  specific:	  the	  structured	  pre-­‐determined	  experience,	  the	  required	  obligation	  of	  a	  Ph.D.	  by	  project	  in	  painting	  in	  London	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  The	  decorum	  is	  that	  of	  the	   given	   academic	   requirements,	   expectancies,	   personal	   habits	   and	  manners,	   stiff	   relations	   of	  concepts,	   ideas,	   conventions,	   images,	  matter	   and	   (pictorial)	   bodies;	   of	   the	   tension	   between	   the	  singularity	   and	   subjectivity	   of	   the	   artwork	   and	   its	   general,	   objective,	   theoretical	   frame-­‐work.	  These	   fragments,	   tensions,	   are	   experienced,	   re-­‐worked	   and	   re-­‐invented.	   They	   are	   not	   invented	  from	  scratch,	  but	  rediscovered	  and	  permutated	  beyond	  their	  physical	  and	  conceptual	  destruction.	  The	   image	   explodes	   and	   falls	   from	   the	   sky,	   as	   a	   profane	   body,	   re-­‐discovering	   its	   mundane	  determinations	  —	  not	  only	  being,	  but	  the	  sky	  too	  is	  sick!	  As	  are	  the	  gods,	  the	  heavens,	  light,	  time,	  space	  and	   logos	  (Noica	  2009:	  46)	  —	  the	  body	   implodes	  and	  arises	   from	  the	  ground	  as	  a	  sacred	  image	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  general.	  Ornaments	  expand	  and,	  unstoppable	  in	  their	  growth,	  inflect	  into	  their	  own	  structure	  and	  become	  ornamental.	  The	  arabesque	  is	  neither	  visual	  nor	  cognitive,	  neither	  figure	  nor	  form,	  image	  or	  line,	  but	  all	  of	  them	  at	  once.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Malabou	  cites	  Derrida	  from:	  A	  Time	  for	  Farewells:	  Heidegger	  (read	  by)	  Hegel	  (read	  by)	  Malabou,	  a	  preface	  by	  Jacques	  Derrida	  to	  her	  doctoral	  thesis,	  The	  Future	  of	  Hegel.	  Plasticity,Temporality	  and	  Dialectic.	  9	  What	  is	  a	  character?	  A	  character	  is	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  any	  causality.	  A	  cause	  cannot	  be	  a	  cause	  unless	  it	  presides	  over	  a	  precise	  order	  of	  events	  (Malabou	  2012:	  23).	  In	  Kant’s	  own	  words:	  “Es	  muß	  aber	  eine	  jede	  wirkende	  Ursache	  einen	  Charakter	  haben,	  d.i.	  ein	  Gesetzt	  ihrer	  Kausalität,	  ohne	  welches	  sie	  gar	  nicht	  Ursache	  sein	  würde	  (Kant	  2000:	  492-­‐493)”	  —	  the	  law	  of	  a	  causality	  without	  which	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  cause	  at	  all,	  that	  is,	  as	  the	  definite	  and	  specific	  relation	  between	  a	  cause	  and	  its	  effects.	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The	  narrative	  presents,	  it	  IS	  an	  arabesque.	  The	  arabesque	  is	  a	  figure	  of	  thought,	  an	  idea;	  more	  than	  an	   idea,	   it	   is	   its	   structuring	  principle	   and	  generative	   force,	   its	  velum.	   Irrespectively	  of	   the	  staged	  narrative	  as	  an	  interlaced	  conjuncture,	  its	  body	  is	  real:	  a	  collection	  of	  found,	  anonymous	  texts,	  fragments,	  works,	  objects	  —	  arabesque	  writing	  edited	  by	  Una	  Joc.	  
The	  RIGHT	  FORM	  is	  excavated	  through	  the	  collaboration	  between	  Una	  Joc	  and	  Cristina	  Cojanu.	  A	  split-­‐author,	  a	  couple,	  a	  double	  aspect	  mirroring	  and	  multiplying	  the	  unfolding	  made	  manifest	  as	  plural	   openings,	   voices	   and	   composite	   faces.	   Characters	   and	   narrative	   develop	   through	   this	  transformational	   relation.	   Una’s	   voice	   rests	   in	   the	   text(s);	   it	   slips	   in	   among	   other	   voices	   and	  resists,	  perturbs	  linear	  endeavours,	  as	  much	  as,	  at	  times,	  it	  reinvigorates	  them.	  Her	  fantastic	  mode	  enacts,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   principle	   of	   thrift	   in	   the	   mushrooming	   of	   meaning	   and	   holds	  contained	  its	  cancerous	  excess,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  her	  mode	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  on	   an	   almost	   endless	  number	  of	   variables	   that	   open	  her	   and	   thus	   the	  meaningful	   relations	   she	  creates	   to	   an	   absolute	   exteriority.	   To	   what	   extent	   and	   where	   exactly	   in	   the	   text(s),	   the	   fictive	  editorial	  voice	  mutates	  into	  an	  authorial	  voice	  is	  important	  only	  for	  the	  reader	  who	  looks	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  functional	  author	  in	  the	  text.	  For	  homogeneity,	  filiation,	  authentication,	  reciprocal	  explanation,	   status	   and	   value,	   theoretical	   coherence	   and	   stylistic	   unity,	   authenticity	   and	  originality.	  But	  these	  are	  not	  findings	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  NOVEL	  OF	  MANNERS.	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘These	   text(s)	   have	   been	   partly	   found,	   partly	   searched	   for	   actively	   and	   […]	   found	  eventually,	  read	  and	  scanned,	  printed	  out,	  bought,	  stolen,	  collected	  and	  kept,	  weighted	  down	  on	   shelves,	   sediments,	  piles	   in	  waiting,	  wasted	   copies	  marked	  and	   re-­‐marked,	   collaged,	   cut,	  taken	  apart,	  glued	  together,	  brick	  by	  brick	  —in	  a	  form	  of	  writing.	  They	  invaded	  the	  room	  of	  my	   own,	   often	   in	   boxes,	   arriving	   at	  my	   door.	   Over	   the	   past	   four	   years,	   almost	   in	   rhythmic	  intervals,	  more	  and	  more	  arrived.	   In	   time	  past,	   they	   filled	  out	  my	   space,	  my	   room,	   shelf	   by	  shelf,	   corner	   after	   corner,	   and	   every	   possible	   surface.	   A	   growing	   weight	   to	   be	   impossibly	  secured	  by	  walls	   of	   improbable	   stature,	   they	   spread	  out	   on	   the	   floor.	   They	  packed	  also	  my	  studio.	  I	  was	  now	  one	  among	  them,	  one	  of	  them.	  I-­‐becoming-­‐they.	  Time	  itself	  is	  written	  in	  the	  text,	  as	  it	  passes,	  space	  as	  it	  spaces.	  In	  vague	  propositions	  that	  cannot	  hope	  to	  fully	  specify	  a	  determinate	  set	  of	  properties	  (Valéry	  1979).’	  	  
If	  the	  fantastic	  is	  a	  point	  of	  access,	  what	  one	  calls	  ‘appropriation’	  is	  the	  exterior	  that	  permeates	  the	  membrane,	  the	  skin	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘I	   live	   the	   text(s)	   as	   a	  maze	   of	   entry-­‐exist	   points	   through	  multiple,	   total	   or	   partial	  embodiments,	  prosthetic	  strategies,	  thought	  instincts,	  experiments	  and	  intentional	  detours.	  I	  find	  my	  way	  by	  discovering	  and	  following	  in	  private	  the	  multiple	  trails	  exposed	  by	  the	  text(s)’	  inner	  reverberations.	  More	  or	  less	  intense	  or	  acute,	  more	  or	  less	  present	  or	  withdrawn,	  they	  momentarily	   allow	  me	   to	   unmake	   the	   confinement	   of	   the	   straight	   line.	   But,	   as	   a	   body	   I	   do	  gravitate	  to	  straight	  lines	  and	  the	  exit-­‐entry	  points	  align	  themselves	  to	  a	  certain	  pattern	  that	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demands	   their	  own	  structural	   right.	  This	   I	  cannot	  deny,	  nor	   that	   I	  am	  writing	  with	  my	  eyes	  and	  that	  I	  am	  bound	  by	  a	  LAW.’	  	  
The	  text(s)	  differ	  and	  intertwine,	  scroll	  along	  lines	  of	  thought	  and	  cartouches	  of	  rest	  and	  pause,	  only	  to	  roll	  up	  again	  and	  flourish	  into	  parergonic	  detours.	  In	  a	  pedestrian	  thought,	  this	  structure	  might	  be	  given	  by	  a	  predetermined	  ORDER.	  In	  ORIENTAL	  thought-­‐variation,	  the	  structure	  is	  not	  pre-­‐given,	  but	  fully	  and	  immersively	  lived	  in	  the	  present	  and	  individually.	  	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘There	  is	  no	  other	  way	  to	  create	  and	  simultaneously	  experience	  such	  a	  structure	  than	  by	  letting	  it	  be,	  by	  being	  it,	  living	  it,	  and	  in	  keeping	  it	  alive.	  The	  body	  never	  lies,	  it	  is	  real,	  and	  if	  it	  succumbs	  to	  this	  thought-­‐path,	  it	  becomes	  and	  is	  this	  path.	  One	  has	  to	  try	  not	  to	  try	  too	  hard	  to	  make	  some	  thing,	  nor	  to	  unmake	  it	  either.’	  
A	  choir	  of	  written	  utterances,	  sounds,	  noises	  —	  lingual,	  sequential,	  cadenced	  presences	  of	  time	  —	  the	  conventional	  voice	  that	  resists	  and	  persists,	  the	  academic	  voice	  that	  invokes	  and	  upsets,	  an	  atonal	  voice	  that	  tunes	  and	  focuses.	  Spread	  out	  densities	  on	  a	  flat	  platform	  murmuring	  the	  arrival	  or	   departure	   of	   a	   rusty	   train	   of	   thought.	   Not	   yet	   here;	   or	   here,	   for	   a	  moment	   or	   two,	   only	   to	  depart	   for	   other	   arrivals,	   relations,	   presentations,	   conceived	   in	   time,	   historically,	   indefinite	  appearances	   in	   murmur	   of	   forms,	   names,	   visions,	   works,	   multiplying	   the	   one,	   connecting,	  lingering.	  Becoming	  an	  I/EYE,	  and	  letting	  it	  be,	  in	  the	  idle	  gait	  of	  sense.	  	  
A	  project	   is	   the	  subjective	  seed	  of	  a	  nascent	  object.	  An	  accomplished	  project	  should	  be	  at	  the	  same	  time	  entirely	  subjective	  and	  entirely	  objective,	  an	   indivisible	  animated	  (living)	   individual.	  In	   its	  origin,	   the	  project	   is	   completely	   subjective,	   original,	   and	   just	   in	   this	   spirit	  possible,	   in	   its	  character	   purely	   objective,	   physical	   and	   a	  moral	   necessity.	   The	  meaning	   of	   projects	  which	  we	  may	  also	  call	  fragments	  from	  the	  future	  differs	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  fragments	  of	  the	  past	  only	  in	  its	  orientation	   arrow,	   which	   for	   the	   latter	   is	   regressive	   and	   the	   former	   progressive.	   What	   is	  important	   and	   what	   counts	   is	   the	   skill	   to	   SIMULTANEOUSLY	   REALISE,	   IDEALISE,	   COMPLEMENT	   AND	  PRESENT	  THINGS	  INSTANTLY.	  […]	  (Schlegel	  1988:	  107,	  my	  own	  translation).	  	  
Schlegel	  puts	   in	   a	  very	  poignant	   form	   the	  aspiration	  of	   a	  Ph.D.	  by	  project	   (in	  painting),	  while	  also	  capturing	  its	  impossible	  paradox.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  second	  limit	  within	  which	  the	  project	  should	  manifest	  itself.	  (The	  first	  limit	  was	  that	  of	  sense.).	  	  
(Una	  Joc:	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  the	  myth	  of	  parthenogenesis	  in	  our	  culture	  and	  the	  long	  history	  of	  the	  (male)	  fantasy	  of	  self-­‐generation.)	  
What	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   a	   research	   by	   practice,	   in	   a	   visible	   or	   hidden,	   one	  way	   or	   another,	   is	   the	  compulsion	   of	   repeating,	   the	   necessity	   that	   still	   compels	   us,	   of	   what	   was	   the	   crisis	   of	   the	  Athenaeum	   fragments	   in	   Early	   Jena	   Romanticism:	   the	   thing	   that	   produces	   the	   truth	   of	   the	  production	  of	   itself,	  of	   its	  own	  auto-­‐production,	  the	   ‘subject-­‐work’,	  the	  work	  that	  works	  out	  and	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presents	   its	   own	   workings,	   its	   own	   presentation	   (Darstellung-­‐Dichtung);	   as	   much	   as	   the	  problematic	  of	  a	  subject	  permanently	  rejecting	  any	  subjectivity	  or	  the	  dissolution	  of	  all	  processes	  of	  production	  in	  the	  abyss	  of	  the	  subject	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988).	  The	  obligation	  that	  one	  necessarily	  faces	  in	  a	  Ph.D.	  by	  project	  contains	  in	  itself	  the	  obligation	  to	  un-­‐decide	  for	  oneself	  what	  the	  subject,	   the	  object,	   the	  subject–object	  relation,	  the	  universal	  subject	  of	  knowledge	  (the	  cannibal	  I/eye),	  its	  historical	  ground,	  its	  subjectivity	  might	  be;	  what	  is	  one’s	  relation	  to	  them;	  how	  meaning	  is	  produced	  and	  how	  it	  circulates	  in	  our	  world.	  	  
Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  point	  out	   that	  what	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  Early	   Jena	  Romanticism	  and	  the	  Athenaeum	  group,	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  moment,	  the	  crisis,	  that	  produced	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  conditions	  for	  (in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Kant	  and	  his	  three	  Critiques)	  speculative	  thought	  and	  critical	  thinking,	  theory	  and	  research.	  Especially	  since	  Kant,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  presentation	  of	  ideas	   of	   reason,	   in	   other	  words,	   the	   relation	   between	   concepts	   or	   ideas	   and	   real	   things,	   or	   the	  relation	  between	  subject	  and	  object,	  between	  ideas	  and	  their	  material	  manifestation,	  became	  the	  historical	  paradigm	  of	  the	  dualism	  in	  modern	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  what	  Kant	  calls	  ‘the	  coordination	  of	  self-­‐same	  terms’	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  something	  to	  MEDIATE	  between	  them.	  It	  is	  a	  problem	   of	   ORIENTATION	   AND	   OF	   INTERMEDIARY	   FORMS	   that	   trans-­‐form	   all	   dualisms	   —	   of	   the	   ex-­‐position	   that	   unfolds	   between	   ‘Dichtung’	   and	   ‘Darstellung’.	   This	   is	   historically	   a	   highly	  controversial	   terrain,	   difficult	   to	   navigate,	   and	   only	   in	   indirect	   way	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   project.	  However	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  mechanics	  of	  the	  movement,	  to	  expand	  the	  motility	  of	  the	  body	  (of	  flesh	  and	  thought)	  to	  transfer	  the	  skills	  and	  affects	  from	  one	  body	  to	  the	  other.	  
Thinking	   back,	   about	   skill	   —	   “the	   skill	   to	   SIMULTANEOUSLY	   REALISE,	   IDEALISE,	   COMPLEMENT	   AND	  PRESENT	  THINGS	  INSTANTLY”	  —	  This	  is	  not	  a	  coachable	  skill	  that	  one	  can	  acquire	  through	  following	  a	  step	  by	  step	  learning	  method;	  there	  is	  not	  one	  fix	  method	  or	  methodology	  to	  help	  acquiring	  this	  skill,	   and	   therein	   lies	  hidden	   its	  paradox.	  There	  are	  many	   (scientific)	   research	  projects	   that	   are	  experimental,	   yet	   the	   method	   of	   experiment	   is	   given	   in	   all	   these	   cases.	   But:	   “The	   skill	   to	  SIMULTANEOUSLY	  REALISE,	  IDEALISE,	  COMPLEMENT	  AND	  PRESENT	  THINGS	  INSTANTLY”	   implies	   the	   fantasy	  of	  no	  delay	  between	  experiment	  and	  method;	  they	  have	  to	  be	  created	  simultaneously.	  Rather	  than	  through	  a	  skill,	  such	  projects	  come	  to	  light	  through	  the	  EXPERIENCE	  of	  complex	  interrelations	  and	  a	  whole	   network	   of	   skills;	   they	   depend	   upon	   an	   expanded	   texture	   woven	   together	   in	   different	  ORNAMENTAL	  and	  PLASTIC	  structures,	  and	  in	  their	  very	  own	  time	  and	  space.	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  thought	  and	  matter	  is	  in	  modern	  philosophy	  the	  problem	  of	   presentation	   (the	  Kantian	   problem	  of	   ‘Darstellung’).	   Different	   routes	   taken	   formed	  different	  parties,	   sedimented	   around	   deep	   and	   unbridgeable	   crevasses.	   For	   Heidegger,	   the	   problem	   of	  presentation	   becomes	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   beings	   and	   Being	   and	   thus	   THE	  essential	   problem	   of	   thinking.	   The	   problem	   of	   presentation	   precedes	   the	   problem	   of	   the	  representation	   of	   the	   ‘absolute’,	   which	   in	   itself	   disintegrates	   in	   the	   concomitant	   and	   multiple	  historicisation	   of	   relations	   of	   presentation.	   ‘Presentation’	   became	  with	   Heidegger	   the	   focus	   of	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thinking	   in	   general,	   being	   also	   a	   reflection	   on	   the	   historicity,	   temporality	   and	   continuity	   of	  relations	  under	  which	  things	  appear	  as	  such	  (Ross	  2007).	  
Why	  is	   it	  meaningful	  to	  take	  on	  now	  the	  obligation	  of	  such	  a	  project?	  What	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  project	  beyond	  itself	  and	  beyond	  myself?	  Nancy	  wrote	  to	  ME	  in	  his	  texts,	  that	  I	  am	  too	  late	  to	  ask	   such	   questions	   and	   in	   this	   form.	   I	   cannot	   hope	   anymore	   to	   find	   A	   meaning,	   a	   fixed	  signification,	  given	  to	  me	  from	  the	  past	  or	  in	  the	  present.	  And	  I	  should	  not	  expect	  one	  complete,	  absolute	   answer	   either.	   I	   can	   only	   be-­‐with-­‐sense(s).	   This	   is	   my	   fiction	   and	   truth	   alike.	   My	  orientation	  function:	  not	  a	  sense,	  but	  also	  not	  no	  sense.	  
Literature,	   Derrida	   explains	   in	   a	   dialogue	   with	   Hélène	   Cixous,	   opens	   this	   privileged	  space	  where	   one	   can	   say	   everything	   and	   avow	   everything	  without	   the	   secret	   having	  been	  betrayed:	  due	  to	  the	  fictional	  status	  of	  the	  literary	  work,	  even	  if	  I	  reveal	  you	  the	  truth	  of	  my	  secret,	   I	  can	  always	  claim,	  by	  right,	  without	  being	  refuted,	   that	  “it	   is	  not	  I	  who	   speaks	   in	  my	   name.”	   This	   poses	   again	   the	   question	   of	   the	   “proper	   name”.	  Who	  speaks?	   Literature	   has	   the	   political	   right	   to	   say	   everything.	   […]	   This	   right	  —	   to	   say	  everything	   without	   avowing	   anything	   —	   weaves	   a	   link	   between	   literature	   and	  democracy.10	  	  What	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  are	  produced	  in	  what	  modes	  of	  existence,	  when	  the	  ornamental	  is	  a	  principle	   of	   thrift	   in	   painting	   and	   in	   writing?	   What	   will	   emerge	   from	   the	   working-­‐out	   of	   the	  ornamental	  force	  itself?	  In	  what	  modes	  of	  existence	  and	  through	  what	  set	  of	  conventions	  are	  we	  encountering	  painting	  that	  neither	  unconsciously	  depicts	  nor	  stubbornly	  negates,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  embodying	  its	  inherent	  condition	  of	  the	  ornamental?	  Can	  the	  arabesque	  and	  the	  ornamental	  be	  invented	  as	  research-­‐forms?	  	  
Asking	   such	   questions	   in	   this	   context	   not	   only	   displays	   certain	   thinking	   patterns	   that	   create	  and	   prescribe	   certain	   expectations	   responding	   to	   certain	   discourses,	   artistic	   practices	   and	  theories.	   This	   endeavour	   inevitably	   pounces	   on	   to	   inexhaustible	   Google-­‐searches	   and	  knowledge(s)	  impossible	  to	  completely	  cover	  even	  in	  extensive	  periods	  of	  time.	  Moreover,	  they	  speak	  also	  of	  those	  recurring	  thinking	  patterns	  that	  determine	  what	  is	  acceptable	  and	  what	  not,	  that	  prescribe	  not	  only	  form,	  but	  content	  too—what	  is	  acceptable	  as	  research.	  Unavoidably,	  this	  is	  the	  decorum	  in	  which	  this	  thesis	  is	  AT	  HOME.	  	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘THE	  CHARACTER’S	  CHARACTERISATION	  IS	  ITS	  CHEMICAL	  DECOMPOSITION,	  YET	  THERE	  ARE	  OF	  EACH	  INDIVIDUAL	   AN	   ENDLESS	   NUMBER	   OF	   DEFINITIONS.	   A	   PROJECT	   IS	   A	   CHARACTER’S	   CHARACTERISATION.	   ITS	  POR-­‐TRAIT,	   ITS	  DISTINCTION	  THAT	  PULLS	  AND	  DRAWS,	   ITS	  DETERMINATION.	  The	   vision	   of	   uncountable	  grains	  of	  a	  discursive	  desert	  cannot	  break	  this	  slim	  but	  firm	  core.’	  The	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  ordered	  perspective	  of	  an	  omnipresent	  gaze	  is	  not	  the	  I/eye	  of	  this	   intentionality.	   Instead,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  From:	  Word	  to	  Life:	  A	  Dialogue	  between	  Jacques	  Derrida	  and	  Hélène	  Cixous,	  in:	  New	  Literary	  History,	  Volume	  37,	  Number	  1,	  Winter	  2006,	  in:	  Roelstraete	  2009:	  47-­‐48.	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body,	   a	   look	   (Heidegger	   1997:	   65)	   is	   opening	   up	   and	   becomes	   a	   variant,	   a	   narrow	   path,	  through	  short	  glances,	  dripping	  steps,	  forwards,	  backwards,	  sideways.	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WHAT 	  THIS	  PROJECT	  IS	  AND	  WHAT 	  IT	  ISN’T 	   	  
To	  define	  something	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  define	  are	  complex	  aporias	  in	  themselves,	  and	  there	  are	   different	  ways	   and	  methods	   to	   approach	   them.	   But	   in	   a	   case	   like	   this,	  when	   all	   factors	   are	  variable,	  nothing	  being	  fixed	  or	  offering	  an	  anchoring	  point	  of	  knowing-­‐truths,	  when	  one	  should	  not	  and	  cannot	  define	  or	  fix	  anything,	  the	  route	  taken	  is	  that	  of	  the	  imaginary	  —	  to	  which	  one	  has	  to	  fully	  commit	  oneself,	  without	  remainder:	  something	  is	  given,	  this	  is	  what	  matters	  and	  not	  what	  is	  given.	  Along	  this	  trail,	  one	  quickly	  starts	  to	  discover,	  experience,	  what	  holds	  one	  can	  grab	  and	  pinch	  tightly,	  which	  slippery	  slopers	  and	  crimps	  one	  has	  to	  be	  attentive	  to	  and	  which	  moves	  and	  steps	  remain	  unsustainable,	  draining	  away	   the	  elegance	  and	  strength	  of	  any	  body	  cramped	   in	  a	  gravitational	  conflict.	  Balanced	  stretching	  will	  help	  one	  reach	  surprisingly	  far,	  but	  jumping	  figures,	  releasing	  the	  ground,	  imagining	  the	  holding	  snatch,	  will	  even	  surpass	  the	  unreachable	  limit.	  	  
FIGURE	  4:	  FOUND	  IMAGE.	  
In	  a	  case	  like	  this,	  where	  form,	  method	  and	  content	  (subject)	  need	  to	  be	  invented	  and	  invented	  simultaneously;	  when	  meaning	  itself	  is	  not	  being	  given,	  but	  made	  and	  experienced;	  when	  the	  will	  to	   say,	   to	   see	   or	   to	   know	   needs	   to	   withdraw	   itself	   for	   the	   taking	   place	   of	   sense,	   then,	   the	  impossibility	  of	  saying	  what	  this	  project	  is,	  is	  the	  imperative.	  It	  is	  the	  imperative	  of	  the	  process	  of	  experiencing	  and	  the	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  project	  and	  its	  limits.	  On	  the	  way,	  one	  discovers	  in	  its	  morphogenesis,	  WHAT	  IT	  IS	  NOT,	  what	   it	   does	  not	  —	  and,	   eventually,	  WHAT	  IT	  IS,	  what	   it	   becomes.	  This	  is	  the	  imperative	  of	  the	  process	  itself,	  a	  given	  fact,	  an	  urgent	  call,	  a	  simultaneous	  gesture	  in	  which	  fantastic	  thought	  begins	  and	  maintains	  itself	  in	  subjection	  to	  the	  imperative.	  	  
The	   history	   of	   visual	   arts,	   the	   elaboration	   in	   time	   of	  major	   issues	   of	   visual	   understanding,	   is	  usually	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  art	  and	  what	  has	  been	  written	  in	  the	  art	  historical	  discourse,	  in	  a	  chronological	  sequence,	  about	  art,	  visual	  perception	  and	  forms,	  is	  for	  the	  most	  part	  about	  and	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Western	  tradition.	  Cultural	  comparisons	  between	  West	  and	  East	   are	   often	   problematic	   and	   dangerous.	   I	   don’t	   aim	   to	   establish	   a	   general	   narrative	   about	  painting	   and	   the	   arabesque,	   nor	   any	   parallels	   or	   comparisons	   between	   certain	   paintings	   and	  arabesques.	  There	  are	  no	  existing	  objects,	   things,	   images,	   or	   ideas,	   from	   the	  past	  or	  present,	   to	  look	  at	  and	  to	  compare	  with	  each	  other.	  	  
It	   is	   not	   the	   intention	   of	   my	   thesis	   to	   be	   an	   art	   historical	   study	   about	   the	   arabesque,	   the	  quintessential	   element	   of	   the	   Islamic	   art.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   I	   don’t	   have	   the	   right	   abilities	   and	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knowledge.	  My	   first	   encounters	  with	   the	   arabesque	  were	   in	   literary	   and	   art	   historical	   texts	   on	  Western	   painting	   (Goethe’s	  Von	   der	  Arabeske,	   essays	   on	  Matisse,	   Dürer,	   or	   Escher),	   where	   the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  was	  often	  conflated	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  decorative.	  Later,	  I	  (re)discovered	  in	  fragments	   by	   Friedrich	   Schlegel	   its	   relation	   to	   literature.	   In	  many	  ways,	  my	   experience	   of	   and	  relation	   with	   the	   arabesque	   overlapped	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	   conscious	   relation	   with	  ornament.	  Grabar’s	  erudite	  studies	  on	  Islamic	  art	  and	  his	  understanding	  of	  ornament	  as	  a	  form	  of	  mediation	   were	   influential	   guides	   in	   the	   process,	   as	   were	   Riegl’s	   studies,	   Stilfragen	   and	  
Spätrömische	   Kunst-­‐Industrie	   and	   Kühnel’s	   concise	   study	   The	   Arabesque.	   Meaning	   and	  
Transformation	  of	  an	  Ornament.	  	  
Ornament,	  the	  art	  historical	  concept,	  is	  a	  huge	  and	  complex	  area	  of	  research	  with	  a	  long	  history	  and	  development.	  Such	  a	  wide	  subject	  cannot	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  thesis	  by	  project	  in	  general	  and	  trying	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  an	  inadequate	  task,	  even	  for	  a	  Ph.D.	  by	  thesis.	  The	  research	  focus	  would	  have	  to	  be	  narrowed	  down	  to	  a	  much,	  much	  smaller	  area.	  My	  understanding	  of	  ornament	  reflects	  and	   is	   informed	  by	   the	  making	  of	   things,	   by	  my	  direct	   concerns	   in	  my	   studio,	   and	   is	   therefore,	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective,	   incomplete	  and	  subjective.	  Nonetheless,	  art	  historical	  studies	  were	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  information.	  	  
The	   ornament	   in	   architecture	   is	   probably	   the	   most	   intense	   research	   area	   in	   which	  contemporary	   ornament	   in	   its	   discursive,	   cognitive,	   symbolic,	   functional	   or	   social	   relevance	   is	  most	  feverishly	  debated.	  If,	  a	  few	  years	  ago,	  books	  spoke	  of	  a	  return	  of	  ornament	  in	  postmodern	  architecture	  after	  its	  debasement	  in	  modernism,	  than,	  nowadays,	  one	  speaks	  of	  ornament	  as	  the	  very	   condition	   of	   architecture	   itself	   (Dürfeld	   2008;	   Levit	   2008:	   7).	   The	   determinations	   that	  contemporary	   ornament	   takes	   in	   architecture	   are	   often	   related	   to	   morphogenetic	   formal	  innovations,	  parametrically	  controlled	  patterns	  and	  flexible	  and	  variable	  geometries.	  Once	  again,	  I	  have	   to	  write	   that	   this	   is	   another	   fascinating	   area	  of	   research	  whose	   temptations,	   I	   am	  afraid	   I	  have	  to	  resist.	  But:	  if	  ornament	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  architecture	  because	  of	  its	  morphogenetic	  form	  innovations	  —	  morphogenesis	   is	  a	  scientific	   term	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  dynamic	  development	  of	   the	  embryo	   that	   describes	   the	   development	   from	   simple	   three-­‐layered	   cellular	   sheath	   to	   tube	   to	  increasingly	   differentiated	   parts	   that	   come	   into	   being	   during	   gestation,	   and	   that	   implies	   that	   a	  certain	   latent	   ‘intelligence’	   or	   code	   is	   present	   within	   the	   DNA	   of	   the	   cells	   that	   propels	   them	  toward	   their	   later	   form	   (Levit	   2008:	   7)	   —	   then,	   I	   have	   to	   ask	   myself:	   is	   not	   this	   ornamental	  condition	   (which	   I	   believe	   to	   be	   the	   case	   not	   only	   for	   architecture)	   another	  way	   to	   experience	  plasticity	  as	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  being?	  	  
Already	  in	  my	  second	  research	  year	  I	  stumbled	  across	  the	  intersection	  between	  the	  ORNAMENTAL	  and	  PLASTICITY.	  ORNAMENT	  is	  a	  concept	  coming	  from	  rhetoric,	  art	  and	  aesthetics,	  from	  the	  context	  of	  adequate	  taste,	  TRUTH	  and	  moral	  (and	  disciplinary)	  purity.	  Ornament,	   in	  this	   line	  of	  arbitrary,	  but	   historical	   determinations,	   seemed	   to	   have	   found	   its	   measure:	   THE	   ORNAMENTAL.	   The	   list	   of	  proper	  names	   that	  exercised	   their	  minds	  on	   this	  ground	   is	   long.	  Suffice	   is	   to	  mention	  here	   that	  
	   36	  
Riegl	   (who	  was	   an	   antagonist	   to	   Semper’s	  materialist	   theory	   of	   ornament,	   and	  who	  was	   at	   the	  modernist	  beginning	  of	  this	  debate	  almost	  a	  contemporary	  to	  Loos)	  was	  influenced	  in	  his	  thinking	  and	  art	  historical	   theory,	  by	  Hegel.	  PLASTICITY	  (plassein,	  to	  mould	  —	  plasma,	  something	  moulded	  or	  created),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  an	  ancient	  philosophical	  concept.	  Its	  roots	  are	  as	  old	  as	  those	  of	  ornament	   (ornare-­‐ornatus).	  Here	   it	   is	   specifically	   addressed,	   as	  Malabou	  elaborated	   it	   from	  her	  encounter	  with	   it	   in	  Hegel’s	   introduction	   to	  Phenomenology	  of	   the	  Spirit	   to	   its	   exposition	   as	   an	  ontological	  concept	  in	  Heidegger’s	  thought.	  Plasticity	  refers	  to	  equilibrium	  between	  the	  receiving	  and	  giving	  of	  forms;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  static	  structure,	  but	  one	  that	  generates	  structure.	  	  
At	   that	   stage,	   bringing	   the	   two	   together	   felt	   like	  being	  both	   a	   gift	   and	   a	   spell.	   The	   concept	   of	  PLASTICITY	  was	  a	  bridge	  over	  the	  ontological	  distance	  between	  ornament/ornamental	  and	  Nancy’s	  ontological	  understanding	  of	   the	   image.	  And	   I	   saw	   the	  ornamental	   as	   an	   intermediary	  between	  representation	  and	  presentation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  very	  impulse	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  ornamental	  as	   an	   ontological	  mode	   in	   the	   image	  was	   put	   into	   question.	   Is	   not	   the	   very	   PLASTICITY	   of	   every	  being	  and	  every	   form	  also	  the	  ontological	  condition	  of	   the	   image?	  What	  need	  was	  there,	   for	   the	  ORNAMENTAL,	   other	   than	   the	   ornamental	   proliferation	   of	   concepts	   in	   a	   bad	   infinity	   (Hegel)?	  Plasticity	  implies	  change,	  difference	  (which	  is	  often	  identified	  culturally	  as	  pejorative	  form).	  The	  ornamental	  as	  a	  form	  of	  mediation	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  the	  ‘as-­‐well-­‐as’	  and	  not	  an	  either/or	  mode.	  It	  leads	  to	  something	  other	  than	  itself	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  a	  fantasy	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  individuals	  to	  make	  and	  re-­‐make	  themselves	  (which	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  crisis	  of	  arbitrariness),	  and	  more	  about	  the	  mediation	  between	  individuals.	  	  
And	  if	  THE	  ORNAMENTAL,	  and	  PLASTICITY,	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  very	  condition	  not	  only	  of	  architecture	  but	  of	  being	  and	  of	  the	  image,	  and	  thus	  of	  painting,	  of	  art,	  what	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  painting?	  If	  being	  is	  nothing	  more	   than	   its	   own	   changeability,	   if	   the	   image,	   as	   being,	   is	   nothing	  more	   than	   its	   own	  changeability,	  is	  there	  anything	  else	  that	  appears	  through	  THE	  ORNAMENTAL,	  that	  is	  its	  own	  sense?	  A	  morphogenetic	  understanding	  of	   form	  brings	  with	  itself	  a	  certain	  duration,	  a	  gestation	  period,	  a	  temporality	  that	  precedes	  time,	  a	  waiting,	  an	  in-­‐between,	  a	  modus	  of	  transition,	  of	  mediation	  and	  suspension	  —	  and	  it	  is	  maybe	  here,	  where	  THE	  ORNAMENTAL	  dwells,	  no	  matter	  if	  it	  is	  for	  an	  instant	  or	  an	  eternity.	  
The	  question	  of	  progress	  is	  something	  one	  has	  to	  pause	  on	  here—	  because	  morphogenesis	  does	  imply	   a	   certain	   progression	   —	   but	   a	   progression	   towards	   something	   that	   is	   already	   latently	  present,	  almost	  a	  regression,	  an	  invention,	  as	  Derrida	  would	  call	  it.	  A	  second	  idea	  that	  one	  has	  to	  pause	  on	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  relation	  of	  the	  whole	  to	  the	  parts	  and	  vice	  versa	  (which	  is	  known	  to	  be	  more	  a	   continental	  problem,	  as	   the	  empiricism	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	   tradition	   tended	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  smallest	  details).	  	  
This	  writing	  is	  not	  ABOUT	  painting,	  ABOUT	  a	  particular	  moment,	  movement	  or	  individual	  artist	  or	  work	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  painting.	  Such	  as	  would	  be,	  for	  example,	  looking	  at	  Runge’s	  graphic	  series	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Die	   Zeiten	   (1805-­‐1807)	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   arabesque	   as	   a	   figure	   of	   thought	   in	   Early	   Jena	  Romanticism;	  or	  looking	  at	  the	  arabesque	  through	  Dürer’s	  frame-­‐drawings	  in	  the	  prayer	  book	  of	  Maximilian	   I	   and	   Sigmar	   Polke’s	   series	   Schleifenbilder	   (1986);	   or	   taking	   as	   starting	   point	   an	  exhibition,	   such	   as	   Ornament	   and	   Abstraction.	   A	   Dialogue	   Between	   Art	   from	   Different	   Cultures,	  
Modern	  Age	  and	  the	  Present,	  Fondation	  Beyeler,	  Basel:	  Fondation	  Beyeler	  Museum	  (2001),	  or	  any	  other	  exhibition	  —	  to	  name	  only	  a	  few	  more	  or	  less	  arbitrary	  examples.	  
I	  am	  also	  not	  analysing	  a	  relation	  between	  abstract	  painting,	  abstraction	  and	  ornament,	  or	  any	  other	   particular	   artistic	   position	   in	   painting.	   One	   could	   write	   about	   Klee’s	   script	   paintings,	  Reinhardt’s	  Calligraphic	  Painting,	  Pollock’s	  paintings	  or	  Marden’s	   interest	   in	  Chinese	  calligraphy	  in	   relation	   to	   Grabar’s	   idea	   of	   the	   intermediary	   of	   writing;	   or	   about	   the	   ‘minor’	   positions	   in	  painting	   of	   those	   who	   really	   committed	   to	   the	   study	   and	   understanding	   of	   Islamic	   ornament	  (Escher),	  as	  against	  ‘major’	  artist,	  who	  appropriated	  freely	  elements	  and	  forms	  (Matisse,	  Le	  Witt,	  Stella	  or	  Taaffe).	  
	  
	  
FIGURE	  5:	  (GRABAR,	  1992:	  90).	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In	  the	  beginning,	  I	  thought	  that	  I	  have	  to	  recover	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  painting	  a	  meaning	  of	  ornament	   and	   to	   advocate	   its	   importance	   and	   presence	   in	   spite	   of,	   or	   even	   because	   of	   its	  modernist	  and	  gendered	  critique.	  Later	  on,	  I	  realised	  that	  this	  couldn’t	  be	  an	  appropriate	  aim	  for	  this	  project,	  as	  it	  would	  shift	  the	  focus	  too	  heavily	  towards	  art	  historical	  discourse.	  It	  is	  important	  to	   have	   such	   knowledge,	   but	   I	   don’t	   think	   that	   a	   thesis	   by	   project	   in	   painting	   should	   bend	   too	  heavily	  towards	  any	  other	  discourse,	  or	  that	  the	  work	  should	  be	  done	  through	  another	  discourse.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  did	  focus	  sometimes	  more	  on	  certain	  philosophical	  concepts	  and	  texts,	  being	  under	  the	   spell	   of	   a	   need	   to	   elaborate	   new	   concepts.	   Again,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   a	   Ph.D.	   by	   project	   in	  painting	   can	   elaborate	   a	   concept,	   or	   even	   an	   idea	   (depending	   on	   how	   one	   understands	   ideas;	  Nancy	   2005:	   87),	   or	   that	   it	   can	   have	   the	   same	   form	   as	   a	   philosophical	   research	  —such	   as,	   for	  example,	   Malabou’s	   exceptional	   doctoral	   thesis	  The	   Future	   of	   Hegel.	   Plasticity,	   Temporality	   and	  
Dialectic,	  where	  she	  elaborated	  the	  concept	  of	  “plasticity”.	  	  
This	   thesis	   emerged	   out	   of	   a	   research	   project	   by	   practice	   in	   painting,	   and	   it	   should	   be	   its	  intention	  to	  find	  the	  right	  form	  for	  this	  specific	  undertaking	  and	  not	  simply	  appropriate	  already	  existing	  forms	  from	  other	  fields,	  whose	  research	  meaning	  and	  value	  has	  been	  already	  established	  and	  accepted	  as	  such.	  	  
The	  chosen	  subject	  of	  a	  thesis	  by	  project	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  what	  is	  required	  of	  the	  subject	  of	  research	  in	  other	  fields	  —	  here,	  IT	  EVEN	  MIGHT	  CHOOSE	  YOU!	  And	  the	  expectancy	  to	  HAVE	  A	  RESEARCH	  SUBJECT	  was	  the	  first	  thing	  I	  had	  to	  leave	  behind.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  subject,	  only	  one,	  than	  it	  is	  for	  sure	  not	   what	   one	   knows	   it	   to	   be,	   but	   an	   obvious	  monstrosity	   that	   cannot	   gather	   into	   being-­‐ABOUT	  something,	  that	  disseminates	  into	  being-­‐with,	  in	  ex-­‐change	  with	  some	  things.	  This	  thesis,	  project	  needs	   to	   invent	   its	   form,	   its	  method	   and	   the	   event	   of	   its	   subject	   simultaneously,	  while	  making,	  without	  any	  temporal	  delay.	  Whatever	  its	  form	  is,	  it	  is	  an	  ex-­‐position	  of	  sense.	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INTERFERENCES	  —	  MEANING-­‐FUL	  ANXIETIES	  	  	  
Something	   that	   hasn’t	   been	   stated	   elsewhere,	   as	   clearly	   as	   here,	   is	   that	   this	   is	   a	  work	   in	   the	  present.	  The	  project	  and	   its	  workings	  are	   in	   the	  present,	   even	   though	   they	  move	  also	  between	  different	   and	   multiple	   temporalities.	   In	   terms	   of	   a	   chronological	   historical	   time,	   the	   project	  invokes	  moments	  of	   the	  past,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  as	  ancient	  as	  the	   idea	  of	   the	  arabesque	  dating	  from	   the	   period	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   Islamic	   art11,	   or	   around	   the	   year	   1600,	   when	   the	   Italian	  Renaissance	   invented	   the	   term	   ‘arabesque’.	   The	   challenge	   one	   faces	   right	   from	   the	   start,	   with	  respect	  to	  this,	  is	  one	  implied	  by	  the	  possibility	  that	  one	  seeks	  in	  the	  past	  and	  in	  a	  foreign	  culture	  answers	   for	   questions	   of	   the	   present	   and	   about	   the	   culture	   one	   belongs	   to.	   One	   might	   also	  suspect	  that	  such	  an	  attitude	  springs	  out	  of	  a	  romantic	  impulse.	  
It	   is	   a	   particular	   attitude	   to	   re-­‐Orient	   myself	   temporally	   and	   spatially	   in	   this	   moment.	   This	  attitude	  comes	  with	  its	  own	  historical	  and	  cultural	  baggage,	  its	  own	  weights,	  and	  I	  have	  to	  remain	  alert	   to	   the	   dangers	   hidden	   under	   multiple	   layers	   of	   distance.	   I	   have	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   any	  attempts	   of	   bridging	   and	   crossing,	   to	   false	   translations,	   forced	   appropriations,	   relations	   or	  connections,	  to	  misreading	  and	  hierarchical	  meaning	  impositions;	  to	  a	  strong	  will	   to	  see	  and	  to	  know	  an	  answer,	  a	  relation,	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  it,	   to	   identify	   it;	  but	  also	  to	  what	  may	  remain	  hidden	  or	  covered	  up	  in	  the	  course	  of	  such	  metamorphic	  and	  metonymic	  changes.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque	  and	  its	  ornamental	  forms	  were	  in	  their	  original	  context	  connected	  to	  utilitarian	   objects	   and	  were	   defined	   by	   popular	   taste.	   The	   double	   paradigms	   of	   being	   and	   the	  image	  were	  not	  relevant	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  The	  visual	  pleasure	  they	  cared	  to	  produce	  was	  doubled	  by	  a	  habitual,	  almost	  internalized	  tactile	  contact,	  by	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  perception	  and	  a	  specific	  attitude	   towards	   figural	   representation.	   They	   were	   used	   by	   all	   social	   levels	   and	   were	   not	  intended	   as	   art.	   Industrial	   objects	   predominated	   over	   single	   works	   of	   art.	  What	   early	   Islamic	  objects	  have	   in	   common	  and	  share	  among	   themselves	   is	   a	   technical	  virtuosity,	   a	   SKILL	  TO	  MAKE-­‐BELIEVE	  (to	  make	  metal	  or	  stone	  look	  like	  textile	  lace),	  the	  WONDER	  that	  comes	  from	  experiencing	  such	  skill	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  stories	  of	  discovering	  or	  failing	  to	  discover	  the	  secrets	  behind	  this	  wonder,	   the	  mysteries,	   the	   intimacies	   that	   remain	   hidden	   and	   protected	   by	   complex	   and	   rich	  interlacing.	  This	  kind	  of	  relations	  can	  easily	  be	  overseen,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  mind,	  especially	   if	  one	  approaches	  painting	  from	  an	  ontological	  understanding	  of	   the	   image	  and	  from	  the	   tension	   between	   different	  modes	   of	   being	   and	   the	   ornamental	   as	   an	   intermediary	   form	   of	  being12	  (Grabar	  2006:	  13-­‐29).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11For	  an	  erudite	  analysis	  of	  an	  ‘exact’	  chronology	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  ‘formation’	  of	  ‘Islamic’	  art,	  see:	  (Grabar:	  1973,	  1987).	  	  12	  For	  Plato	  the	  image	  is	  an	  intermediary	  form	  of	  being,	  an	  atopon,	  between	  being	  and	  non-­‐being,	  thus	  not	  a	  proper	  being.	  The	  discourse	  of	  painting	  runs	  in	  parallel	  and	  echoes	  a	  specific	  understanding	  and	  thinking	  of	  the	  image.	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Traditional	  Western	  painting,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  the	  art	  form	  par	  excellence.	  It	  was	  a	  way	  to	   an	   ideal	   higher	   state,	   a	   ‘window	   to	   another	   world’,	   something	   to	   be	   transcended	   through	  contemplation.	  It	  had	  a	  narrative	  and	  symbolic	  meaning.	  Traditionally,	  painting	  implied	  frontality	  between	  viewer	  and	  a	  painting	  on	  the	  wall	  that	  constituted	  an	  opening	  into	  a	  metaphysical	  space.	  Even	   after	   all	   modernist	   and	   avant-­‐garde	   moves	   to	   challenge	   and	   disrupt	   a	   traditional	  understanding	   of	   painting,	   after	   all	   postmodernist	   attempts	   to	   deconstruct	   and	   re-­‐construct	   it,	  painting,	  or	  rather	  paintings	  in	  plural,	  still	  remained	  primarily	  a	  visual	  form	  of	  art	  (subjected	  to	  truth’s	  paradigms).	  	  
The	  attitude	  to	  re-­‐Orient	  myself	  is	  not	  only	  an	  attitude	  but	  also	  a	  gesture	  and	  an	  act.	  I	  co-­‐relate	  painting	  and	  the	  image,	  which	  belong	  to	  another	  mode	  of	  existence,	  with	  something	  whose	  entire	  scope	  was	  to	  create	  pleasure	  and	  wonder	  by	  enhancing	  functional	  objects,	  tools	  at-­‐hand	  (to	  use	  Heidegger’s	   term).	   I	  am	  walking	   the	   line	  between	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  profane,	   in	  many	  aspects.	  Western	   painting	   has	   been	   challenged	   in	   many	   different	   ways	   in	   its	   meaning,	   purpose	   or	  understanding	  and	  we	  have	  been	  often	  threatened	  and	  entertained	  with	   its	  death.	  Many	  artists	  pushed	   painting	   and	   art	   closer	   and	   closer	   to	   the	   ‘daily’	   realm—	   of	   which	  Marcel	   Duchamp	   is	  maybe	  the	  most	  iconic	  example	  with	  his	  ready-­‐mades.	  	  
Western	   art	   discourse	   seems	   to	   create	   its	   needs,	   classifications,	   interests	   and	   expectations,	  definitions	   as	   a	   self-­‐obsessed,	   egoistic	   cannibal.	   The	   ‘import’	   of	   early	   Islamic	   artefacts	   into	   the	  Western	  art	  discourse	  was	  essentially,	  and	  re-­‐phrased	  in	  ‘modernist’	  terms,	  a	  re-­‐representation	  of	  ‘ready-­‐mades’,	  of	  ‘industrial’	  daily	  objects,	  that	  allowed	  to	  define	  and	  to	  classify	  taxonomically	  Islamic	   art	   according	   to	   aesthetic	   principles	   and	   values	   of	   Western	   art	   tradition.	   The	   whole	  endeavour	   was	   to	   establish	   a	   discursive	   space	   for	   these	   Near	   Eastern	   artefacts,	   so	   loved	   by	  Western	  collectors,	  that	  would	  re-­‐create/re-­‐present	  them	  as	  artworks,	  yet	  also	  in	  opposition	  to	  Western	   artworks.	   Islamic	   art	   has	   been	   institutionalised	   by	   the	   Western	   world	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Western	  tradition	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  own	  aesthetic	  principles.	  Duchamp’s	  ready-­‐mades	   exposed	   also	   this	   collective,	   (un)conscious,	   yet	   ferocious	   cannibalism	   of	   the	  Western	  art-­‐world.	  	  
As	  we	  still	  haven’t	  said	  enough	  about	  painting	  (Myers,	  T.R.:	  2011,	  12),	  can	  we	  look	  at	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  skill-­‐to-­‐make-­‐believe,	  of	  wonder	  and	  mystery;	  of	  a	  virtuosity	  and	  intimacy	  that	  is	  a	  TECHNICS	  of	  bodies	  (Nancy)?	  We	  haven’t	  stopped	  discovering	  (or	  failing	  to	  discover)	  its	  mysteries.	  Is	  not	  a	  painting	   that	   enters	   our	   life;	   that	   we	   touch	   and	   are	   in	   contact	   with	   painting’s	   sense?	   Is	   not	  painting	  axiomatically	  a	  private	  event	  for	  each	  one	  of	  us?	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A	  problem,	  impossible	  to	  stress	  often	  enough,	  is	  what	  I	  have	  called	  the	  ‘impossible	  paradox’13	  of	   the	  project,	  and	  this	   is	   the	  necessity	  of	   the	  absolute	   identity	  between	  the	  concrete	  work/the	  exhibition	  form	  and	  the	  need	  for	  abstract	  frames	  of	  reference;	  in	  other	  words	  “the	  production	  of	  the	   production”	   or	   “the	   presentation	   of	   presentation”	   (which	   is	   the	   image	   in	   Nancy’s	  understanding).	   In	   this	   problem	   there	   is	   actually	   a	   conflation	   of	   two	   problems.	   One	   is	   the	  problem	  of	  the	  work	  that	  produces	  its	  own	  theory,	  that	  of	  signifying	  and	  a-­‐signifying	  meaning:	  a	  sense	   that	   happens	   as	   the	   excess	   of	   meaning	   or	   signification,	   of	   language,	   and	   a	   sense	  represented	  and	  given	   in	  concepts,	   in	   language.	  The	  second	  problem	   is	   related	   to	   this,	  but	   it	   is	  more	  specific	   to	   the	  relation	  between	  painting	  and	   literature,	   image	  and	  word.	  This	  problem	  is	  specific	   to	   the	   shifting	   from	   one	   medium	   to	   the	   other,	   which	   is	   almost	   always	   the	   case	   with	  paintings.	  Our	  responses	  to	  them	  are	  almost	  never	  in	  the	  same	  medium.	  The	  case	  of	  a	  research	  by	  practice	  is	  a	  potentialization	  of	  this	  shifting	  from	  one	  medium	  to	  another,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  shifting	  of	  the	  shifting	  from	  one	  medium	  to	  another,	  from	  image	  to	  word,	  from	  sense	  to	  sense.	  To	  come	  back	  to	  what	  I	  said	  earlier	  about	  the	  different	  temporalities	  of	  the	  project,	  this	  is	  for	  sure	  A	  time	  of	   the	   project,	   a	  microscopic	   internal	   time	   opened	   by	   these	   shifts,	   their	   structure	   and	   pattern,	  with	   all	   their	   progresses	   and	   regresses	   and	   detours	   and	   blockages	   or	   stagnations	   and	   lines	   of	  flight	  and	  drops.	  And	  if	  painting	  or	  images	  are	  presenting	  sense,	  if	  they	  expose	  sense	  that	  is	  not	  given	  as	  linguistic	  sense	  in	  words,	  than	  what	  kind	  of	  ‘theory’	  of	  their	  own	  can	  they	  produce?	  How	  open	  can	  this	  signifying	  abstract	  meaning	  be	  and	  still	  resist	  complete	  psychosis	  and	  neurosis?	  
The	  two	  narratives,	  the	  death	  of	  painting	  and	  of	  ornament,	  these	  figures	  of	  endpoint	  and	  crisis,	  shook	  the	  disciplines’	  timely	  reasoning	  to	  the	  core,	  but	  they	  equally	  strengthened	  their	  acts	  and	  boosted	  their	  excessive	  production,	  circulation	  and	  functional	  displacement.	  It	  is	  here,	  where	  the	  ornamental	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  effectively	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  thrift	  at	  work.	  Their	  continuity	  was,	  and	  still	  is	  perpetuated	  by	  an	  existential	  necessity	  of	  a	  desire	  for	  visual	  pleasure	  and	  symbolic	  forms,	  for	  stories	  and	  fiction,	  doubled	  by	  the	  exchange	  structure	  of	  our	  capitalist	  world	  with	  its	  culture	  of	   excessive	   hyper-­‐proliferation,	   unsaturated	   demand	   and	   display	   of	   power.	   Life	   becomes	   our	  fiction	   and	  with	   this	   our	  mythical	   regeneration.	   Plasticity	   (and	   plastic,	   the	  material	   that	   is	   the	  very	  idea	  of	  its	  infinite	  transformation)	  echoes	  an	  idea	  of	  a	  continuous	  creation,	  and	  thus	  the	  idea	  of	  theological	  creation.	  	  
Traditional	  disciplines,	   like	  painting,	   cannot	  but	  question	   their	   limit,	   first	  of	  all,	   in	  relation	   to	  life,	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ornamental	   and	   the	   plasticity	   of	   being;	   they	   have	   to	   re-­‐invent	  themselves	   with	   respect	   to	   an	   ornament-­‐concept	   that	   reflects	   the	   exchange-­‐structure	   of	   this	  world	  and	  our	  current	  understanding,	  use,	  design	  and	  need	  for	  ornament.	  This	  started	  to	  happen	  in	   modern	   painting,	   after	   which	   it	   had	   been	   intensified	   for	   a	   brief	   period	   in	   the	   modernist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “Now,	  let	  there	  be	  no	  doubt,	  much	  less	  confusion:	  paradox	  is	  not	  confusion,	  of	  course	  —	  nor	  is	  it	  doubt:	  it	  is	  assertive,	  ascertained	  taunting	  of	  thought	  itself	  (Roelstraete	  2009:	  25).”	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discourse	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  shallow	  planarity,	  the	  figure-­‐ground	  relation	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	   the	   pictorial	   field	   from	   a	   Newtonian	   perspectival	   set-­‐space	   into	   an	   ornamental	   relational	  (Leibnizian)	  inter-­‐space	  —	  only	  to	  be	  repressed	  once	  more	  in	  the	  next	  move.	  
The	  conceptual	  framework	  sustaining	  such	  kipping	  thoughts	  expands	  the	  ornamental	  as	  form-­‐producing	  form	  only	  to	  (re)-­‐flex	  an	  ontological	  understanding	  of	  the	  image,	  as	  the	  “presentation	  of	  presentation”	  (Nancy	  2005)	  into	  a	  weightless	  point	  from	  which	  to	  pull	  up	  and	  follow	  through	  the	  arabesque.	  This	  movement	   scales	  up	  and	  down	   the	   infinite	   rapport	  between	   image	  and	   the	  ornamental	   and	   develops	   a	   complex	   motility	   between	   being-­‐language,	   being-­‐image	   and	   being-­‐ornament	  —and,	  not	  to	  forget,	  being-­‐script.	  	  
A	  modified	   traditional	   hypothetico-­‐deductive	  model	   is	   inducted:	   explored	   is	   a	  hypo	  (under)-­‐
thesis	  (-­‐a	  placing,	  -­‐proposition),	  not	  of	  explanation,	  but	  of	  a	  phantasm,	  the	  inventive	  conception	  of	  a	  fictional	  object	  of	  the	  fantastic	  —	  a	  non-­‐objective	  modality	  of	  presence	  free	  of	  every	  reference	  and	  referent	  (Heidegger,	  Malabou	  1973:	  173).	  Method	  itself	  is	  addressed	  as	  a	  question,	  a	  limit,	  a	  projection,	  something	  to	  be	  excavated,	  reached,	  invented;	  remembered,	  but	  not	  something	  that	  is	  given.	  The	  arabesque,	  that	  is	  movement,	  carries	  forward	  the	  momentum	  of	  a	  play	  out,	  of	  multiple	  play	  outs,	  of	  plastic	  and	  graphic	  imminence	  from	  which	  a	  figure	  might	  emerge:	  	  
What	  was	  at	  first,	  and	  what	  at	  last	  remains.	  And	  what	  the	  middle	  bringeth,	  but	  contains	  End	  and	  beginning	  evermore	  the	  same;	  Thy	  song	  is	  changeful	  as	  yon	  starry	  frame,	  And	  that	  thou	  ne’er	  beginnest,	  is	  thy	  fate.	  That	  thou	  canst	  never	  end,	  doth	  make	  thee	  great.	  
(Appropriated	   from	   J.	   W.	   Goethe’s	   Hafis	   Nameh,	   in	  West-­‐Östlicher	   Divan,	   translated	   by	   E.	   A.	   Bowring,	   in:	   Kühnel	  1976:10;	  Schimmel	  2001,	  in:	  Brüderlin	  2001:	  23.)	  
The	   ornamental	   arabesque	   is	   the	   structuring	   principle	   and	   generative	   force,	   which	   (re)-­‐presents	   and	   trans-­‐forms	   in	   contact	   its	   own	   figure,	   body,	   form.	   It	   is	   “[…]	   jene	   durch	   die	  Dichtungskraft	   hervorgebrachte	   Form,	   in	   der	   sich	   die	   unendliche	   Fülle	   ahnungsweise	  manifestiert	   (Pollheim	   1966:	   56	   in	   Kirves	   2012:	   23)”	   —	   the	   arabesque	   is	   that	   form	   that	   is	  brought	  forward,	  and	  exposed	  through	  Dichtung14,	  which	  is	  neither	  only	  fiction,	  nor	  only	  poetry.	  In	   this	   form	   the	   infinite	   plenitude	   of	   the	   one	   manifests	   itself	   suggestively	   (directly,	   not	  symbolically).	  	  
The	  hypothesis	  of	  invention,	  this	  PHANTASM,	  makes	  something	  visible	  as	  such	  along	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  vision	  requires	  a	  politics	  of	  positioning	  and	  responsibility.	  The	  arabesque	   is	  method	  (from	  old	  Greek:	  meta	  (after)	  and	  hodos	  (way,	  a	  traveling).	  In	  a	  very	  literal	  WAY	  here,	  it	  leads	  me	  to	  be	  immersed	  and	  to	  follow	  the	  intricacies	  of	  a	  line	  in	  its	  kaleidoscopic	  all-­‐overness;	  in	  the	  imaginary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  For	  Darstellung	  and	  Dichtung:	  (Nancy	  2008:	  68-­‐90).	  
	   43	  
elaboration	   of	   its	   being	   an	   “exemplary	   singularity”	   (Agamben).	   The	   figure	   of	   the	   arabesque	  figures	  something	  out.	  It	  opens	  up	  a	  temporally	  constituted	  space	  of	  events	  into	  an	  event-­‐space,	  a	  truth-­‐space.	   Its	   figuration	   is	   processual	   and	   instantiates	   itself	   in	   the	   act	   of	   looking	   in-­‐between	  figure	   and	   ground.	   Its	   ontic-­‐ontological	   matter	   exemplifies	   itself	   concretely	   in	   a	   specific	  temporal-­‐spatial	  structure	  and	  not	  in	  a	  symbolic	  way	  (Kirves	  2012:	  17).	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘One	  must	  not	  aim	  at	  originality,	  particularly	   in	  our	   time;	   for	  everything	  original	   is	  the	   object	   of	   a	   concentrated	   aim	   and	   a	   very	   avid	   attention	   that	   is	   anxious	   to	   exploit	   the	  slightest	  means	  for	  distinguishing	  itself.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  what	  was	  original	  in	  the	  morning	  is	  copied	  the	  same	  evening;	  and	  the	  more	  conspicuous	  and	  new	  it	  was	  in	  the	  morning,	  the	  more	  conspicuous	  and	  intolerable	  in	  the	  evening	  is	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  effect	  one	  had	  created.	  —Despise	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	  alike	  (Valéry	  1989:	  182).’	  	  
Fiction	   is	   our	   life.	   As	   we	   live,	   we	   are	   continually	   producing	   fictions.	   …	   You	   are	   at	   present	  thinking	  of	   the	   longed-­‐for	  moment	  when	  I	  shall	  have	  finished	  speaking.	  …	  It	   is	  a	   fiction!	  We	  live	  only	  by	  fictions,	  which	  are	  our	  projects,	  hopes,	  memories,	  regrets,	  thoughts	  etc.,	  and	  we	  are	   no	   more	   than	   their	   perpetual	   invention.	   Note	   well	   (I	   insist!)	   —	  that	   all	   these	   fictions	  necessarily	   relate	   to	  what	   is	   not,	   and	   are	   no	   less	   necessarily	   opposed	   to	  what	   is;	   besides,	  which	   is	   curious,	   it	   is	  what	  is	   that	  gives	  birth	   to	  what	  is	  not,	   and	  what	  is	  not	   that	  constantly	  responds	  to	  what	  is.	  You	  are	  here,	  and	  later	  on	  you	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  here,	  and	  you	  know	  it.	  
What	  is	  not	  corresponds	  in	  your	  mind	  to	  what	  is.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  power	  over	  you	  of	  what	  
is	   produces	   the	  power	   in	   you	  of	  what	   is	  not;	   and	   the	   latter	   power	   changes	   into	   a	   feeling	   of	  impotence	  upon	  contact	  with	  what	  is.	  So	  we	  revolt	  against	  facts;	  we	  cannot	  admit	  a	  fact	   like	  death.	  Our	  hopes,	  our	  grudges,	  all	   this	   is	  a	  direct,	   instantaneous	  product	  of	  conflict	  between	  
what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not	  (Valéry	  1989:	  227).’	  	  
What	  painting	  as	  practice	  is,	  and	  what	  it	   is	  not,	   is	  something	  that	  is	  questioned	  along	  with	  its	  relation	  to	  other	  art	  disciplines.	  What	  is	  its	  medium,	  its	  material,	  its	  work?	  The	  conventions	  of	  its	  tradition	  have	  to	  be	  (re)discovered,	  they	  are	  not	  immutable	  realities.	  Is	  not,	  the	  entire	  history	  of	  painting,	  one	  long	  collection	  of	  successive	  and	  manly	  novels	  of	  manners	  —written	  with	  plenty	  of	  time	  and	  studio	  room	  space	  of	  their	  own?	  Representation/description	  and	  prescription	  —	  and	  a	  compulsive	  need	  to	  repeat	  again	  and	  again	  a	  crisis.	  	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘But,	  one	  can	   learn	   to	  make	   the	  most	  of	   few	  well-­‐observed	  conventions:	   this	   is	   the	  mainspring	  of	  all	  games.	  Once	  they	  exist	  and	  one	  is	  used	  to,	  one	  expects	  them,	  one	  can	  then	  enjoy	  breaking	  them	  (Valéry	  1989:	  195).’	  
The	  spaces	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  that	  refuse	  language	  —	  which	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  at	   stake	   in	   an	   image,	   but	   also	   in	   the	   workout	   of	   the	   body	   —	   carry	   equal	   force	   to	   produce	  knowledge(s).	  This	  thesis,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  image	  as	  presentation	  and	  representation,	  ventures	  in	   a	   relation	   between	   painting	   and	   bodybuilding	   practices,	   and	   produces	   along	   the	   way	   its	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instruments	  for	  participating	  in	  such	  a	  relation.	  Corporeality	  and	  embodiment	  (informed	  by	  the	  historical	  representation	  of	  the	  female	  body	  in	  painting),	  the	  corporeal	  experience	  of	  a	  painting	  body,	   the	   body	   as	   image,	   or	   image	   as	   body;	   the	   body	   as	   affecting	   and	   affected	   by	   a	   painting	  practice	   or	   by	   popular	   subcultural	   bodybuilding	   practices,	   are	   only	   some	   of	   the	   permutations	  discovered	  within	  the	  syntactic	  opened	  by	  the	  arabesque.	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THE	  ARABESQUE	  
That	  you	  canst	  never	  end,	  doth	  make	  thee	  great,	  And	  that	  thou	  ne’er	  beginnest,	  is	  thy	  fate.	  Thy	  song	  is	  changeful	  as	  yon	  starry	  frame,	  End	  and	  beginning	  everymore	  the	  same;	  And	  what	  the	  middle	  bringeth,	  but	  contains	  What	  was	  at	  first,	  and	  what	  at	  last	  remains.	  	   Dass	  du	  nicht	  enden	  kannst,	  das	  macht	  dich	  groß,	  Und	  daß	  du	  nie	  beginnst,	  das	  ist	  dein	  Los.	  Dein	  Lied	  ist	  drehend	  wie	  die	  Sterngewölbe,	  Anfang	  und	  Ende	  immerfort	  dasselbe,	  Und	  was	  die	  Mitte	  bringt,	  ist	  offenbar	  Das,	  was	  zu	  Ende	  bleibt	  und	  anfangs	  war.	  	  
(From	  Goethe’s	  Hafis	  Nameh	  in	  his	  West-­‐Östlicher	  Divan,	  translated	  by	  E.	  A.	  Bowring.	  (Kühnel	  1976:	  10;	  Schimmel	  2001,	  in	  Brüderlin	  2001:	  31).	  
	  
These	   lines	  by	  Goethe	   instantiate	   the	   sense	  of	   near	  Eastern	  poetry,	   but	   they	   also	   capture	   the	  essence	  of	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  arabesque,	  of	  this	  special	  mentality	  that	  also	  penetrated	  Arabic	  music	  and	   poetry	   (Schimmel	   2001,	   in	   Brüderlin	   2001:	   31).	   (However,	   Goethe	   himself	   spoke	   of	   the	  arabesque	  in	  its	  western	  context	  as	  mere	  decoration,	  ‘Zierart’	  and	  ‘bloße	  Dekoration’.)	  
The	   relationship	   to	   the	   linear	   language	   of	   the	   arabesque	   appears	   strongly	   ‘in	   Arabic	  poetry,	   [...]	   the	   poet	   does	   not	   try	   to	   evoke	   a	   real	   past	   but	   only	   its	   shadowy	  memory,	  elaborating	   it	   with	   bubbling	   fantasy	   and	   by	   stressing	   it	   with	   brilliant	   but	   fleetingly	  executed	  descriptions	  of	  the	  mere	  ephemeral	  aspects	  of	  the	  event.	  Alliterative	  and	  end	  rhymes,	  metaphors,	  and	  synonyms	  served	  him	  as	  expressive	  contrivances;	  and	  just	  as	  the	   serial	   repetition	   of	   the	   main	   motif’s	   variation	   seems	   to	   the	   designer	   to	   be	   the	  perfect	  solution,	  so	  does	  the	  poet	  try	  to	  find	  perfect	  formulation	  through	  the	  harmony	  of	  beginning	  and	  end	  verses	  and	  the	  winged	  rhythm	  of	  the	  words	  forming	  his	  ode.	  […]	  	  […]	   in	   Arabic	   music,	   with	   its	   tonal	   variation	   of	   a	   single,	   continuous,	   and	   apparently	  unending	  melody,	  without	  the	  use	  of	  stressed	  themes,	  but	  bubbling	  up	  and	  then	  fading	  away	   in	   harmonies	   just	   as	   does	   the	   continuously	   branching	   of	   a	   scrollwork,	   (Kühnel	  1976:	  10).	  The	  Arabic	  poem	  aimed	  to	  be	  a	  reflectance	  of	  an	  invisible	  principle	  of	  order	  (Schimmel	  2001,	  in	  Brüderlin	   2001:	   32).	   The	   technical	   term	   for	   poetry,	   nazm,	   means	   order	   or	   system.	   The	   poetic	  impulse	   aims	   to	   condense	   experiences	   in	   highly	   abstract,	   stylised	   and	   harmonic	   forms.	   The	  classic	  lyrical	  Persian	  poem	  form,	  the	  ghasel,	  or	  the	  heavy	  orchestrated	  poem	  of	  praise,	  kassida,	  appear	  to	  be	  never	  ending	  harmonies	  that	  can	  finish	  only	  through	  the	  artificial	  construction	  and	  insertion	  of	  an	  end-­‐verse.	  This	  is	  assisted	  by	  the	  grammatical	  structure	  of	  classic	  Arabic	  language	  that	  builds	  on	  majoritarian	  three-­‐letter	  roots,	  which	  allow,	  almost	  with	  mathematical	  precision,	  a	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rhythmic	  expansion	  of	  the	  roots,	  creating,	  once	  again,	  the	  impression	  of	  an	  atmospheric	  infinite	  rapport.	  	  
The	  arabesque	  is	  the	  last	  great	  ornament	  in	  Western	  art	  history.	  When	  mentioned	  in	  relation	  to	  my	   research,	   the	   word	   itself	   seems	   to	   provoke	   confusion.	   Either	   because	   its	   meaning	   is	   not	  understood	   anymore,	   coming	   from	   a	   forgotten	   past	   and	   a	   foreign	   culture,	   or,	   because	   its	  equivocal	  meaning-­‐transformations	   hamper	   a	   quick	   grasp	   into	   one	   single	  meaning.	   (Or	  maybe	  because	   my	   interlocutors	   are	   surprised	   by,	   uninterested	   in	   my	   research	   focus,	   as	   they	   reject	  anything	  related	  to	  ornaments.)	  
In	   common	   speech,	   the	   arabesque	   denotes	   a	   type	   of	   ornament,	   something	   decorated	   in	   this	  manner,	   or	   anything	   decorative	   and	   superfluous.	   In	   its	   widest	   sense,	   from	   a	   morphological	  perspective,	   it	   refers	   to	   rich	   vegetal	   or	   geometric	   motifs	   of	   Islamic	   origin,	   even	   to	   Islamic	  decorative	  inscriptions	  or	  figural	  motifs	  in	  general.	  With	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  formalist	  theory	  of	  ornamentation	  and	  pattern	  design	  appeared	  also	   the	  need	   for	  more	   specific	   classifications	  and	  formal	   taxonomies,	   which	   led	   to	   a	   restriction	   in	   meaning.	   As	   a	   technical	   term,	   art	   historians	  employ	  it	  to	  describe	  ornament-­‐forms	  encountered	  in	  only	  two	  periods:	  in	  Islamic	  art	  from	  about	  the	   9th	   century	   onwards	   (Near-­‐Eastern	   arabesque)	   and	   in	   Western	   art	   from	   the	   Renaissance	  onwards	  (Western	  arabesque).	  As	  surface	  decoration,	  it	  was	  used	  in	  architecture,	  on	  exterior	  and	  interior	  walls,	   on	   floors	  and	  ceilings,	  on	   functional	  objects,	   carpets,	   textiles,	   vases,	   furniture,	   in	  illumination	  and	  calligraphy.	  	  
The	   Austrian	   art	   historian,	   Alois	   Riegl	   defined	   it	   as	   the	   genus	   of	   vegetal	   ornament	   of	   the	  Saracen	  art,	  that	  is,	  of	  Islamic	  art	  in	  medieval	  and	  modern	  time;	  and	  described	  it	  as	  a	  Gabelranke	  or	  Gabelblattranke:	   the	   “stylized	   form	   of	   the	   forked	   rinceaux”,	   an	   interplay	   of	   twine	   elements	  with	  new	  ones,	  creating	  a	  veil-­‐net	  beyond	  recognition	  in	  which	  no	  leaf	  or	  stem	  endings	  run	  down	  freely,	  each	  end	  beginning	  a	  new	  convolute	  of	  curls	  and	  fringes.	  The	  arabesque	  is	  an	  untouched	  
sui	  generis	  property	  of	  the	  Orient,	  especially	  of	  the	  Arab	  world;	  and	  the	  name	  of	  a	  specific	  form	  grounded	  (legt	  ja	  zu	  Grunde)	  in	  ancient	  stylized	  forms	  of	  twill	  ornaments	  (Rankenornament).	  	  
Riegl	  followed	  the	  formal	  development	  and	  continuity	  of	  vegetal	  ornamental	  forms	  and	  traced	  the	   arabesque	   lineament	   from	   its	   origin	   (in	   Ancient	   Egyptian	   art,	   Late	   Antique	   and	   Byzantine	  types	  of	   scrolling	   vegetal	   decoration)	   to	   its	   formal	  manifestations	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  8-­‐9th	  centuries.	  He	  used	  a	  morphological	  form	  analysis	  and	  hands-­‐on	  observation,	  and	  believed	  in	  the	  arabesque	  as	  an	  exemplary	  model	  through	  which	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  uncover	  the	  conditions	  for	  possibility	   (die	  Bedingungen	  der	  Möglichkeit)	   for	  a	  history	  of	  ornamentation	  as	  a	   form	  of	  art	   in	  general.	  (In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  process,	  he	  elaborated	  the	  concept	  of	  Kunstwollen,	  often	  translated	  as	  ‘will	  to	  make	  art’,	  or	  ‘what	  art	  wants	  to	  do’.)	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FIGURE	   6:	   MIRROR,	   SECOND	   QUARTER	   OF	   16TH	   CENTURY,	   OTTOMAN	   TURKEY,	   IRON,	   IVORY	   AND	   GOLD.	  
AVAILABLE	   VOM	   URL	   HTTP://ISLAMIC-­‐ARTS.ORG/2011/ART-­‐OF-­‐THE-­‐OTTOMANS-­‐BEFORE-­‐
1600/HB_1972-­‐24/.	  [ACCESSED	  OCTOBER	  2013].	  
	  
FIGURE	   7:	   WOODEN	   FRIEZE;	   EGYPT;	   9TH/3RDCENTURY.	   AVAILABLE	   FROM	   URL	  
HTTP://PATTERNINISLAMICART.COM/BACKGROUND-­‐NOTES/THE-­‐EVOLUTION-­‐OF-­‐STYLE/.	   [ACCESSED	  
OCTOBER	  2010].	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FIGURE	  8:	  NASRID	  PALACE,	  ALHAMBRA,	  GRANADA,	  ANDALUCIA,	  SPAIN.	  AVAILABLE	  FROM	  URL	  
HTTP://WWW.PHOTOGRAPHERSDIRECT.COM/BUYERS/STOCKPHOTO.ASP?IMAGEID=2109108.	  [ACCESSED	  
OCTOBER	  2013].	  
As	  twine	  ornaments	  were	  unknown	  to	  the	  ancient	  Orient,	  Riegl	  assumes	  that	   they	  must	  have	  been	  appropriated	  through	  an	  influence	  coming	  from	  the	  Hellenic	  culture.	  The	  inherited	  motifs	  were	  those	  of	  stylized	  versions	  of	  the	  acanthus,	  with	  its	  leafy	  forms	  and	  the	  vine,	  with	  its	  twining	  stems.	  These	  evolved	  into	  the	  distinctive	  Islamic	  form	  of	  ornament	  between	  the	  8th/9th	  centuries	  and	  the	  11th	  century.	  Examples	  of	  early	  forms	  of	  arabesque	  can	  be	  found	  on	  mosaics	  of	  the	  Great	  Mosque	   of	   Damascus	   from	   the	   8th	   century.	   After	   the	   11th	   century	   arabesque	   ornaments	   were	  widely	   used	   in	   the	   Islamic	   culture,	   but	   not	   only	   and	   went	   through	   further	   developments	   and	  formal	  changes.	  
FIGURE	  9:	  MODERN	  ARABESQUE	  FROM	  A	  WALL	  PAINTING	  IN	  STAMBUL	  (RIEGL	  1975:	  260-­‐161,	  FIG.	  138).	  
Arabesque	   designs	   developed	   motifs	   similar	   to	   Volutenkelch	   (chalice-­‐curls)	   or	   Blattfächern	  (forked	   leaf	   form	   carried	   on	   stems),	   both	   of	   which,	   according	   to	   Riegl,	   point	   to	   a	   common	  genealogy	   for	   the	   arabesque	   and	   the	  Palmette.	   Other	   designs	   derived	   from	   Lillies,	   rosettes,	   or	  calyx-­‐shaped	  volutes.	  	  
	   	  











FIGURE	  10:	  (GRABAR	  1992:	  11).	  	  (Grabar	  sees	  in	  this	  genealogy	  an	  example	  of	  forced	  art	  historical	  taxonomy	  based	  on	  arbitrary	  interpretations:	  we	   still	   don’t	   know	  what	  were	   the	   intentions	   behind	   these	   ornamental	   forms.	  One	   could	   read	   these	   motifs	   as	   so	   called	   ‘palmette	   designs’,	   as	   they	   are	   labelled	   in	   the	  Metropolitan	   Museum,	   or,	   as	   easily,	   one	   could	   read	   them	   as	   fantastic	   birds	   with	   two	   heads	  (Grabar	  1992:	  9-­‐46,	  1987:	  178-­‐194).	  	  
FIGURE	  11:	  (GRABAR	  1992:125).	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FIGURE	  12:	  (GRABAR	  1987:	  ILLUS.	  126,	  127)	  
Very	   often,	   two	   or	   more	   arabesque	   systems	   are	   combined	   to	   form	   new,	   more	   complicated	  designs.	   A	   coloured	   background	   was	   introduced	   to	   increase	   the	   harmonic	   tension	   between	  continuity	   in	   line-­‐movement,	   harmonious	   coverage	   of	   the	   surface,	   renunciation	   of	   any	   plastic	  effects,	  and	  the	  full	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  design.	  The	  atmospheric	   infinite	  rapport	  —	  showing	  no	  beginning	   or	   end,	   the	   pattern	   seems	   to	   be	   infinitely	   extendable	   in	   all	   directions—	   and,	   an	  inversion	  of	   the	   figure-­‐ground	  relation	  —	  the	   flat	  outline	  pattern	  creates	  a	   constant	  oscillation	  between	  motif	  and	  ground	  —	  are	  two	  of	  its	  main	  characteristics.	  
From	  a	  freely	  flowing	  scroll,	  stemmed	  leaves	  with	  an	  unnatural	  outline	  emanate	  in	  both	  directions,	   they	   split	   again,	   and	   the	   whole	   regenerates	   itself	   imperceptibly	   in	   a	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symmetrical	   rhythm.	  All	   heaviness	   is	   taken	   from	   the	  motif	   by	  means	   of	   drilled	   holes	  and	  teardrop-­‐shaped	  slits	  and	  with	  it	  all	  resemblance	  to	  nature.	  (Kühnel	  1949:	  16).	  	  The	  arabesque	  ornament	  confronts	  sight	  with	  a	  kaleidoscopic	  challenge	  that	  no	  longer	  allows	  it	  to	  linger	  on	  details	  or	  individual	  forms,	  nor	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  in	  the	  whole	  image	  at	  once.	  Tendrils	  trans-­‐form	  themselves	  into	  new	  ones	  and	  all	  twines	  end	  in	  ‘unfree’	  yoke-­‐endings,	  which	  in	  their	  movement	   draw	   polygon-­‐like	   shapes	   filled	   with	   larger	   twines	   and	   leaf	   amalgams,	   after	   the	  principle	   of	   complete	   coverage.	   The	   linear	   conduct	   in	   the	   arabesque	   drives	   forth	   the	   line	   to	  multiple	  intersections	  and	  cross	  overs	  in	  continuous	  rhythmic	  undulations.	  No	  main	  motif	  stands	  out	   and	   the	   relation	   to	   vegetal	   forms	   is	   veiled	   completely.	   The	   role	   of	   twines	   as	   stems	   is	  transformed	  and	  the	   floral	  character	  of	   the	  design	   is	  undermined	  and	  turned	  indistinguishable.	  Arabesques	   are	   anti-­‐naturalistic	   and	   anti-­‐mimetic.	   Basic	   motifs	   don’t	   follow	   the	   structural	  hierarchy	  found	  in	  natural	  organic	  forms	  —	  stem,	  twines,	  flowers—	  and	  all	  parts	  have	  the	  same	  autonomous	  and	  meaningful	  function.	  
FIGURE	  13:	  IRAN,	  KHARRAQAN,	  MAUSOLEUM,	  1093	  (GRABAR	  1992:	  101).	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Arabesques	  are	  abstract,	  but	  not	  enough	  so:	   their	   formation	   is	  not	  strictly	  symmetrical,	  as	   in	  geometric	   style.	   Thus	   they	   are	   neither	   entirely	   vegetal,	   organic	   forms,	   nor	   geometric	   forms.	  (Although	  the	  phrase	  ‘geometric	  arabesques’	  is	  used,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  decorative	  motifs	  of	  the	  Alhambra	  in	  Spain,	  Riegl	  refers	  in	  this	  case	  rather	  to	  ‘crystalized	  forms’).	  The	  line	  movement	  can	   be	   planimetric	   and	   abstract,	   which	   points	   to	   a	   direct	   influence	   from	   Saracen	   art,	   or	  more	  naturalistic	   and	  plastic,	  which	  hints	   at	   classic-­‐ancient	   influences	   from	  Hellenic	   and	  Roman	   art.	  Arabesques	  have	  been	  used	  as	  framing	  designs	  and	  surface	  fillings,	  feature	  related,	  according	  to	  Riegl,	  to	  ancient	  forms	  of	  braid	  ribbons	  that	  expanded	  into	  surface	  filling	  ornaments.	  The	  infinite	  rapport	  is	  created	  through	  the	  repetition	  of	  endless	  part-­‐variations.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	   14:	   EWER,	   SILVER	   INLAID	  
BRONZE,	   IRAN	   13TH	   CENTURY.	   LONDON,	   VICTORIA	   AND	   ALBERT	   MUSEUM,	   333—1892	   (GRABAR	   1992:	  
152;	  FIG.	  126.).	  
Seriality,	  mirroring,	   upside-­‐down	   repetitions,	   reciprocal	   duplications,	   geometric	   strap-­‐works,	  medallions	  or	  cartouches	  give	  this	  chaotic	  meander	  a	  sense	  of	  order.	  Rhythm	  in	  movement	  and	  complete	  coverage	  of	  the	  surface	  fulfil	  the	  desired	  impression	  of	  the	  arabesque:	  a	  kaleidoscopic	  passing	   of	   ever-­‐changing	   unreal	   forms.	   The	   arabesque	   underlines	   its	   own	   ephemeral	   and	  incomplete	  quality;	  the	  infinite	  repetition	  recalls	  the	  insignificance	  of	  the	  individual	  form	  and	  the	  uninterrupted	   covering	   of	   the	   surface	   refrains	   from	   any	   objective	   meaning.	   The	  maker	   is	   not	  interested	  in	  arresting	  details,	  but	  in	  the	  delight	  of	  a	  kaleidoscopic	  excess	  and	  in	  the	  exhaustion,	  through	   variational	   repetitions,	   of	   all	   possibilities	   within	   self-­‐imposed	   restrictions.	   The	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arabesque	  is	  purely	  abstract	  line	  and	  doesn’t	  carry	  any	  symbolic	  function.	  The	  decorative	  intent	  has	  no	  meaningful	  purpose.	  	  
FIGURE	  15:	  (GRABAR	  1992:	  224;	  FIG.	  8.3).	  
Arabesques	  are	   linear	  statements	  about	  two-­‐dimensional,	  almost	  symmetrical	   form-­‐relations.	  As	  planar	  manifestations	  they	  exclude	  tri-­‐dimensional	  elements	  such	  as	  ‘light’	  or	  ‘shadow’	  (or,	  in	  earlier	  examples,	   translate	   them	   into	   linear	  marks).	  Without	   ‘light’,	   such	  ornamental	   forms	  are	  timeless	  –	  they	  make	  no	  reference	  to	  time	  or	  space;	  and	  neither	  to	  any	  cause-­‐effect	  relation	  or	  to	  any	  moral	   implications.	   The	   only	   representational	   marks	   they	   allow	   are	   calligraphic	   forms	   of	  Arab	   letters	  —that	   is,	   of	   divinely	   inspired	   words	   (God’s	   chosen	   medium	   to	   reveal	   Himself	   to	  Prophet	   Muhammad)	   whose	   absolute	   aesthetic	   appeal	   lies	   in	   their	   sound.	   Such	   linear	  speculations	  and	  meditations	  are	  extremely	  rich	  and	  complex	  textures,	  difficult	  to	  entangle	  for	  an	  untrained	  eye	  —or	  an	  eye	  over-­‐trained	   to	   follow	  undeviating	   lines.	   [One	  of	   the	  key	  differences	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  arabesques	  is	  that	  the	  European	  artists	  created	  designs	  that	  were	  not	  as	  strict	  and	  uniform,	  and	  the	  surface	  was	  not	  treated	  as	  an	  individual	  whole,	  but	  broken	  up	  in	  different	  compartments	  containing	  rather	  loosely	  structured	  arabesques	  (Kühnel	  1976:33).]	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Arabesque	  structures	  appear	  to	  be	  operative	  chains	  of	  recursive	  designations	  and	  distinctions,	  and	  Grabar	   points	   out	   that	  with	   the	   arabesque	  we	   can	  discuss	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   syntactic	  structure	   that	   preceded	   that	   of	  many	   new	   terms;	   that	   is	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   syntactic	   change	  before	  a	  morphemic	  one	  (Grabar	  1987:	  194).	  
Arabesque	   ornaments	   are	   the	   creation	   over	   a	   full	   millennium	   of	   collective,	   anonymous	  craftsmanship	  of	  men	  who	  “during	  their	  whole	  lifetime,	  [were]	  satisfied	  to	  limit	  their	  imagination	  to	  a	  decorative	  motif”,	  and	  restricted	  themselves	  to	  its	  formal	  limits	  in	  order	  to	  create	  ever	  new	  variants,	  and	  more	  complex	  and	  harmonious	  solutions.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	   16:	   EXAMPLES	   OF	   ARABESQUES	   IN	  
TYPOGRAPHICAL	  USE	  AND	  OTHER	  ORNAMENTS,	  ZÜRICH:	  PRIVATELY	  PRINTED,	  V&A	  MUSEUM	  LIBRARY.	  
It	   was	   not	   spiritual	   poverty	   nor	   the	   effort	   to	   comply	   with	   a	   mandatory,	   regulated	  system	  which	  determined	  the	  outstanding	  position	  of	  the	  arabesque.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	   was	   the	   delight	   in	   ornamental	   meditation	   and	   in	   aesthetic	   asceticism	   and,	   on	   the	  other,	   an	   ambition	  which	  went	  well	   beyond	   a	  mere	   playful	   urge	   to	   invent	   ever	   new	  variants	   of	   a	   basic	   form	  and	   to	   adapt	   them	   to	   all	   possible	  decorative	  necessities.	   […]	  Doubtless,	   it	  was	  foremost	  the	  artist	  who	  carried	  in	  himself	  the	  Islamic	  world	  view	  to	  plunge	  into	  linear	  speculations	  of	  abstract	  nature	  (Kühnel	  1976:	  6).	  	  Artists	  were	   anonymous,	   and	   the	  developed	  designs	  displayed	  often	   a	   luxurious	   growth,	   but	  sometimes	  they	  were	  also	  restrained	  in	  manner.	  There	  are	  three	  essential	  characteristics	  that	  all	  arabesques	   have	   in	   common,	   regardless	   of	   their	   geo-­‐political	   and	   historical	   determinations:	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harmonious	  coverage	  of	   the	  entire	  surface,	   rhythmic	  continuity	  and	  renunciation	  of	  any	  plastic	  effects.	  These	  features	  give	  the	  designs	  a	  unified	  character	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  regional,	  temporal	  or	  ‘language’	  diversity.	  Thus	  compositions	  and	  vibrational	  systems	  of	  bifurcated	  scrollwork	  or	  even	  single	  patterns	  are	  difficult	  to	  attribute	  to	  a	  regional	  or	  temporal	  origin.	  
The	   arabesque	  was	   a	   constitutive	   element	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   Islamic	   culture	   not	   only	   as	   a	  visual	   ornamental	   form,	   but,	   and	   even	   more	   so,	   as	   an	   idea,	   a	   structuring	   principle;	   as	   the	  manifestation	   of	   an	   unambiguous	   expression	   of	   the	   Islamic	   culture	   and	   its	   collective	   force.	   In	  Islamic	  thought,	   there	   is	  no	  direct	   line,	  no	  quick	  short	  cut.	  One	  needs	  to	   look	  for,	   to	  search	  and	  find	   the	   meaning	   —	   or	   God’s	   visual	   symbols,	   while	   God	   remains	   wholly	   invisible.	   Even	   the	  ‘mihrab’,	   the	  small	  wall	  niche	   in	  a	  mosque	  that	   indicates	  the	  direction	  of	  Mecca,	   the	   focal	  point	  that	  marks	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  the	  worshiper	  should	  seek	  God,	   is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  by	  a	  quick	  glance.	   Islamic	   thought	   is	   complex	  and	   immune	   to	  direct	   lines.	   It	   is	   rich,	  oblique	  and	  speaks	   in	  riddles.	   Its	   answers	   are	   never	   obvious,	   but	   complicated,	   circular,	   and	   pleated	   into	   themselves.	  Nothing	   is	   simple,	   straight	   or	   direct.	   These	   characteristics	   are	   not	   to	   be	   confounded	   with	  ambiguity,	   unclearness	   or	   muddiness,	   because	   Islamic	   thought	   is	   also	   concrete,	   definite	   and	  either	   black	   or	   white	   –	   no	   understatement,	   no	   tempered	   tones,	   no	   vague	   contours.	   Such	  complexity	  is	  presented	  and	  expanded	  equally	  in	  all	  directions	  and	  in	  all	  its	  details	  and	  parts.	  No	  parts	  are	   left	  out	  or	  withdrawn	   in	  perspective	  –	  all	   sit	  equally	  on	   the	  same	  plane,	  next	   to	  each	  other,	   unfolding	   an	   infinite	   rapport,	   and	   are	   structured,	   ordered	   and	   arranged	   in	   clear,	   but	  complex	  patterns	  of	  thought.	  The	  more	  symmetrical	  and	  rhythmic	  such	  patterns	  of	  thought	  are,	  the	  greater	  the	  pleasure	  they	  produce.	  (Ibn	  Arabi’s	   ‘geography’	  of	  hell,	  which	  inspired	  Dante,	   is	  an	   image	   of	   such	   inordinate	   expression	   with	   symmetry.)	   Islamic	   thought	   is	   an	   instantiated	  passion,	  but	  a	  passion	  that	  is	  non-­‐individually,	  perfectly	  mastered	  and	  disciplined.	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FIGURE	   17:	   MIHRAB,	   THE	   BEY	  
HAKIM	  MOSQUE	  IN	  KONYA	  (AFTER	  RESATURATION).	  TURKEY,	  MIDDLE	  OF	  THE	  13TH	  CENTURY.	  BERLIN	  (OST),	  
STAATL.	  MUSEUM	  ZU	  BERLIN,	  ISLAMISCHES	  MUSEUM.	  MUSEUM	  PHOTO.	  (KÜHNEL	  1949:	  31).	  
The	  arabesque	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  a	  world	  order	  in	  which	  nature	  and	  all	  beings	  are	  the	  creation	  of	  one	  divine	  creator	  that	  manifests	  itself	  in	  all	  phenomena.	  All	  ideas	  and	   forms	  pre-­‐exist	   in	  eternity,	  but	  only	   in	   receiving	   their	  physical	  manifestation,	   they	  achieve	  REALITY,	  real	   existence.	   All	   physical	   phenomena	   are	   transitory	   and	   destined	   to	   pass	   away.	   God	  contains	  in	  himself	  all	  forms	  of	  all	  things.	  All	  reality	  in	  its	  physical	  manifestation	  is	  an	  emanation	  of	  God’s	  spirituality	  and	  intelligence.	  This	  Neo-­‐Platonist	  thought	  was	  constituent	  for	  Muslim	  and	  Arab	  thinkers,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  found	  in	  13th	  century	  mystic	  thought.	  (Meister	  Eckhart	  wrote	  that	  “all	  creatures	  in	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  forms	  in	  God	  have	  been	  divine	  life	  for	  ever”	  and	  “these	  pre-­‐existing	  forms	  are	  the	  origin	  and	  principle	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  all	  creatures”.)	  “Every	  nature	  emanates	  from	  its	  appropriate	  form.”	  Thus	  everything	  pre-­‐exists	  in	  eternity	  in	  forms	  emanating	  from	  God,	  but	  it	  manifests	   itself	   in	   time	  and	  space	  only	  when	   it	  assumes	  visible	   form.	   Ibn	  Arabi	   (1165-­‐1240),	  a	  mystic	   Sufi	   and	   philosopher	   (who	   preceded	   Meister	   Eckhart	   by	   100	   years)	   explained	   the	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“Oneness	  of	  God”	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  “Oneness	  of	  being”	  and	  believed	  that	  the	  divine	  consciousness	  embraces	  all	  intelligible	  forms	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  “prototypes”	  (Grabar	  1987:	  178-­‐194).	  	  	  
Sharing	  this	  belief,	  Near	  Eastern	  craft-­‐makers	  were	  not	  directly	  concerned	  with	  the	  depiction	  or	  recording	  of	  physical	  realities	  existing	  around	  them.	  Their	  aim	  was	  not	  to	  give	  permanence	  to	  earthly	  forms,	  as	  this	  purpose	  would	  have	  competed	  with	  and	  contradicted	  the	  divine	  order	  and	  creation,	  which	  was	  the	  ONLY	  and	  perfect	  creation.	  Craft-­‐workers	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  aspired,	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   the	   true	   nature	   of	   things,	   creating	   from	   their	  imagination	  and	   for	  purely	   aesthetic	   aims,	   and,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   they	   showed	  a	  provision	   to	  give	   aesthetic	   quality	   to	   common	   daily	   items	   (Grabar	   1973:	   82).	   The	   Islamic	   world-­‐view	  was	  resistant	   to	   realism	   and	   naturalism,	   to	   the	   iconography	   of	   Byzantine	   and	   Christian	   art,	   but	  possessed	  by	  the	  FANTASTIC	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  virtuosic	  stylization	  and	  abstraction	  of	  form.	  Artists	  devoted	   anonymously	   their	   entire	   life	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   variations	   and	   the	   discovery	   of	   new	  formal	  possibilities	  of	  the	  forked	  leaf	  form	  carried	  on	  stem-­‐design.	  The	  communal	  drive	  of	  entire	  ethnic	  groups	  was	  to	   fine-­‐tune	  their	  own	  specific	  variation,	  within	   its	  extreme	  restrictions.	  The	  arabesque	   is	   linear	   speculation	   at	   the	   limit.	   It	   is	   the	  manifestation	   of	   the	   tension	   between	   the	  finite	  and	  the	  infinite,	  between	  limitation	  and	  unconditioned	  freedom,	  between	  Man	  and	  God	  —and	  the	  infinite	  rapport	  between	  them.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  18:	  EXAMPLE	  OF	  A	  CLASSICAL	  ISLAMIC	  ARABESQUE;	  WOODCUT	  DETAIL	  FROM	  KAIRO	  AND	  EXAMPLES	  
OF	  DETAILS	  OF	  FILLING	  FORMS	  (RIEGL	  1975:	  332-­‐333,	  FIG.	  189;	  FIG.	  189	  A,	  B,	  C;	  FIG.	  190).	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FIGURE	  19:	  EXAMPLE	  OF	  WESTERN	  RENAISSANCE	  ARABESQUE,	  FIG.	  66.	  (BRÜDERLIN	  2001:	  104).	  The	  actual	  word	  ARABESQUE	  was	  invented	  in	  the	  Italian	  Renaissance,	  around	  the	  year	  1600,	  to	  refer	   to	   what	   were	   seen	   as	   original	   characteristics	   of	   Islamic	   culture.	   These	   were	   ‘later	  successors’	  of	  ornaments	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  first	  centuries	  of	  Islam,	  whose	  uniqueness	  relied	  on	  the	   way	   in	   which	   ornamental	   forms	   were	   treated,	   combined,	   composed	   and	   structured,	   as	   a	  result	   of	   a	   particular	   understanding	   of	   man’s	   creation,	   and	   not	   as	   a	   vehicle	   of	   new	   formal	  inventions.	   The	   Western	   arabesque	   derived	   from	   both	   traditions,	   from	   its	   European	   past,	  especially	  late	  Roman	  painting,	  and	  from	  the	  Islamic	  world.	  (Europe’s	  interest	  in	  the	  Orient	  was	  always	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   its	   own	   origins.)	   The	   three	   terms	   ARABESQUE,	   MORESQUE	   and	  GROTESQUE	   were	   used	   in	   the	   beginning	   interchangeably,	   before	   clearer,	   more	   distinctive	  categorizations	   were	   defined.	   While	   Near	   Eastern	   arabesques	   were	   anonymous	   creations,	  Western	  arabesque	  designers	  are	  easily	   identifiable.	  The	  arabesque	  had	  been	  transmitted	   from	  Spain,	   where	   it	   flourished	   in	   the	   15th	  century,	   or	   by	  way	   of	   Venice,	   where	   Persian	   and	   Syrian	  artisans	  were	   in	   residence,	   and	   reached	   Italy,	   France	   and	  Germany	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   16th	  century.	  The	  European	  variety	  is	  not	  so	  strict	  and	  uniform.	  Among	  its	  most	  important	  designers	  were	   Francesco	  Pellegrino	   (who	  published	   in	   1546	   a	   ‘livre	   de	  moresques’),	   Peter	   Flettner	   (his	  book	  on	  moresques	  appeared	   in	  1549,	  after	  his	  death)	  and	  Hans	  Holbein	   the	  Younger	  (created	  designs	  in	  1537)	  (Kühnel	  1949:	  32).	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  FIGURE	   20:	   HANS	   HOLBEIN	   THE	   YOUNGER,	   DRAWING	   FOR	   A	   COVERED	  
PITCHER,	   1532-­‐1534.	   ETCHING	   BY	   WENZEL	   HOLLAR	   AFTER	   A	   LOST	   DRAWING	   BEI	   HOLBEIN,	   SIGNED:	  
HHOLBEIN	   INV.	   W.	   HOLLAR	   FEC.	   1645.	   AFTER	   GANZ,	   KATALOG,	   NO.C	   37	   (KÜHNEL	   1949:	   PLATE	   24A,	  
24B).	  
	  
	  FIGURE	  21:	  WOODCUT	  FROM	  THE	  “BOOK	  OF	  MORESQUE”	  
OF	  FRANCESO	  PELLEGRINO(1530).	  (KÜHNEL	  1949:	  23,	  PLATE	  23).	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The	   arabesque	   lives	   at	   the	   border	   between	   image,	   word	   and	   ornament,	   in	   both	   traditions.	  Dürer	  playfully	  manifested	  this	  conjuncture	  in	  his	  drawings	  of	  Maximillian’s	  prayer	  book.15	  	  
	  
	  FIGURE	   22:	   THE	   CONFLATION	   OF	   DÜRER’S	   MONOGRAM,	  
MARIENARABESKE 	   (MARY-­‐ARABESQUE),	   IMAGE	   AND	   ORNAMENTAL	   DRAWING;	   ALBRECHT	   DÜRER	   (ALBRECHT	  
DÜRER’S	   DESIGNS	   OF	   THE	   PRAYERBOOK,	   LONDON	   1817,	   R.	   ACKERMANN’S	   LITHOGRAPHIC	   PRESS,	   V&A	  
MUSEUM	  LIBRARY).	  
	  
FIGURE	   23:	   ALBRECHT	   DÜRER.	   (ALBRECHT	   DÜRER’S	  
DESIGNS	   OF	   THE	   PRAYERBOOK,	   LONDON	   1817,	   R.	   ACKERMANN’S	   LITHOGRAPHIC	   PRESS,	   V&A	   MUSEUM	  
LIBRARY).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  In	  1986,	  at	  the	  Venice	  Biennale,	  Polke	  showed	  Schleifenbilder,	  a	  series	  of	  paintings,	  in	  which	  he	  took	  over	  certain	  ornamental	  lineaments	  from	  Dürer’s	  woodcuts,	  Der	  Triumphzug	  Kaiser	  Maximilians	  I.	  (1522).	  The	  ornaments	  were	  placed	  against	  an	  expressive	  black	  and	  white	  background,	  painted	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  register.	  They	  become	  the	  main	  figure	  in	  the	  images.	  [Online]	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.altertuemliches.at/termine/ausstellung/ein-­‐dialog-­‐durch-­‐die-­‐jahrhunderte-­‐albrecht-­‐duerer-­‐%E2%80%93-­‐sigmar-­‐polke.	  [Accessed	  October	  2012].	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  FIGURE	   24:	   ALBRECHT	   DÜRER	   (ALBRECHT	   DÜRER’S	  
DESIGNS	   OF	   THE	   PRAYERBOOK,	   LONDON	   1817,	   R.	   ACKERMANN’S	   LITHOGRAPHIC	   PRESS,	   V&A	   MUSEUM	  
LIBRARY).	  
	  
FIGURE	  25:	  EXAMPLES	  OF	  ALBRECHT	  DÜRER’S	  FIGURATION	  OF	  HIS	  MONOGRAM	  (BACH	  2001:	  126,	  127).	  
	  
FIGURE	  26:	  EXAMPLES	  OF	  ALBRECHT	  DÜRER’S	  FIGURATION	  OF	  HIS	  MONOGRAM	  FROM	  THE	  PRAYER	  BOOK	  OF	  
MAXIMILIAN	  I;	  FOL.	  35V(BACH	  2001:	  140,	  141).	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  FIGURE	   27:	   EXAMPLES	   OF	  
ALBRECHT	   DÜRER’S	   FIGURATION	   OF	   HIS	   MONOGRAM	   FROM	   THE	   PRAYER	   BOOK	   OF	   MAXIMILIAN	   I;	   FOL.	  
35V(BACH	  2001:	  140,	  141).	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FIGURE	  28:	  SIGMAR	  POLKE,	  SCHLEIFENBILD,	  PROVIDENCIA,	  1986.	  
FIGURE	  29:	  SIGMAR	  POLKE,	  SCHLEIFENBILD,	  EXPERENTIA	  UND	  SOLENTIA,	  1986.	  
	  
Alois	   Riegl	   work	   was	   influential	   in	   establishing	   a	   connection	   between	   Western	   and	   Near	  Eastern	   art	   and	   an	   indispensable	   consultant	   for	   Western	   collectors.	   A	   series	   of	   exhibitions,	  Vienna	  (1901),	  Paris	  (1906,	  1908,	  1912	  —the	  first	  showing	  of	  the	  Vever	  collection	  at	  the	  Musée	  des	  Arts	  Décoratifs),	  Berlin	   (1910)	  and	  Munich	  (1910),	  London	  (1931	  —	  the	   first	  exhibition	  of	  Persian	   painting)	   displayed	  many	   artefacts	   and	   pictures	   for	   the	   very	   first	   time	   and	   offered	   an	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opportunity	  for	  scholars	  to	  write	  essays	  and	  to	  publish	  their	  research	  in	  show	  catalogues.	  Later	  on,	  in	  1949,	  the	  Orientalist	  scholar	  Ernst	  Kühnel,	  who	  helped	  organizing	  the	  Munich	  exhibition	  in	  1910,	   which	   marked	   an	   important	   research	   step	   in	   Oriental	   Studies	   constituting	   the	   entry	   of	  Persian	   painting	   into	   the	   general	   history	   of	   art,	  wrote	   the	   already	  mentioned	   study	   about	   the	  meaning	  and	  transformation	  of	  the	  arabesque	  ornament.	  Other	  books	  and	  design	  manuals,	  very	  old	   and	  more	   recent	   ones,	   offer	   taxonomic	   examples	   and	   guide	   lines	   for	   possible	   patterns	   for	  specific	   purposes.	   Oleg	   Grabar	   wrote	   often	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   arabesque	   in	   the	   formation	   of	  Islamic	   art	   in	   his	   erudite	   studies	   on	   Oriental	   culture,	   but	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Western	   art	  history.	  	  
The	   idea	   of	   the	   arabesque	   penetrated	   Western	   poetry,	   literature,	   philosophy	   and	   modern	  painting	   too.	   We	   encounter	   it	   in	   texts	   by	   F.	   Schlegel,	   who	   elaborated	   in	   his	   writings,	   in	   an	  unsystematic	   way,	   the	   arabesque	   as	   a	   literary	   figure	   of	   thought	   “der	   modernen	   Poesie”	   (or	  “poiesy”	   or	   “absolute	   literature”).	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   arabesque	   needs	   to	   be	   contextualised	  within	   the	   platonic-­‐macrobian	   contextio-­‐velum	   and	   truth	   paradigms,	   and	   in	   their	   ramifications	  and	  outbursts	  in	  literature,	  philosophy	  and	  art.	  	  
In	   Western	   classical	   music,	   arabesque	   pieces	   are	   short	   embellished	   compositions,	   often	   for	  piano,	   that	  aim	   to	   recreate	   through	  sound	   the	  atmosphere	  of	   the	  Arabic	  architecture,	   as	   in,	   for	  example,	  Claude	  Debussy’s	  Deux	  Arabesques,	  composed	  in	  1888	  and	  1891,	  respectively;	  or	  Robert	  Schumann’s	   Arabesque	   Op.	   18.	   (The	   legacy	   of	   this	   piece	   was	   reflected	   in	   Dara	   Birnbaum’s	  
Arabesque	   video	   installation.)	   And	   in	   classical	   ballet,	   the	   arabesque	   is	   a	   hallmark	   position,	   in	  which	   the	   body	   "spirals"	   from	   the	   crown	   of	   the	   head	   through	   the	   back	   and	   then	   straightens	  through	  the	  extended	  leg.	  The	  body	  is	  supported	  on	  one	  leg,	  with	  the	  other	  leg	  extended	  behind	  it	  with	  the	  knee	  straight.	  The	  standing	  leg	  may	  be	  either	  bent	  in	  plié	  or	  straight.	  This	  dancing	  figure	  is	   used	   in	   both	   allegro	   (fast	  movements)	   and	   adagio	   (slow	  movements)	   choreography,	   usually	  concluding	  a	  phrase	  of	  steps	  and	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  one.	  The	  extremities	  of	  the	  body	  elongate	   into	  extreme	  over-­‐extensions	   that	   imagine	   infinite	   lines,	  while	   the	  arched	  spine	  along	  with	   the	   tension	   created	   between	   the	   inward	   and	   outward	   rotations	   in	   the	   body	   recall	   the	  sinuous,	  spiralling	  line	  of	  an	  arabesque	  ornament.	  
	  FIGURE	  30:	  POSTAL	  STAMP	  WITH	  EDGAR	  DEGAS,	  END	  OF	  AN	  ARABESQUE,	  OIL	  AND	  PASTEL	  ON	  
CANVAS,	   1877,	   38X67	   CM.	   AVAILABLE	   FROM	   URL	   HTTP://WWW.ARTONSTAMPS.ORG/.	   [ACCESSED	  
OCTOBER	  2013].	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THE	  ARABESQUE,	  A	  FIGURE	  OF	  THOUGHT,	  FRIEDRICH	  SCHLEGEL	  
The	  proposition	  of	  research	  by	  project	  points	  its	  arrow	  towards	  the	  Athenaeum	  venture	  and	  so	  does	  the	  projection	  of	   the	  arabesque.	  At	  the	  end	  of	   the	  18th	  century,	  Schlegel	   introduced	  it	  as	  a	  figure	   of	   thought	   in	   literary	   criticism.	   He	   established	   it	   as	   a	   literary	   concept	   and	   an	   aesthetic	  category	   without	   writing	   a	   systematic	   analysis.	   He	   mentions	   it	   a	   few	   times	   in	   Brief	   über	   ein	  
Roman	  (Letter	  about	  a	  novel),	  but	  most	  references	  are	  oblique	  entanglements	  of	  thought	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  engage	  with	  them	  is	   through	  exploring	  his	   fragmentary	  writing	  practice.	  Schlegel’s	  wilfully	  incomplete	  writings	  are	  constitutive	  moments	  for	  the	  Early	  Jena	  Romanticism	  and	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  poetry	  (literature)	  and	  philosophy.	  	  
Schlegel	   was	   attracted	   to	   the	   complex	   metamorphic	   force	   of	   the	   arabesque:	   intuitive,	   yet	  conscious;	  playful,	  yet	  structured;	  chaotic,	  yet	  only	  so	  from	  distance;	  finite	  in	  form,	  yet	  infinite	  in	  rapport.	  He	  valued	  its	  ability	  to	  MANIFEST	  THE	  INFINITENESS	  OF	  THE	  ONE.	  Schlegel	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  Oriental	   way	   of	   thinking,	   to	   which	   he	   often	   compared	   Western	   thought.	   He	   enjoyed	   writing	  obliquely	   allowing	   thoughts	   to	  manifest	   in	   complex	   riddles	   that	   appeal	   to	   the	   imagination	   and	  ingenuity	  of	  the	  reader.16	  	  
Schlegel	  and	  the	  whole	  close	  circle	  of	  the	  Athenaeum	  collective	  were	  interested	  in	  elastic	  thought	  formation	  and	   they	  believed	   in	   the	   revelatory	  power	  of	   the	  unknowable,	   the	  unintelligible	  and	  the	   heterogeneous.	   Ambiguity17,	   vagueness	   and	   equivocation	   were	   seen	   as	   signs	   of	   maximum	  complexity	   —	   as	   unambiguous	   ambiguity.	   His	   writings	   are	   a	   polyphonic	   manifestation	   of	  potentialities	   and	   it	   is	   uneasy	   to	   follow	   his	   ideas	   in	   their	   labyrinthine	   proliferation.	   Schlegel’s	  writing	  practice	   is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  arabesque	  principle	   itself:	   it	   is	   the	  diction	  of	  multiple,	  reciprocal	   references	   and	   complementing.	   No	   free	   endings.	   No	   hierarchical	   structures,	   but	  continuous	  growth	  of	  thought	  and	  intersecting	  ideas.	  No	  bottom	  to	  top,	  top	  to	  bottom	  or	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  directions,	  but	  an	   infinite	  planar	  rapport	   towards	  all	   sides.	  No	  organically	  pre-­‐determined	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Lucinde	  is	  an	  arabesque	  novel	  by	  F.	  Schlegel,	  published	  in	  1799	  as	  the	  first	  of	  a	  four	  part	  novel	  project.	  Its	  arabesque	  structure	  contains	  various	  literary	  forms	  –	  letters,	  dialogues,	  aphorisms,	  journal	  notes.	  Schlegel	  believed	  that	  a	  novel	  as	  an	  artwork,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  the	  ‘new	  poetry’	  should	  contain	  and	  present	  its	  own	  theory.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  arabesque	  figure	  of	  thought	  was	  a	  way	  towards	  achieving	  this.	  17	  “Confusion,	  erring	  and	  doubt:	  behold	  the	  holy	  trinity	  of	  anti-­‐epistemology	  whose	  worship	  (along	  with	  that	  of	  not-­‐knowing	  as	  ‘losing’)	  has	  been	  blown	  out	  of	  all	  proportion	  in	  recent	  years,	  decades	  —	  and	  with	  it	  has	  come	  the	  irresponsible	  overrating	  of	  ambivalence	  and	  ambiguity	  […]	  this	  fetishistic	  cult	  of	  ambiguity	  has	  many	  names	  and	  faces,	  and	  the	  obvious	  fact	  of	  its	  multiple	  faciality	  or	  multifacetedness	  (‘ambi’	  is	  Latin	  for	  ‘both’,	  so	  ambiguous	  really	  only	  means	  two-­‐faced)	  is	  among	  the	  first	  to	  be	  named	  in	  its	  defence,	  soon	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  the	  different	  and	  the	  dubious,	  the	  fissured,	  fractured	  and	  the	  fragmented,	  the	  hybrid,	  hesitant	  and	  heterogeneous	  […],	  the	  intermediary,	  interstitial	  and	  non-­‐linear,	  the	  liminal,	  the	  mobile	  and	  multiplicity	  […],	  periphery,	  pluralisation	  and	  polysemy	  […],	  the	  rhizome	  and	  the	  reticular,	  the	  situational	  transience	  and	  shifting,	  fuzzy	  logic	  of	  all	  nuance	  and	  becoming.	  […]	  —	  the	  undermining	  of	  all	  possibility	  of	  antagonism	  or	  contradiction	  upon	  which	  the	  practice	  of	  paradox	  (if	  not	  critique!)	  ultimately	  rests.	  For	  the	  mighty	  logical	  figure	  of	  paradox	  speaks	  of	  a	  love	  of	  truth	  —	  and,	  symmetrically	  of	  a	  love	  of	  lies	  as	  that	  which	  positively	  requires	  unveiling,	  revealing.	  […]	  Confusion,	  erring	  and	  doubt,	  when	  canonized	  as	  ‘method’,	  are	  nothing	  but	  fancy	  ruses	  —sorry	  excuses	  for	  not	  having	  to	  make	  up	  one’s	  mind	  or	  take	  one	  side	  (rather	  than	  ‘an’	  other),	  for	  not	  having	  to	  choose,	  for	  not	  having	  to	  judge	  —	  fear	  of	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  position	  of	  critique,	  in	  short	  (Roelstraete	  2009:	  25).”	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functions	  between	  parts,	  but	  thought-­‐inherent	  relations	  between	  thought-­‐fragments.	  Passionate	  thought,	  but	  a	  passion	  that	  is	  completely	  self-­‐mastered	  and	  disciplined.	  	  He	  saw	  in	  the	  calculated	  confusion	  of	  the	  arabesque	  an	  alternative	  form	  to	  the	  finitude	  of	  the	  subject.	  A	  possibility	  to	  step	  outside	   oneself	   within	   an	   anonymous	   and	   collective	   creative	   drive,	   to	   respond	   to	   an	   absolute	  spontaneity	  of	  thought.	  The	  arabesque	  stood	  for	  Schlegel	  for	  the	  “INFINITE	  OPULENCE	  IN	  AN	  INFINITE	  ONENESS”,	  which	  allowed	   for	  a	  de-­‐	  and	  re-­‐territorialisation	  of	   traditional	  classical	  encyclopaedic	  knowledge	  and	  reasoning.	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THE	  ENTWURF 	  OF	  THE	  PARTS	  TO	  THE	  WHOLE	  
This	   text	   is	   its	   self-­‐Entwurf18	  and	  projects	  multiple	  protrusions	   in	   the	  processual	  net	   (Greber	  2003;	   von	   Graevenitz	   1992:	   229-­‐157)	   stretched	   out	   in	   the	   minute	   it	   is	   knitted,	   between	   the	  arabesque	  as	  a	  visual	  form	  and	  the	  arabesque	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  thought.	  I	  have	  no	  desire	  to	  twist	  and	  batter	   an	   unambiguous	   apparatus	   criticus	   into	   the	   monstrous	   semblance	   of	   a	   novel.19	  The	  ornamental,	  an	   infant	  prodigy	  of	  historical	  ornaments,	  and	   the	   image,	  an	  existentially	   insecure,	  divided	  self	   are	   the	   characters	   in	  gestation,	  waiting	   to	  define	   the	   lines	  of	   their	   thoughts,	   to	  get	  their	  sur-­‐face	  ripped.	  The	  eclectic	  narrative	  writes	  this	  body	  in	  its	  process	  of	  formation	  in	  view	  of	  its	  ontological	  possibilities.	  The	  ornamental	  is	  an	  ontological	  mode	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  generating	  of	   forms	   and	   images.	   Found	   fragments,	   bundles	   of	   words,	   flesh	   materials,	   muscular	   tissues	  contract	   from	   different	   corners	   of	   land	   into	   this	   body,	   this	   figure,	   this	   place	   in	   an	  unprogrammatic	   but	   intentional,	   astonishing	   yet	   expected	   manner.	   Textile	   ideas,	   fibre	   forms,	  barely	  visible,	  spread	  all	  over	  the	  place	  with	  impertinence	  that	  only	  innominate	  substance	  could	  have.	  The	   impertinence	  of	  a	   form	  that	  writes	   itself,	   that	   is,	   that	  decides	   its	  distinction	  by	   itself,	  violates	  each	  and	  every	  instinct	  of	  my,	  of	  your	  knowledge.	  The	  conspicuous	  extravagant	  body	  fills	  out	   your	   sight	   with	   its	   sheer	   mass	   and	   all-­‐overness,	   and,	   inevitably	   pulls	   you	   in,	   in	   the	  compression	   of	   a	   growingly	  microscopic,	   close-­‐up	   image.	   Our	   insatiable	   demand	   and	   urge	   for	  ordered	   logical	   chains,	   evolutionary	   systems	   and	   filial	   lineages,	   surely	   eradicates	   all	   such	  fragments	  and	  plants	  them	  in	  a	  colour-­‐chart-­‐soil	  of	  ideological	  soil	  corrosion.	  	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘But	  —	  “it	  is	  equally	  destructive	  for	  the	  spirit,	  to	  have	  a	  system	  and	  to	  have	  no	  system.	  It	  will	  have	  thus	  to	  decide	  to	  combine	  the	  both	  (Schlegel	  1988:	  109).”	  And	  I	  shall	  want	  to	  keep	  them	  breezy	  and	  right	   in	   the	   space	  of	   their	  aeriality	  (Nancy	  2008:	  43).	   In	   the	  play	  between	  light	   and	   shadow,	   line	   and	   mass,	   known	   and	   unknown.	   These	   fragments,	   the	   ones	   that	  escaped	  fire,	  the	  essential	  burning,	  ‘write’	  and	  ‘read’	  the	  body	  of	  their	  own	  fictional	  becoming.	  Their	  organon	  is	   inscribed	  via	  a	  poiesis	  that	  perpetuates	  and	  accumulates	  their	  coming-­‐into-­‐being	   in	   three	   different	   hypostases:	   firstly,	   a	   poiesis	   that	   is	   condensed	   in	   the	   line,	   point	   or	  mark	  that	  makes	  an	  inaugural	  distinction,	  secondly,	  a	  poiesis	  of	  a	  thought	  and	  act	  elongated	  to	  a	  projected	  limit,	   towards	  its	  potency’20	  (distinction	  finding	  its	  right	  measure	  of	  distinction),	  and	   thirdly,	   the	  poiesis	  of	   the	  acceleration21	  produced	   in	   the	  process	   in	  which	   this	   initiatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  myth	  of	  parthenogenesis	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Western	  thought	  and	  culture.	  Entwurf:	  German	  for	  project,	  scheme,	  concept,	  draft,	  design,	  or	  plan.	  Theoretical	  term	  in	  contemporary	  architecture	  theory	  (Dürfeld	  2008:	  11-­‐23).	  	  19	  Nabokov	  2011:	  73.	  20	  ‘Potentiation’:	  ridicarea	  la	  putere,	  the	  potentiation	  of	  an	  element	  to	  the	  potency	  of	  a	  set,	  or	  whole	  (Noica	  2007:	  28,	  251;	  1987:	  307-­‐375).	  21	  Noica	  understands	  acceleration	  as	  a	  punctual	  concentration	  in	  movement.	  For	  Noica,	  what	  makes	  a	  difference,	  thus	  what	  IS,	  what	  interests	  us	  in	  existence,	  from	  a	  dialogical	  and	  ontological	  perspective,	  is	  acceleration	  and	  not	  movement	  itself.	  His	  understanding	  of	  movement	  or	  motion	  goes	  back	  to	  Aristotle	  and	  his	  thinking:	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  man	  as	  an	  animal,	  as	  living	  being,	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  motion,	  as	  will,	  desire,	  or	  volition,	  that	  characterizes	  life.	  
	   68	  
point	  responds	  and	  acts	  accordingly	  to	  its	  possibility	  of	  elongation,	  its	  deformation.	  This	  is	  an	  
Entwurf	  in	  which	  a	  body	  dissociates	  itself	  in	  body	  and	  as	  body	  from	  its	  body	  through	  motion	  and	  ontological	  change.	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
Catherine	  Malabou	  in	  her	  book,	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  constructs	  the	  portrait	  of	  her	  conceptual	   metamorphosis	   as	   a	   “transformational	   mask”,	   a	   thought	   image	   she	   finds	   in	   Lévi-­‐Strauss.	  	  
Transformational	  masks	   ‘are	  plural,	  composed	  of	  multiple	  faces—masks	  of	  masks	  […]	  [that]	  never	  reveal	  the	  face	  they	  mask.	  They	  are	  ill	  suited	  to	  the	  human	  face	  and	  never	  marry	   the	  model,	   nor	   are	   they	   designed	   to	   hide	   it.	   They	   simply	   open	   and	   close	   onto	  other	   masks,	   without	   affecting	   the	   metamorphosis	   of	   someone	   or	   something.	   Their	  being	   lies	  essentially	   in	   the	  hinge	  that	  divides	  them	  in	  half.’	   […]	  Lévi-­‐Strauss	  admired	  their	   ‘dithyrambic	   gift	   for	   synthesis’,	   their	   ability	   to	   hold	   together	   heterogeneous	  elements.	  By	  showing	   the	   transformational	  relations	   that	  structure	  any	   face	  (opening	  and	  closing	  onto	  other	  faces)	  rather	  then	  disguising	  a	  face,	  the	  masks	  reveal	  the	  secret	  connection	   between	   formal	  unity	   and	  articulation,	   between	   completeness	  of	   form	   and	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  dislocation.	  […]	  for	  it	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  differentiated	  structure	  of	  
all	  form	  and	  hence	  the	  formal	  or	  figural	  unity	  of	  all	  difference	  and	  articulation	  (Malabou	  2010:2;	  italics	  by	  the	  author).”	  Malabou	   concludes	   that	   Lévi-­‐Strauss,	   through	   paying	   attention	   to	   and	   a	   careful	   ethnographic	  analysis	  of	  transformational	  masks,	  makes	  the	  discovery	  that	  	  
The	   articulation	   of	   two	   sides	   of	   a	   face,	   or	   between	   faces,	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   dividing	   line	  between	   two	  different	  ways	  of	   representing	  a	  single	   face.	  The	  articulation	  of	   the	   face	  thus	  refers	  to	  another	  invisible	  articulation,	  the	  articulation	  between	  what	  Lévi-­‐Strauss	  calls	  the	  plastic	  and	  the	  graphic	  components	  of	  the	  mask.	  	  
FIGURE	   31:	   BOOK	   COVER	   OF	   CLAUDE	   LÉVI-­‐STRAUSS’	   BOOK	   LA	   VOIE	  
DES	  MASQUES 	  (1979),	  PLON.	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The	  two	  articulated	  sections	  usually	  constitute	  two	  bracketed	  profiles	  of	  a	  single	  face.	  This	   aesthetic	   process	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘split	   representation.’	   […]	  This	   dissociation	   is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  object	  is	  conceived	  and	  represented	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  double	  
aspect.	   Lévi-­‐Strauss	   explains	   that	   the	  mask	  manifests	   a	   union	   of	   ‘plastic	   and	   graphic	  components.	   These	   two	   elements	   are	   not	   independent;	   they	   have	   an	   ambivalent	  relationship,	  which	   is	   simultaneously	   one	   of	   opposition	   and	  one	  which	   is	   functional.’	  The	  plastic	   component	   of	   the	  mask	  designates	   everything	   that	   refers	   to	   the	   face	   and	  body	  to	  its	  referent;	  the	  graphic	  component	  offers	  ornament	  or	  decoration	  (painting	  or	  tattoo)	   on	   the	   same	   face	   or	   body.	   These	   two	  modes	   of	   representation	   symbolize	   the	  doubling	   of	   actor	   and	   part,	   INDIVIDUAL	   AND	   SOCIAL	   CHARACTER	   [freedom	   and	  obligation/necessity,	   artwork	   and	   theory].	   Interestingly,	   when	   ‘graphic’	   and	   ‘plastic’	  are	   articulated	   in	   this	   way,	   they	   no	   longer	   amount	   to	   autonomous	   entities	   and	   are	  instead	   able	   to	   exchange	   their	   respective	  modes	   of	   signification.	   The	  masks	   undergo	  transformation	   precisely	   because	   ‘THE	  MODES	  OF	  EXPRESSION	  OF	  THE	  ONE	  [PLASTIC]	  ALWAYS	  TRANSFORM	   THOSE	   OF	   THE	   OTHER	   [GRAPHIC],	   AND	   VICE	   VERSA.’	   Masks	   thus	   reveal	   the	  
interchangeability	   or	   conversion	   relation	   between	   the	   plastic	   and	   graphic,	   image	   and	  
sign,	  body	  and	  inscription	  (Malabou	  2010:	  3;	  italics	  by	  Malabou,	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  	  
	  FIGURE	   32:	   ILLUSTRATION	  
FROM	  CLAUDE	  LÉVIS-­‐STRAUSS,	  LA	  VOIE	  DES	  MASQUES 	  (1979),	  PLON.	  
	  
FIGURE	   33:	   ILLUSTRATION	   FROM	   CLAUDE	   LÉVIS-­‐STRAUSS,	   LA	   VOIE	   DES	  
MASQUES 	  (1979),	  PLON.	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The	   search	   for	   the	   right	   form	   becomes	   a	   double	   search	   and	   the	   right	   form	   flares	   up	   into	   a	  double	  self.	  This	  doubling	  process	  unveils	  different	  faces	  of	  the	  same	  coin,	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  form,	  transforming	  the	  same,	  differing	  themselves	  from	  themselves.	  Each	  side	  is	  a	  sharing	  of	  sides,	  which,	  in	  the	  end,	  are:	  	  
the	  articulation	  of	  two	  sides	  or	  two	  logical	  faces,	  which,	  as	  I	  soon	  come	  to	  understand,	  correspond	  to	  the	  two	  types	  of	  negation.	  […]	  According	  to	  the	  one	  side,	  negation	  forms	  
its	  own	  solution	  by	  doubling	  itself:	  dialectical	  negativity	  [Hegel,	  Deleuze].	  According	  to	  the	  other,	  negation	  differentiates	  itself	  and	  displaces	  itself	  without	  resolving	  anything	  through	  doubling,	  so	  that	  it	  traces	  its	  distancing	  in	  terms	  of	  spacing	  a	  pure	  dislocation:	  deconstructive	   negativity	   [Derrida].	   […]	   dialectic	   destruction,	   and	   deconstruction	  circulate	  continuously,	  moving	  in	  and	  out	  of	  one	  another,	  continuing	  to	  transform	  each	  other	  today	  just	  as	  they	  always	  have	  (Malabou	  2010:	  4-­‐5;	  Italics	  by	  Malabou).	  (And,	   it	   is	   in	   this	  way	  that	  painting	  and	  philosophy	  structure	  themselves	  as	   traditions	  and	  as	  images	  of	  their	  own	  change.)	  
One	  face	  opens	  onto	  another;	  one	  articulation	  gives	  way	  to	  the	  next.	  This	  [ornamental]	  movement	   may	   continue	   infinitely.	   The	   secret,	   primitive	   connection	   that	   bonds	  transformation	   and	   substitution,	   metamorphosis	   and	   replacement,	   contrast	   and	  functional	   relation	  marks	   the	   impossibility	   for	   figure	   or	   form	   to	   be	   self-­‐identical,	   to	  coincide	  purely	  and	  simply	  with	   itself.	   Likewise,	   in	   return,	   this	   connection	  marks	   the	  impossibility	  for	  this	  non-­‐self-­‐coincidence	  or	  rupture	  to	  manifest	  in	  any	  other	  way	  than	  as	  a	  figure,	  to	  give	  itself	  in	  any	  other	  way	  than	  as	  becoming	  of	  form	  (Malabou	  2010:	  4).	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FIGURE	  34:	  COJANU,	  CATCH	  SIGHT	  OF	  MY	  MOVING	  IMAGE,	  2013.	  
Una	  Joc:	   ‘The	  problem	  of	   the	   invention	  of	   forms	  and	   ideas	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	  delicate	   that	  a	  speculative	  and	  practiced	  intelligence	  can	  set	  itself.	  Everything	  in	  this	  field	  of	  research	  must	  be	  created	  —	  and	  not	  only	  the	  means,	  the	  methods,	  the	  terms,	  and	  the	  notions	  —	  but	  also,	  and	  above	  all,	  the	  very	  object	  of	  our	  curiosity	  must	  be	  defined	  (Valéry	  1989:7).’	  
FIGURE	  35:	  COJANU,	  CATCH	  SIGHT	  OF	  MY	  MOVING	  IMAGE,	  2013.	  





















	   72	  
THE	  RELATIONSHIP	  BETWEEN	  ORNAMENT,	  THE	  ORNAMENTAL,	  IMAGE	  AND	  BODYBUILDING	  PRACTICES	  
Grabar’s	  preliminary	  working	  definition	  in	  The	  Mediation	  of	  Ornament	  is:	  “any	  decoration	  that	  has	  no	  referent	  outside	  of	   the	  object	  on	  which	   it	   is	   found,	  except	   in	   technical	  manuals	  (Grabar:	  1992,	  xxiv).”	  But	  the	  definition	  he	  arrives	  at	  is	  that	  of	  ornament	  as	  intermediary	  form	  that	  carries	  beauty	  within	  it	  and	  provides	  pleasure.	  	  
Thinking	   ornament	   in	  relation	   to,	  of	  or	  on	   the	  human	  body	   is	   not	   unusual.	   Riegl	  himself	   developed	   his	   acute	  sense	   for	   surface	   articulation,	  “optically	   farsighted	   planar	  impressions”	   and	   an	  understanding	   of	   manifested	  planarity	   of	   the	   pictorial	   field	  through	   his	   appreciation	   of	  tribal	   art	   and	   Maori	   (body)	  ornament.	   Body	   art	   practices	  are	   encountered	   in	   various	  religious	   and	   social	   rituals	   in	  different	  cultures,	  from	  the	  past	  and	  present.	   In	  Western	   art,	   at	  least	   since	   the	   second	   half	   of	  the	   twentieth	   century,	   many	  artists	   have	   embraced	   the	  human	   body	   as	   the	  medium	   of	  their	   art	   practice,	   and	   the	  emergence	   of	   the	   new	   body	  culture	   intensified	  the	   focus	  on	  body	   ornament	   and	   multiplied	  its	  forms.	  
	   	   	   	   FIGURE	  36:	  (RIEGL	  1975:	  79,	  FIG.	  31	  AND	  32).	  
Adolf	  Loos,	   “setting	  out	   from	  an	  old	  embryology	  of	   cultural	  ontogeny	  recapitulating	  personal	  phylogeny”	  (Masheck	  2001,	  Woodfield	  2001:	  171),	  and	  against	  the	  by	  then	  deceased	  Riegl	  (1905),	  refers	   in	  Ornament	  and	  Crime	   (1908)	   to	   the	   degenerate	   form	   of	   body	   ornamentation	   in	   other	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cultures.	  While	  Kracauer,	  a	  few	  years	  later,	  identifies	  as	  the	  new	  ornament	  of	  our	  capitalist	  world	  the	  mass	   ornament,	   the	   abstract	   (but	   not	   abstract	   enough)	   formal	   control	   of	   the	   masses	   into	  massive	   patterns,	   impossible	   to	   be	   perceived	   in	   their	   wholeness,	   which	   hide	   behind	   their	  aesthetic	   the	   actual	   process	   of	   ‘ornamentalization’	   and	   de-­‐individualization	   of	   the	   people	  (Kracauer	  1995:	  75-­‐88).	  	  
	  
	  
FIGURE	  37:	  (KRACAUER,	  1995:	  74).	  
In	  issues	  related	  to	  gender	  inequality,	  cultural	  identity,	  and	  in	  body	  modification	  practices,	  the	  desire	   and	   attempt	   to	   recover	   and	   reclaim	   one’s	   own	   body	   or	   to	   re-­‐signify	   it,	   involves	   often	   a	  surface	   and/or	   subcutaneous	   ornamentalization	   of	   the	   skin	   through	   different	   forms	   of	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inscriptions	   on	   the	   body,	   such	   as	   tattooing	   or	   scarification,	   implants	   or	   piercings,	   earlobe	  stretching	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  marking	  the	  body;	  even	  the	  customization	  of	  the	  actual	  flesh	  or	  of	  	  
	  FIGURE	  38:	  COPTIC	  TATTOO	  DESIGN	   (CARLWELL	  1956;	  V&A	  
MUSEUM	  LIBRARY).	  
the	   shape	  of	   the	  body	   through	  different	  body	   technologies	   (appropriated	   from	  biomedical	   and	  information	   technologies).	   Different	   forms	   of	   control	   and	   regime	   attempt	   to	   fit	   the	   body	   or	  certain	  body	  parts	  into	  a	  certain	  aesthetic	  shape	  or	  performance	  form.	  
FIGURE	   39:	   LAST	   SUPPER,	   RELIGIOUS	   TATTOO	   DESIGN.	   AVAILABLE	   FROM	   URL	  
HTTP://WWW.LASTSPARROWTATTOO.COM/FORUM/ATTACHMENTS/TATTOO-­‐DESIGNS-­‐BOOKS-­‐
FLASH/3408D1295851950-­‐RELIGIOUS-­‐SPIRITUAL-­‐TATTOOS-­‐LAST-­‐SUPER-­‐BACK.JPG.	   [ACCESSED	   OCTOBER	  
2013].	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If	  some	  ornamental	  forms	  may	  be	  restricted	  to	  certain	  (subcultural)	  groups	  and	  contexts,	  many	  other	  ornaments,	   ‘applied’	  on	  or	  of	  the	  human	  body	  are	  used	  by	  all	  of	  us	  living	  in	  a	  community.	  An	  ornament	   is	   also	   a	   certain	   gesture,	   a	   specific	  movement	   of	   the	  hand,	   arm	  or	   finger	  when	   a	  
decorum	  requires	  it;	  ornament	  can	  be	  a	  specific	  style	  of	  behaviour,	  a	  way	  of	  speaking,	  a	  certain	  posture,	   a	   muscular	   flexion	   that	   would	   enhance	   the	   sensory	   perception	   of	   a	   body,	   making	   it	  obvious	   like	   an	   image,	   standing	   out	   and	   pleasurable	   (or	   not).	   Ornament	   in	   this	   sense	   carries	  beauty	  within	   it	   (Grabar	   1992:	   26)	   and	   Grabar	   himself	   calls	   the	   visual	   attributes	   of	   an	   object,	  artefact,	  or	  monument	  its	  MUSCULATURE	  (Grabar	  1992:	  30,	  37).	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  40:	  MR.	  OLYMPIA	  1980,	  FOUND	  IMAGE.	  
	  
FIGURE	  41:	  RONNIE	  COLEMAN	  AND	  FLEX	  WHEELER,	  FOUND	  IMAGE.	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FIGURE	  42:	  RITA	  BELLO,	  FOUND	  IMAGE.	  
Why	   bodybuilding	   practices	   and	   not	   something	   else?	   Because	   what	   is	   characteristic	   for	  bodybuilding	  practices	  is	  the	  nexus	  of	  relations	  between	  aesthetics,	  body	  modification	  practices	  and	   sport.	  Because	  of	   its	   emphasis	  on	  aesthetics	   and	   the	   image,	   both	  as	   representation	  and	  as	  presentation,	  on	  how	  something	  looks,	  how	  visible	  and	  defined	  it	  is	  (this	  something	  being	  usually	  covered	  and	  hidden)	  rather	  than	  what	  it	  does	  or	  produces.	  Posing,	  the	  flexion	  of	  muscles	  groups	  in	   a	   free	   or	   mandatory	   routine	   is	   not	   regarded	   as	   an	   act	   and	   a	   voluntary	   production	   of	   a	  deed/act/work,	   and	   thus	   bodybuilding	   practices	   are	   not	   accepted	   as	   a	   sport	   discipline.	  Bodybuilding	   competitions	   take	  place	   in	   isolation	   from	  other	   sport	   events	   and	  many	   see	   them	  more	   related	   to	   beauty	   pageants	   than	   to	   sport.	   Strongman	   competitions	   and	   Olympic	  weightlifting	   never	  weakened	   their	   eagerness	   to	   separate	   themselves,	   since	   their	   split	   [Eugen	  Sandow,	  1901	  Royal	  Albert	  Hall:	   first	  major	  event	   in	   its	  modern	   form	  (just	  posing	  without	  any	  weight	  lifting);	  judges	  were:	  Sir	  C.	  Lawes	  (sculptor),	  Sir	  A.	  C.	  Doyle	  (writer)	  and	  Sandow	  himself].	  However	  training	  styles	  and	  programs	  blur	  the	  boundary	  between	  them,	  as	  many	  bodybuilders	  incorporate	   in	   their	   training	   strongman	   exercises,	   Olympic	   weightlifting	   and	   even	   CrossFit	  WODs.22	  Overall,	   bodybuilding	  practices	   still	   have	  negative	   connotations	   in	   general	   and	   among	  athletes.	  	  
Because	  of	  the	  artificial	  forms	  and	  pursued	  body	  shapes,	  which	  often	  involve	  transformations	  through	   biomedical	   technologies,	   bodybuilding	   practices	   are	   also	   a	   form	   of	   body-­‐modification.	  And	   if	   one	   considers	   the	   idea	   of	   life	   as	   an	   art-­‐project	   and	   the	   plastic	   process	   of	   carving	   and	  sculpting	  a	  human	  body,	  then	  bodybuilding	  is	  also	  a	  popular	  form	  of	  art	  and	  lifestyle.23	  	  
Bodybuilding	   practices	   are	   only	   one	   manifestation	   in	   the	   ever-­‐growing	   body-­‐culture	   of	   our	  time,	   that	   perpetuates	   and	   reinvigorates,	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another,	   and	   under	   a	  mask	   of	   social,	  moral,	   ethical,	   aesthetical,	   or	   functional	   values,	   ancient-­‐old,	   equally	  profane	  and	   sacred	  beliefs:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  CrossFit:	  a	  mix	  of	  aerobic	  exercises,	  gymnastics	  and	  Olympic	  weightlifting;	  constantly	  varied	  functional	  movements	  at	  high	  intensity;	  WOD:	  workout	  of	  the	  day.	  23	  See:	  Scheller,	  No	  Sports!	  Zur	  Ästhetik	  des	  Bodybuildings	  (2010).	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the	  pursuit	  of	  becoming	  our	  better-­‐selves,	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  change,	  a	  difference	  —	  to	  MAKE	  a	  meaning	  for	  one’s	  existence,	   that	   is	  —	  not	  to	  quit,	   to	  hold	  on	  in	  there	  (in	  the	  precariousness	  of	  being	  and	  life),	  to	  give	  110%	  (to	  transcend	  one’s	  limits)	  and	  to	  support	  the	  community	  (so	  that	  one	   can	   receive	   the	   deserved	   recognition	   of	   one’s	   deeds	   from	   the	   other).	   But	   it	   is	   definitely	  something	  characteristic	   for	  bodybuilding	  that	   its	  response	  to	  these	  principles	  are	  aesthetically	  embodied	   and	   lived	   through	   the	   body	   and	   its	   transformations	  —	   bodybuilding	   is	   not	   a	  praxis	  (prattein:	  to	  do,	  to	  act)	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  but	  poiesis	  (poiein:	  to	  pro-­‐duce,	  to	  bring	  into	  being)	  and	  a	  spectacle	  of	  excess,	  an	  exaggeratedly	  visible	  explanation	  of	  bodies.	  
If	  one	  is	  interested	  in	  ornament	  as	  a	  visual	  form	  that	  carries	  a	  cognitive	  task,	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  ornamental	   as	   an	   ontological	   intermediary	   dimension,	   and	   if	   one	   desires	   to	   experience	   an	  embodied	   relation	   between	   image	   and	   the	   ornamental	   then,	   I	   believe,	   bodybuilding	   practices	  open	   a	   space	   in	   which	   such	   tensions,	   extensions	   and	   de-­‐tensions	   are	   actively	   re-­‐worked	   and	  intensified	  with	  timely	  relevance.	  
Bodybuilding	  practices	  are	  a	  phenomenon	  specific	  to	  our	  Western	  (post)modern	  culture.	  Their	  initial,	   ideal	   forms	  were	  shaped	  by	   the	  visual	  perception	  of	   the	  human	  body	   in	  ancient	  Greece,	  body	  representations	  in	  Renaissance	  art	  and	  20th	  century	  comics.	  These	  bodies	  embody	  an	  image	  in	   pursuit	   of	   representing	   AND	  presenting	   an	   image	   of	   the	   body	   and	   a	   body	   as	   image.	   If	   one	   is	  interested	   in	   the	   body	   of	   painting	   and	   as	   a	   corporeal	   activity,	   in	   the	   image	   and	   the	  (re)presentation	  of	   the	  body,	   than	  bodybuilding	  practices	  are	  a	   space	   in	  which	  all	   these	   issues	  are	  folded	  and	  unfolded	  into	  themselves.	  The	  meaning	  of	  these	  folds	  surface	  directly	  through	  the	  language	  of	  the	  body	  itself,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  painting.	  
FIGURE	  43:	  EUGEN	  SANDOW,	  FOUND	  IMAGE.	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PERFECTIBLE	  METAMORPHOSIS	  
Among	  the	  shells	  on	  a	  shore	  lies	  a	  button.	  In	  its	  accurate	  roundness	  and	  evenness	  it	  is	  a	  queer	  object,	   here,	   side	   by	   side	   with	   the	   diversified	   forms	   of	   nature	   (Albers	   2000:	   25-­‐28).	   Among	  people	   on	   the	   beach,	   a	   body-­‐built	   body	   conspicuously	   perturbs	   the	   sight.	   In	   its	   accurate	  roundness	  and	  evenness	   it	   is	  a	  queer	  object	  side	  by	  side,	  among	  the	  shells	  on	  a	  shore,	  with	  the	  button,	  and	  in	  its	  monstrous	  size	  a	  mount	  of	  solid	  mass,	  a	  floating	  world.	  	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘If	  our	  world	  goes	  to	  pieces	  we	  have	  to	  rebuild	  our	  world.	  But	  do	  we	  know	  how	  to	  build?	  Education	  meant	   to	  prepare	  us.	  But	  how	  much	  of	  education	   is	   concerned	  with	  doing	  and	  how	  much	  with	  recording?	  How	  much	  of	   it	  with	  productive	  speculation	  and	  how	  much	  with	  repeating?	  We	  collect	  rather	  than	  construct.	  We	  are	  proud	  of	  knowledge	  and	  forget	  that	  facts	  only	  give	  reflected	  light.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  wait,	  to	  search,	  to	  learn,	  to	  do,	  to	  form,	  we	  have	  to	  turn	   to	   materials	   and	   artwork.	   From	   them	   we	   learn	   courage,	   we	   learn	   to	   dare	   to	   make	   a	  choice,	  to	  be	  independent,	  to	  commit.	  There	  is	  no	  authority	  to	  be	  questioned.	  In	  making	  our	  choice	  we	  develop	  a	  standpoint,	  a	  posture,	  a	  body.	  Any	  experience	  is	  immediate,	  one	  thing	  at	  a	  time,	  and	  we	  have	  to	  apply	  what	  we	  absorb	  to	  our	  work	  of	  the	  moment.	  We	  cannot	  postpone.	  We	   have	   to	   develop	   our	   senses,	   to	   trust	   our	   inner	   intuition;	   to	   stretch	   the	  mobility	   of	   our	  position,	  posture;	  to	  learn	  to	  construct	  by	  understanding	  the	  mechanics	  of	  movement.	  To	  feel	  the	  —	  OUR	  body,	   the	  material.	  To	   learn,	   to	  hear,	   to	   listen	   to	   the	  slow	  process	  of	  building,	  of	  moving	  form.	  Of	  building	  a	  body,	  an	  image,	  a	  world.	  	  
The	  fine	  arts	  have	  specialized	  in	  the	  use	  of	  a	  few	  materials,	  mostly	  obedient	  materials.	  But	  any	  material	  is	  good	  enough	  for	  art.	  The	  (human)	  body	  above	  all.	  All	  art	  is	  made	  with	  the	  body,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  The	  struggle	  with	  a	  rugged	  material,	  its	  resistance	  and	  resilience	  teaches	  us	  best	  a	  constructive	  discipline.	  RESISTANCE	   is	  one	  of	   the	  necessary	  factors,	  which	  makes	  us	  realise	   the	   characteristics	   of	   our	   medium	   and	   makes	   us	   question	   our	   work	   procedure.	   It	  teaches	  us	  the	  CHARACTER	  OF	  BEING.	  We	  learn	  patience	  and	  endurance;	  we	  learn	  to	  respect	  the	  material	   and	   its	   movement	   in	   working	   with	   it:	   we	   have	   to	   use	   our	   imagination	   and	   be	  inventive.	  Learning	  to	  form	  makes	  us	  understand	  all	  forming,	  creation	  [—	  truth].	  This	  is	  not	  the	  understanding	  or	  misunderstanding	  we	  arrive	  at	   through	   the	  amateur	  explaining	   to	   the	  amateur	  —	   appreciating	  —	   this	   is	   fundamental	   knowing.	   Education	   should	   lead	   us	   to	   the	  quietness	  of	  vision	  [fiction,	  fantastic]	  and	  discipline	  of	  forming	  [truth]	  (Albers	  2000:	  25-­‐28).	  
What	   is	   the	  medium	   of	   vision	  —what	   is	   its	   form	   (peras)?	  With	   every	   step	   toward	   a	   vision	  questions	  arise	  and	  you	  pursue	  those	  questions.	  RESISTANCE	  is	  the	  medium	  of	  vision,	  because	  it	  makes	   vision	   real,	   it	   forms	   it.	   A	   vision	   that	   becomes	   actual,	   that	   is	   coming	   into	  being,	   is	   an	  acceleration,	  an	  intensification	  of	  force	  over	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  material,	  the	  breaking	  open	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of	  a	  path	  into	  being	  (Malabou	  2011:	  60)	  —	  and	  the	  re-­‐discovery	  of	  an	  ancient	  form.	  The	  inner	  resistance	   of	   the	   material	   is	   re-­‐formed	   processualy	   into	   an	   ornamental	   trace,	   at	   once	   the	  uniting	   element	   of	   memory,	   act,	   and	   perception,	   a	   novelty,	   and	   an	   organized	   repeatable	  function;	   energy	   and	   a	   generator	   of	   energy.	   At	   once	   astonishment	   and	   recollection…	  “Reflection	  is	  a	  restraint	  on	  chance,	  a	  chance	  to	  which	  one	  adapts	  a	  convention.	  And	  what	  is	  a	  play	   of	   chance	   if	   not	   that	   addition	   which	   creates	   an	   expectation	   and	   gives	   a	   different	  importance	   to	   various	   faces	   of	   dice	   (Valery	   1989:	   7)?”	   Exception,	   chance	   and	   act	   (Valéry	  1989:	  175).’	  
FIGURE	  44:	  BRICE	  MARDEN,	  EAGLES	  MERE	  SET,	  5 	  (1996-­‐1997),	  WHITNEY	  MUSEUM	  OF	  AMERICAN	  ART.	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RESISTANCE,	  THE	  EMBODIED	  IMAGE	  AND	  AESTHETICS	  
The	  ART	  OF	  LIVING	  or	   the	  AESTHETICS	  OF	  LIFE.	  LIFE	  AS	  AN	  ARTWORK,	  as	  a	  perfectible	  project	  moving	  towards	  self-­‐refinement	  and	  self-­‐design,	  is	  an	  old	  philosophical	  paradigm.	  	  
An	   old	   philosophical	   paradigm	   that	   is	   rooted	   deeply	   in	   the	   history	   of	   our	   culture.	   Its	   traces	  proliferate	   through	   various	   channels,	   and	   across	  multiple	   fields	   of	   discourse.	   In	   philosophy,	   it	  was	   addressed	   by	   Plato,	   Hegel,	   Nietzsche,	   Kierkegaard,	   or	   Foucault,	   to	   name	   only	   a	   few;	   in	  religion,	  it	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  virtue	  theory,	  and	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  can	  work	  hard	  to	  reach	  a	  more	  perfect	  state	  of	  belief.	  MAN	  as	  self-­‐created	  and	  self-­‐determined,	  autonomous	  being	  is,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  belief	  and	  image,	  the	  brainchild,	  of	  modern	  thinking.	  	  
Give	  body	  to	  this	  thought	  and	  nurture	  it	  to	  postmodern	  sizes	  and	  shapes	  and	  you	  get	  the	  well-­‐designed,	  purposeful,	  practically	  minded	  and	  controlled	  body-­‐ideal	  of	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  postmodern	  society.	  Measured,	  calculated,	  functional,	  cost-­‐effective,	  optimized,	  typified,	  falsified.	  	  
Maximize	  the	  same	  body	  and	  individualize	  its	  purpose.	  Inflate	  its	  frame,	  define	  the	  lines	  of	  its	  parts,	   increase	   its	   mass	   to	   new	   heights	   and	   you	   get	   the	   extravagance	   and	   obviousness	   of	   a	  singular,	  individual	  body,	  with	  no	  other	  function	  than	  the	  display	  of	  pure	  difference,	  as	  image	  and	  in	  image.	  Singular	  in	  its	  conspicuousness,	  unsettling	  in	  its	  aesthetic,	  this	  monstrous,	  exceptional	  embodiment	   is	   simultaneously	   a	   becoming	   alive	   of	   a	   monumental	   inorganic	   mass	   and,	   at	   the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  the	  metamorphosis	  of	  an	  organic	  body	  into	  an	  inorganic	  monumental	  sculpture.	  	  
The	   self-­‐built	   body,	   the	   self-­‐transformed,	   self-­‐negating	   body	   of	   the	   bodybuilder	   exists	   as	   its	  trace.	  The	  trace	  of	  the	  scission	  in	  the	  body	  that	  becomes	  its	  own	  image	  and	  thus	  dissociates	  itself	  from	  and	  in	  its	  body,	  in	  and	  as	  a	  body	  that	  can’t	  be	  seen.	  	  
As	  the	  brain	  is	  able	  to	  auto-­‐affect	  itself,	  while	  the	  self	  remains	  necessarily	  blind	  to	  its	  own	  auto-­‐affection;	   in	  other	  words,	   as	   the	  brain	  has	   “the	  capacity	   to	  experience	   the	  altering	  character	  of	  contact	  with	  itself”,	  while	  the	  self	  remains	  blind	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  this	  capacity	  (Malabou	  2012:	  41-­‐45);	  the	  built	  body,	  auto-­‐affects	  itself	  through	  its	  own	  resistance,	  but,	  it	  remains	  indifferent	  to	  the	  plasticity	  of	  its	  suffering	  and	  /or	  is	  not	  able	  (anymore)	  to	  see	  itself	  doing	  this.	  
The	  built-­‐body	  is	  a	  body	  that	  de-­‐forms	  and	  re-­‐forms	  itself,	  and	  becomes	  a	  conformed	  copy	  of	  its	  self.	  And,	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  becomes	  itself.	  The	  body	  will	  always	  remain	  a	  trace	  in	  this	  trans-­‐formation	  and	  within	   this	  progression	   towards	  an	  advent-­‐body.	  The	  built-­‐body	  creates	  and	  bears	   its	  own	  trace	   from	   within;	   that	   effaces,	   mutates	   and	   commutes	   into	   an	   image—	   an	   image	   (from	   the	  outside),	  through	  and	  within	  which	  the	  body	  itself	   is	  conserved.	  This	   image	  remains	  a	  fiction,	  a	  fiction	  that	  plays	  an	  infinite	  game	  of	  permutations	  on,	  in	  and	  as	  a	  body.	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THE	  BODY	  THAT	   IS	   A	   TRACE.	  AND	  A	   TRACE	   “THAT	   IS	   ‘THIS	   SPACING	  AND	  TEMPORALIZATION	  THAT	  DESTINES	  PRESENCE	  TO	  DIFFER	  IRREDUCIBLE	  FROM	  ITSELF,	  THE	  PLAY	  OF	  NON-­‐COINCIDENCE	  WITH	  ITSELF	  CORRESPOND	  TO	  A	  FORM	   OF	   ‘WRITING’,	   THE	   MOVEMENT	   OF	   A	   ‘TRACE’,	   BUT	   NOT	   A	   FORM.	   The	   trace	   does	   not	   derive	   from	  presence;	   it	  comes	  before	  presence,	   it	   is	  always	  ahead	  of	  what	  it	  traces	  […]	  (Malabou	  2010:	  11,	  emphasis	  my	  own).”	  The	  body,	  here,	  is	  thus	  the	  supplement	  —	  the	  supplement,	  the	  excess	  of	  its	  own	  body-­‐image.	  And,	  as	  a	  supplement,	  it	  only	  exists	  in	  and	  as	  a	  chain	  of	  substitutions	  enacted	  on	  and	  in	  the	  body	  itself.	  	  
The	  transformative	  aspect	  of	  any	  form,	  life	  and	  presence,	  the	  change	  in	  being	  when	  something	  comes	   into	  presence,	  exposes	   the	  plastic	  metabolism	  of	  all	   thought	  and	  being.	  The	  plasticity	  of	  form	  as	   a	   sculptural	   act	   is	   here	  doubled	  by	   its	   ontological	  meaning,	  which	  dis-­‐locates	   all	   unity	  while	  revealing	  the	  schizoid	  consistency	  of	  every	  form	  and	  reality.	  
IT	   IS	   THIS	   BODY	   THAT	   IS	   ONLY	   IMAGE	   THAT	   PROBLEMATIZES	   PRESENTATION	   AND	   REPRESENTATION	   IN	   AN	  IMAGE,	  AS	  AN	  IMAGE.	  	  
If	  this	  body	  is	  only	  image,	  this	  image,	  is	  then,	  the	  (re)presentation	  of	  something,	  something	  that	  is	   absent	   in	   itself,	   but	   that	   is	   presented	   as	   this	   absence.	   Being-­‐image	   is	   being	   in	   the	   present	  (Nancy	  2005),	  but	  the	  body	  of	  the	  bodybuilder	  is	  never	  present,	  it	  is	  always	  either	  YET	  TO	  COME	  OR	  ALREADY	   PAST.	   An	   event,	   a	   time-­‐space	   moment,	   possibly	   recorded,	   conserved,	   in	   a	   physical	  photograph.	  	  
Therefore,	   this	   body	   that	   is	   only	   image	   is	   never	   here,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   never	   nowhere.	   It	   is	   an	  imaginary	   object,	   “a	   non-­‐objective	   modality	   of	   presence	   free	   of	   every	   reference	   and	   referent	  (Malabou	  2011:	  11).”	  This	  body	  that	  is	  only	  image	  is,	  in	  the	  end,	  its	  own	  ornamental	  motor	  of	  its	  own	  mutability.	   BODYBUILDING	   PRACTICES	   ARE	  ORNAMENTAL	   PROCESSES	   AND	   STRUCTURES	   THAT	   PRODUCE	  FORMS	  OF	  KNOWLEDGE.	  THEY	  WORK	  TOWARDS	  THEIR	  OWN	  END	  AND	  DISPLAY.	  THEY	  UNFOLD	  THE	  ORNAMENTAL	  AS	  GIVING	  AND	  RECEIVING	  OF	  FORMS,	  AS	  ANNIHILATION	  AND	  FORMATIVE	  DESTRUCTION.	  	  
The	  ornamental,	  here,	  is	  “the	  becoming	  essential	  of	  accident”	  and,	  at	  once,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  in	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  “becoming	  accidental	  of	  essence”	  (Malabou	  2005:	  XII).	  The	  ornamental	  does	  not	   realise	   itself	   as	   ornament,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   a	   form	   of	   manifested	   (planar)	   surface-­‐embellishment,	   a	   tensely	   contracted	   figure-­‐ground	   collapse.	   It	   is	   the	   activity	   of	   form	   itself	   that	  indicates	  the	  plasticity	  of	  body	  (mass).	  The	  ornamental,	  as	  the	  “becoming	  essential	  of	  accident”	  and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   “the	   becoming	   accidental	   of	   essence”;	   as	   the	   capacity	   of	   substance	   to	  receive	  and	  to	  produce	  form.	  	  
The	  body	   (substance),	   a	   yet	   un-­‐formed	  material	   is	   to	   be	  built	   (massed,	   gathered	  up	   in	   itself,	  penetrated	  with	  self	  and	  within	  itself)	  through	  a	  process	  that	  produces	  changes	  and	  knowledges;	  through	  a	  chain	  of	  painful	  and	  recurring	  substitutions,	  through	  resistance	  and	  in	  the	  alliance	  of	  giving	  and	  receiving	  form.	  Through	  movement.	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Flatness	   gets	   dis-­‐rupted	   by	   cavities	   through	  which	   light	   goes	   into	   shadow,	   and	   shadow	   into	  light;	  wholeness	  divides	  into	  its	  parts,	  and	  parts	  gather	  into	  wholeness;	  volume	  replaces	  planes,	  lines	   cut	   through	   the	   surface;	   soft	   outlines	   get	   tightened	   up	   into	   sharp,	   precise	   striations	  outlining	  hard	  volumes.	  Arbitrary	   features	  become	  necessity,	  and,	  yet	  again,	   remain	  accidental.	  The	  same	  old	  ontological	  game,	  between	  accidents	  and	  necessities,	  is	  here,	  yet	  again	  at	  stake	  in	  a	  hidden	  form.	  
	  Una	   Joc:	   ‘The	   body	   can	   be	   replaced	   with	   any	   other	   material.	   Material	   is	   a	   field	   where	  authority	   blocks	   independent	   experimentation	   less	   than	   in	   many	   other	   fields,	   and	   for	   this	  reason,	  it	  seems	  well	  fitted	  to	  become	  training	  ground	  for	  invention	  and	  speculation.	  	  
Free	   experimentation	  here	   can	   result	   in	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   an	   inner	  urge	   to	   give	   form;	   it	   can	  result	  in	  art,	  or	  in	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  invention	  in	  some	  more	  technical	  way.	  Most	  important	  to	  one’s	  own	  growth,	  is	  to	  see	  oneself	  leave	  the	  safe	  ground	  of	  accepted	  conventions,	  and	  to	  find	  oneself,	  alone	  and	  self-­‐dependent.	  It	   is	  an	  adventure	  which	  can	  permeate	  one’s	  whole	  being.	  Self-­‐confidence	   can	   grow	   and	   find	   its	   potencies	   and	   orient	   itself	   towards	   its	   limits.	   The	  inherent	   laws	  of	  materials	   are	  of	   great	   importance;	   they	   introduce	  boundaries	   for	   a	   task	  of	  free	  imagination	  (Albers	  2000:	  7).	  Freedom,	  real	  freedom,	  is	  at	  its	  best	  when	  it	  finds	  its	  limit	  (peras);	   and	   reflection	   is	   a	   restraint	  on	  chance,	   a	   chance	   to	  which	  one	  adapts	  a	   convention.	  And,	  what	   is	  a	  play	  of	  chance,	   if	  not	   that	  addition	  which	  creates	  an	  expectation,	  and	  gives	  a	  different	  importance	  to	  the	  various	  faces	  of	  dice?’	  	  
It	   can	   happen,	   then,	   that	   the	   germ	   is	   no	  more	   than	   a	  word.	   Things	   that	   exist,	   that	   have	   no	  particular	  use,	  but	  that	  want	  to	  be	  used;	  and	  meanwhile	  they	  drift.	  The	  germ	  may	  be	  no	  more	  than	  a	  fragment	  of	  a	  sentence,	  a	  resistant	  form,	  a	  material	  contact,	  a	  line,	  any	  thing	  that	  seeks	  and	  toils	  to	  create	  its	  own	  justification	  and	  so	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  context,	  a	  subject,	  a	  character,	  an	  individual,	  a	  fragment,	  a	  world	  (Valéry	  1987:	  174).	  	  
‘I	   see	   everything	   and	   I	   see	   nothing.	   I	   have	   several	   levels	   of	   ideas,	   some	   of	   result,	   others	   of	  execution;	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  uncertainty	  dominates	  them	  all;	  and,	  finally,	  there	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  my	  own	  expectation,	  ready	  to	  seize	  on	  the	  already	  realised,	  writable	  elements	  that	  are	  or	  will	  be	  offered,	  even	  those	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  subject	  (Valéry	  1987:	  173).’	  	  
The	   bodybuilder’s	   body	   is	   its	   material,	   its	   field	   of	   invention.	   Though	   many	   react,	   maybe	  positively,	   but	   mainly	   negatively,	   to	   this	   self-­‐invention,	   not	   many	   think	   of	   it	   as	   an	   act	   of	   re-­‐discovery.	  Is	  it	  possible,	  for	  a	  moment,	  to	  forget	  this	  idea	  of	  monstrous	  psychotic	  self-­‐invention,	  and	   remember	   the	   small,	   precise	   steps	  with	  which	   this	  megalomaniac	  project	   of	   self-­‐inventive	  muscular	  hypertrophy	  works?	  	  
When	   working	   out	   the	   bodybuilder	   becomes	   body.	   No,	   when	   working	   out	   the	   bodybuilder	  becomes	  the	  body-­‐part	  that	  is	  being	  worked	  out.	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  legs,	  arms,	  head,	  ears,	  eyes,	  every	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part	  of	  the	  body	  becomes	  chest,	  or	  back,	  or	  biceps,	  or	  triceps,	  or	  glutes,	  or	  hamstrings,	  when	  each	  of	  one	  of	  these	  body	  parts	  are	  being	  worked	  out	  through	  isolated	  or	  compound	  exercises.	  These	  are	  bodies.	  Each	  day	  another	  body	  embodied	  —actively,	  and	  passively.	  	  
Inherent	   material	   laws	   are	   listened	   to,	   from	   the	   innermost	   interior	   tissues,	   carefully	   and	  repeatedly.	   Becoming	   material	   means	   becoming	   its	   material	   law,	   cause	   and	   character.	   In	   this	  process	   of	   auto-­‐affection	   the	  material	   distances	   itself	   from	   itself,	   it	   dislocates.	   Through	   this,	   it	  regulates	  itself	  —and	  may	  also	  start	  to	  work	  against	  itself.	  If	  one	  becomes	  body,	  unshaped	  mass,	  these	   laws	   can	   crystallize	   into	   form,	   only	   after	   their	   complete	   explosion	   and	   dislocation	   into	  micro	  details.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  bodybuilder	  listens	  to.	  This	  is	  the	  precision	  of	  the	  non-­‐language	  of	  the	  silent	  mass.	  In	  the	  gym,	  verbal	  language	  or	  language	  whose	  purpose	  is	  meaning	  occurs,	  if	  at	  all,	  only	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  becoming	  lost	  (Acker	  1997:	  144-­‐145).	  
Against	  the	  usual	  belief	  that	  a	  workout	  involves	  the	  dull	  performance	  of	  an	  endless	  number	  of	  repeated	  movements	  with	  resistance	  from	  A	  to	  B,	  any	  committed	  builder	  who	  respects	  the	  body	  would	  argue	  against	  this,	  by	  giving	  detailed	  explanations	  of	  what	  works	  best	  for	  his	  or	  her	  body	  in	  that	  moment;	  what	   is	   their	  experience	  of	   the	  body-­‐material	   in	  their	  specific	  situation,	  at	   this	  precise	  moment	   in	   time,	   and	   not	   even	   for	   the	  whole	   body	   in	   general,	   but	   for	   individual	   body-­‐parts	  or	  fragments	  of	  body-­‐parts	  (e.g.	  ‘biceps	  head’).	  Body-­‐builders,	  no	  matter	  how	  different	  their	  workouts	  are,	  all	  agree	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  not	  one	  fixed	  law	  inherent	  in	  the	  material	  and	  that	  variation,	  surprise	  and	  chance	  work	  wonders.	  	  
In	   the	   process	   of	   auto-­‐affection,	   the	   body-­‐material	   transforms	   itself	   and	   its	   inherent	   laws.	  Change	  and	  resistance,	  how	  destruction	  happens	  and	  how	  form	  is	  received	  through	  workout,	  rest	  and	  diet,	  is	  a	  constantly	  adjustable	  calculus.	  Equally,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  movement;	  movement	  differs	  in	  itself	  from	  itself,	  as	  does	  its	  duration	  and	  endurance,	  its	  speed	  and	  explosiveness.	  The	  metabolic	  power	  of	  the	  body	  speaks	  a	  language	  that	  is	  constantly	  regenerating	  its	  meanings,	  but	  that	   allows	   resistance-­‐work	   to	  happen	   and	   to	  do	  what	   it	   does	  —	  and	   this	  may	   appear,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  controllable,	  but	  not	  entirely.	  In	  this	  excess	  that	  remains	  uncontrollable	  is	  where	  the	  ornamental	  dwells	  and	  from	  where	  it	  starts	  enfolding.	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
I	  have	  done	  nothing	  but	  portraits.	  Miming	  selves	   in	  and	   for	   themselves,	   inscribed,	  described,	  extracted,	   abstracted—	  nude,	  yet	  dressed	  subjects	  put	   forward,	  one	  after	   the	  other.	   	  My	  vision	  doubts	  and	  hopes	  for	  response,	  it	  doubles.	  It	  turns	  one	  eye	  to	  itself	  and	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  And	  I	  am	  blind	   to	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   image,	   and	   all	  my	   looking	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   find	   a	  mirror.	   No	  mirrors	  without	  others;	  we	  don’t	  exist	  if	  we	  can’t	  be	  seen.	  If	  I	  am	  anything	  in	  the	  picture,	  it	  is	  always	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  screen,	  the	  stain,	  the	  spot.	  And	  yet	  the	  particle	  continues	  to	  turn	  into	  a	  wave	  and	  a	  wave	  keeps	  becoming	  a	  particle.	  It	  does	  not	  go	  beyond,	  it	  cannot	  go	  beyond	  its	  limit.	  It	  queues	  in	  line,	   it	   fills,	   it	   floods;	   and	   waves	   exhale	   in	   deep	   peaks	   what	   they	   inhaled	   before.	   The	   more	  
	   84	  
dramatic	   the	   appearance,	   the	  more	   disturbing	   the	   disappearance.	   Of	   the	   figure	  —	   that	   is.	   The	  whole	   figure	   and	   nothing	   but	   the	   figure,	   since	   it	   is	   the	   figure	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   not	   the	   eye	   in	  isolation	  that	  affects	  the	  look.	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THE	  CARPET	  PARADIGM	  AND	  THE	  BLUE	  TILE	  FROM	  THE	  WALL	  OF	  DAMASCUS,	  THE	  GRID	  AND	  THE	  ARABESQUE	  
WHAT	  IS	  TO	  PAINT	  THE	  ABSOLUTE?	  AND	  SO:	  WHAT	  IS	  ABSOLUTE	  PAINTING?	  TO	  PAINT	  OR	  TO	  FIGURE	  IS	  NO	  LONGER	  TO	  REPRODUCE,	  THEREFORE	  NOT	  EVEN	  TO	  REVEAL,	  BUT	  TO	  PRODUCE	  THE	  EXPOSITION	  OF	  THE	  SUBJECT.	  TO	  PRO-­‐DUCE:	  TO	  BRING	  FORTH,	  TO	  DRAW	  IT	  OUT	  (Nancy	  2006:	  220,	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  	  Every	   image	  [painting]	   is	   in	  some	  way	  a	   ‘portrait’,	  not	   in	   that	   it	  would	  reproduce	   the	  traits	  of	  a	  person,	  but	  in	  that	  it	  pulls	  and	  draws	  (this	  is	  the	  semantic	  and	  etymological	  sense	  of	  the	  word),	  in	  that	  it	  extracts	  something,	  an	  intimacy,	  a	  force.	  And,	  to	  extract	  it,	  it	   subtracts	   or	   removes	   it	   from	   homogeneity;	   it	   distracts	   it	   from	   it,	   distinguishes	   it,	  detaches	  it	  and	  casts	  it	  forth	  (Nancy	  2005:	  4).	  […]	  The	  image	  is	  separated	  in	  two	  ways	  simultaneously.	  It	  is	  detached	  from	  the	  ground	  [fond]	  and	  it	  is	  cut	  out	  within	  a	  ground.	  It	   is	   pulled	   away	   and	   clipped	   and	   cut	   out.	   The	   pulling	   away	   raises	   it	   and	   brings	   it	  forward:	  makes	  it	  a	  ‘fore’,	  A	  SEPARATE	  FRONTAL	  SURFACE,	  whereas	  the	  ground	  itself	  had	  no	  face	  or	  surface.	  The	  cutout	  or	  clipping	  creates	  edges	  in	  which	  the	  image	  is	  framed:	  it	  is	  the	  templum	  marked	  out	  in	  the	  sky	  by	  the	  Roman	  augurs.	  It	  is	  the	  space	  of	  the	  sacred	  or,	  rather,	  the	  sacred	  as	  a	  spacing	  that	  distinguishes	  itself	  (Nancy	  2005:	  7;	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  The	  Distinct	  is	  in	  fact	  none	  of	  that,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  nothing.	  It	  is	  the	  thing	  itself:	  it	  is	  what	  is	  the	  ground	  of	  things,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  things	  that	  are,	  and	  that	  withdraws	  their	  sense	  of	  being	  into	  the	  secret	  from	  which	  all	  the	  senses	  draw	  their	  sensibility	  (Nancy	  2005:	  75).	  [And	  is	  this	  not	  the	  process	  of	  imagination:	  “this	  schematism	  of	  our	  understanding	  with	   regard	   to	  appearances	  and	   their	   form	   [that]	   is	  a	  hidden	  art	   in	   the	  depths	  of	   the	  human	  soul,	  whose	  true	  operations	  we	  can	  divine	  from	  nature	  and	  lay	  unveiled	  before	  our	  eyes	  only	  with	  difficulty	  (Kant	  2008:	  273;	  A,	  142;	  B180-­‐181)?”]	  	  The	  Distinct	  and	  the	  Oscillator	  have	  a	  common	  cause.	  One	  supports	  the	  other,	  which	  in	  turn	  agitates	  the	  first.	  It	  is	  no	  more	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  them	  than	  to	  confuse	  them	  (Nancy	  2005:	  75).	  The	  distinct	  according	  to	  its	  etymology,	  is	  what	  is	  set	  apart	  by	  marks	  (the	  word	  refers	  back	  to	  stigma,	  a	  branding	  mark,	  a	  pinprick	  or	  puncture,	  an	  incision,	  a	  tattoo):	  what	   is	  withdrawn	   and	   set	   apart	   by	   a	   line	   or	   trait,	   by	   being	  marked	   also	   as	  withdrawn	  [retrait]	  (Nancy	  2005:	  7).	  	  The	  first	  mark,	  made	  on	  a	  surface,	  destroys	  its	  virtual	  flatness	  […]	  The	  flatness	  towards	  which	   Modernist	   painting	   orients	   itself	   can	   never	   be	   utter	   flatness	   (Greenberg,	   in	  Knives	  2012:	  13).	  The	  first	  mark	  is	  the	  distinct.	  And	  each	  image	  is	  a	  finite	  cutting	  out,	  by	  the	  mark	  of	  distinction.	  Each	  image	  is	  a	  singular	  variation	  on	  the	  totality	  of	  distinct	  sense	  —	  of	  the	  sense	  that	  does	  not	  link	  together	  the	  order	  of	  significations.	  This	  sense	  is	  infinite,	  and	  each	  variation	  is	  itself	  singularly	  infinite	  (Nancy	  2005:	  12).	  Even	  if	   flatness	  is,	   for	  one	  reason	  or	  another	  (that	  of	  medium-­‐specificity	  and	  self-­‐criticism,	  or	  that	  of	  a	  decorative	  flatness	  that	  opens	  up	  into	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  illusion-­‐space	  in	  an	  image),	  a	  space-­‐modus	  of	  the	  painted	  image	  in	  Modernist	  painting,	  we	  still	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  any	  kind	   of	  mark	   on	   such	   a	   flat	   surface,	   on	   a	   pictorial	   plane,	  will	   nevertheless	   lead	   absolutely,	   not	  only	  to	  the	  purity	  of	  medium	  specificity,	  but	  also	  to	  distinction	  and	  composition,	  to	  participation.	  	  
Traditional	   Western	   painting,	   especially	   Renaissance	   painting	   operated	   under	   the	   visual	  ideology	   of	   the	   congruity	   principle	   between	   a	   Newtonian	   box-­‐space	   and	   the	   pictorial	   space,	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which	  had	   to	  be	  used	   in	   such	   a	  way,	   that	   it	  would	   create	   the	   illusion,	   sense	  or	  depth	  of	   a	   real	  perspectival	  space.	  The	  tension	  between	  real	  space	  and	  pictorial	  space	  in	  image	  is	  controlled	  by	  the	   figure-­‐ground	   relation	   which	   regulates,	   through	   an	   ornamental	   process	   (that	   does	   not	  hypostatise	   itself	   as	   ornament;	   Hetzer	   1978),	   ontologically	   and	   symbolically	   the	   different	  imaginative	  planes,	  in	  which	  schemata	  of	  representation	  and	  perception,	  visual	  expectations	  and	  aspects	  of	  a	  visual	  habitus	  and	  visual	  ideologies	  get	  woven	  into	  flat	  all-­‐over	  pattern	  (Brett	  2005:	  121).	  When	  the	  picture	  plane	  becomes	  dominant	  over	  illusionistic	  effects	  than	  the	  pictorial	  field	  operates	   within	   a	   flatness	   that	   demands	   an	   integral	   planarity	   of	   all	   pictorial	   form	   (Masheck	  1976).	   This	   ornamental	   space	   is	   a	   relational	   space,	   of	   rapport,	   that	   does	   not	   figure	   something	  simply	   in	   front	   of	   a	   ground,	   but	   with	   and	   through	   the	   ground.	   And,	   not	   only	   is	   its	   spatiality	  constantly	  re-­‐con-­‐figured	  with,	  through	  and	  in	  con-­‐tact	  with	  the	  ground,	  but	  also	  its	  temporality,	  which	   is	  effectively	  an	   infinite	  series	  of	  regenerative	   instants.	  The	  dynamic	  polarity	  of	  a	   figure-­‐ground,	   or	   distinct-­‐oscillator	   relation,	   or	   a	   quadripartite	   tension	   figure-­‐ground-­‐nonfigure-­‐nonground	  (Krauss	  1994)	  structure	  —	  it	  doesn’t	  really	  matter.	  In	  the	  end,	  what	  HAS	  TO	  be	  given	  necessarily	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   disunity	   in	   unity	   (and	   thus,	   ultimately	   a	   consciousness)	   of	   a	  ‘pattern’	  on	  a	  ground.	  This	  is	  what	  constitutes	  the	  ornamental	  space,	  while	  the	  ornamental	  time	  is	  epitomized	  in	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  relational	  elements,	  through	  movement	  and	  cessation,	  as	  constant	  re-­‐actualisations-­‐modes.	  This	  ornamental	  space	  is	  an	  intermediary,	  internal	  plane	  in	  which	   sur-­‐face	   and	   space,	   movement,	   still-­‐stand	   or	   simultaneity	   co-­‐exist,	   defying	   an	   either-­‐or	  logic,	  in	  which	  either	  part	  would	  be	  denied	  and	  sacrificed	  for	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  other	  —	  as	  is	  the	  case,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  famous	  paradoxical	  Duck-­‐Rabbit	  figuration,	  in	  which,	  one	  can	  see	  the	  duck	  only	  by	  denying	  the	  rabbit	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Any	  figuration	  ex-­‐poses	  itself,	  within	  itself,	  in	  an	  ornamental	  space	  and	  is	  a	  ‘as-­‐well-­‐as’	  process,	  a	  daimonic	  act,	  an	  obvious	  demon,	  a	  monster,	  —	  half-­‐man,	  half-­‐god.	  	  
Absolute	   painting	   in	   this	   sense	  might	   be	   the	   absolute	   form	   of	   self-­‐relation	  mediated	  through	   a	   departure	   from	   the	   self	   (Nancy	   2006:	   226),	   not	   to	   reproduce,	   not	   even	   to	  reveal,	  but	  to	  produce	  the	  ex-­‐position	  of	  the	  subject.	  To	  produce	  it:	   to	  bring	  it	   forth,	   to	  draw	   it	  out	   (Nancy	  2006:	  226),	   to	   articulate	  a	  presence	  or	   the	  pre-­‐sense	  of	  presence	  itself	   (Nancy	   2006:	   234).	   [In	   this	   ornamental	   space	   of	   the	   in-­‐between	   [Binnen-­‐raum;	  
Zwischen-­‐raum],	  presence	  is	  por-­‐trait	  and	  drawn	  to	  itself	  (Nancy	  2006:	  237)].	  	  The	   atmospheric	   INFINITE	  RAPPORT,	   the	   possibility	   of	   infinite	   growth	   in	   all	   directions	  —which	  Krauss	   addresses	   through	   the	   schema	  of	   THE	  GRID	   and	  as	   a	   centrifugal	   aspect	  of	   a	  work	  —	   is	   a	  characteristic	  of	  ornamental	  space.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  said	  here	  that	  it	  is	  ornament	  which,	  contrariwise	  to	   its	   traditional	   understanding,	   instantiates	   itself	   as	   an	   autonomous	   form	   of	   perception	   that	  enables	   not	   only	   a	   sensory,	   but	   also	   a	   cognitive	   understanding	   of	   the	   imaginative	   space	   of	   the	  image,	  and	  of	   the	  constant	  relational	  re-­‐calculation	  of	  different	  modus	  operandi	   in	  the	  pictorial	  field:	  on	  a	   first,	  conventional	   level,	   the	  perspectival	  box-­‐space;	  on	  a	  second,	   ‘decorative’	   level,	  a	  two	  dimensional	  flat	  space	  with	  a	  very	  short	  depth	  created	  through	  the	  raising	  of	  a	  plane	  before	  or	   in	   front	  of	  another	  (ground)	  plane	  (which	   is	  behind	   it)	  without	  any	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  (and	  this	  is	  a	  case	  not	  only	  for	  decorative	  (wall)	  patterns,	  but	  also	  happening	  when	  only	  one	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single	  mark	  is	  made	  —even	  in	  Fontana’s	  case,	  of	  cuts	  in	  the	  canvas)	  and,	  on	  a	  third	  level,	  an	  in-­‐between	  space	   that	   implies	  a	  series	  of	  planes	  placed	  ONE	  IN	  FRONT	  OF	  THE	  OTHER,	  as	  much	  as,	  ONE	  NEXT	  TO	  THE	  OTHER,	   in	   an	   ‘as-­‐well-­‐as’	   relation	   between	   the	   different	   planes,	   between	   figure	   and	  ground,	   which	   ARE	   not,	   but	   becoming	   distinct	   in	   a	   chain	   of	   differing	   instantiations.	   Strictly	  speaking,	   there	   is	   no	   figure	   and	   no	   ground,	   in	   this	   case,	   but	   the	   infinite	   latent	   potential	   of	  becoming	   and	   the	   instantiations	   of	   this	   potential	   in	   contact	   with	   a	   subject,	   a	   sub-­‐iectum	   or	   a	  subjectivity	   —	   or	   whatever	   is	   now	   in	   their	   place.	   In	   between	   these	   space-­‐figures,	   and	   their	  specific	  co-­‐relative	  temporalities,	  the	  atrophy	  and	  hypertrophy	  of	  one	  or	  the	  other	  regulates	  the	  infinitely	  finite	  imaginative	  space	  within	  an	  image.	  Depth-­‐space	  with	  its	  hierarchical,	  perspectival,	  fixed	   structure	   of	   parts-­‐to-­‐whole	   relations,	   and	   co-­‐existence-­‐space	   of	   all	   parts	   on	   the	   same	  meaning-­‐	   and	   value	   level,	   can	   be	   simultaneously	   and	   antagonistically	   realised	   within	   the	  ontological	  dimension	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  ornamental	  space.	  
Infinite	  rapport,	  parallelism	  of	  contradictory	  elements,	  all-­‐over	  coverage	  of	  a	  flat	  sur-­‐face,	  the	  equal	  value	  given	  to	  all	  elements	  and	  placing	  the	  primary	  burden	  of	  interpreting	  and	  enjoying	  an	  image,	   object	   or	   monument	   on	   the	   viewer-­‐user	   (Grabar	   1987:	   180)	   are	   characteristics	   of	   the	  arabesque	   as	   an	   idea	   and	  ornamental	   form	   (in	  Grabar’s	   specific	   understanding	  of	   ORNAMENTAL:	  carrying	  beauty	  and	  giving	  pleasure,	  an	  essentially	  redundant	  form	  that	  trans-­‐forms	  anything	  it	  touches).	  The	  figure-­‐ground	  inversion	  and	  the	  dynamic	  oscillation	  between	  the	  two	  is	  recognized	  as	   an	   invention	   of	   Islamic	   art	   (not	   in	   terms	   of	   new	   forms,	   but	   of	   new	   ways	   to	   combine	   and	  compose	  already	  existent	  basic	   forms	  within	   their	  potencies	   for	  new	  variants),	  whose	   creative	  attitudes	  manifested	  best	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  arabesque:	  “the	  very	  notion	  of	  background	  is	  open	  to	  doubt,	  as	  almost	  all	  motifs	  appear	  on	  the	  same	  level	  of	  perceptibility”	  (Grabar	  2006:	  20).	  Direct	  visibility	  and	  immediacy	  of	  interpretation	  are	  being	  avoided	  and	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  meaning	  that	  is	  transmitted	  —	  the	  creative	  impulse	  in	  Islamic	  culture	  was	  not	  to	  tell	  something,	  but	  to	  make	  life	  and	  its	  activities	  more	  beautiful.	  Early	  Islamic	  art,	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  was	  mainly	  secular	  and	  popular,	  modest	  and	  utilitarian	   in	  character.	  This	   can	  be	  seen	  best	   in	  what	   is	   recognized	  as	   its	  main	  form	  of	  manifestation,	   in	  the	  HIDDEN	  architecture	  of	   interior	  spaces	  that	  truly	  exists	  not	   in	  the	  collective	  experience	  and	  not	  when	  seen	  as	  a	  monument	  or	  symbol	  visible	  to	  all	  from	  all	  sides,	  but	   through	   how	   it	   exposes	   itself	   in	   private,	   in	   the	   inward-­‐turned	   perception,	   when	   entered,	  penetrated	  and	  experienced	  from	  within.	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FIGURE	   45:	   SHEIKH	   LOTF	   ALLAH	   MOSQUE,	   ISFAHAN,	   1618.	   AVAILABLE	   FROM	   URL	  
HTTP://TAGHRIBNEWS.COM/VGLIWPAZRT1AUZ2..TT9KLUCKIPTL.X.HTML#2.	  [ACCESSED	  OCTOBER	  2013].	  
It	  is	  a	  curious	  peculiarity	  of	  much	  of	  Islamic	  art	  (with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  Ottoman	  architecture)	   that	  even	   its	  grandiose	  architectural	  compositions	  can	  best	  be	  seen	  and	  appreciated,	   not	   as	   a	   collective	   experience,	   but	   as	   a	   lonely	   and	   private	   one.	   The	  understanding	   of	   a	   stalactite	   façade	   with	   its	   almost	   infinite	   subdivisions	   cannot	   be	  shared,	  just	  as	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  endless	  details	  of	  a	  rug	  and	  of	  the	  subtleties	  of	  a	  miniature	  or	  the	  use	  of	  an	  ewer	  or	  of	  a	  plate	  are	  individual,	  private	  activities.	  […]	  It	  is	  as	  though	   the	   point	   of	   anonymous	   (collective)	   artistic	   creativity	   were	   to	   compel	   the	  viewer	  or	  user	  to	  withdraw	  within	  himself,	  to	  meditate	  on	  his	  own,	  in	  effect	  to	  find	  his	  own	  explanation	  of	  the	  work	  (of	  art)	  or	  to	  discover	  in	  it	  an	  inspiration	  for	  his	  own	  life	  (Grabar	  2006:	  28).	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FIGURE	  46:	  ARDABIL	   CARPET,	   10.51M	   X	  5.34M,	  VICTOR	   AND	  ALBERT	  MUSEUM.	   INSCRIPTION	   AT	   ONE	   END	  
OF	  THE	  CARPET:	  “I	  HAVE	  NO	  REFUGE	  IN	  THE	  WORLD	  OTHER	  THAN	  THY	  THRESHOLD./THERE	  IS	  NO	  PROTECTION	  
FOR	  MY	  HEAD	  OTHER	  THAN	  THIS	  DOOR./THE	  WORK	  OF	  THE	  SLAVE	  OF	  THE	  THRESHOLD	  MAQSUD	  OF	  KASHAN	  IN	  
THE	  YEAR	  946.”	  
	   90	  
FIGURE	  47:	  DETAIL	  OF	  FIG.	  46. 
One	  gets	  immersed	  in	  an	  ‘enclosed	  court’,	  with	  almost	  no	  outlook.	  In	  a	  manifold	  complexity	  of	  sensory	  perceptions	   coming	   from	   the	   sky,	   from	  an	  outer	  world,	   to	   imagine	  one’s	  own	  real	  and	  concrete	  world,	   and	  one	  gets	   arrested	   in	   this	  haphazard,	   indirect	   circulation	   that	   takes	  one	  by	  surprise	   in	   never-­‐ending	   rhythmic	   circles	   and	   virtual	   sur-­‐faces.	   It	   is	   not	   clear	  meaning	   that	   is	  transmitted,	   but	   the	   embodied	   perception	   of	   BLIND	   WRITING,	   the	   corporeal	   experience	   of	  simultaneous	  centrifugal	  and	  centripetal	  forces.	  	  
Either	  text	  is	  distinguished	  in	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  image	  and	  this	  image	  oscillates	  on	  the	  former’s	  face,	  or	  else	  the	  image	  is	  distinguished	  between	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  text	  and	  this	  text	   oscillates	   throughout.	  The	   image	   scintillates,	   and	   the	   text	   gives	  off	   a	   flat	  muffled	  sound.	  The	  image	  is	  mute,	  and	  the	  text	  crackles	  with	  noise.	  Or	   it	   is	  the	  inverse,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  the	  same	  movement.	  Each	  one,	  in	  the	  end,	  is	  the	  distinct	  and	  the	  oscillator	  of	   the	   other.	   Each	   is	   the	   ekphrasis	   of	   the	   other	   while	   also	   being	   its	   illustration,	   its	  illumination.	   Ekphrasis	   draws	   a	   phrase	   from	   its	   other,	   just	   as,	   from	   its	   other,	  illumination	  draws	  a	  sight.	  A	  phrase	  image	  and	  a	  sight	  of	  sense	  (Nancy	  2005:	  75).	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FIGURE	  48:	   PAINTING	   ON	   PAPER,	   45	   X	   50	   CM,	   15TH	   CENTURY;	   IT	   CONTAINS	   THE	   NAME	   OF	  ALI	   ROTATED	   IN	  
FOUR	  QUADRANTS	  AND	  DEPICTED	  IN	  EVERY	  ONE	  OF	  THE	  COLOURS	  USED	  IN	  THE	  PAINTING	  EXCEPT	  FOR	  THE	  RED	  
BACKGROUND	  (GRABAR	  1992:	  47-­‐48;	  120,	  PLATE	  3.).	  
At	  this	  level	  we	  can	  modify	  Derrida’s	  assumption	  of	  writing	  as	  a	  signifier	  of	  the	  signifier	  of	   the	   signified.	   In	   some	   written	   objects,	   like	   the	   Ali	   page	   (pl.3)	   […]	   the	   primary	  signified	  is	  not	  the	  word	  or	  combinations	  of	  words	  that	  was	  written,	  but	  the	  artfulness	  of	   the	   craftsman,	   the	   imagination	   of	   the	   artist,	   or	   an	   inversion	   of	   esthetic	   behaviour	  possible	   in	   a	   post-­‐Bakhtian	   world,	   the	   pleasure	   of	   emotional,	   intellectual,	   sensuous	  reactions	  by	  today’s	  viewer,	  regardless	  of	  the	  correctness	  or	  even	  appropriateness	  for	  the	   considered	  work	  of	   art,	   projected	  onto	   the	  object	   as	   examples	   of	   the	  pleasure	  or	  involvement	  of	  all	  viewers	  since	  the	  object’s	  creation	  (Grabar	  1992:	  115).”	  The	  attainment	  of	  a	  manifest	  planarity	  (Flächenerscheinung)	  and	  pictorial	  “farsightedness”	  that	  flattens	   what	   is	   seen	   into	   “optically	   farsighted	   planar	   impressions”	   (optisch	   fernsichtige	  
Flächeneindrücke	  –	  Riegl,	  Masheck	  2001:	   {167}),	   long	  before	   its	  modern	  and	  modernist	   revive,	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was	   the	   structuring	  principle	   in	  medieval	   and	  Byzantine	  painting,	   as	  demonstrated	  by	  Riegl	   in	  
Spätrömische	  Kunstindustrie	  (1901).	  	  
When	  modern	  painting	   started	   to	   imagine	   itself	   as	   flat	   two-­‐dimensional	   surface,	   through	   the	  old	   text(ile)-­‐metaphor	   of	   the	   WOVEN	   TEXTURE,	   the	   ORIENTAL	   CARPET	   with	   its	   system	   of	   flat	  embellishment	  and	  colourful	   interlacing	  based	  on	  centralized	  motifs	  boxed	   into	  compartments,	  was	   the	  preferred	  analogy	   (to	  wallpaper-­‐design).	  However	   its	  ornamental	   characteristics	  were	  gradually	  and	  increasingly	  neglected,	  until	  being	  entirely	  ignored	  in	  the	  modernist	  interpretation.	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘Cultural	   collages,	   fragments	   appropriated	   and	   embedded	   into	   another	   context	   are	  interesting	   traces	   to	   follow,	   not	   in	   order	   to	   decide	   upon	   their	   correctness,	   but	   in	   order	   to	  experience	  the	  webbing	  of	  contingent	  similarities	  and	  associations.	  The	  arabesque	  itself	  relies	  on	  such	  appropriations	  and	  imports	  from	  different	  cultures,	  regions	  or	  time	  periods.	  
	  FIGURE	   49:	   THE	   LINDSCHAN	   MOSQUE	   (IN	  
ISFAHAN),	   12TH	   CENTURY,	   STUCCO	   DECORATION	   REPEATING	   THE	   NAME	   OF	   THE	   PROPHET,	   AROUND	   1300,	  
(GRABAR	  2006:	  74,	  FIG.	  6).	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FIGURE	  50:	  (GRABAR	  1992:	  121,	  PLATE	  4.).	  
	  FIGURE	   51:	   PIET	   MONDRIAN,	  
OCEAN	  AND	  STARS 	  (1915),	  (HOFMANN	  (2001),	  282,	  ILLUS.	  1).	  
	   94	  
THE	  CARPET	  PARADIGM	  is	  a	  modern	  construct	  of	  Western	  painting,	  a	  model	  generated	  in	  Western	  art	  history	  from	  its	  perspective	  and	  for	  its	  specific	  needs	  and	  through	  an	  influence	  coming	  more	  from	   design-­‐theory	   than	   an	   interest	   in	   Oriental	   carpets	   and	   what	   they	   manifested.	   Joseph	  Masheck	  published	  in	  September	  1976	  in	  Arts	  Magazine	  the	  essay	  entitled	  The	  Carpet	  Paradigm,	  which	  “was	  something	  of	  a	  history-­‐of-­‐ideas	  inquiry	  into	  carpet,	  textile	  and	  the	  related	  figures	  for	  integral	  flatness	  in	  surface	  design	  as	  they	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  early	  modern	  design	  movement	  to	  serve	   the	   modernist	   cause”	   (Masheck	   2009).	   The	   phrase	   was	   proposed	   to	   describe	   the	  enthusiasm	  and	  fascination	  for	  Oriental	  carpets	  among	  modern	  artists	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  These	  carpets	  seemed	  to	  provide	  a	  model	  for	  the	  pictorial	  space	  and	  colour	  combination,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	   figure-­‐ground	  rapports,	  which	   informed	  and	  preceded	  the	  20th	  century	   theories	   of	   pictorial	   FLATNESS.	   In	   Post-­‐impressionist	   circles,	   to	   compare	   painting	   to	  textiles	  was	  a	  singular	  point	  of	  praise;	  and	  the	  equivalence	  of	  the	  ‘decorative’	  and	  the	  ‘fine’	  arts	  was	   a	   topic	   that	   was	   gaining	   more	   and	   more	   terrain	  —	   this,	   until	   the	   modernist	   ideology	   of	  medium-­‐specificity,	  self-­‐criticism	  and	  ornament	  debate	  set	   in	  and	  imposed	  a	  radical	  asceticism.	  But	  in	  1891,	  Oscar	  Wilde	  still	  wrote	  in	  The	  Picture	  of	  Dorian	  Gray:	  	  
In	  the	  flowerless	  carpets	  of	  Persia,	  tulip	  and	  rose	  blossom	  indeed,	  and	  are	  lovely	  to	  look	  on,	   though	   they	   are	   not	   reproduced	   in	   visible	   shape	   and	   line	   …	   Nor,	   in	   its	   primary	  aspect,	  has	  a	  painting,	  for	  instance,	  any	  more	  spiritual	  message	  or	  meaning	  for	  us	  than	  a	  blue	  tile	  form	  the	  wall	  of	  Damascus	  (Brett	  2005:209).	  	  It	   had	   become	   commonplace	   to	   treat	   of	   carpets	   and	   tiles	   in	   the	   same	   sentence	   as	  paintings.	  This	  signified	   the	  overthrow	  of	  academic	  precedents	  —	  that	   taste	  could	  be	  formed	   in	   manufactures,	   and	   that	   colore	  had	   won	   over	   disegno.	   With	   this	   went	   the	  rejection	  of	  narrative	  values	  in	  painting,	  so	  that	  hitherto	  more	  humble	  genres	  such	  as	  still-­‐life	  gained	  prestige	  over	  historical	  subjects;	  narrative	  meaning	  was	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  musical	   analogy	   and	   symbolism	   […]	   [and]	   in	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   of	   1900,	   [the	  motto	  became]	  […]	  ut	  pictura	  musica	  […](Brett	  2005:	  210).	  Una	  Joc:	  ‘The	  conclusion	  has	  to	  be	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  base	  a	  history	  of	  modern	  painting	  upon	  the	  development	  of	  painting’s	  own	  unique	  means	  and	  conditions	  of	  existence,	  autonomously	  self-­‐generated	   and	   independent	   of	   other	   realms,	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   historically	   thin	   and	  theoretically	  restricted.	  Modern	  painting	  largely	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  discourse	  of	  decoration,	  both	  in	  its	  formal	  means	  and	  its	  theory	  of	  meaning	  (Brett	  2005:	  210).’	  
The	   connection	   between	   19th	   century	   painting	   and	   modernist	   criticism	   was	   the	   Kantian	  assumption	  that	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  is	  detached	  from	  social	  function	  —interesseloses	  Wohlgefallen	  —	  which,	  Brett	  rightly	  writes,	  seems	  (falsely)	  to	  elevate	  the	  blue	  Damascus	  tile,	  while	   it	   just	  as	  falsely	  debases	  the	  decorative	  aspect	  of	  painting.	  Greenberg	  wrote	  about	  Picasso	  that	  it	  loads	  the	  picture	  with	  “decorative	  space	  fillers”	  —	  (Often	  Orientalists	  interpreted	  the	  ornamentalization	  of	  Islamic	  art	  as	  the	  drive	  of	  a	  horror	  vacui,	  the	  fear	  for	  empty	  space,	  which	  in	  Ancient	  Greece,	  in	  the	  Geometric	   Age,	   was	   considered	   a	   stylistic	   element	   of	   all	   art,	   but	   which	   received	   increasingly	  negative	   connotations	   within	   the	   Vitruvian-­‐Ciceronian	   discourse	   of	   decorum)	   —	   that	   are	  “cramping	   instead	   of	   liberating”	   (Picasso	   at	   Seventy	   Five,	   1958,	   in:	   Brett	   2005:	   210)	   and	   that	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“collage	   declined	   into	   decoration”	   (The	   Pasted	   Paper	   Revolution,	   1958,	   in:	   Brett	   2005:	   210).	  Greenberg	  explains	  his	  argument	  for	  the	  deprecation	  of	  the	  decorative:	  	  
“Solo	   works	   of	   art	   are	   meant	   to	   be	   looked	   at	   FOR	   THEIR	   OWN	   SAKE	   (and)	   WITH	   FULL	  ATTENTION,	   and	   not	   as	   adjuncts,	   incidental	   aspects,	   or	   settings	   of	   things	   other	   than	  themselves	  […]	  they	  CHALLENGE	  OUR	  CAPACITY	  FOR	  DISINTERESTED	  ATTENTION	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  more	  concentrated	  etc.	  (The	  Case	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  1959	  in:	  Brett	  2005:	  210;	  emphasis	  my	  own).”	  	  This	   seems	   to	  be	   the	  distinction	  between	  abstract	   art	   and	  decoration,	   but	   this	   argument	  not	  only	   presupposes	   a	   priori	   that	   the	   two	   are	   in	   fact	   distinct,	   but	   it	   also	   de-­‐forms	   the	   Kantian	  argument	  which	  speaks	  about	   “interesseloses	  Wohlgefallen”	  with	  respect	   to	  Nature,	  and	  not	   to	  culture,	  that	   is	  very	  much	  created	  for	  our	  own	  purpose	  and	  in	  which	  we	  invest	  a	   lot	  of	   interest	  (Brett	  2005:	  210-­‐211).	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘A	  crucial	  juncture	  here:	  the	  painting	  that	  becomes	  in	  the	  studio	  and	  the	  painting	  that	  becomes	   outside	   the	   studio	   are	   two	   distinct	   things	   (or	   maybe	   one	   thing	   with	   a	   cut	   in	   the	  middle?)	   And	   then	   there	   is	   the	   painting	   in	  my	   head,	  which	   I	   can	   see,	   but	  which	  will	   never	  happen,	  and	  the	  one	  I	  cannot	  see,	  which	  will	  happen.	  And,	  without	  falling	  prey	  this	  time	  to	  any	  thoughtful	   entanglement:	   is	   not	   every	   painting	   I	   ever	  made	   the	   ONE	   painting,	   as	   Balzac	   let	  Frenhofer	  believe?’	  	  
Painting	   in	   the	   studio	   and	  painting	  outside	   the	   studio	   are	  distinct,	   yet	   the	   same.	  Outside	   the	  studio	  and	  the	  art	  world,	  painting’s	  existence	  is	  most	  often	  intermingled	  with	  an	  idea	  of	  lack	  —	  of	  colour,	  of	  an	  object	  to	  fill	  an	  empty	  space,	  of	  a	  (taxonomic)	  presence	  in	  a	  collection,	  of	  value,	  of	  resemblance.	   Outside	   of	   the	   studio	   painting	   is	   an	   ornament	   of	   life	   “because,	   as	   at	   best	   in	   the	  ‘applied’	  or	  decorative	  arts	   themselves,	   it	  magnifies	   (or	  celebrates)	  qualities	  already	  present	   in	  material	  life	  and	  work	  (Masheck	  2009).”	  Painting	  in	  the	  studio,	  on	  another	  hand,	  is	  ornament	  (in	  its	  traditional	  pejorative	  sense)	  because	  it:	  	  
Is	  but	  a	  guiled	  shore	  To	  a	  most	  dangerous	  sea;	  the	  beauteous	  scarf	  	  Veiling	  an	  Indian	  beauty;	  in	  a	  word,	  
The	  seeming	  truth	  which	  cunning	  times	  put	  on	  To	  entrap	  the	  wisest	  	  
(Shakespeare,	  The	  Merchant	  of	  Venice	  in	  Grabar	  1992:	  26).	  
“The	   seeming	   truth	   which	   cunning	   times	   put	   on	   /	   To	   entrap	   the	   wisest”	   is	   very	  much	  what	  Krauss	   laid	   bare	   in	   the	   Optical	   Unconscious:	   the	   equation	   of	   painting	   with	   perception,	   that	  becomes	  disembodied	  personality,	  and	  flatness	  led	  to	  the	  repression	  of	  those	  aspects	  of	  painting	  that	  were	  impurely	  mixed	  with	  literature,	  dream,	  visual	  puns,	  and	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  depiction	  that	   were	   not	   part	   of	   ‘art’	   (such	   as	   advertising),	   and	   of	   those	   works	   of	   art	   which	   used	   found	  objects	  and	  images,	  such	  as	  scientific	  illustration	  (Brett	  2005:	  211).	  But	  also,	  the	  lure	  of	  a	  theory	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that	   institutes	   itself	   in	   reaction	   to	   something	   that	   it	   in	   fact	   revives,	   a	   new	   academicism	   that	  represses	  its	  origins,	  and	  the	  lure	  of	  an	  empty	  historical	  formalism	  itself.	  
In	  another	  trail	  of	  thoughts,	  if	  painting	  comes	  from	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  image,	  from	  the	  distinct,	  desiring	   to	  be	  desirable,	   penetrated,	   touched,	   to	   find	   its	   ‘seamăn’,	   its	   being-­‐alike,	   from	  another	  world,	   or	   from	   the	   sky,	   then	   it	  most	   definitely	   IS	   (also)	   an	   ornament.	   The	   distinction	   between	  (painted)	  image	  and	  ornament	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  not	  clear,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  fixed.	  	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘My	  undecidability	   in	   the	  plasticity	  –	  ornamental	  couple,	   the	   fact	   that	   I	  would	  even	  end	  up	  with	  a	  couple	  to	  uncouple,	  haunts	  me.	  And	  before	  it	  gets	  forgotten,	  as	  it	  often	  happens	  with	  most	  unexpected	  thoughts,	  I	  have	  to	  write	  this	  down	  here,	  in	  such	  a	  manner,	  that	  at	  least	  once	   in	   the	   text,	   something	   was	   mentioned	   about	   this:	   plasticity,	   Malabou	   writes	   (and	   to	  adjourn	  my	  trail	  of	   thoughts	   in	  this	  moment	  to	   find	  out	  where	  exactly	  she	  did	  this,	  so	  that	   I	  can	  guard	  the	  truthful	  authority	  of	  my	  argument	  would	  be	  a	  crime	  and	  I	  have	  to	  live	  with	  the	  guilt	   of	   not	   committing	   it!)	   has	   the	   following	   significations:	   it	   designates	   the	   capacity	   to	  receive	   form	   (reception),	   the	   power	   to	   give	   form	   (donation),	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  deflagration	   or	   explosion	   of	   every	   form	   (annihilation).	   These	   were	   the	   first	   three	  significations	   analysed	   in	   her	   earlier	   books.	   Later	   she	   focused	   on	   a	   fourth	   signification,	  discovered	  through	  drifting	   in	  psychoanalysis,	  cellular	  biology	  and	  neuroscience,	   that	  of	   the	  creation	  through	  the	  irrevocable	  destruction	  of	  form	  —that	  of	  negative,	  destructive	  plasticity.	  In	   the	   first	   three	  meanings	  of	   plasticity	   form	   retains	   in	   itself	   the	  possibility	   to	   return	   to	   its	  initial	  form,	  while	  the	  destructive	  negative	  plasticity	  completely	  and	  absolutely	  destroys	  any	  such	  possibility,	  creating	  an	  entirely	  new	  identity	  without	  past	  or	  future	  (Alzheimer	  disease).	  	  
This	   appears	   now	   as	   the	   suture	   of	   my	   haunting:	   the	   ornamental	   is	   plasticity	   that	   leads	   to	  something	  else,	  it	  doesn’t	  come	  back	  to	  itself	  as	  itself,	  but	  as	  other,	  that	  it,	  itself,	  is.	  For	  some	  this	   is	   negative	   and	   destructive,	   for	   others	   it	   is	   positive	   and	   it	   implies	   effective	   completion	  (that	  still	  remains	  transitory),	  even	  transfer	  of	  sense	  and	  meaning	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  And	  this	   is	  why	  the	   image	   is	  ornamental:	   “—	  because	   the	   image,	   then,	   is	  above	  all	   the	   there	  of	  a	  
beyond.	   It	   is	  not	   at	   all	   its	   ‘representation’:	   it	   is	   thinking	  as	   the	   effectivity	  of	   a	  place	  opening	  
itself	  to	  presence	  (Nancy	  2005:	  125).”	  The	  ornamental	  is	  the	  flight	  home,	  the	  interval,	  the	  in-­‐between,	   the	   “infinitesimal	   calculus	   of	   a	   passage	   to	   the	   limit”	   (Nancy	   2005:	   111),	   of	   the	  transformational	  mask,	  between	  an	  interior	  and	  an	  exterior	  of	  form,	  between	  faces	  that	  make	  a	  sur-­‐face	  possible.	  Plasticity	  spaces	  itself	  from	  within	  or	  without,	  the	  ornamental	  slips	  in,	   it	  buffers,	  filters,	  fills,	  spaces,	  attracts,	  expels,	  exhales,	  proofs,	  orients	  …	  Plasticity	  implies	  a	  host	  or	  a	  parasite	  and	  movement,	  the	  ornamental	  multiplicity	  and	  spacing	  —	  and,	  plasticity.’	  
Thinking	   about	   destructive	   plasticity	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   art.	   This	   permanent	   dislocation	   of	   one	  identity	  through	  which	  a	  new,	  completely	  alien	   identity	   is	   formed,	  that	   is	  neither	  the	  sublation,	  nor	  the	  compensatory	  replica	  of	  the	  old	  form,	  but	  literally	  a	  form	  of	  destruction,	  which	  remains	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ultimately	   an	   adventure	   of	   form	   (Malabou	   2012:	   18).	   We	   have	   to	   pause	   and	   reflect	   what	   this	  means	  for	  art,	   if	   it	  happens,	  how	  it	  happens	  and	  if	  not,	  what	  if	   it	  would	  happen?	  (Ready-­‐mades,	  icons,	  museum-­‐marketing	  objects,	   souvenirs,	   performance-­‐objects	   during	   the	  performance	   and	  after,	  installation	  objects	  —	  what	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  artwork’s	  previous	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  existence?	  Is	  the	  image	  image	  or	  image	  plus	  its	  otherness,	  non-­‐image?)	  	  
Painting	   and	   text	  —	   ut	   pictura	  poesis	  —	   and	   text	   (Latin	   texere,	   to	   weave)	   and	   textiles,	   thus	  painting	   and	   textiles,	   are	   at	   least	   terminologically	   interlaced	   with	   each	   other	   since	   ever.24	  “Consider	  painting	  once	  again:	  pingo	  means	  above	  all	   ‘to	  embroider	  with	   threads	  of	   colour,’	  or	  else	   ‘to	   tattoo’.	   This	  mixes	   weaving,	   incision,	   and	   delineation	   with	   tinting	   and	   coloration.	   The	  woven	  thread	  and	  the	  puddle,	  or	  the	  line	  and	  the	  covered	  surface”	  (Nancy	  2005:	  74).	  
Text	  means	  Tissue;	  but	  whereas	  hitherto	  we	  have	  always	  taken	  this	  tissue	  as	  a	  product,	  a	  ready-­‐made	  veil	  behind	  which	  lies,	  more	  or	  less	  hidden,	  meaning	  (truth),	  we	  are	  now	  emphasizing,	  in	  the	  tissue,	  the	  generative	  idea	  that	  the	  text	  is	  made,	  is	  worked	  out	  in	  a	  perpetual	  interweaving;	  lost	  in	  this	  tissue—this	  texture—the	  subject	  unmakes	  himself,	  like	   a	   spider	   dissolving	   in	   the	   constructive	   secretions	   of	   its	  web.	   […]	   (Barthes	   1975:	  64).25	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
What	  is	  interesting	  about	  the	  façade	  mosaics	  on	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  Great	  Mosque	  of	  Damascus,	  is	  the	   way	   in	   which	   an	   ornamental	   value	   is	   combined	   with	   an	   iconographic	   meaning.	   The	  main	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  mosaics	  of	  the	  buildings	  	  
is	  one	  which	  in	  the	  classical	  and	  Byzantine	  tradition	  whence	  it	  derived	  usually	  formed	  a	  background	  —at	  times	  meaningful,	  at	  other	  times	  ornamental	  —to	  some	  other	  topic.	  In	  Damascus	  the	  latter	  is	  absent;	  instead,	  a	  series	  of	  naturalistic	  trees	  is	  rhythmically	  set	  in	  the	  forefront.	  Since	  it	  appears	  unlikely	  that	  these	  trees	  were	  the	  main	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  mosaics,	  they	  become	  the	  formal	  equivalents	  of	  personages	  who	  form	  the	  main	  subject	  matter	  in	  the	  models	  used	  by	  Damascus	  mosaicists,	  as	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  fifth-­‐century	  mosaics	  of	  the	  church	  of	  St.	  George	  in	  Salonika	  (or	  Thessaloniki).	  A	  fascinating	  example	   of	   THE	   TRANSFER	   OF	   FORMAL	   RELATIONSHIPS	   BETWEEN	   THE	   PARTS	   OF	   AN	   IMAGE	  occurred	  here.	  The	  desire	   for	  a	   concrete	  meaning	  —	  paradisiac	  architecture	  —	   in	  an	  understandable	  iconographic	  language	  —	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  the	  classic	  tradition	  —	  led	  to	  the	  mutation	  of	  a	  background	  motif	  into	  the	  main	  subject	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	   foreground	   motif—in	   the	   tradition	   the	   main	   subject	  —	   into	   a	   secondary	   theme	  (Grabar	  1987:	  88-­‐89,	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  After	  4th	  century:	  contexere,	  intexio,	  contextio	  literally	  meaning	  to	  weave	  together	  and	  webbing,	  net;	  an	  ancient	  metaphor,	  is	  that	  of	  thought	  as	  a	  thread,	  and	  of	  the	  raconteur	  as	  a	  spinner	  of	  yarns,	  whereas	  the	  true	  storyteller,	  the	  poet,	  is	  a	  weaver;	  and	  the	  written	  page	  becomes	  a	  textus,	  meaning	  cloth.	  25	  The	  metaphoric	  trail	  of	  text-­‐texture-­‐textile-­‐context	  is	  complicatedly	  intermingled	  with	  that	  of	  the	  veil,	  and	  together	  they	  belong	  the	  platonic-­‐macrobian	  paradigm	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  philosophy	  and	  literature	  connected	  through	  a	  third	  paradigm,	  that	  of	  truth.	  Chrétien	  de	  Troyes’	  (1140-­‐1190)	  structural	  concepts	  of	  
contextio	  (designing	  technically	  the	  ordo	  relations,	  the	  structure	  of	  content	  in	  a	  story),	  conjointure	  (the	  harmonious	  mélange	  of	  multiple	  traditions)	  and	  velum	  (referring	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  stories	  in	  the	  platonic	  paradigm	  used	  to	  represent	  truth):	  Der	  Dichtung	  Schleier	  aus	  de	  Hand	  der	  Wahrheit’,	  the	  Dichtung’s	  veil	  from	  truth’s	  hand	  (Goethe	  in	  von	  Graevenitz	  1992:	  235).	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  an	  arabesque	  novel	  this	  metaphorical	  chain	  precedes	  and	  informs	  the	  literary	  theory	  of	  Early	  Jena	  Romanticism,	  and	  Schlegel’s	  ideas.	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FIGURE	   52:	   DAMASCUS,	   GREAT	   MOSQUE,	   MOSAIC	   IN	   WEST	   PORTICO	   DETAILS,	   EARLY	   EIGHT	   CENTURY	   (FIG.	  
155	  AND	  156)	  AND	  REPRESENTATION	  OF	  CITIES,	  UMN	  AL-­‐RASSAS,	  MOSAIC	   IN	  CHURCH,	  CIRCA	  760	  (GRABAR	  
1992:	  181,	  FIG.	  155,	  156,	  157).	  
The	   Great	   Mosque	   in	   Damascus	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   official	   buildings	   of	   early	   Islam	   and	   the	  intention	  behind	  its	  decoration	  was	  to	  have	  a	  symbolic	  and	  illustrative	  meaning.	  The	  avoidance	  of	   figural	   representations	   in	   early	   Islam	  was	   intentional	   and	  deliberate	   in	   the	   case	  of	   religious	  buildings	   and	   led	   to	   unexpected	   syntactic	   changes	   and	   transformations	   on	   the	   vocabulary	   of	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imagery	   borrowed	   and	   utilized	   by	   Muslim	   Patrons.	   However,	   the	   avoidance	   of	   figural	  representations	  was	  not	   the	  avoidance	  of	   symbolic	  meaning,	  which	  was	   still	   attached	   to	   forms	  that	  were	  used.	  Contrariwise,	  symbolic	  significance	  was	  given	  to	  new,	  or	  adopted	  forms	  in	  older	  artistic	  languages	  for	  which	  such	  symbolism	  had	  not	  been	  known	  (Grabar	  1987:	  89).	  It	  was	  not	  an	  a	  priori	  doctrine	  that	  informed	  the	  creative	  consciousness	  in	  Early	  Islam,	  but	  the	  avoidance	  of	  representations	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  response	  to	  an	  available	  formal	  vocabulary	  and	  of	  a	  search	  for	  an	  identifying	  original	   imagery.	  Grabar’s	  argument	  brings	  here	  also	  coinage	  as	  an	  example,	  and	  he	   writes	   that	   the	   official	   art	   of	   the	   empire	   avoided	   representations	   of	   living	   things,	   but	   the	  culture	  as	  a	  whole	  seemed	  at	  first	  indifferent	  to	  the	  problem.	  This	  indifference	  will	  turn	  into	  an	  opposition	  later	  on,	  which	  was	  not	  only	  the	  result	  of	  a	  concrete	  historical	  circumstance,	  but:	  
a	   typologically	   definable	   attitude	   that	   sees	   and	   understands	   any	   representation	   as	  somehow	   identical	   with	   that	   which	   it	   represents,	   and	   it	   is	   its	   peculiarity	   that	   it	  immediately	  interpreted	  this	  potential	  magical	  power	  of	  images	  as	  a	  deception	  and	  as	  evil.	  
	  FIGURE	   53:	   DAMASCUS,	   GREAT	   MOSQUE,	   SYRIA,	  
MOSAIC	   DETAIL.	   AVAILABLE	   FROM	   URL	  
HTTP://WWW.BRITANNICA.COM/EBCHECKED/MEDIA/107279/DETAIL-­‐OF-­‐A-­‐MOSAIC-­‐FROM-­‐THE-­‐GREAT-­‐
MOSQUE-­‐DAMASCUS-­‐SYRIA.	  [ACCESSED	  OCTOBER	  2013].	  
	  Una	   Joc:	   Is	  not	  THE	  TRANSFER	  OF	  FORMAL	  RELATIONSHIPS	  BETWEEN	  THE	  PARTS	  OF	  AN	  IMAGE	  ONE	  OF	  THE	  MODI	  OPERANDI,	   if	  not	  THE	  MODUS	  OPERANDI,	  of	  contemporary	  painting	  —with	  all	   the	  good	  and	  bad	  infinities	   that	   it	   implies	  —and,	   of	   course,	   ‘formal	   relationships’	   understood	   in	   its	  widest	   sense	  possible	  and	  not	  only	  within	  formalist	  parameters?	  
One	  has	  to	  slip	   in	  here	  some	  of	  Riegl’s	  observations	  about	  Antique	  and	  Late	  Roman	  painting:	  Antique	   painting	   aimed	   to	   capture	   individual	   particular	   forms	   as	   unmediated,	   clear,	   material	  phenomena,	  in	  their	  extension	  in	  a	  two	  dimensional	  space.	  This	  was	  realised	  through	  a	  rhythmic	  composition	  of	  forms	  one	  next	  to	  each	  other	  or	  one	  above	  the	  other,	  but	  not	  one	  behind	  the	  other,	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in	  which	  case	  individual	  forms	  or	  parts	  of	  forms	  would	  cover	  each	  other	  up.	  A	  rhythmic,	  in-­‐row	  repetition	  of	   similar	  or	   identical	   forms	  opened	  and	   created,	   in	   first	  place,	   a	  plane.	   Late	  Roman	  painting	  however,	  presented	  not	  so	  much	   individual	   forms	  as	  singular	  phenomena,	  but	   in	   their	  relation	  to	  a	  collective	  appearance	  and	  in	  a	  tri-­‐dimensional	  space.	  This	   led,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   to	  the	   isolation	  of	   the	   individual	  autonomous	   form	  from	  the	  ground,	  or	   from	  the	  universal	  visual-­‐plane,	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   to	   its	   co-­‐relation	   to	   other	   individual	   forms.	   This	   meant	   also	   the	  emancipation	   of	   the	   ground,	   which	   gained	   a	   new	   function	   as	   an	   individual	   unity	   and	   creative	  form-­‐force.	  Rhythm	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  principle	  that	  structured	  the	  com-­‐position	  of	  forms.	  The	  short	  depth	  of	   field	   that	  had	  been	   introduced	  added	  a	  new	  rhythm	  of	  colour	  and	   light/shadow	  play	  that	  would	  help	  to	  structure	  the	  rapports	  between	  what	  was	  posited	  (Riegl	  1901:	  211-­‐217).	  
	  
FIGURE	  54:	  (RIEGL	  1901:	  128).	  What	   started	   to	   form	   and	   to	  manifests	   itself	   in	   early	   Islamic	  mosaic	   decorations,	   but	   also	   in	  other	   techniques	   (stucco	   decorations,	   wood	   and	  metal-­‐work,	   ceramics,	   etc.)	   in	   resistance	   and	  under	   the	   temptation	   of	   Byzantine	   and	   Christian	   art	   is	   an	   attitude	   towards	   ornamentalization	  and	   an	   ornamental	   mode	   of	   creation	   that	   emphasizes	   visual	   pleasure,	   rhythm,	   ambiguity	   and	  ambivalence,	  and	  a	  peculiar	  nature	  of	  perception.	  This	  type	  of	  creativity	  found	  its	  right	  measure	  and	  determination	   in	   a	   spatiality	   and	   temporality	   in	  which	   “[…]	   the	   operative	   point	   of	   view	   is	  quite	  literally	  the	  place	  form	  which	  one	  uses,	  touches	  or	  views	  a	  motif	  displayed	  on	  a	  surface	  of	  something	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  place	  created	  in	  order	  to	  view	  it).”	  Thus,	  consciously	  or	  not,	  location	  and	   the	  activities	  connected	  with	   it	   (sitting	  or	  walking,	   for	   instance)	  determine	   the	  meaning	  of	  what	  one	  sees	  (Grabar	  1992:	  210).	  	  
Next	  to	  sensory	  materiality	  we	  have,	  thus,	  a	  choice	  of	  possible	  but	  incompatible	  ways	  of	  focusing.	   […]	   the	   viewer-­‐user	   penetrates	   into	   the	   object,	   both	   literally,	   as	   rugs	   are	  meant	   to	   be	   walked	   on,	   and	   perceptually,	   as	   the	   eye	   meanders	   its	   forms,	   to	   follow	  rinceaux	   or	   to	   decompose	   flowers.	   At	   this	   stage	   it	   no	   longer	  matters	  much	  whether	  kings	  and	  courtiers	  played	  here	  or	  whether	  some	  mystical	  message	   is	  encoded,	   for	   in	  reality	   it	   is	  only	   the	   sensory	  pleasure	  of	   seeing,	   feeling,	   composing,	   and	   recomposing	  that	  dominates.	  And	  it	  does	  so,	  because	  of	  a	  setting	  taken	  from	  nature	  that	  has	  nothing	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to	  do	  with	  any	  real	  nature,	  just	  as	  the	  people	  or	  animals	  are	  not	  common	  beasts	  or	  men	  in	  common	  activities.	  They	  are	  all	  in	  a	  dream,	  they	  are	  an	  imaginary	  fantasy.	  They	  are	  totally	   unreal	   and	   yet	   they	   are	   stems,	   leaves,	   animals	   and	   flowers.	   […]	   Nothing	   is	  happening,	  has	  happened,	  nor	  will	  happen.	  It	  is	  all	  a	  dream,	  a	  fantasy,	  and	  that	  fantasy	  without	   event,	   without	   story,	   has	   been	   expressed	   with	   a	   stunning	   visual	   clarity	   in	  which	   every	   part,	   every	   brick	   or	   tile,	   every	   bit	   of	   inscription	   has	   been	   defined	   with	  utmost	  precision.	  Once	  caught,	  one	  cannot	  but	  wander	  and	  forget.	  (Grabar	  2006:	  240,	  249).	  This	  space	  and	  temporality	  is	  one	  of	  becoming,	  not	  of	  being.	  It	  is	  a	  space	  in	  which	  ornamental	  forms	   fulfil	   their	   intermediary	   agency	   and	   lead	   the	   viewer	   or	   user	   to	   behave	   in	   some	  way	   or	  another	  toward	  an	  object,	  image,	  monument.	  And	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  ornament,	  as	  an	  intermediary,	  to	  transform	  everything	  it	  touches	  into	  something	  else,	  to	  lead	  elsewhere	  than	  towards	  itself	  (or	  towards	  itself	  as	  other).	  	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘For	  the	  secret	  Image	  of	  …	  —[…]	  It	  is	  an	  image	  that	  must	  be	  unimagined,	  that	  is	  thought,	  if	  thought	  is	  a	  commotion,	  a	  syncope,	  and	  a	  bedazzlement.	  Its	  flash	  is	  not	  the	  image	  of	  the	  obscure,	  but	  the	  brilliance	  that	  sparks	  out	  from	  having	  knocked	  against	  it:	  a	   flash	   of	   darkness	   sliced	   away.	   A	   blow	   and	   a	   shout,	   a	   stupefying	   pain,	   a	   breath	   cut	  short,	  the	  wordless	  unimagined,	  in	  a	  bark,	  a	  wail,	  a	  groan,	  a	  sonorous	  uprising	  (Nancy	  2005:	  79).’	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	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FIGURE	  55:	  BALKH	  MOSQUE,	  9TH	  CENTURY,	  PLAN.	  KAIROUAN	  MOSQUE,	  8TH-­‐9TH	  CENTURIES,	  PLAN.	  (GRABAR	  
1987:	  ILLUS.	  39	  AND	  40).	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  FIGURE	   56:	   WALL	   PAINTING	   IN	  
HELLENISTIC	  MODE	  IN	  THE	  BATH	  AT	  QUSAYR	  ‘AMRAH	  (GRABAR	  2006:	  433;	  FIG.	  10).	  
In	  1979,	  Rosalind	  Krauss	  published	  in	  Volume	  9	  of	  October	  magazine	  an	  essay	  entitled	  Grids.	  In	  this	  essay,	  she	  identifies	  the	  grid	  as	  the	  emblematic	  structure	  of	  the	  modernist	  ambition	  and	  as	  a	  form	   that	   relentlessly	   sustained	   itself	   as	   such,	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   being	   impervious	   to	  change.	  Its	  appeal	  relies	  in	  the	  demonstration	  that	  physical	  and	  aesthetic	  planes	  are	  co-­‐extensive	  and	   coordinate.	   Its	   structure	   displays	   an	   infinite	   lateral	   spread	   of	   a	   single	   surface,	   over-­‐all	  regularity,	   an	   order	   of	   pure	   relationship,	   and	   declares	   the	   pictorial	   field	   as:	   flattened,	  geometricized,	  ordered,	  anti-­‐mimetic	  and	  anti-­‐real.	  The	  grid	  claims	  thus	  not	  only	  for	  the	  pictorial	  field,	  but	  for	  the	  space	  of	  art	  in	  general,	  an	  autonomous	  and	  autotelic	  existence.	  Krauss	  identifies	  the	   grid	   with	   a	   hidden	   naked	   materialism,	   and	   as	   a	   matrix	   of	   knowledge	   that	   enacts	   the	  separation	   of	   perceptual	   field	   from	   real	   field.	   But	   looking	   at	   the	   work	   of	   artists	   such	   as	   Ad	  Reinhardt	  or	  Agnes	  Martin,	  she	  states	  that	  artist	  were	  attracted	  and	  devoted	  to	  the	  grid,	  which	  was	  a	  deterministic	  and	  hugely	   restrictive	   structure,	  not	  because	   they	  were	   interested	   in	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  concrete,	  naked	  materialistic	  order,	  but	   in	  the	  Universal,	   in	  Being,	  Mind	  or	  the	  Spirit,	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  Symbolic.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  grid	  operates	  within	  its	  own,	  newly	  (or	  re-­‐discovered)	  constructed	  spatiality	  and	  temporality:	  that	  of	  the	  infinite,	  autonomous	  and	  autotelic	  space	  and,	  respectively,	  its	  temporality	  that	  is	  an	  absolute	  present,	  that	  declared	  everything	  else	  to	   be	   the	  past:	   “in	   the	   temporal	   dimension,	   the	   grid	   is	   the	   emblem	  of	  modernity	   by	   being	   just	  that:	  the	  form	  that	  is	  ubiquitous	  in	  the	  art	  of	  our	  century,	  while	  appearing	  nowhere,	  nowhere	  at	  all,	  in	  the	  art	  of	  the	  last	  one”	  (Krauss,	  1979:	  50-­‐59).	  
The	  grid	   is,	   to	  be	   clear	  about	   this,	   one	  of	   the	  oldest	   and	  most	  basic	   types	  of	   flatness,	   infinite	  rapport,	   all-­‐overness,	   absolute	   symmetry,	   seriality,	   mirroring	   and	   uninterrupted	   continuity,	  while	   being	   also,	   as	   Krauss	   claims,	   the	   emblem	   of	   modernity.	   Emblem	   that	   is:	   symbol,	   inlaid	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ornamental	  work,	  embossed	  ornament,	  or	  insertion	  –	  to	  insert,	  to	  throw	  in	  (Online	  Etymological	  Dictionary).	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   grid	   on	  which	   the	   chequerboard	   pattern	   is	   based	  —	   and	   the	  Duchampian	   anti-­‐retinal	   chessboard	   schema	   —	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   ancient	   examples	   of	  ornamental	   space,	   in	  which	   the	   figure-­‐ground	   relation	   is	  not	  only	  annulled	  or	   levelled	  out,	  but	  presented	   as	   becoming	   and	   in	   visual	   form.	   Already	   in	   Late	   Roman	   painting,	   the	   ground,	   as	  
Intervalle,	   interval/gap/cessation,	   became	   a	   creative	   individual	   unity	   with	   potential	   to	   form	  through	  rhythm	  (Riegl	  1901:	  210).	  The	  ground	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  surface	  behind	  or	  underneath	  another	  sur-­‐face,	  but	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  a	  gap,	  a	  cessation,	  a	  blank,	  for	  a	  rhythm	  —	  for	  the	  Distinct.	  	  
	  
	  FIGURE	   57:	   DETAIL	  
OF	  THE	  MOSAIC	  PAVEMENT	  IN	  THE	  BATH	  HALL	  AT	  KHIRBAT	  AL-­‐MAFJAR	  (GRABAR	  2006:	  428;	  FIG.	  5).	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The	   affinity	   of	   modern	   painting	   with	   ornament	   and	   pattern	   lies	   in	   the	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	  ground	  and	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  modern	  paintings	  have	  to	  be	  spatio-­‐logically	  or	  semantically	  flat.	  The	  change	   from	  perspectival	  box-­‐space	   to	  ornamental	   space,	  or	   the	  reduction	  of	   space	   to	  sur-­‐face,	   led	   to	   a	   gradual	   de-­‐substantiation	   and	   simultaneous	   metamorphosis	   of	   the	   image-­‐figures	  into	  ornamental	  figures	  and	  to	  an	  optical	  and	  ontological	  gain	  in	  substance	  of	  the	  ground.	  Spatial	   homogeneity	   of	   conventional	   image-­‐space	   is	   thus	   abrogated,	   and	   the	   figure-­‐ground	  relation	  negates	   the	  depth	  of	   field	   and	  becomes	   an	  ornamental	   blank,	   interstice,	   gap,	   distance.	  There	   is	   a	   phenomenological	   necessity	   involved	   here:	   figure	   and	   ground	   have	   to	   be	  phenomenologically	   given	   as	   distinct	   from	   each	   other	   for	   the	   ex-­‐tension	   and	   ex-­‐pansion	   of	   an	  ornamental	  distance	  or	  gap	  to	  take	  place;	  so	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  ground	  has	  to	  be	  present	  and	  this	   ground-­‐intelligibility	   constitutes	   not	   only	   any	   surface	   decoration,	   but	   consciousness	   itself	  (Kirves	  2012:	  15).	  In	  The	  Optical	  Unconscious,	  Krauss	  speaks	  of	  a	  figure	  —	  non-­‐figure	  —	  ground	  —	   non-­‐ground	   schema,	   as	   modernist	   painting	   negated	   both	   figure	   and	   ground,	   and	   thus	  dialectically	  levelled	  out	  the	  difference	  between	  them.	  
Una	   Joc:	   ‘So,	   what	   is	   ornamental	   space,	   ornamental	   temporality?	   Is	   it	   space	   that	  accommodates	  within	   itself	  non-­‐space,	  blank	  or	  gap,	  and	  non-­‐time,	  cessation?	  The	   fiction	  of	  what	  is	  not;	  the	  ‘what	  is	  not’	  that	  is	  real?	  The	  ornamental	  is	  the	  imaginary	  production	  without	  a	  referent,	  a	  pure	  ontological	  creation,	  “the	  foreigner	  on	  the	  inside,	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  metabolic	  force	  that	  sleeps	  without	  sleeping	  in	  what	  is,	  the	  very	  face	  of	  being	  that	  concepts	  cannot	  say	  without	  losing	  face	  (Malabou	  2011:	  12).	  
	  And	   what	   is	   the	   grid,	   this	   emblem	   of	   modernity?	   This	   ornamental	   structure	   that	   resists	  development,	   that	   covers	   up	   and	   reveals	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   shame	   of	   its	   relation	   to	   the	  symbolic	  and	  to	  the	  ornamental?	  —	  The	  character	  that	  best	  embodies	  the	  tragic	  mythology	  of	  the	  grid,	   that	   of	   not	   being	   able	   to	   act	   in	   accordance	   with	   his	   own	   thinking,	   is	   Don	   Juan	   (or	   Don	  Quixote):	  	  
His	   entire	   anxiety	   is	   to	   give	   himself	   Determinations.	   But	   these	   are	   denied	   to	   him,	   in	  their	   truth,	   in	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   book	   (they	   are	   windmills	   and	   flocks	   of	   sheep),	  because	  it	  is	  he	  who	  invents	  them,	  while	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  book	  they	  are	  not	  real	  Determination	  for	  him,	  because	  everything	  depends	  on	  the	  invention	  of	  others	  (Noica	  2009:	  32).	  	  The	   grid,	   like	   Don	   Juan,	   fully	   incorporates	   the	   Individual.	   Both	   are	   true	   individualities,	  characters	  severed	  from	  the	  inertia	  of	  common	  generality.	  They	  are	  not	  into	  something	  already	  given,	  but	  have	  provided	  themselves	  with	  the	  image	  of	  their	  own.	  Don	  Juan	  no	  longer	  wishes	  to	  be	  caught	  in	  the	  truth	  and	  prejudices	  of	  society	  and	  belief.	  He	  is	  a	  libertine	  and	  does	  as	  he	  pleases.	  The	   problem	   that	   both	   face	   and	   that	   leads	   to	   their	   tragedy	   is	   that	   although	   they	   are	  individualities,	  they	  are	  really	  into	  anything,	  as	  they	  reject	  any	  General.	  They	  are	  caught	  into	  an	  infinity	  for	  which	  they	  have	  no	  responsibility	  and	  no	  RAPPORT	  and	  are	  thus	  caught	  not	  even	  in	  a	  ‘bad	   infinity’,	   but	   in	   the	   IN-­‐DIFFERENT	   infinity	   of	   more	   and	   more.	   They	   are	   both	   advocates	   for	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INFIDELITY,	   like	   Plato,	   but	   whereas	   Plato	   saw	   INFIDELITY	   as	   necessary	   to	   ascend	   to	   the	   Idea	   of	  Beauty,	  the	  grid	  and	  Don	  Juan	  ascend	  to	  nothing,	  because	  they	  are	  blind	  and	  refuse	  any	  general	  order,	  or	  are	  unable	  to	  see	  it.	  Don	  Juan	  loves	  conquest	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  as	  the	  grid,	  in	  mere	  self-­‐repetition	  or	  blind	  rotation.	  Don	   Juan	   falls	   into	   lower	  and	   lower	  determinations,	   into	  complete	  disorder	   in	   his	   ‘becoming’,	   only	   to	   face	   an	   inert	   generality,	   nothingness.	   But	   nothingness	   itself	  speaks	  in	  the	  name	  of	  order,	  of	  the	  general,	  of	  death.	  Don	  Juan	  and	  the	  grid	  are	  figures	  of	  human	  slaves	  who	  have	  forgotten	  all	  masters,	  even	  the	  inner	  one:	  fortress,	  ghetto,	  the	  Stone	  Guest,	  the	  General,	  defied	  by	  man	  and	  accepted	  only	  as	  a	  guest	  and	  not	  as	  a	  true	  master.	  It	  is	  Molière	  who	  introduces	  GUILT	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  man	  in	  the	  old	  Spanish	  story,	  and	  it	  is	  SHAME,	  Krauss	  writes,	  that	  the	  grid	  presides	  over,	  the	  shame	  of	  the	  indecision	  about	  the	  grid’s	  connection	  to	  matter	  and	  spirit.	  Both	  Don	  Juan	  and	  the	  grid	  are	  mythological	  structures	  that	  deal	  with	  contradictions	  and	  that	  allow	  contrary	  views	  to	  be	  held	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  para-­‐logical	  suspension,	  through	  covering	  up	  the	  contra-­‐diction	  or	  through	  repression,	  but	  not	  through	  re-­‐solving	  the	  paradox.	  	  
Furthermore,	   Krauss	   pays	   attention	   in	   Grids	   to	   what	   she	   calls	   “a	   certain	   kind	   of	   accessory	  literature	  to	  which	  painting	  paid	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  attention”	  and	  identifies	  the	  grid	  as	  the	  illustrative	   matrix	   of	   knowledge	   in	   physiological	   optics.	   Thus,	   even	   though,	   “itself	   invisible	   in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  painting”,	  the	  grid,	  “as	  an	  emblem	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  vision”,	  became	  an	  insistent	  and	  visible	  feature	  of	  neo-­‐impressionist	  and	  symbolist	  painting.	  The	  grid	  was	  present	  in	  symbolist	  painting,	  Krauss	  writes,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  window,	  which	  in	  the	  associative	  system	  of	  symbolism,	  was	  equally	  opaque	  and	   transparent,	  as	   transmission	  and	  reflection,	  as	  mirror	   that	  flows	  and	   freezes;	  as	   source	   towards	  birth	  and,	   simultaneously,	   as	   freezing	   into	  stasis	   towards	  death.	  	  As	  grid	  or	  window,	  as	  a	  matrix	  of	  ambi-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐valence,	  the	  grid	  is	  present	  even	  where	  one	  does	  not	   expect	   it,	  Krauss	  writes,	   in	   the	  works	  of	  Matisse,	  who	   “admits	  openly	   to	   the	  grid	  only	  in	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  papiers	  découpés”.	  	  
The	   grid	   (like	   the	   image)	   is	   “fully,	   even	   cheerfully,	   schizophrenic,	   because	   it	   portends	   the	  centrifugal	   and	   centripetal	   existence	   of	   the	   work	   of	   art”	   —	   however,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	  precariousness	  of	  being	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art	  is	  something	  ontologically	  constituent	  for	  the	  work	  of	  art	  as	  such	  and	  does	  not	  reside	  only	  in	  the	  grid	  as	  a	  structure	  to	  portend	  to	  this.	  It	  is	  rather	  the	  mode	  of	  being	  that	  the	  work	  of	  art	  is,	  that	  is	  cheerfully	  schizophrenic:	  beyond-­‐the-­‐frame-­‐attitude	  and	  within-­‐the–frame-­‐attitude;	  engulfment,	  implosion	  and	  petrification;	  complete	  isolation	  from	  and	  complete	  merger	  with	  the	  world.	  	  
Krauss	   ends	   her	   essay	   with	   the	   conclusion	   that	   one	   has	   to	   interpret	   the	   grid	   not	   from	   a	  historical	  perspective,	  that	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  development,	  because,	  as	  she	  stated	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  her	  argument,	  the	  grid	  resists	  any	  development,	  but	  from	  an	  etiological	  psychological	  condition,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  the	  historical	  one	  as	  it	  is	  not	  progressive,	  but	  rather	  “an	  investigation	  into	  the	   conditions	   for	   one	   specific	   CHANGE	   —	   the	   acquisition	   of	   disease	   to	   take	   place”,	   “into	   the	  background	   of	   a	   chemical	   experiment,	   asking	  when	   and	   how	   a	   given	   group	   of	   elements	   came	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together	  to	  effect	  a	  new	  compound	  or	  to	  precipitate	  something	  	  out	  of	  a	  liquid	  (Krauss	  1979:	  50-­‐64).”	  The	  lack	  of	  development	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  lack	  of	  quality	  (in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  malady	  can	  be	  creative).	  And	  thus	  the	  grid	  is	  also	  anti-­‐developmental,	  anti-­‐narrative	  and	  anti-­‐historic.	  Krauss	  brings	  to	  the	  sur-­‐face	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  grid	  to	  the	  symbolic,	  which	  modernist	  painting	  tried	  to	  (un)consciously	  hide	  away.	  But	  she	  does	  not	  look	  at	  the	  grid	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  ornamental	  structure.	  Nakedly	   displayed	   as	   symbolic	   structure,	   as	   myth,	   matrix	   of	   knowledge,	   as	   window	   or	   as	  schizophrenic	  sur-­‐face,	  defined	  as	  an	  emblem,	  Krauss	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  what	  remains	  repressed	  even	  for	  her,	  the	  inlaid	  ornamental	  work,	  the	  embossed	  ornament	  that	  determines	  its	  character.	  The	  grid	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  oldest	  schema	  of	  the	  ornamental,	  and	  also	  of	  the	  arabesque.	  The	  grid	  is	  an	  ornament	  —	  in	  which	  pure	  (mathematical)	  presentation	  and	  aesthetic	  ex-­‐position	  can	  be	  displayed	  on	  the	  same	  value	  plane.	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AN	  O(L)DD	  MARRIAGE:	  KUNST	  UND	  ORNAMENTIK	  
Art	   is	   braided	   with	   its	   appropriations	   and	   expropriations.	   Thus,	   art	   expropriates	   and	  expatriates.	   It	   is	  no	  apex	  and	  it	   is	  not	   fixed,	  but	  hyperbolic,	  peripheral	  and	  marginal.	  Entering	   -­‐	  experiencing	   this	   milieu,	   this	   a-­‐real,	   we	   need	   to	   re-­‐Orient	   ourselves.	   What	   I	   am	   saying	   is	   to	  literally,	  physically	  and	  temporally	  turn	  towards	  the	  East	  and	  dwelling	  not	  only	  in	  the	  Occident.	  Not	  dwelling	  in	  either	  of	  the	  two,	  but	  travelling,	  going-­‐after	  in	  method	  of	  tabular	  shakedown.	  	  
In	   this	   reconnaissance	   of	   the	   pictorial	   space,	   ornamental	   elements	   are	   not	   only	   superfluous	  surface	   fillings,	   but	   they	   pivot	   the	   genetic	   construction	   and	   experience,	   the	   metabolism	   and	  stratagems	  of	   painting.	   Visual	   overload	   and	  discursive	   contemplation,	   elocution	   and	   reflection,	  form	  and	  content,	  —in	  the	  same	  line	  of	  thought:	  body	  and	  mind—	  are	  not	  in	  disaccord	  with	  each	  other,	  but	  of	  one	  heart	  –	  the	  heart	  that	  shelters	  the	  margin.	  
Art	  and	  décor	  are	  stranded	  on	  the	  same	  offering	  pit:	   they	  both	  take,	  receive	  and	  accept	  what	  shows	  honour	  to	  what	  fits	  to	  itself	  and	  in	  the	  context;	  they	  show	  honour	  to	  what	  shows	  itself	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  itself	  (phenomenon)	  —	  and	  they	  offer	  and	  exhibit	  this	  fitting.	  What	  fits	  and	  is	  suitable,	  is	  what	  appears,	  what	  appears	  in	  an	  appearance	  (phenomenon)	  —	  and	  its	  excess.	  	  
Remember	   the	   line:	   Painting	   as	   Gaze:	   on	   the	   Revelatory	   Force	   of	   the	   Arabesque.	   Painting,	  glancing,	  gazing,	  starring,	  writing,	  playing,	  gambling,	  arbesque-­‐ing	  …	  an	   idle	  gait	  on	  side	  alleys,	  away	   from	   the	   A-­‐road	   that	   separates	   ‘fine	   art’	   from	   ‘decorative	   art’,	   that	   is	   away	   from	   the	  linguistic	  construction	  of	  the	  ornament	  debate.	  Erring	  on	  side	  alleys,	  drifting	  away	  on	  imaginary	  paths	   is	   experimenting	  with	   heterogeneous	   ornamental	   forces.	   But	   the	   route	   away	   from	   some	  given	  categories	  and	  classifications	  might	  only	  open	  a	  new	  one-­‐way	  road	  indebted	  even	  more	  to	  some	  hidden	  taxonomies.	  
Decoration,	  décor,	  decorum,	   to	  decorate,	  decent,	  dokein,	  dekhesthai,	  dacasyati,	  dacati	   –	   this	   is	  the	  incision	  of	  beauty	  and	  taste,	  appearance,	  offering	  and	  thought.	  Thus,	  while	  keeping	  it	  in	  mind,	  we	   should	   indeed	   mistrust	   the	   hierarchical	   opposition	   installed	   by	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   clear	  demarcation	  between	  art	  and	  ornamentation.	  And	  if	  we	  choose	  to	  believe	  in	  their	  unbridgeable	  opposition,	   than	   we	   should	   be	   aware,	   on	   what	   scaffolding	   this	   cut	   grounds	   and	   of	   the	  implications	  it	  bears	  within	  it.	  	  
Ornament,	   décor,	   decorum	   and	   decoration	   are	   intertwined	   historically	   with	   the	   truth-­‐	   and	  common	  sense-­‐	  paradigms.	  Vitruvius	  had	  already	  assigned	  rhetorical	  principles	   to	  architecture	  and	   subsumed	   both	   of	   them	   under	   the	   representational	   system	   of	   the	   community.	   Ornaments	  were	  then	  modes	  for	  the	  self-­‐representation	  of	  the	  community,	  expressions	  of	  the	  visual	  habitus	  that	  described	  and	  inscribed	  a	  relation	  based	  upon	  and	  controlled	  through	  rules	  and	  principles	  between	   the	   individual/individuum	   and	   the	   community/the	   general.	   The	   same	   meaning	   of	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decorum	   is	   found	  also	   in	  Cicero’s	  writings.	   In	   this	  sense,	  ornament	  continued	  to	  play	   the	  role	  a	  
decorum	  or	  prepon	  throughout	  the	  Ancient	  Regime.	  
Ideological,	  cultural,	  social,	  political	  or	  aesthetical	  changes	  are	  manifested	  and	  reflected,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  in	  how	  visual	  pleasure	  is	  expressed	  and/or	  repressed	  in	  daily	  life.	  Such	  changes	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  ornament,	  in	  their	  relation	  to	  commodification,	  social	  and	  political	  power.	  Ornament	   is	  a	   cognitive	   form,	  an	   intermediary	  between	  subject	  and	  object,	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  society	  or	  the	  community;	  between	  objects	  and	  works	  of	  art;	  between	   the	   individual,	   the	   general	   and	  determinations.	  The	   relevance	  of	   the	   cognitive	   task	  of	  ornament	   is	   in	  many	  ways	  historically,	   philosophically	   and	   aesthetically	   intermingled	  with	   the	  TRUTH	  paradigm,	  with	  reason,	  knowledge	  and	  ontological	  reality.	  	  
Until	   the	   18th	   century,	   ornaments	   were	   forms	   of	   mediation	   and	   social	   interpersonal	  communication.	   They	   indicated	   what	   was	   suitable	   and	   acceptable	   in	   a	   certain	   context	   and	  marked	  social	  positions	  within	  a	  hierarchical	   structure;	   they	  manifested	   in	  social	  behaviour,	   in	  the	  structure	  of	  social	  events,	  in	  visual	  codes,	  in	  functional	  objects,	  in	  human	  habits	  and	  gestures,	  in	  costumes,	  clothing,	  in	  fashion,	  and	  in	  language.	  Ornaments	  formed	  the	  décor	  for	  a	  social	  class.	  Political	  and	  social	  changes	  during	  the	  18th	  century	  (that	  reached	  a	  peak	  in	  1848	  with	  the	  French	  Revolution)	  changed	  the	  functioning	  and	  meaning	  of	  ornament.	  And,	  already	  in	  Weimarer	  Klassik	  writers	  and	  thinkers,	   influenced	  by	  the	  artistic	   ideals	  of	  ancient	  Greece,	  despised	  ornaments	  as	  added,	  superfluous	  forms,	  as	   imitations,	   that	  shared	  no	  essence,	   function,	  role	  or	  meaning	  with	  the	  structure	  on	  which	  they	  were	  added.	  (J.	  W.	  Goethe	  (Von	  der	  Arabeske,	  1749-­‐1832)	  and	  I.	  Kant	  refer	  to	  ornament	  as	  Zierart	  or	  bloße	  Dekoration	  —mere	  decoration.)	   If,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  ornament	  was	  still	  seen	  by	  the	  majority	  as	  a	  static	  form	  added,	  in	  a	  unifying	  relation	  with	  its	  ‘bearer’,	  to	  a	  structure	  to	  complete	  it	  as	  a	  whole,	  ornament	  would	  soon	  develop	  into	  an	  autonomous	   form,	   independent	   of	   its	   structure	   and	   carrying	   a	   symbolic	   meaning	   on	   its	   own,	  especially	   as	   a	   metaphor	   of	   power	   (Raulet,	   2001,	   in:	   Frank	   and	   Hartung	   2001:	   148-­‐162).	  Ornaments	   became	   marks	   of	   uniqueness	   and	   luxury	   and	   stood	   for	   the	   value	   implied	   by	   the	  possession	  of	  a	  unique	  thing.	  This	  understanding	  of	  ornament	  prevailed	  from	  the	  2nd	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  well	  into	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  
Political,	  social,	  technological	  and	  cultural	  changes	  that	  marked	  the	  19th	  century	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  production	  of	  commodities,	  on	  architecture	  and	  on	  art,	  which	  intensified,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	   20th	   century,	   the	   ornament	   debate.	   Rhetoric	   played	   a	   prime	   role	   in	   this	   polemic,	  which	  unfolded	  mainly	   as	   artificially	   constructed	   linguistic	   strategies	   (Ocón-­‐Fernández	   2003:	   14-­‐18).	  Dialectical	   constructions	   are	   based	   on	   highly	   developed	   stylistic	   mechanisms	   and	   are	  accompanied	   by	   specific	   ornamental	   patterns	   that	   structure	   arguments	   and	   proliferate	   their	  forms.	   One	   has	   to	   remain	   alert	   to	   these	   operations	   that	   occur	   often	   in	   such	   circles.	   Here,	   the	  ornamental	   turned	   against	   itself!	   But	   in	   this	   paradox,	   that	   of	   the	   ornamental	   that	   produced,	  enhanced	  and	  perpetuated	  this	  polemic,	  lies,	  I	  believe,	  also	  a	  relevance	  of	  ornament.	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In	   1893,	   Riegl	   published	   Stilfragen.	   Grundlegungen	   zu	   einer	   Geschichte	   der	   Ornamentik	  (Problems	  of	  Style:	  Foundations	  For	  a	  History	  of	  Ornament)	  and	  established	  ornamentation	  as	  an	  art	  historical	  discipline	  that	  dealt	  with	  the	  history	  of	  ornament	  as	  an	  autonomous	  art	  form	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  and	  in	  its	  formal	  development	  and	  taxonomic	  categorization.	  
FIGURE	  58:	  ADOLF	  LOOS,	  VILLA	  KARMA	  (1904),	  DETAIL	  OF	  THE	  VAULTED	  CEILING	  OF	  THE	  ENTRANCE	  HALL.	  
AVAILABLE	   FORM	   URL	   HTTP://MADDME.WORDPRESS.COM/CATEGORY/UNCATEGORIZED/.	   [ACCESSED	  
OCTOBER	  2013].	  
The	   modernist	   dictum	   against	   ornament	   is	   only	   the	   most	   recent	   manifestation	   of	   such	   an	  ideology.	  The	  debate	  against	  decoration	  and	  ornamentation	  in	  relation	  to	  architecture	  and	  as	   it	  has	  been	  presented	  by	  Loos	  in	  Ornament	  and	  Crime	  (1908)	  and	  by	  Le	  Corbusier	  in	  The	  Decorative	  
Art	   of	   Today	   (1925)	   goes	   back	   to	   ancient	   Greece.	   Throughout	   history	   there	   have	   been	   many	  epochs	   and	   societies	   in	  which	   decoration	   and	   any	   form	  of	   visual	   display,	   have	   been	   criticized,	  blamed	  or	  discouraged.	  Three	  arguments	  were	  usually	  brought	   against	  decoration,	   either	   each	  on	   their	   own	   or	   two	   or	   all	   three	   intertwined	   with	   each	   other	   to	   different	   degrees:	   DECORUM,	  THEOLOGY	  and	  PROGRESS	  (Brett	  2005).	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FIGURE	  59:	  LE	  CORBUSIER	  UNVEILING	  THE	  MODEL	  FOR	  THE	  PALACE	  OF	  SOVIETS	  (1931).	  AVAILABLE	  FROM	  
URL	   HTTP://WWW.AGGREGAT456.COM/2010/12/SARTORIAL-­‐MOMENT.HTML.	   [ACCESSED	   OCTOBER	  
2013].	  
The	  argument	  of	  DECORUM	  has	  a	  literary	  origin	  and	  comes	  from	  rhetoric,	  which	  was	  employed	  as	  civic	  art	  in	  public	  speech	  and	  political	  forums	  in	  ancient	  Greece.	  It	  is	  the	  art	  and	  skill	  to	  employ	  stylistic	  mechanisms	   to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  persuasive	  effect.	  Ornatus	   referred	   to	   the	   set	  of	   such	  stylistic	  devices	   and	   linguistic	   forms	   that	   aimed	   to	  achieve	  a	   certain	  effect	   through	  a	  beautiful,	  but	  appropriate	  form.	  It	  was	  part	  of	  the	  elocutio	  (speech	  art,	  elocution).	  As	  the	  art	  of	  persuasion	  (Aristotle)	  rhetoric	  was	  seen	  as	  dangerous,	  because	  of	  its	  force	  of	  manipulation,	  of	  deceit	  and	  of	  shaping	  a	  man’s	  character.	  The	  ornatus	  especially	  shared	  this	  problematic	  relation	  to	  truth.	  The	  ornament	   debate	   started	   in	   ancient	   Greece	   with	   Aristotle	   and	   Plato’s	   argument	   against	   the	  Sophists26.	  Plato	   favoured	   the	   logical	   and	  dialectical	  method	  as	  a	  way	   to	  discover	   truth	  and	  he	  marked	   a	   difference	   between	   a	   cognitive	   and	   logical	   method	   towards	   truth	   and	   knowledge	  (mathematical	   presentation	  —Darstellung),	   and	   a	   rhetorical,	   stylistic	   and	   ornamental	   practice	  (exposition	  or	  philosophical,	  discursive	  presentation	  —Dichtung-­‐Darstellung)	  that	  seemed	  to	  hide	  truth	  rather	  than	  demonstrating	  it.	  Many	  aporias	  from	  various	  discourses	  go	  back	  to	  the	  Platonic	  truth	  paradigm.	  
The	  main	   claim	  was	   not	   against	   the	   ornatus	   per	   se,	   the	   demand	  was	   to	   limit	   the	   use	   to	   an	  appropriate	  measure	  and	  very	  sparingly.	  This	  created	  a	  doctrine	  of	  TASTE	  that	  implied	  that	  there	  were	  various	  degrees	  of	  decoration	  and	   that	   some	  were	  more	   appropriate	   than	  others.	  Hence,	  
decorum	  may	   refer	   to:	   a	   behaviour	   in	   keeping	  with	   good	   taste	   and	   propriety,	   etiquette,	   to	   the	  suitability,	   to	   the	   requirements	  of	   a	  person,	   rank,	  or	  occasion,	  or	   to	  particular	   requirements	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  School	  of	  pre-­‐Socratic	  philosophers,	  ca.	  600	  BC:	  Demosthenes,	  Lysias,	  Isocrates,	  Quintilian.	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good	  taste	  and	  propriety.	  As	  literary	  term	  decorum	  denotes	  suitability	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  a	  style	  for	  the	  subject	  (Gombrich	  2006;	  Brett	  2005).	  
Cicero27	  developed	   his	   argument	  with	   respect	   to	   literary	   style,	   and	   Vitruvius28	  applied	   these	  Ciceronian	   principles	   to	   architecture.	   Both	   favoured	   a	   plainness	   of	   language	   and	   style	   and	  restraint	   from	  ornamental	   forms.	   The	   Ciceronian	   concept	   of	  decorum	   is	   an	   element	   present	   in	  different	  cultural/religious	  types	  of	  societies	  with	  regard	  to	  special	  areas	  of	  activity	  –	  hospitals,	  laboratories,	   barracks	   —	   in	   Japanese	   tradition	   and	   in	   Buddhist	   influenced	   cultures.	   The	  Ciceronian	   aestheticism	   can	   be	   found	   wherever	   simplicity	   and	   austerity	   are	   seen	   as	   social	   or	  religious	  virtues;	  it	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  invoke	  the	  whole	  cultural,	  social	  or	  religious	  aspects,	  it	  can	  be	  restrained	  to	  particular	  areas	  and	  can,	  usually	  it	  does,	  coexist	  with	  an	  opposite	  visual	  display	  of	  ornamental	  forms	  (Brett	  2005:	  187).	  	  
Whereas	  the	  first	  argument	  involves	  a	  doctrine	  of	  taste,	  shared	  values	  and	  common	  sense	  in	  a	  settled	  and	  agreed	  reality,	  and	  asks	  what	  is	  fitting	  in	  the	  context,	  the	  second	  theological	  argument	  involves	   an	   ontological	   question	   –	   what	   is	   real?	   Thus	   reality	   is	   disputed	   among	   different	  possibilities	   and	   there	   is	   no	   common	   sense	   for	   the	   appropriate	   reality	   yet.	   Arguments	   against	  ornamentation	  and	  decoration	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  Reformation.	  The	  Plain	  Style	  was	  an	  expression	  of	  social	  and	  religious	  changes:	  authority	  was	  relocated	  within	  the	  social	  body	  and	  the	  individual,	  and	  the	  intermediary	  religious	  apparatus	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  removed	  and	  with	  it,	  all	  images,	  ritualistic	  and	  ceremonial	  objects,	  all	  visual	  signs	  of	  belief	  were	  also	  expelled.	  Church	  music	  had	  to	  remove	  all	  polyphonic	  ornamentation.	  Ornaments	  and	  their	  banishment	  became	  a	  form	  of	   cultural	  battle	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  17th	   century	   in	  Britain	   for	  Quakers	  and	  Shakers.	  Refraining	  from	  using	  any	  type	  of	  ornamental	  forms,	  their	  houses,	  interiors,	  objects	  displayed	  a	  virtuosity	   of	   craft	   and	   a	   fetishization	   of	  workmanship	   and	  material	   qualities	   (as	  would	   be	   the	  case	   with	   Loos’	   modernist	   ascetic	   dictum).	   The	   restrain	   from	   decorative	   elements	   and	   from	  surface	   ornamentation	   had	   no	   effect	   on	   the	   desire	   for	   visual	   pleasure,	   which	   continued	   to	   be	  cultivated	  and	  saturated	  through	  using	  good	  quality	  materials,	  through	  perfect	  proportions	  and	  complex	  tonalities	  in	  restrained	  colours	  in	  relation	  to	  white.	  This	  protestant	  plain	  style	  aesthetic	  became	  orthodoxy	  in	  itself,	  a	  decorum	  that	  represented	  in	  essence	  the	  platonic	  theory	  of	  beauty	  (Brett	  2005:	  188-­‐193).	  	  
The	  third	  argument	   is	   that	  of	   the	  PROGRESS	  AND	  EVOLUTION	  of	  modern	  man,	  which	   is	  specific	   to	  Modernism	  and	   its	  definitions	  of	  Modernity	  and	   the	  modern	  Man.	  Brett	   recalls	  Habermas’	   idea	  that	  Modernity	  is	  “an	  unfinished	  project”	  determined	  by	  its	  constant	  renewal;	  a	  moving	  concept	  dependent	  on	  a	  where	  and	  when	  context,	  grounded	  in	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  present	  while	  being	  oriented	  to	   the	   future.	   (The	   figure	  of	  Don	   Juan	  comes	  again	   to	  mind.)	  Stressing	  present	  and	   future	   time,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Cicero	  (106-­‐43	  BC):	  Roman	  rhetorician,	  a	  well-­‐known	  ancient	  orator,	  the	  only	  one	  who	  both	  spoke	  in	  public	  and	  also	  produced	  treatises	  on	  the	  subject.	  28	  Vitruvius	  (80–70	  BC,	  died	  after	  c.	  15	  BC):	  Roman	  architect,	  author	  and	  engineer.	  
	   113	  
and	  the	  rupture	  with	  the	  past	  and	  its	  traditions	  is	  what	  links	  together	  the	  varied	  expressions	  of	  what	  we	  refer	  to	  as	  Modernism(s).	  Modernism(s)	  cannot	  be	  identified	  with	  a	  particular	  style	  or	  manner.	  Habermas	  emphasizes	  that	  Modernity	  had	  to	  create	  its	  normativity	  –	  its	  decorum	  –	  for	  itself	   and	   from	  within;	   it	  had	  also	   to	   create	   its	  dynamic	  concepts	   such	  as:	   revolution,	  progress,	  emancipation,	  development	  and	  a	  self-­‐generating	  crisis.	  Modernism	  is	  a	  historical	  concept	  based	  on	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Modernity,	  as	  it	  is	  expressed,	  theoretically	  constructed	  and	  physically	  realised	  in	  Loos’	  and	  Le	  Corbusier’s	  writings	  and	  architecture	  (Brett	  2005:	  194).	  
For	  Loos,	  who	  oscillates	  between	   the	  edge	  of	  a	  Marxist	  argument	  and	   that	  of	  a	  psychological	  argument	   influenced	   by	   Freud	   and	   psychoanalysis,	   ornament	   is	   degenerated,	  wasted	   time	   and	  material	   and	   an	   expensive	   ‘crime’	   against	   the	  modern	  man.	  Ornaments	   are	   expressions	   of	   lust	  and	  desire	  and	  they	  bring	  with	  themselves	  a	  demand	  for	  ever	  more	  such	  forms	  and	  styles	  leading	  to	   a	   progressive	   devaluation	   of	   labour	   and	   material.	   His	   principle	   is:	   “The	   form	   of	   the	   object	  should	  last,	  that	  is	  we	  should	  find	  it	  tolerable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  object	  itself	  lasts	  (Loos	  1998:172).”	  Loos’	   idea	  that	  art	  has	  taken	  the	  place	  of	  ornament	  became	  and	  remained	  a	  constant	  anxiety	  of	  modernist	  art	  that	  developed	  a	  strong	  phobia	  against	  any	  decorative	  residue.	   In	  his	  endeavour,	  Loos	  establishes	  a	  (classicist)	  decorum	  for	  Modernity,	  and	  his	  arguments,	  which	  are	  grounded	  on	  several	  ontological	  determinations,	  will,	   in	  the	  end,	  provide	  precisely	  an	  ontological	   foundation	  for	   this.	   He	   fetishizes	   high	   quality	  materials	   and	   exquisite	  workmanship,	   while	   urging	   against	  traditional	  ornament.	  But	  he	  only	  replaced,	  in	  fact,	  traditional	  ornamental	  forms	  with	  the	  use	  of	  luxurious	   materials	   and	   virtuosity	   of	   craft	   expressed	   in	   harmonic	   proportions	   and	   details.	  Ornaments	  were	  dis-­‐placed	  and	  re-­‐placed.	  	  
FIGURE	  60:	  ADOLF	  LOOS,	  MICHAELERPLATZ,	  VIENNA,	  DETAIL.	  
Le	  Corbusier’s	  argument	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  similar	  wit	  and	  polemic.	  He	  believes,	  like	  Loos,	  in	  the	   impossibility	   and	  unreason	   of	   a	  modern	   ornament,	   but	   for	   him,	   the	  modern	  man	  needs	   to	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“begin	   again	   from	   scratch”.	   The	   MACHINE	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   complex	   agency	   of	   change	   that	   re-­‐educates	   our	   habits	   and	   expectations	   of	   precision;	   the	   machine	   constructs	   a	   new	   decorative	  reality	   that	   is	   not	   based	  on	  ornamental	   forms	   anymore,	   but	   on	   geometry,	   precise	   proportions,	  abstract	   effectiveness,	   seriality	   and	   industrial	   production.	   The	   modern	   man	   doesn’t	   need	  decoration,	   but	   art	   (wrongly)	   understood	   in	   the	   Kantian	   sense	   —as	   “interesseloses	  Wohlgefallen”—	  a	  delight	  devoid	  of	  interests,	  a	  disinterested	  passion	  that	  exalts	  us.	  Le	  Corbusier	  proposes	  a	  decorative	  art	  that	  is	  not	  decorative	  anymore,	  but	  industrial	  and	  made	  by	  machines,	  that	   is	   not	   expensive	   or	   luxurious,	   but	   cheap	   and	   ubiquitous.	   The	   modern	   man	   doesn’t	   care	  anymore	   about	   expressing	   his	   sentiments	   and	   individuality	   in	   functional	   objects,	   as	   “we	   rid	  ourselves	   of	   the	   romantic	   and	   Ruskinian	   baggage”.	   Le	   Corbusier	   critiques	   Loos	   precisely	   for	  replacing	   ornaments	   with	   the	   use	   of	   lavish,	   high	   quality	   materials,	   and	   projects	   instead	   an	  emerging	   “normal	   perception	  of	   the	   objects	   in	   our	   life”.	   The	  perspective	   taken	  by	  Corbusier	   is	  that	   of	   an	   ideology	   of	   taste	   mixed	   with	   Kantian	   aesthetic	   ideas:	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   disinterested	  aesthetic	  feeling	  and	  a	  clear	  division	  between	  functional	  objects,	  things,	  and	  aesthetic	  works.	  If	  in	  Loos’	   case	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  a	   fetishization	  of	  materials	  and	  craft,	   in	  Le	  Corbusier’s	   case	  we	  can	  speak	   of	   a	   fetishization	   of	   usefulness	   and	   of	   a	   “law	  of	  mechanical	   selection”	   (Brett	   2005:	   198-­‐199).	  	  
In	  La	  Peinture	  Moderne	  (1926),	  Le	  Corbusier	  establishes	  that	  objects	  	  
tend	  toward	  a	  type	  that	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  evolution	  of	  forms	  between	  the	  ideal	  and	  maximum	   utility,	   and	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   the	   necessities	   of	   economical	   manufacture,	  which	  conform	  inevitably	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  nature.	  This	  double	  play	  of	  laws	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  objects	  that	  may	  thus	  be	  called	  standardized.”	  […]	  The	   way	   from	   individualism	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   types	   is	   the	   organic	   way	   of	  development…the	  type	  discards	  the	  extraordinary	  and	  re-­‐establishes	  order.	  	  	  ‘Type’	  is	  for	  Le	  Corbusier	  created,	  and	  the	  result	  of	  a	  certain	  industrial	  and	  economic	  means	  of	  production.	  This	   industrial	   type-­‐form	   is	   the	   Ideal	  Form.	  But	  Brett	   sees	   in	   this	  move	   the	  sleight	  through	  which	   industrial	  societies	  and	   its	  organizations	  become	   idealised,	  natural	  and	   logically	  necessary,	  and	  contained	  into	  a	  syllogistic	  form.	  The	  DIFFICULTY	  IS	  HOW	  TO	  INCLUDE	  THE	  PARTICULAR,	  WHICH	  IS	  DESIRABLE,	  THE	  PERSONAL,	  THE	  ORIGINAL	  WITHIN	  THE	  ESTABLISHED	  TYPE.	  (Corbusier	  1926,	  Brett	  2005:	   200-­‐205).	   “A	  SYSTEM	  OBLIVIOUS	  TO	  DIFFERENCES	   IN	  FORM	   leads	   to	   the	   production	   of	  working	  masses	  that	  can	  be	  employed	  equally	  well	  at	  any	  point	  of	  the	  globe.	  —Like	  the	  mass	  ornament,	  the	  capitalist	  production	  process	  is	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  The	  commodities	  that	  it	  spews	  forth	  are	  not	  actually	  produced	  to	  be	  possessed;	  rather,	  they	  are	  made	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  profit	  that	  knows	  no	  limit	  (Kracauer	  1995:	  75-­‐86).”	  Brett	  names	  two	  more	  problems	  in	  Le	  Corbusier’s	  argument:	  the	  failure	  to	  address	  consumption	  and	  the	  gendered	  hierarchies	  he	  puts	  in	  place.	  Corbusier	  does	  not	  address	  the	  close	  interrelation	  between	  a	  concern	  for	  production	  and	  consumption.	  Innovation,	  the	  development	  in	  technology,	  the	  lust	  and	  desire	  for	  novelty	  that	  bring	  with	  them	  an	  excessive	  consumerism,	   are	   not	   considered	   at	   all.	   The	   way	   it	   is	   presented	   in	   his	   book,	   his	   notion	   of	  modernity	  seems	  to	  be	  of	  something	  that	  has	  been	  achieved,	  even	  finished,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  reflect	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the	  embodied	  modernity	  of	  an	  industrial	  capitalist	  society.	  Le	  Corbusier	  saw	  in	  place	  a	  gendered	  hierarchy	   in	   the	   “serious	   business	   of	   design”	   and	   in	   architecture	   where	   ‘male	   abilities	   were	  indispensable	   in	   this	   field:	   consideration	   of	   ensemble,	   organization,	   sense	   of	   unity,	   balance,	  proportion,	  harmony	  (Brett	  2005:	  197-­‐204).	  	  
	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
C.C.	  —‘Form	  is	  determined	  not	  by	  arbitrary	  rules,	  but	  by	  intention.	  Indeed	  intentionality	  is	  all	  (Acker	   1991:	   3)—	   however,	   this	   intentionality	   is	   not	   an	   epistemological	   and	   purposeful	  intention,	  but	  a	  fictive	  projection	  that	  involves	  all	  our	  senses	  at	  a	  limit.	  You	  edited	  these	  texts,	  which	  are	  found	  fragments	  of	  what	  may	  have	  been	  be	  a	  novel	  of	  manners,	  into	  a	  thesis.	  What	  is	  an	  author?	  Who	  is	  speaking?’	  
	  Una	  Joc:	  ‘The	  avoidance	  of	  autonomous	  authorship	  emphasizes	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  person	  to	  act	   as	   a	   social	   being	   and	   of	   aesthetic	   creation	   as	   collective	   act.	   But,	   the	   author	   function	   is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  mode	  of	  existence,	  circulation,	  and	  functioning	  of	  certain	  discourses	  that	  are	   objects	   of	   appropriation	   within	   a	   society.	   Traditionally	   and	   ideologically	   the	   author	  functions	   as	   a	   constant	   level	   of	   value,	   as	   a	   field	   of	   theoretical	   and	   conceptual	   coherence,	  stylistic	  unity	  and	  as	  a	  historical	   figure	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  events.	  The	  author	   function	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   juridical	   and	   institutional	   system	   that	   encompasses,	  determines,	  and	  articulates	  the	  universe	  of	  discourses.	  It	  does	  not	  affect	  all	  discourses	  in	  the	  same	  way	  at	  all	   times	  and	  in	  all	   types	  of	  civilization	  and	  it	   is	  defined	  by	  a	  series	  of	  complex	  operations.	  The	  author	  does	  not	  refer	  purely	  and	  simply	  to	  a	  real	  individual,	  since	  it	  can	  give	  rise	   simultaneously	   to	   several	   selves,	   to	   several	   subject-­‐positions	   that	   can	   be	   occupied	   by	  different	   classes	   of	   individuals.	   The	   author	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   thrift	   in	   the	   proliferation	   of	  meaning	   because	   it	   limits	   and	   controls	   the	   cancerous	   and	   dangerous	   proliferation	   of	  significations	  within	  a	  world,	  where	  one	   is	   thrifty	  not	  only	  with	  one’s	   resources	  and	  riches,	  but	  also	  with	  one’s	  discourses	  and	  their	  significations.	  It	  is	  a	  functional	  principle	  by	  which	  one	  limits,	   excludes,	   and	   chooses	   in	   our	   culture,	   in	   short,	   by	   which	   one	   impedes	   the	   free	  circulation,	   the	   free	  manipulation,	   the	   free	   composition,	  decomposition,	   and	   re-­‐composition	  of	  fiction	  (Foucault	  1994:	  205-­‐222).	  	  
And	  since	  I	  am	  not	  one	  and	  not	  their	  pure	  author,	  I	  am,	  in	  a	  more	  truthful	  way,	  their	  editor.	  There	  are	  not	   really	   any	   ideas	   that	   are	  purely	   (in	  an	  absolute	   sense)	  mine	  or	  yours.	   In	  and	  through	   my	   ideas	   others	   are	   speaking.	   Most	   of	   the	   time,	   we	   only	   repeat	   thoughts	   already	  encountered.	  We	  fall	  deep	  into	  the	  ground,	  acting	  out	  a	  subjectivity	  and	  are	  predetermined	  by	  a	   ‘sub-­‐iectum’.	   The	   sub-­‐iectum	   contains	   both	   sets	   of	   rules:	   those	   of	   the	   transcendental	  conditions	   of	   the	   intuitive	   and	   discursive	   access	   to	   the	   phenomena	   and	   those	   that	   are	  historically	  generated.	  Most	  of	  our	  thoughts	  are	  ‘ready-­‐made’	  categories,	  concepts,	  judgments,	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arguments,	   representations,	   instrumental	   devices	   for	   constructing	   and	   structuring	   formal	  unity.	  True	  thoughts	  are	  rare,	  accidental	  and	  arbitrary,	  often	  minor;	  and	  they	  are	  neither	  on	  the	   side	   of	   the	   object	   nor	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   subject.	   They	   are	   always	   new,	   pure	   choices	  between	  indiscernibles.’	  	  
C.C.	  —	   ‘The	  craft	  of	  painting	  —	  be	   it	  as	  painting	  on	   flat	  surfaces,	  on	  canvas,	  wood,	  walls,	  or	  floors,	   on	   three-­‐dimensional	   objects,	   or	   dis-­‐embodied,	   hand-­‐dyed	   silk	   painting,	   or	   painting	  stuffed	   into	  grotesque	  monster-­‐cushions,	  or	  even	  painting	  taking	  over	  the	  physical	  space	  —	  unreels	   in	   your	   practice	   as	   Ariadne’s	   thread,	   and	   displays	   an	   affinity	   and	   resistance	   to	  painting	  conventions.	  Radiant	  colours,	  visual	  pleasure	  and	  immersive	  experience	  intersect	  in	  these	  variant-­‐rich	  compositions,	  ornamental	  both	  in	  form	  and	  appearance	  —some	  do	  actually	  represent	   ornament.	   You	   paint	   them	   always	   in	   series	   and	   they	   seem	   to	   question	   an	  individual’s	  aura.	  How	  do	  you	  relate	  ornament	  to	  AURA?’	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘Kracauer	  identified	  a	  new	  form	  of	  ornament	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  body	  culture—the	  MASS	  ORNAMENT,	  which	   is	   formed	   by	   the	  masses	   of	   thousand	   of	   bodies,	   sexless	   bodies	   in	   bathing	  suits	  that	  move	  in	  regular	  patterns,	  of	  geometrical	  precision,	  in	  a	  packed	  stadium	  in	  front	  of	  cheering	  masses,	  themselves	  arranged	  as	  another	  mass	  ornament	  by	  the	  stands	  in	  tier	  upon	  ordered	  tier.	  This	  type	  of	  ornament	  is	  of	  the	  mass,	  and	  not	  the	  people,	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  It	  per-­‐forms	   figures,	   but	   the	   participating	   bodies	   are	   no	   longer,	   free	   autonomous,	   individuals,	   but	  parts	   of	   the	   mass	   and	   only	   as	   such,	   can	   they	   become	   fractions	   of	   the	   figure.	   This	   is	   what	  differentiates	  the	  mass	  ornament	  from	  ballet,	  rhythmic	  gymnastics	  or	  synchronic	  swimming:	  while	  all	  these	  types	  of	  performances	  remain	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  way	  plastic	  expressions	  of	  erotic	  life	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	   them	  and	  determined	   their	   traits,	   the	  mass	   ornament	   takes	   place	   in	   a	  vacuum.	  It	   is	  a	   linear	  system	  that	  has	  no	   longer	  an	  erotic	  meaning.	   It	   is	  a	  pure	  adventure	  of	  form;	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  	  
The	  geometry	  of	  their	  figures,	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  parallel	  lines	  are	  means	  to	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  The	   ornament	   is	   the	   end	   result	   and	   the	   only	   way	   that	   makes	   it	   possible	   is	   by	   completely	  emptying	   out	   all	   the	   substantial	   constructs	   of	   their	   contents	  —that	   is	   all	   individuals.	   The	  ornament	   appears	   above	   the	   people	   as	   individuals;	   they	  make	   it	   possible	   as	   it	   rises	   out	   of	  their	  mass,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   participate	   in	   it.	   This	   is	   an	   ornament	   that	   is	   detached	   form	   its	  bearer	   and	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   rationally	  —	   because	   it	   is	   composed	   of	   lines	   and	  circles,	  waves	  and	  spirals,	  of	  Euclidean	  geometry	  principles	  and	  physics,	  and	   it	  excludes	  the	  proliferation	  of	  organic	  forms	  or	  spiritual	  emanations.	  The	  body	  is	  not	  preserved,	  but	  it	  is	  lost.	  Individuals	   get	   reduced	   to	   objectified	   parts	   –	   legs	   equal	   the	   repetition	   of	   parallel	   lines	  (Kracauer	  1995:75-­‐86).	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  mass	  ornament	  reflects	  that	  of	  the	  entire	  contemporary	  situation.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  mass	  ornament	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  capitalist	  production	  system.	  Since	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   capitalist	   production	   process	   does	   not	   arise	   purely	   out	   of	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nature,	   it	   must	   destroy	   the	   natural	   organisms	   that	   it	   regards	   either	   as	   means	   or	   as	  resistance.	  Community	  and	  personality	  perish	  when	  what	  is	  demanded	  is	  calculability;	  it	   is	   only	   a	   tiny	   piece	   of	   the	  mass	   that	   the	   individual	   can	   clamber	   up	   charts	   and	   can	  service	  machines	  without	  any	  friction.	  A	  SYSTEM	  OBLIVIOUS	  TO	  DIFFERENCES	  IN	  FORM	  leads	  to	  the	  production	  of	  working	  masses	  that	  can	  be	  employed	  equally	  well	  at	  any	  point	  of	  the	  globe.	  —Like	  the	  mass	  ornament,	   the	  capitalist	  production	  process	   is	  an	  end	   in	   itself.	  The	  commodities	  that	  it	  spews	  forth	  are	  not	  actually	  produced	  to	  be	  possessed;	  rather,	  they	  are	  made	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  profit	  that	  knows	  no	  limit.	  The	  production	  process	  runs	  its	   secret	   course	   in	   public.	   Everyone	   does	   his	   or	   her	   task	   on	   the	   conveyor	   belt,	  performing	   a	   partial	   function	   without	   grasping	   the	   totality.	   Like	   the	   pattern	   in	   the	  stadium,	  the	  organization	  stands	  above	  the	  masses,	  a	  monstrous	  figure	  whose	  creator	  withdraws	  it	  from	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  bearers,	  and	  barely	  even	  observes	  it	  himself	  (Kracauer	  1995:	  75-­‐86).	  
FIGURE	  61:	  (BRÜDERLIN	  2001:	  222).	  
For	   Kracauer	   the	   mass	   ornament	   is	   the	   rational	   and	   empty	   form	   of	   the	   cult	   devoid	   of	   any	  explicit	   meaning	   and	   substance.	   It	   is	   what	   Malabou	   calls	   negative	   plasticity,	   the	   formative	  destruction	   of	   form,	   which	   creates	   a	   completely	   new	   and	   alien	   identity,	   annihilating	   any	   past-­‐forms,	   indifferent	   to	   form,	  an	  adventure	  of	   form	  suspended	  as	   such.	   (Is	  not	   the	  mass	  ornament	  such	   a	   hidden	   and	   invisible	   structure	   that	   governs	   also	   art	   institutions,	   the	   art	   world	   and	   its	  market?	  And	  painting	  too?)	  
When	  we	  speak	  about	  AURA	  and	  artwork,	  I	  think	  of	  Benjamin	  and	  The	  Work	  of	  Art	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  
Mechanical	  Reproduction.	  AURA	  appears	  there	  alongside	  AUTHENTICITY	  in	  relation	  to	  artworks	  and	  their	  tradition,	  which	  underwent	  transformations	  through	  the	  discovery	  of	  mechanical	  means	  of	  reproduction.	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  original	  is	  the	  prerequisite	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  AUTHENTICITY,	  but	  since	  the	  whole	  sphere	  of	  AUTHENTICITY	  is	  outside	  the	  technical,	  and	  of	  course	  outside	  all	  forms	  of	  reproducibility,	   the	  quality	  of	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  product	  of	  mechanical	  reproduction	   is	  always	  depreciated.	  What	   is	   de-­‐formed	   is	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   object,	  whose	   AUTHENTICITY,	  which	   is	   its	  essence	  that	   is	  transmissible	  from	  its	  beginning	  and	  ranging	  from	  its	  substantive	  duration	  to	   its	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testimony	   to	   the	   history	  which	   it	   has	   experienced,	   is	   under	   question.	   “One	  might	   subsume	   the	  eliminated	   element	   in	   the	   term	   AURA	   and	   go	   on	   and	   say:	   that	   which	   withers	   in	   the	   age	   of	  mechanical	  reproduction	  is	  the	  AURA	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art.”	  What	  Benjamin	  names	  AURA	  is	  “a	  unique	  phenomenon	  of	  distance,	  however	  close	  it	  [the	  object,	  natural	  or	  historical]	  may	  be,”	  and	  thus,	  the	  bases	   of	   the	   contemporary	   decay	   of	   the	   AURA	   rests	   on	   two	   circumstances,	   both	   of	   which	   are	  related	   to	   the	   increasing	   significance	   of	   the	   masses	   in	   contemporary	   life:	   the	   desire	   of	  contemporary	   masses	   to	   bring	   things	   ‘closer’	   spatially	   and	   humanly,	   and	   their	   bent	   toward	  overcoming	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  every	  reality	  by	  accepting	  its	  reproduction.	  	  
Every	  day	  the	  urge	  grows	  stronger	  to	  get	  hold	  of	  an	  object	  at	  very	  close	  range	  by	  way	  of	  its	  likeness,	  its	  reproduction.	  […]	  To	  pry	  an	  object	  from	  its	  shell,	  to	  destroy	  its	  aura,	  is	  the	   mark	   of	   a	   perception	   whose	   “sense	   of	   the	   universal	   equality	   of	   things”	   has	  increased	   to	   such	   a	   degree	   that	   it	   extracts	   it	   even	   from	   a	   unique	   object	   by	  means	   of	  reproduction.	   Thus	   is	   manifested	   in	   the	   field	   of	   perception	   what	   in	   the	   theoretical	  sphere	   is	   noticeable	   in	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   statistics.	   THE	   ADJUSTMENT	   OF	  REALITY	  TO	  THE	  MASSES	  AND	  OF	  THE	  MASSES	  TO	  REALITY	  IS	  A	  PROCESS	  OF	  UNLIMITED	  SCOPE,	  AS	  MUCH	  FOR	  THINKING	  AS	  FOR	  PERCEPTION	  (Benjamin	  1999:	  211-­‐244).	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The	   restlessness	   of	   the	   dialectical	   movement	   implies	   infinity	   as	   the	   instability	   of	   every	  determined	  point	  in	  the	  present	  that	  hangs	  in	  the	  ropes	  of	  the	  given	  and	  the	  gift,	  the	  present	  and	  its	  presentation.	  So,	  again,	  what	   is	  actually	   that	   I	  am	  circling	  around,	   is	  difference	   in	  sameness,	  discontinuity	  in	  continuity	  and	  vice	  versa	  continuity	  in	  discontinuity.	  What	  is	  posited	  is	  a	  fiction	  and	  its	  deposition	  offsets,	  in	  an	  ornamental	  process.	  
We	   should	   unlock	   their	   différance.	   From	   their	   beginnings	   they	   run	   in	   parallel.	   They	   are	  drawing	   parallel	   lines…like	   this	   |	   |,	   or	   like	   this	   (	   (,	   if	   not	   like	   this	   )	   ).	   Sometimes	   smiling	   and	  sometimes	   not	  wanting	   to	   know	   of	   each	   other’s	   existence.	   They	  walk	   along	   together,	   but	   only	  side	  by	  side	  in	  parallel.	  They	  share	  with	  each	  other	  the	  beginning:	  our,	  and	  by	  our	  I	  mean	  both	  men’s	   and	   women’s	   drive	   for	   emulation	   and	   decoration	   and	   the	   pathway	   lined	   up	   by	   their	  different	  manifestations	  and	  discourses.	  They	  are	  siblings,	  yet	  siblings	  from	  a	  different	  father.	  At	  moments	   they	   are	   in	   close	   proximity,	   but	   only	   in	   the	   proximity	   reckoned	   by	   an	   infinitesimal	  calculus.	  	  
Their	  touch	  always	  slips.	  It	  slips	  away	  in	  womanly	  tact	  and	  then	  it	  slides	  back	  in	  unadulterated	  manly	  retribution.	  They	  settle	  their	  accounts	  of	  their	  kind	  by	  defining	  and	  accumulating	  endless	  details	   to	   guard	   their	   genus,	   to	   exclude	   the	  other.	   The	  one	   claims	   to	  be	  purposeless,	  while	   the	  other’s	   rise	   seems	   to	   serve	   the	   sole	   purpose	   of	   beautification	  of	   everything	   it	   touches,	  with	   or	  without	  purpose.	  Once	  a	  symbol	  for	  art,	  then	  a	  pariah	  in	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  Woman,	  the	  Savage,	  the	  Oriental,	   the	   Degenerate,	   the	   Criminal.	   They	   share	   a	   Zeitgenossenschaft,	   a	   contemporaneity,	  because	   from	   the	   beginning,	   they	   run	   side	   by	   side,	   concomitantly.	   Curiously	   enough,	   their	  contemporary	  presence	  seemed	  to	  authorize	  only	  one	  to	  be	  really	  contemporary,	  while	  throwing	  the	   other	   far	   away	   in	   the	   exotic	   and	   ancient	   times	   of	   no	   man’s	   land.	   Their	   path	   shows	   how	  contemporary	  contemporaneity	  and	  non-­‐contemporaneity	  (Unzeitgemäßheit)	  can	  be.	  	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
At	  this	  pace,	  I	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  write	  anything,	  especially	  not	  the	  thing	  I	  should	  write.	  The	  twists	  and	   turns	   of	  my	   thoughts	   are	   going	   down	   the	   stream	   and	   find	   no	   gentle	   finalities	   in	   gates	   of	  conclusions.	   I	   keep	   slipping	   in	   the	   traps	   laid	   down	  by	   a	   just	   finished	   sentence.	   Thoughts	   sieve	  through	   slow	   fingers.	   And	   the	   white	   collar	   of	   my	   original	   contribution	   to	   knowledge	   weighs	  heavy	  on	  my	  neck	  and	  bows	  my	  head	  to	  the	  ground	  —	  as	  does	  the	  counting.	  	  
To	   appear	   and	   appearance.	   Truth	   and	   exactitude.	   These	   thoughts	   on	   truth	   are	   not	   mine,	   I	  encountered	  them	  in	  a	  lecture	  by	  Alain	  Badiou.	  I	  LIKED	  THEM.	  Truth	  understood	  as	  the	  adequation	  between	   the	   subject’s	  understanding	  and	   the	   thing	  perceived	  by	   it	   implies	   that	   truth	   takes	   the	  form	  of	  a	  proposition	  and	  that	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  judgment.	  This	  definition	  of	  truth	  has	  been	  criticized	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by	   modern	   philosophy,	   who	   oriented	   its	   thinking	   towards	   the	   difference	   between	   truth’s	  becoming	  and	  the	  transmission	  of	  truth,	  between	  truth	  and	  knowledge.	  	  
Art	  presents	  singular	  absolutely	   finite	   truth.	  The	  work-­‐of-­‐art’s-­‐workings	  are	   the	  preservation	  and	  inscription	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  infinity	  of	  truth.	  This	  infinite	  creation	  of	  truth,	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  infinity	  is	  an	  ornamental	  nod,	  a	  metabolic	  force,	  that	  can	  be	  isolated	  and	  specified	  but	  not	  named.	  It	  is	  the	  point	  in	  the	  present,	  which	  we	  can	  neither	  believe	  in	  nor	  know,	  but	  which	  we	  can	  experience	  and	  sense	  in	  all	  its	  effectivity	  as	  a	  passage	  (of	  thought)	  in	  the	  now	  and	  in	  the	  present.	  	  It	   is	   the	   point	   in	   infinity	   through	  which	   thought	   passes.	   This	   singular,	   absolutely	   finite	   nod	   of	  truth	  is	  the	  passage	  of	  thought	  to	  being	  and	  of	  being	  to	  thought.	  
Truth	   is	   always	   its	   becoming,	   an	   event,	   a	   new	   event.	   For	   Heidegger	   truth	   was	   aletheia,	   the	  event	  of	  veiling-­‐unveiling,	  and	  the	  understanding	  of	  truth	  was	  techné,	  or	  science.	  Truth	  is	  always	  something	  new	  and	  only	  its	  understanding	  can	  be	  continued,	  repeated	  and	  applied	  via	  a	  techné.	  While	  knowledge	  relies	  on	  the	  repetition	  of	  what	  IS	  already,	  the	  event	  of	  truth	  relies	  on	  chance.	  It	  is	  by	  chance,	  purely	  accidently,	  that	  one	  makes	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  faithful	  to	  some	  thing	  that	  just	  happened	   but	   that	   cannot	   be	   explained,	   demonstrated	   or	   named.	   To	   be	   faithful	   here	   is	   an	  interruption	   in	   the	  habitual,	  passive	  citation	  of	   the	  set	  of	  principles	   that	  normally	  controls	  and	  drives	  the	  cognitive	  activity	  in	  our	  daily	  life.	  In	  this	  interstice,	  truth	  appears	  in	  its	  newness.	  And	  what	   I	  mean	  by	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   refers	  directly	   to	  what	   renders	  possible	   a	   debriefing	   as	   the	  adequate	  ground	  for	  the	  intellectual	  horizon	  from	  which	  we	  understand	  and	  perceive	  the	  world.	  What	   truth	  perforates	  are	   the	   links	   in	   the	   triad	  of	   the	   ‘I’,	   its	  horizon	  and	  a	  phenomenon.	  Truth	  riddles	  our	  phantasms.	  Phantasms	  are	  for	  Aristotle	  perceptions	  instantaneously	  produced	  by	  the	  psyche,	  of	  what	  has	  been	  accessed	   in	   the	  world,	  only	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  which,	  a	  debriefing	  of	   the	  world	   can	  happen,	  which	  opens	   the	  possibility	   for	   cognition	  of	   the	  world	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  An	  eventful	   anonymous	   supplement	   of	   such	   phantasms	   disrupts	   the	   habitual	   repetition	   of	   the	  Kantian	  schematism.	  	  
Truth’s	  problems	  start	  to	  appear	  as	  the	  power	  or	  potency	  of	  truth,	  as	  the	  desire	  to	  reach	  total	  knowledge	   and	   universality,	   to	   turn	   whatever	   singularities	   into	   individualities	   and	   to	  exponentially	   expand	   them	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   general.	   The	   construction	   of	   truth	   is	   the	  formation	   of	   a	   finite,	   subjective	   and	   accidental	   singularity.	   The	   anticipation	   of	   a	   singularity	   as	  universality	  is	  forcing	  truth	  into	  false	  and	  empty	  omnipotence.	  	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
What	  is	  décor?	  (Nancy	  2007:	  50).	  Décor	  is	  what	  arranges	  a	  space	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  attracts	  a	  gaze	   (den	  Blick).	   Décor	   brings	   something	   into	   A	  view,	   orients,	   directs	   and	   attracts	   the	   look.	   It	  organizes	  something	  for	  reception,	  for	  becoming	  reception,	  for	  acceptance.	  For	  the	  GIFT.	  Décor	  is	  a	   space	   for	   welcoming	  —	   Be-­‐sinn-­‐ung,	   that	   is	   consciousness,	   a	   consciousness	   within	   which	   a	  subject	  itself	  comes	  at	  home,	  at	  home	  in	  the	  world	  and	  thus	  into	  being-­‐with.	  It	  is	  an	  encounter	  of	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a	  consciousness	  with	  another	  one,	  or	  with	  itself.	  Décor	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  desired	  and	  accepted,	  the	  desire	  for	  community.	  
In	  English,	  décor,	  or	  decor,	  refers	  normally	  to	  the	  furnishing	  and	  decoration	  of	  a	  room,	  to	  the	  scenery	  of	  a	  stage;	  but	  in	  French,	  it	  can	  refer	  also	  to	  forms	  of	  embellishment	  and	  visual	  pleasure.	  Décor,	  decorum	  and	  decoration,	   imply	  a	  doctrine	  of	  taste	  and	  appropriateness,	  but	  the	  meaning	  in	   which	   Nancy	   is	   interested,	   is,	   I	   believe,	   that	   of	   an	   ontological	   advent.	   Décor	   is	   the	   staging	  mechanism	   that	   makes	   it	   possible	   for	   a	   self	   to	   emerge	   for	   itself	   in	   itself.	   This	   nascent	  appropriateness	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  self,	  for	  the	  image,	  because	  it	  enables	  self-­‐consciousness	  and	  self-­‐recognition.	  The	   subject	   is	   thus	   able	   to	   recognize	   itself	   and	   to	  perceive	   the	   common	  sense	  upon	  which	  not	  only	  the	  actual,	  social,	  political	  or	  cultural	  decorum	  grounds,	  but	  also	  the	  subject	  itself.	  In	  the	  artistic	  image,	  the	  subject	  comes	  to	  itself,	  to	  being	  its	  own	  subject	  (Nancy	  2007).	  	  
But	  consciousness	  is	  not	  only	  of	  something,	  but	  also	  within	  something.29	  The	  image	  shows	  the	  sameness	   between	   its	   “self	   outside	   self”	   and	   its	   “self	   at	   itself”.	   It	   is	   a	   subject	   that	  makes	   itself	  distinct,	  that	  gathers	  itself	  into	  itself,	  in	  an	  instance,	  or	  in-­‐stance,	  and	  comes	  to	  take	  the	  stance	  of	  itself,	  for	  itself	  and	  for	  the	  others.	  Its	  own	  cessation	  allows	  and	  presents	  its	  coming	  into	  presence.	  	  
In	   image,	   a	   sub-­‐stance	   (matter)	   and	   self	   ad-­‐here,	   co-­‐here	   and	   unite,	   because	   the	   sub-­‐stance	  takes	   the	   stance	  of	  WHATEVER	   (Agamben	  2009:1-­‐2)	   on	   a	   sur-­‐face;	   the	   sub-­‐stance	  welcomes	   the	  WHATEVER-­‐form,	   the	   “exemplary	   singularity”,	   it	   receives	   the	   GIFT	   of	   the	   Blick,	   of	   the	   look,	   and	  becomes	  An-­‐blick,	  sight,	  aspect,	  perspective,	  look,	  face.	  
The	  face	  of	  the	  image	  puts	  us	  face-­‐to	  face	  with	  our	  own	  face,	  the	  face	  of	  our	  own	  self	  confronted	  with	  itself.	  The	  image	  presents,	  exposes	  this	  confrontation.	  	  
Something	   comes	   into	   presence	   without	   knowing	   that	   it	   gives	   an	   agreement	   and	   without	  knowing	   the	  GIFT	  it	  gives.	  That	  which	  has	  no	   identity,	  what	   is	  not	  yet	  distinct,	  accepts	   the	   look,	  becomes	  gaze,	  in	  other	  words	  it	  accepts	  and	  intimates	  the	  exterior	  in	  its	  most	  intimate	  interior	  –	  this	  is	  how	  being	  comes	  into	  being	  that	  is	  being-­‐with.	  
This	   GIFT	   I	   am	   mentioning	   here	   is	   specific.	   It	   is	   Marion’s	   GIFt	   (Marion	   2008:	   80-­‐100).	  Phenomena,	   in	   their	   traditional	  understanding,	  as	   that	  which	  shows	   itself	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   itself,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This	  is	  one	  of	  Noica’s	  key	  thoughts	  in	  his	  ontology.	  Intentionality	  for	  him	  has	  a	  triple	  implication:	  ‘of	  something’,	  ‘from	  something’	  and	  ‘within	  something’	  and	  he	  claims,	  that	  life	  is	  always	  “oriented”	  referring	  to	  the	  Greeks	  (Plato)	  for	  whom	  any	  form	  of	  life	  is	  a	  form	  of	  intentionality;	  the	  Greeks	  called	  this	  intentionality	  ‘eros’;	  everything	  aspires	  to	  something,	  no	  matter	  if	  this	  something	  is	  determined	  or	  not,	  every	  creature	  has	  its	  ‘daimon’	  (supernatural	  being,	  good	  or	  evil,	  a	  personification	  of	  men’s	  destiny).	  Noica	  claims	  that	  reason	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  life,	  ‘as	  a	  way	  of	  tending	  towards	  something,	  not	  of	  registering	  and	  filtering	  something.’	  Hence	  consciousness	  is	  for	  Noica	  a	  processuality	  and	  mediation,	  it	  is	  oriented	  towards	  being	  and	  its	  meaning,	  and	  this	  orientation	  of	  consciousness	  is	  a	  reflexive	  act	  –	  knowing	  the	  knowledge,	  love’s	  for	  love’s	  sake,	  art	  for	  art’s	  sake,	  imaging	  the	  image.	  	  Reflexivity	  is	  ‘the	  function	  of	  a	  function’,	  an	  operation	  of	  an	  operation	  or	  an	  operation	  based	  on	  an	  operation.	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are	  defined	  and	  definite,	   twice:	  by	  the	  constituting	   ‘I’	  and	  by	  the	  delimiting	  horizon	  of	   intuition	  (everything	   that	   appears	   appears	   in	   intuition).	   With	   Husserl,	   this	   intuition	   becomes	   attested	  through	  itself,	  and	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  founded	  in	  reason.	  Therefore,	  all	  phenomena	  seem	  to	  have	  a	   right	   to	   appear	   and	   there	   is	  no	  need	   for	   further	   reasons	   for	   their	   appearance.	  However,	   at	   a	  closer	   look,	   intuition	   remains	   determined	   in	   various	   ways.	   Intuition	   only	   gives	   ‘to	   us’	   what	  appears,	  it	  only	  gives	  to	  an	  ‘I’	  what	  appears,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  ‘I’	  constitutes	  all	  phenomena.	  What	  can	  be	  given	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  always	  judged,	  decided	  by	  an	  ‘I’.	  Moreover,	  the	  realm	  of	  non-­‐experience	   is	  circumscribed	  beforehand	  by	  what	   is	  already	  experience,	  as	  Husserl	  says,	  all	  given	  and	  experienced	  phenomena	  have	   their	  own	  horizon	  of	   “non-­‐observed	   lived-­‐experience”	  (Marion	  2008:	  18-­‐48).	  Thus,	  phenomena	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  unconditioned,	  in	  their	  right	  to	  appear,	  but	  in	  reality	  they	  remain	  limited	  by	  intuition	  itself,	  by	  its	  horizon	  and	  by	  the	  ‘I’.	  	  
Marion’s	   interest	   is	   in	   “saturated	   phenomena”,	   in	   those	   phenomena	   that	   exceed	   intuition.	  Whereas	   common-­‐law	   phenomena,	   which	   are	   visible	   and	   permit	   objective	   knowledge,	  production	  and	  predication,	  are	  poor	  in	  intuition	  and	  limited	  in	  meaning,	  “saturated	  phenomena”	  are	   not	   visible,	   but	   revealed.	   They	   give	   themselves	   in	   revelation	   and	   through	   the	   GIFT	   of	  revelation.	   Artworks	   are,	   for	   Marion,	   saturated	   phenomena,	   which	   reveal	   themselves	   as	   gifts.	  Marion	   also	   refers	   here	   to	   Derrida’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   GIFT	   in	   Given	   Time:	   I.	   Counterfeit	   Money	  (Derrida	  1991),	  so	  as	  to	  develop	  a	  different	  position.	  Derrida’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  GIFT	  focused	  on	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  the	  GIFT	  in	  view	  of	  the	  triadic	  context	  of	  the	  GIVER,	  the	  GIVEN-­‐GIFT	  and	  the	  GIFT-­‐RECIPIENT,	   and	   Marion	   thinks	   that	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   the	   GIFT	   is	   buried	   under	   a	   system	   of	  exchange.	  The	  GIFT	  interpreted	  from	  the	  horizon	  of	  givenness	  itself,	  is	  the	  “GIFT	  that	  gives	  itself	  by	  giving	  its	  giving”,	  the	  “gift	  that	  gives	  itself	  by	  giving	  its	  reception”,	  that	  “gives	  itself	  here	  without	  limit,	  without	  return,	  outside	  of	  commerce	  (Marion	  2008:	  92-­‐99).”	  The	  very	  mode	  of	  appearing	  of	  the	  GIFT	  is	  precisely	  a	  decision	  and	  the	  character	  of	  givenness	  of	  the	  gift	  that	  decides	  itself	  as	  a	  gift	  and	   thus	  emerges	  and	  reveals	   itself	   from	   itself.	   Its	  appearance	   is	  exhausted	   in	   its	  givenness,	  as	  the	   gift	   gives	   itself,	   in	   abandoning	   itself.	   Saturated	   phenomena	   reveal	   themselves,	   give	  themselves	  in	  abandoning	  themselves,	  they	  emerge	  from	  their	  own	  self	  and	  loose	  themselves	  in	  their	  revealing.	  	  
Una	  Joc:	  ‘It	  is	  in	  this	  sense,	  that	  I	  am	  speaking	  of	  the	  “revelatory	  force	  of	  the	  arabesque”	  and	  of	  “painting	  as	  gaze”,	  that	  is	  painting	  as	  look,	  as	  GIFT,	  the	  GIFT	  of	  a	  look.	  What	  is	  carried	  through	  in	  the	   idea	   of	   the	   arabesque,	   is	   an	   avoidance	   of	   immediate	   interpretation	   and	   immediate	   and	  collective	   apperception	   of	   interpretable	   phenomena,	   which	   is	   intensified	   by	   the	   excessive	  sensuousness	   of	   the	   interiorization	   of	   aesthetic	   experience.	   The	   fascination	   with	   the	  subtleties	  of	  details	  and	  the	  elaboration	  of	  endless	  details	  are	  best	  explored	  and	  experienced	  in	  private.	  With	  arabesques,	  one	  has	  the	  feeling	  as	  though	  the	  creative	  impulse	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  compel	  the	  viewer	  or	  user	  to	  withdraw	  within	  her/himself,	  to	  meditate	  on	  her/his	  own,	  to	  discover	  a	  work	  for	  her/himself	  for	  her/his	  own	  life.	  To	  allow	  oneself	  to	  get	  immersed	  in	   the	  myriad	  of	  details,	   to	  wander	  deep	  within	   intricate	  detours	  of	  visual	  entanglement,	   to	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wonder	   and	   wander	   with	   disbelief	   in	   a	   lengthy	   process	   of	   visual	   entanglement;	   to	   forget	  oneself	  in	  this	  SATURATED	  state;	  to	  loose	  sight	  of	  the	  horizon,	  of	  the	  I	  and	  of	  intuition.	  	  
What	   you	   see	   is	   not	   what	   you	   see,	   nor	   is	   it	   something	   else:	   in	   this	   impossibly	   ambiguous	  labyrinth,	  Ariadne’s	  thread	  is	  what	  you	  wish	  to	  put	  into	  what	  you	  see	  and	  what	  you	  know	  can	  be	  put	  there	  (Grabar,	  2006:213-­‐251;	  2006:13-­‐29).’	  
This	  excess	  of	  intuition	  implies	  that	  there	  isn’t	  an	  already	  lived,	  objectified	  experience	  to	  open	  the	   horizon	   of	   this	   particular	   non-­‐observed	   experience.	   We	   may	   encounter	   this	   excess	   of	  intuition	   in	  an	   image,	   in	   its	  ex-­‐position	  of	  a	  novelty,	  of	  an	   invention,	  of	   the	   formation	  of	  a	  new	  world,	  of	  a	  coming	  into	  being,	  into	  presence,	  of	  a	  self	  exposing	  itself	  as	  self.	  The	  revelation	  of	  the	  GIFT,	  which	  is	  the	  GIFT	  of	   the	   look,	   that	   is	   the	   look	  as	  the	  outlook	  in	  the	  view	  of	  an	   instant,	   is	  an	  ontological	  ornamental	  intermediary,	  a	  daimon.	  	  
In	  image,	  a	  space	  is	  opened,	  traced,	  marked	  within	  which	  something	  positions,	  gives,	  receives	  and	  looses	  itself.	  
Decorum	  is	  something	  in	  which	  we	  need	  to	  fit	  in	  –	  this	  is	  its	  main	  function:	  it	  communicates	  the	  commune.	  Décor/decorum	  ornamentalizes	  the	  space	  between	  being	  and	  non-­‐being,	  between	  the	  individual	   and	   the	   general,	   the	   personal	   and	   the	   public.	   Décor	   and	   decorum	   are	   both	   equally	  individualizing	   and	   generalizing;	   both	   are	   the	   delimitation	   of	   the	   community	   and	   the	  mark	   of	  private	  property	  and	  territory,	  and	  of	  particularity.	  They	  mark	  the	  boundary	  of	  co-­‐belonging,	  of	  identification,	   of	   Eros	   and	   desire,	   and	   also	   of	   isolation	   and	   exclusion.	   They	   are	   the	   view	   on	   a	  (sur)face	   of	   the	   ABOVE-­‐ALL	   face	   (in	   the	   end,	   this	   is	   what	   surface	   means)	   –	   the	   undisclosed	  embodied	   face	   of	   a	   figure	   that	   configures	   itself	   from	   the	   amalgam	   of	   a	   (back)ground	   and	   that	  disfigures	  itself	  instantly	  in	  facing	  its	  own	  ground.	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LIMIT	  WITHIN	  IMAGE,	  IMAGE	  WITHIN	  LIMIT	  
Imagining	   imagination,	   imagining	   the	   image	  and	   imagining	  painting.	  Painting	  and	  philosophy	  structure	  themselves	  as	  traditions	  and	  as	  the	  image	  of	  their	  own	  change.	  In	  philosophy,	  two	  main	  strings	  proved	  extremely	  influential	  for	  thinking	  the	  image:	  the	  transcendental	  (e.	  g.	  Heidegger,	  Hegel,	  Descartes,	  Plato)	  and	  the	  immanent	  (e.	  g.	  Deleuze,	  Hegel,	  Spinoza).	  In-­‐between	  these	  two	  a	  bottomless	   gap	   empties	   itself	   out	   extending	   into	   unbridgeable	   depths,	   only	   to	   self-­‐inflate	   and	  contract	   the	   two	   into	   one	   and	   the	   same	   tact.	   In	   painting	   the	   image	   is	   stretched	   out	   between	  representation	  and	  presentation,	  between	  perspectival	  Euclidian	  and	  planar	  ornamental	   space.	  In	  between	  the	  two,	  painting	  multiplies	  itself	  as	  historical	  time.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  imaginary	  concerns	  touched	  upon	  over	  and	  over	  again	  that	  remained	  inert	  in	  a	  timeless	  blossom	  stage	  and	  blocked	  in	  inescapable	  antithetical	  dichotomies	  between	  They	  and	  
Us:	   representation	   -­‐	   presentation,	   subject	   -­‐	   object,	   signification	   -­‐	   sense,	   being	   -­‐	   becoming,	  ontological	   -­‐	   ontic,	   presence	   -­‐	   absence,	   offering	   -­‐	   withdrawal,	   one	   -­‐	   multiple,	   exposition	   of	  presence	  -­‐	  display	  of	  appearance,	  isolation	  -­‐	  merger,	  trace	  –	  form.	  The	  metaphysical	  perpetuation	  of	  such	  abstract	  ideas,	  within	  the	  fundamental	  precariousness	  of	  Being,	  welcomed	  already	  many	  intruders	  who	   tried	   to	   reorient,	   transpose,	   and	  displace	   the	   immortalization,	   immutability	   and	  the	  nexus	  of	  such	  relations.	  
Nancy	  developed	  across	  several	  texts	  (e.g.	  1996;	  2005;	  2006),	  his	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  image.	  (The	  image	  was	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  attention	  for	  many	  thinkers,	  such	  as	  Blanchot,	  Barthes,	  Rancière,	  Lyotard,	  E.	  Alloa,	  D.	  Mersch	  and	  many	  others.)	  In	  my	  reading	  of	  Nancy,	  I	  am	  influenced	  also	  by	  Noica’s	   thinking:	   I	  believe	   that	   the	   image,	  understood	  ontologically	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  being,	  can	  be	  blocked	  in	  ontological	  and	  ontic	  creative	  maladies.	  	  
The	   image,	   the	   presentation	   of	   a	   subject,	   may	   resist	   our	   reification,	   objectification	   or	  mechanical	  attitude	  towards	  images.	  It	  may	  provoke	  through	  its	  resistance	  a	  contact,	  a	  reciprocal	  touching	  relation	  between	  images	  and	  us,	  artworks	  and	  the	  world,	  between	  They	  and	  Us,	  which	  is	  not	   based	   on	   representational	   frontality	   and	   metaphysical	   dualism:	   we	   are	   obsessed	   with	  individuation,	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  full	  understanding	  and	  the	  complete	  assimilation	  of	  the	  frontal	  other,	   that	   for	   this	   very	  purpose	   is	   systematically	   sliced	   and	  dissected	   in	   the	   sum	  of	   disparate	  parts,	  in	  a	  machined	  whole,	  with	  effective	  outcomes.	  The	  exposition	  that	  the	  image	  is	  makes	  They	  and	  Us	  alike.	  It	  makes	  us	  acknowledging	  distinctness,	  differentness,	  separateness,	  and	  accept	  the	  threat	  of	  semiotic	  collapse	  and	  of	   the	   incomprehensible	  kernel	  —“the	  hidden	  art	  of	   the	  human	  soul”	  (Kant	  1998:	  173).	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FIGURE	   62:	   (NAUMANN	   AND	   BAILEY	   2009:	   21).	   VITALY	   HALBERSTADT	   AND	   MARCEL	   DUCHAMP,	  
PHOTOGRAPH	   BY	   MAN	   RAY	   (CA.	   1932)	   PUBLISHED	   IN	   A	   BOOKLET	   ENTITLED	   LE	   MONDE	   DES	   ECHECS,	  
PUBLSIHED	  BY	  L’ECHIQUIER,	  BRUSSELS,	  FEBRUARY	  1933.	  
The	  Kantian	  Darstellung	  (exposition)	  and	  the	  image	  imply	  distance	  and	  frontality	  —exposition,	  which	  is	  philosophical	  presentation,	  Darstellung	  and	  Dichtung,	  clear	  and	  distinct	  presentation	  of	  concepts,	   forms	  and	  categories	  and	   invention.	  A	   facing	  between	  a	  subject	  or	  self	  and	  something	  that	   is	   like	   a	   self,	   but	   other.	   They	   both	   mobilize	   desire	   and	   a	   facing	   between	   two	   faces	  simultaneously	  at	  di-­‐stance	  and	  in	  (con-­‐)tact	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  image	  is	  not	  in	  front	  of	  us,	  but	  before	  us.	   Its	  distance	   is	   the	  spacing	  of	  an	  ontological	  difference.	  The	   image	  brings	  the	  same	  to	  account	  without	  destroying	  the	  breadth	  between	  the	  two	  faces,	  one	  of	   the	  same	  and	  one	  of	   the	  other,	  and	  brings	  them	  into	  con-­‐tact.	  	  
FIGURE	  63:	  IN	  PLASTER	  (PLATH,	  THE	  COLLECTED	  POEMS,	  1961).	  
While	   pointing	   out	   that	   images	   are	   not	   only	   visual,	   but,	   also	  musical,	   olfactory,	   or	   gustative,	  Nancy	   writes	   that	   the	   image	   is	   different	   from	   other	   things	   in	   the	   world,	   from	   “mere	  representations”	   or	   “cheap	   decorations”,	   from	   the	   being-­‐there	   of	   things	   that	   are	   available,	  grasped,	  fully	  assimilated	  or	  understood,	  functional	  and	  useful	  —the	  image	  is	  the	  distinct	  and	  it	  is	  from	  the	  sky.	  	  
But	   this	  ontological	  and	  ontic	  distinctness	   is	   something,	  which,	   I	  believe,	   cannot	  be	   taken	   for	  granted.	   Something	   that	   may	   or	   may	   not	   realise	   itself,	   it	   may	   or	   may	   not	   find	   its	   proper	  Determinations	   (in	  Noica’s	   sense).	  Being	  has	  a	   tendency	   for	  dislocation.	  The	  ontico-­‐ontological	  difference	  between	  image	  and	  things,	  between	  being	  and	  beings	  circulate	  constantly	  in	  and	  out	  of	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one	   another.	   The	   image,	   as	   being,	   is	   not	   static	   and	   it	   is	   not	   monolithic,	   but	   “singular	   plural”	  (Nancy	  2000).	  The	  image,	  like	  being,	  is	  maybe	  nothing	  more	  than	  its	  own	  changeability.	  It	  exists	  in	   multiple,	   consequent	   or	   concurrent	   determinations,	   sometimes	   even	   contradictory	   ones	  simultaneously.	  As	  presence,	  it	  is	  always	  in	  excess	  of	  itself	  while	  remaining	  all	  the	  way	  the	  same,	  manifesting	   the	   plasticity	   of	   being,	   the	   concurrent	   liability	   and	   permanence	   of	   form.	   The	  difference	   between	   image	   (in	   Nancy’s	   understanding)	   and	   image	   (in	   its	   common	   use)	   are	  ontologically	  given,	  as	  Nancy	  points	  out,	  but	  this	  difference	  manifests	  itself	  in	  and	  through	  ontic	  determinations	   given	   by	   cultural,	   social,	   historical	   or	   political	   constructions.	   There	   is	   a	   tensed	  friction	   between	   artistic	   images,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   as	   event	   and	   becoming	   (when	   presence	  includes	  the	  presencing	  of	  absence,	  of	  the	  void,	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  negativity,	  the	  dialectical	  and	  the	   differential	   one)	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   images	   as	   an	   essentialist	   visual	   perception	   and	  representation,	   constructed	   by	   a	   subject	   and	   by	   an	   understanding	   of	   presence	   as	   essence	   and	  immutability.	  	  
The	  process	  of	  imagination,	  the	  “hidden	  art	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  human	  soul”	  (Kant	  1998:	  173),	  the	  schematism	  of	  the	  pure	  image	  determines	  the	  existence	  of	  any	  image	  and	  makes	  subjectivity	  and	   the	   subject	   possible.	   Each	   image	   exposes	   and	  presents	   a	   view/look	   (Bild)	   and	   re-­‐presents	  (Vor-­‐stellung,	  Ab-­‐bild-­‐ung)	  something	  that	  is	  given	  as	  one	  already	  (Ein-­‐bild-­‐ung).	  The	  first	  pure	  image	  before	  all	   images	  was	  already	   concomitantly	  one	   image	   (Ein-­‐bild(-­‐ung)),	   a	  before-­‐image	  (Vor-­‐bild),	   an	   after-­‐image	   (Nach-­‐bild)	   and	   a	   copy	   (Ab-­‐bild)	   (Heidegger	   1991:	   92-­‐97).	   Every	  image	  is	  ALSO	  a	  pure	  image,	  putting	  the	  manifold	  into	  the	  ONE	  of	  an	  image.	  	  
My	  thought	  is	  then:	  if	  the	  image	  is	  an	  ontological	  mode	  of	  becoming	  an	  almost	  infinite	  number	  of	  possible	  Determinations	  (Noica),	  some	  of	  which	  are	  sensed	  as	  more	  truthful	  and	  some	  falser,	  some	  as	  art	  and	  some	  as	  mere	  decoration,	  some	  more	  valuable,	  some	  less,	   then	  we	  could	  think	  about	  the	  image	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  divided	  self,	  whose	  existential	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  autonomy	  are	  severely	   ruptured.	   If	   we	   think	   how	   important	   and	   how	   dependent	   images	   and	   artworks	   are	  nowadays	   of	   how	   and	   if	   they	   are	   CURATED,	   this	   clinical	   perspective	   is	   not	   at	   all	   far-­‐fetched	  (especially	  in	  our	  world,	  of	  the	  worldwide	  web	  of	  electronic	  information,	  where	  cleaning	  out	  is	  a	  form	  of	  taking	  care	  not	  to	  go	  under	  ).	  	  
‘To	  curate’	  comes	  from	  the	  Latin	  curatus,	  meaning	  “to	  be	  responsible	  of	  the	  care	  (of	  souls)”	  and	  “to	   take	   care,	   to	   be	   concerned	   and	   to	   heal”	   (Online	   Etymological	   Dictionary).	   While	   still	  remaining	   one	   and	   the	   same	   (permanence	   of	   form),	   in	   spite	   of	   all	   irruptions,	   explosions,	  dislocations,	   re-­‐formulations,	   reconstructions	   and	   re-­‐design	   (liability	   of	   form),	   curated	   images	  gather	  themselves	  into	  a	  (new)	  meaning	  with	  each	  show	  anew	  (donation/annihilation	  of	  form)	  in	  an	   act	   of	   positive	   plasticity.	   The	  more	   labile	   or	   flexible	   they	   are,	   the	  more	   sense-­‐capacity	   and	  fuller	  range	  of	  movement	  they	  have,	  the	  more	  trans-­‐formations	  they	  provoke	  with	  more	  stamina	  in	  time.	  The	  more	  things	  they	  engage	  with	  and	  participate	  in,	  the	  more	  they	  are	  praised	  and	  their	  value	   (monetary	   or	   symbolic)	   as	   artworks	   increases.	   Such	   plastic	   malleability	   and	   instability	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require	   an	   extreme	   internal	   force	   and	  drive	   for	   change	   and	   equally,	   an	  unimaginable	   force	   for	  self-­‐identity,	   that	   is	   able	   to	   sustain	   and	   resist	   such	   outmost	   number	   of	   transformations,	  metamorphoses	  or	  gaps.	  	  
The	  image,	  in	  analogy	  to	  an	  existentially	  insecure	  person	  without	  a	  stable	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  autonomy,	  would	  protect	  and	  construct	  its	  SELF	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  feel	  real	  and	  whole.	  (The	   analogy	   is	   to	   a	   psychotic	   person	   in	   the	   standard	   clinical	   sense	   of	   psychosis:	   a	   subject	  displaying	  a	  derangement	  of	  personality	  and	  a	  loss	  of	  contact	  with	  reality	  —	  having	  and	  finding	  no	  sense;	  exposing	  abnormal	  or	  deteriorated	  social	  functioning,	  irrational	  thinking	  processes	  and	  inappropriateness	  in	  its	  appearance	  and	  acts;	  a	  person	  that	  shows	  an	  outside	  the	  norm	  condition	  of	   the	   mind,	   of	   embodiment	   and	   behaviour,	   and	   an	   excessive	   and	   extreme	   state	   of	  consciousness.)	  	  
A	   type	   of	   schizoid	   organization	   and	   self-­‐preservation	   mechanism	   are	   EXPERIENCED	   in	   the	  production	  of	  images	  by	  image-­‐makers	  (artists,	  curators,	  viewers,	  critics,	  users	  —	  the	  image	  IS	  in	  our	  participation	   in	   it)	   and	  by	   the	   image	  within	   itself.	   (EXPERIENCE:	   “To	  undergo	   an	   experience	  with	  something,	  […]	  be	  it	  a	  person,	  a	  thing,	  or	  a	  god,	  means	  that	  this	  experience	  befalls	  us,	  strike	  us,	  comes	  over	  us,	  overwhelms	  us	  and	  transforms	  us	  (Heidegger	  in	  Malabou	  2011:	  28).”)	  
This	  self,	  this	  image,	  is	  troubled	  by	  an	  extreme	  state,	  a	  combination	  of	  despair,	  angst,	  alienation,	  boredom,	   and	   absurdity.	   Such	   existential	   states	   are	   normal,	   often	   experienced	   for	   longer	   or	  shorter	  periods	  by	  everyone,	  but	  they	  are	  kept	  in	  balance	  through	  the	  potentiality	  of	  distance	  and	  FICTION,	  of	  WHAT	  IS	  and	  WHAT	  IS	  NOT.	  Distance	  makes	  the	  projection	  of	  meaning	  possible	  and	  opens	  up	  hope	  for	  change,	  preventing	  existential	  feelings	  from	  reaching	  such	  an	  ultimate	  intensity.	  Our	  existence	   is	   a	   balancing	   act	   between	   the	   belief	   in	   the	   meaningfulness	   of	   the	   world	   and	   the	  possibility	  that	  everything	  meaningful	  breaks	  down.	  	  
The	  existence	  of	  the	  image	  is	  a	  similar	  high-­‐wire	  act	  and	  often	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  take	  its	  identity,	  autonomy	   and	   realness,	   its	   presence,	   for	   granted.	   In	   order	   to	   resist	   and	   fight	   such	   radical	  existential	   states,	   the	   image,	   like	   any	   other	   divided	   self,	   develops	   a	   complex	   self-­‐control-­‐mechanism	   to	   safeguard	   its	   self	   in	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   world.	   The	   image	   is	   divided	   between	  presentation	   and	   representation,	   between	   giving,	   receiving,	   and	   annihilating	   form,	   between	  passivity	   and	   activity.	   This	   ontological	   and	   existential	   insecurity	   is	   a	   productive	   and	   creative	  force	  to	  which	  we	  should	  expose	  ourselves,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  fix	  it,	  to	  ‘cure’	  it,	  accordingly	  to	  rational,	   aesthetical,	   economic	   or	   political	   principles	   and	   purposes.	   All	   too	   often	   images	   are	  ‘curated’,	  cleaned	  out.	  Luckily,	  sometimes,	   in	  spite	  all	  calculated	   intentions,	  some	  slippages	  and	  leakages	   remain	  unbridgeable	  exposing	  accidental	   surprises	  of	   this	   “hidden	  art	   in	   the	  depth	  of	  the	  human	  soul.”	  Even	  though	  ‘curated’,	  images	  remain	  ‘un-­‐healed’	  resisting	  the	  healing	  process	  in	  their	  own	  passive	  way.	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Nancy’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   image	   as	   the	   presentation	   of	   presentation	   works	   against	   the	  normal	   way	   we	   talk	   about	   images:	   as	   signifying	   representations,	   as	   imitations	   or	   mimetic	  reproductions,	  as	  reflections	  or	  mirrors	  of	  a	  determinate	  and	  determinable	  pre-­‐existing	  reality.	  In	  Nancy’s	  view,	   the	   image	  traces	  or	   figures	  a	   force,	  which	  has	  no	  pre-­‐existing	  reality.	  The	   first	  line	   of	   the	   image,	   the	   line	   that	   draws	   the	   figure,	   that	   figures	   something,	   is	   both	   a	   line	   of	  separation	  and	  withdrawal.	  The	  instant	  (por)trait	  is	  not	  only	  a	  line	  of	  separation,	  but	  also	  one	  of	  mediation	  between	  the	  image	  and	  us,	  between	  the	  image	  and	  its	  ground,	  the	  image	  and	  the	  world,	  being	  and	  beings,	  between	  images.	  
The	  image	  is	  both	  the	  ex-­‐position	  of	  a	  new	  presence	  and	  the	  dis-­‐play	  of	  appearance.	  It	  exposes	  self-­‐co-­‐incidence	  and	  self-­‐fittingness	  of	  some	  thing	  with	  itself	  in	  itself.	  The	  image	  shows	  the	  thing	  in	  itself	  and	  its	  appearance,	  their	  co-­‐incidence	  and	  the	  gap	  inscribed	  in	  the	  ‘co’.	  The	  image	  is	  not	  entirely	   a	   being.	   Its	   (sur-­‐)	   face	   is	   the	   above-­‐all-­‐face,	   its	   ex-­‐position	   is	   the	   positioning	   of	   an	  intimacy	  to	  its	  exteriority,	  its	  ex-­‐pression	  is	  the	  pressure	  and	  touch	  against	  its	  sur-­‐face,	  through	  it,	  without	  trespassing	   it.	  The	  image	  is	  a	  site	  of	  con-­‐centration	  in	  co-­‐incidence	  that	  displays	  and	   IS	  the	   transformative	   rupture	   in	   any	  presence,	   a	   force.	   It	   is	  not	   the	  display	  of	   forms	  and	   it	   is	  not	  formal	  (in	  the	  normal	  understanding	  of	  form),	  but	  the	  making	  visible	  and	  the	  taking	  hold	  of	  the	  force	  that	  forms,	  of	  the	  forming	  force	  itself.	  It	  displays	  the	  giving	  of	  form	  as	  the	  receiving	  of	  form.	  How	   something	   resembles	   itself	   as	   such	   is	   laid	   out	   and	   presented	   as	   difference	   in	   sameness	  through	  mechanisms	  of	   resemblance	  and	   formation.	  What	  gives	   form,	   receives	   it	  at	   same	   time,	  and	  presents	   itself	   in	   image,	  as	  a	  presence,	  only	   inasmuch	  as	   it	   says	  mutely,	   in	   image,	   that	   it	   is	  this	  thing.	  Being	  and	  non-­‐being	  alike.	  
The	  sense	  of	  the	  image	  is	  touching,	  unmediated	  by	  any	  order	  of	  representation	  or	  signification	  –	  this	  is	  its	  distinction.	  And	  there	  has	  to	  be	  something	  that	  keeps	  this	  distinction	  going,	  that	  holds	  it	   at	   distance,	   that	   keeps	   the	   difference	   moving,	   differing	   itself	   from	   itself.	   That	   closes	   down,	  while	  something	  else	  is	  opening.	  There	  is	  a	  contingent	  gap	  between	  the	  ontological	  and	  the	  ontic	  difference	   and	   a	   sort	   of	   necessary,	   anti-­‐dualistic	   mediation	   between	   them,	   a	   distance	   and	   an	  ornamentalization	   of	   an	   excess	   of	   ground,	   of	   force,	   that	   keeps	   this	   concatenation	   going	   and	  unresolved.	  The	  line	  of	  the	  image	  IS	  a	  force,	  which	  touches	  us	  without	  creating	  an	  emotion	  that	  implies	  continuity	  or	  empathy.	  What	   touches	  and	  makes	  contact	   is	   the	   force	  of	   sense	   in	  being-­‐with,	  the	  trace	  or	  line	  that	  both	  presents	  something	  and	  withdraws	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Through	  this	  ontological	  separation,	  its	  radical	  otherness	  and	  insurmountable	  assimilation,	  the	  image	  can	  expose	   a	   sense 30 	  of	   the	   world	   in	   an	   unmediated	   way.	   Its	   sense	   is	   scattered,	   dissimilar,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Nancy	  uses	  the	  entire	  semantic	  field	  of	  the	  word	  sense,	  referring	  at	  sense	  in	  all	  its	  five	  senses:	  meaning,	  direction,	  five	  senses,	  reason,	  and	  intuition.	  When	  Nancy	  speaks	  of	  sense	  he	  refers	  to	  something	  that	  takes	  place	  before	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  sensible	  and	  the	  intelligible.	  Sense	  takes	  place;	  it	  is	  in	  our	  sharing	  of	  simultaneous	  time-­‐space	  and	  in	  being	  with	  one	  another.	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heterogeneous	  and	  non-­‐signifying,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  sense.	  	  The	  image	  images	  “a	  singular	  variation	  on	  the	  totality	  of	  distinct	  sense”	  (Nancy	  2005:12).	  	  
A	  PAUSE	  ON	  THE	  IDEA	  OF	  FORM	  AS	  LIMIT	  My	  intention	  is	  to	  recover	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  form	  the	  idea	  of	  peras	  that	  is	  of	  a	  limit	  that	  doesn’t	  limit.	   The	  Husserlian	   phenomenological	   perspective	   of	   something	   from	   something,	   that	   is	   of	   a	  limit	   that	   limits	   from	  another	   limit,	   that	   also	   orders	   and	   systemizes,	   induces	   a	   seeing	   that	   is	   a	  decoding	  of	  signs,	  ideas	  and	  symbols,	  a	  reading	  out	  of	  failures	  or	  non-­‐failures.	  Such	  is	  a	  faculty	  of	  registering	  and	  filtering.	  But	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  alternative	  intentionality	  produced	  by	  a	  limit	  that	  doesn’t	  limit,	  a	  demonic/daimonic	  (Plato,	  daimon,	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  great	  spirit,	  half-­‐god	  and	  half-­‐man,	  of	  an	  intermediary	  nature)	  looking	  within	  something,	  a	  speculative	  and	  meditative	  vision	  of	  
what	   is	   for	   what	   it	   is	   within	   what	   it	   is	   and	   could	   be	   in	   its	   nature	   (Noica).	   Distinctness	   and	  difference,	  fragmentation	  or	  individuality	  recognized	  for	  what	  they	  are	  within	  their	  potentiality,	  rather	   than	   distinctness	   as	  mal-­‐position	   that	   one	   has	   to	   digest	   and	   assimilate	   conceptually,	   or	  that	   needs	   to	   be	   adjusted	   to	   fit	   the	   system	   or	   norm.	   An	   individuality	   that	   is	   within	   its	   own	  measure.	  A	  vision	  with	  responsibility	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  positioning.	  	  
An	   event	   that	   is	   able	   to	  make	   thinking-­‐structures	   porous	   relies	   on	   the	   potency	   to	   play	  with	  limits	   that	   limit	   (truth	   as	   exactitude	   and	   adequation	   and	   judgement-­‐proposition),	   that	   are	  accidental	  and	  necessary	  limitations	  (e.	  g.	  formal,	  material	  outlines,	  concepts,	  categories,	  styles…)	  and	  a	  limit	  that	  doesn’t	  limit	  (truth	  as	  an	  accidental	  chance	  event,	  as	  becoming).	  A	  thinking	  figure	  at	   its	   limit	   is	   thinking	   its	   ‘visible,	   knowable’	   limits	   and	   its	   invisible	   ones,	   within	   which	   it	   is	  oriented	  as	  being.	  
Peras	  is	  the	  Ancient	  Greek	  word	  for	  limit.	  Its	  meaning	  was	  a	  direct	  expression	  of	  a	  way	  of	  life	  of	  peregrination	  and	  traversing	  the	  sea.	  It	  reflects	  the	  symbolic,	  magical	  and	  mythological	  meaning	  and	  force	  of	  the	  sea’s	  other	  shore.	  The	  word	  was	  initially	  used	  by	  Homer	  in	  the	  Iliad	  in	  relation	  to	  entities	  whose	   limits	  were	  outside	  human	  perception,	   the	   earth,	   the	   sea,	   the	   sky,	   or	  Gods,	   and	  referred	  to	  a	  limit	  that	  had	  to	  be	  imagined,	  presupposed	  and	  inferred	  (not	  deduced,	  as	  it	  was	  not	  the	   result	   of	   a	   causal	   logical	   deduction).	   Peras	   became	   a	   poetic	   index	   for	   distance	   and	  displacement,	   and	   non-­‐conceptual	   sense	   given	   in	   and	   by	   the	   projection	   and	   plunge	   into	   the	  unknown	  of	  dis-­‐place	  and	  di-­‐stance	  (Liiceanu	  2007).	  	  
Starting	   in	   one	   point	   with	   one	   point	   in	   vision,	   extending	   and	   projecting	   it	   to	   a	   sensed,	   but	  unknown	  extremity.	  Such	  a	  movement	   is	  a	  passionate	  pro-­‐jection	  and	  participation,	  potentially	  traced	   in	   the	   process	   of	   imagination	   and	   in	   an	   image.	   For	   Aristotle,	   peras	   was	   not	   a	   hollow	  exterior	  surface	  dressing	  up	  an	  entity,	  and	  Nancy	  reflects	  this	  idea	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  bodies	  as	  ‘partes	  extra	  partes’	  (Nancy	  2008:	  29).	  This	  limit	  is	  the	  projection	  of	  the	  point’s	  most	  intimate	  interiority,	  the	  inflection	  of	  its	  intimate	  identity	  into	  its	  outside,	  into	  its	  infinite	  exterior.	  Peras	  is	  also	  not	  about	  overtaking	  a	  known	  border	   (the	  Greek	  word	   for	  border	  and	  outline	  was	  horos),	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but	  about	  reaching	  the	  one	  limit	  within	  which	  one	  is	  moving	  as	  being.	  It	  is	  about	  the	  process	  and	  path	  of	  reaching	  an	  unknown	  but	  sensed	  limit	  (in	  Nancy’s	  understanding	  of	  sense).	  Such	  a	  limit	  is	  an	  ontological,	  orientational,	  directional	  sense-­‐function	  (Liiceanu	  2007)	  
❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
With	   this	   in	   mind,	   we	   can	   imagine	   how	   images	   are	   simultaneously	   bordering	   on	   complete	  isolation	   and	   complete	  merging	   of	   identity	  with	  what	   exists	   in	   the	  world,	  with	   objects,	   things,	  entities	  and	  beings.	  	  	  
I	  am-­‐with	  images,	  daily,	  constantly	  in	  contact	  with	  representations	  and	  pictures	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  media	  and	  hybrid	  forms.	  Being	  is	  exposed	  in	  images,	  shared	  in	  images	  shared	  in	  real	  and	  virtual	  realities.	   In	   an	   incessant,	   conscious	   and	   unconscious	   being-­‐with	   images,	   in	   private	   and	   public	  practice,	  in	  life,	  I	  am	  actively	  engaged	  in	  making	  more	  images,	  representations	  and	  decorations,	  some	  more,	   some	   less	   vulnerable,	   redundant,	   existentially	   insecure,	   visual	   occurrences	   effaced	  maybe	  by	  inauthenticity,	  meaninglessness	  and	  absurdity	  -­‐	  even	  though	  and	  precisely	  because,	  as	  Heidegger	  put	  it,	  we	  live	  (lived)	  in	  “a	  world	  as	  picture/Bild”	  (Heidegger	  2003:	  69-­‐113).	  	  
Being	   is	   incessantly	   imagined	   and	   shared,	   produced,	   desired,	   taken,	   copied,	   multiplied,	  calculated,	   created,	   remembered,	   forgotten,	   appropriated,	   collaged,	   transformed,	   re-­‐configured,	  trans-­‐figured,	   displayed,	   projected,	   printed,	   animated,	   corrected,	   collected,	   photoshop-­‐ed,	   sold,	  exchanged,	   falsified,	  stolen	  …	   in	  and	  as	   image.	  Our	  existence	  exposes	  divided	  psychotic	   images.	  Images	  precipitate	  and	  participate	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  continuity.	  The	  same	  image	  can	   be	   seen	   simultaneously	   in	   different	   cultural	   and	   socio-­‐political	   contexts,	   proving	   to	   be	  nothing	   but	   the	   same.	   Rarely	   can	   we	   take	   hold	   on	   an	   over-­‐riding	   sense	   of	   consistency	   and	  cohesiveness.	  Even	  glossy	  pictures	  in	  magazines	  display	  the	  desired	  ultra-­‐perfect	  appearance,	  as	  they	  ‘should’	  and	  are	  expected	  in	  such	  marketing	  mechanisms,	  while	  being	  also	  images	  exposing	  the	   obviousness	   of	   emptiness	   and	   redundancy,	   fragmentation	   and	   insubstantiality.	   While	  something	   is	   displayed,	   something	   else	   remains	   hidden.	   Between	   them,	   worlds	   spin	   out.	  Nowadays,	   the	  mode	  of	  existence	  of	   images	  has	  to	  constantly	  shift	   form,	  ground,	  and	  sense.	  An	  artistic	  image	  is	  not	  only	  an	  artistic	  image,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  commodity,	  a	  decorative	  picture;	  a	  copy	  is	  not	   only	   a	   copy	   and	   an	   original	   has	   lost	   its	  aura	   as	   an	   original.	   But	   this	   devalued,	   non-­‐auratic	  original	  regains	  its	  value	  from	  the	  number	  of	  copies	   it	  produces,	  as	  this	  sheer	  reproductivity	  of	  copies	  promotes	  new	  originals.	  The	  image	  is	  not	  one	  and	  the	  image	  is	  not	  whole.	  The	  image	  is	  not	  a	  representation	   or	  mere	  decoration,	   yet	   it	   is,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  precisely	   this.	  The	   image	   is	   the	  distinct	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  distinct	  within	  itself,	  thus	  the	  very	  being	  from	  which	  it	  was	  distinct	  in	  the	  first	  place.	   (And	   this	   is	  precisely	  what	   is	  being	  exposed	  and	  what	   is	   the	  aesthetic	  drive	  behind	  bodybuilding	  practices,	  where	  the	  image	  is	  literally	  embodying	  the	  subject	  that	  it	  itself	  reveals.)	  
Images	   have	   both	   a	   disjunctive	   and	   a	   conjunctive	   relation	   to	   the	   world.	   Their	   identity	   and	  autonomy	  seem	  to	  be	  lived	  in	  and	  as	  a	  constant	  creative	  split	  experience	  within	  themselves,	  as	  a	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formative	  failure	  of	  adjustment,	  as	  a	  fictional	  loss	  of	  contact	  with	  the	  world,	  with	  objects,	  or	  as	  an	  acute	   depersonalization	   and	   engulfment	   in	   the	   consumerist	   reification	   and	   thingness	   of	   the	  world;	  as	  a	  worthless,	  empty	  and	  scattered	  (ir)reality.	  This	  existential	  split	  that	  slices	  back	  and	  forth	  through	  an	  equal	  feeling	  of	  impotence	  and	  potence,	  through	  spot	  on	  clarity	  and	  ambiguous	  equivocation,	  is	  something	  that	  characterizes	  the	  image	  and	  that	  differentiates	  human	  existence.	  
Schizoid	  (with	  a	  real	  chance	  to	  change	  into	  schizophrenic)	  experiences	  are	  inherently	  located,	  I	  believe,	  within	  the	  creative	  process	  of	  image-­‐making	  and	  in	  the	  endless	  act	  of	  condensation	  and	  gathering	  in	  itself	  that	  the	  image	  is.	  Embellished	  with	  our	  own	  ground	  and	  intentions,	  with	  our	  own	  being-­‐with-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  with	  our	  own	  world,	  when	  encountering	  an	  image,	  we	  may	  receive	  its	  form	  or	  not	  and	  we	  may	  ‘give	  it’	  a	  just	  created	  form.	  Our	  operative	  point	  of	  view	  may	  be	  quite	  literally	  from	  which	  one	  is	  in	  con-­‐tact	  with	  an	  image,	  or	  the	  place,	  the	  curing	  spot,	  created	  for	  us,	  in	  order	  to	  view	  it	  in	  its	  healthy	  blossom.	  The	  image	  gives	  itself	  over	  to	  a	  choice	  of	  possible,	  but	  incompatible	   ways	   of	   focusing,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   lending	   itself	   to	   highly	   sophisticated	  control	  mechanisms.	  Caught	  between	  such	  existential	   insecurities	  and	  ontological	  anxieties,	   the	  image	  develops	  for	  itself	  a	  fictional	  self-­‐system	  as	  a	  guardant,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  secure	  the	  totality	  of	  its	  experiences.	   The	   more	   it	   grows,	   the	   more	   dangerous	   and	   suspect	   this	   system	   becomes.	   This	  fictional,	   artificial	   relation	   to	   the	  world	   is	   a	   pseudo-­‐interpersonal	   relation	   based	   on	   fantastical	  omnipotence	   and	   relative	   freedom.	   Every	  move	   is	  meaningful	   and	  necessary,	   and,	   at	   the	   same	  time,	  purely	  in	  vain.	  If	  anything	  goes,	  nothing	  really	  matters.	  Freedom	  tends	  towards	  submission	  and	  submission	   towards	   freedom,	   the	   image	   towards	   the	  concept	  and	   the	  concept	   towards	   the	  image,	  the	  eidos	  towards	  the	  ídea	  and	  the	  ídea	  towards	  the	  eidos.	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❃	  ❃	  ❃	  
Besides	   somatic	   maladies,	   identified	   for	   centuries,	   and	   the	   psychical	   maladies,	  identified	   for	   barely	   a	   century,	   there	  must	   also	   be	  maladies	   of	   a	   higher	   order,	   of	   the	  spirit	  let	  us	  suppose.	  No	  neurosis	  can	  explain	  the	  despair	  of	  Ecclesiastes,	  the	  sentiment	  of	  exile	  on	  earth	  or	  of	  alienation,	  metaphysical	  ennui,	  the	  sentiment	  of	  the	  void	  or	  of	  the	  absurd,	   the	  hypertrophy	  of	   the	   I,	   rejections	  of	  everything,	  and	  empty	  controversy;	  no	  psychosis	   can	   explain	   economic	   and	   political	   tumult,	   abstract	   art,	   the	   demonism	   of	  technology,	  and	  the	  extreme	  cultural	  formalism	  that	  nowadays	  leads	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  empty	  exactitude.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  some	  of	  these	  orientations	  have	  resulted	  in	  major	  creations.	  Nevertheless	  they	  still	  represent	  a	  great	  maladjustment	  of	  the	  spirit.	  But	  whereas	  the	  somatic	   diseases	   have	   an	   accidental	   character	   […]	   and	   the	   psychical	   diseases	   are	  somehow	   contingent-­‐necessary,	   because	   they	   arise	   from	  man’s	   individual	   and	   social	  conditioning,	   both	   of	   which	   are	   accidental,	   the	   maladies	   of	   the	   spirit	   seem	   to	   be	  constitutive.	  	  	  […]	  The	  maladies	  of	  the	  spirit	  are	  in	  fact	  maladies	  of	  Being,	  ontic	  maladies,	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	   in	   contrast	   to	   other	   maladies,	   they	   may	   well	   be	   constitutive	   of	   man,	   since,	  although	  the	  body	  and	  the	  soul	  also	  participate	  in	  Being,	  it	  is	  the	  spirit	  alone	  that	  fully	  reflects	   it	   in	  both	   its	  power	   and	  precariousness.	  Diseased	  Being	   also	   is,	   in	   one	  of	   the	  variations	  of	   ‘is’.	  Living	  and	  dead	   things	  can	  be	   left	  blocked	   in	  one	  of	   the	  maladies	  of	  Being,	  which	  they	  then	  conceal	  with	  their	  apparent	  certitude,	  but	  which	  man,	  with	  his	  higher	  incertitude,	  reveals.	  However,	  Being	  may	  not	  only	  be	  diseased	  but	  also	  false.	  […]	  Beyond	  the	  chronic	  malady	  of	  human	  being,	  that	  of	  being	  mensurate	  in	  time	  (if	  indeed	  this	   is	   a	  malady),	   the	   true	  maladies	   of	  man	  would	   come	   to	   light,	   as	   a	   Being	   in	   time	  which	  is	  incapable	  of	  finding	  its	  measure	  in	  time	  (Noica,	  2009:	  29).	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  64:	  MARCEL	  DUCHAMP	  IN	  HIS	  10TH	  STREET	  APARTMENT	  BEFORE	  A	  CHESS	  SET	  BY	  MAX	  ERNST,	  1966	  
(PHOTOGRAPH	  BY	  MARK	  KAUFFMAN),	  (NAUMANN	  AND	  BAILEY	  2009:	  136).	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FROM	  A	  DISTANCE	  
It’s	  been	  a	  few	  months	  now,	  since	  we	  have	  submitted	  our	  project,	  since,	  as	  other	  say,	  we	  have	  finished	  it.	  And	  it	  occurred	  to	  us	  just	  know,	  that	  among	  the	  many	  things	  that	  would	  change,	  if	  we	  continued	   to	  work	   on	   it	   (which	  will	  most	   likely	   happen	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another)	  would	   be	   to	  change	  the	  title.	  From	  a	  distance,	  both	  temporal	  and	  spatial,	  we	  realized	  that	   ‘painting	  as	  gaze’,	  besides	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  throws	  us	  into	  a	  relation	  with	  psychoanalysis,	  which	  we	  didn’t	  ignore	  but	  didn’t	  refer	  to	  either,	  is	  also	  not	  specific	  enough	  for	  this	  project.	  Yes,	  ‘painting	  as	  gaze’	  announces	  a	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  image	  and	  painting,	  but	  what	  is	  more	  at	  stake	  here,	  is	  PAINTING	  and	  WRITING	  and	  a	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  IMAGE	  in	  relation	  to	  both.	  So,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  You,	  dear	  reader,	  at	  such	  a	  late	  hour,	  to	  re-­‐read	  these	  fragments	  and	  re-­‐view	  the	  project	  under	  its	  new	  title:	  Painting	  and	  Writing:	  On	  the	  Revelatory	  Force	  of	  the	  Arabesque.	  	  
It	  is	  always	  necessary	  to	  posit	  a	  paradigm	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  meaning,	  but	  it	  is	  never	  too	  late	  to	  divert	  it,	  to	  alter	  it,	  for	  new	  meaning	  to	  emerge.	  	  
What	  was	  at	  first,	  and	  what	  at	  last	  remains.	  And	  what	  the	  middle	  bringeth,	  but	  contains	  End	  and	  beginning	  evermore	  the	  same;	  Thy	  song	  is	  changeful	  as	  yon	  starry	  frame,	  And	  that	  thou	  ne’er	  beginnest,	  is	  thy	  fate.	  That	  thou	  canst	  never	  end,	  doth	  make	  thee	  great.	  Una	  Joc	  and	  Cristina	  Cojanu	  (Vienna,	  April	  2014)	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   APPENDICES	  
APPENDIX	  1:	  ALOIS 	  RIEGL	  
Alois	  Riegl	  (1858	  –	  1905)	  was	  an	  Austrian	  art	  historian,	  a	  major	  figure	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  art	  history	  as	  a	  self-­‐sufficient	  academic	  discipline	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  practitioners	  of	  formalism.	   There	   is	   a	   dynamic	   art	   historical	   trace	   that	  marked	   its	   own	  path	   up	   to	   the	   present	  from	  Riegl	   to	  Worringer,	   von	   Schlosser,	  Wölfflin,	  Wollheim,	  Warburg,	   Panofsky	   and	  Gombrich,	  and	  a	  philosophical	  path	  from	  Hegel	  to	  Riegl	  to	  Kojève,	  Foucault	  and	  Benjamin.	  It	  is	  along	  these	  paths	  that	  Riegl’s	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  have	  been	  rediscovered	  in	  their	  relevance	  for	  the	  present.	  	  
Riegl’s	  work	  belongs	   to	   those	  art	  historical	  practices	   that	   sustained	  modernism	  and	   that	  had	  been	  disregarded	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  development	  of	  interdisciplinary	  visual	  and	  cultural	  studies	  as	  being	  trapped	  in	  the	  concerns	  of	  a	  “deterministic	  narrative	  of	  masterpieces,	  genius,	  and	  taste	  built	  upon	  an	  evolutionary	  schema	  (Ostrow	  2001:	  {1}).”	  	  
Riegl	  worked	  as	  director	  and	  curator	  of	  the	  Textile	  Department	  in	  the	  Austrian	  Museum	  for	  Art	  and	   Industry,	   presently	   the	   Museum	   for	   Applied	   Arts	   (MAK)	   and	   as	   a	   professor	   at	   Vienna	  University.	  As	  an	  art	  historian	  he	  thought	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  an	  art	  history	  grounded	  in	  classic	  aesthetics,	   values	   and	   criteria.	   His	   work	  was	   led	   by	   the	   internal	   logic	   of	   artworks	   and	   by	   the	  belief	  that	  certain	  abstract,	  iconic,	  or	  structural	  qualities	  are	  embodied	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  that	  have	  to	  be	  analysed	  on	  their	  own,	   in	  separation	  from	  aesthetic,	  categorical	  or	  social	   judgements	  and	  historical	  taste	  manifestations.	  He	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  a	  totalizing	  history	  or	  methodology.	  His	  research	  took	  the	  form	  of	  an	  “open-­‐ended	  series	  of	  exegeses	  on	  patterns	  of	  variation,	  change,	  and	  development	  of	  art	  (Ostrow	  2001:	  {2}).”	  
One	  of	  his	  main	   ideas	  was	   that	   form,	   style	  and	  content	  are	   inseparable	   from	  each	  other,	   and	  that	  through	  comparison,	  interpretation,	  speculation,	  theoretical	  and	  morphological	  analysis	  one	  could	   understand	   changes	   and	   developments	   in	   art	   in	   certain	   periods	   of	   time.	   Against	   the	  traditional	   compartmentalization	   of	   art,	   he	   aimed	   at	   discerning	   principles	   empirically	   that	  delimit	   the	  parameters	  of	   certain	  disciplines,	  motifs	  or	  genres	  over	  a	  period	  of	   time.	  He	   tested	  “observations	   against	   the	   record	   of	   their	   objectifications.”	   He	   also	   advocated	   for	   a	   non-­‐hierarchical	  view	  on	  art	  claiming	  equal	  significance	  and	  no	  qualitative	  distinction	  between	  high	  and	  low,	  mass,	  or	  popular	  artistic	  manifestations.	  	  
He	   rejected	   the	   idea	   of	   cycles	   of	   innovation	   and	   decay	   and	   removed	   the	   stigma	   of	   decline	  through	   identifying	   ‘decadent’	   periods	   as	   markers	   of	   change	   impregnated	   with	   new	  intentionalities	  and	  different	  criteria.	  Forms	  and	  styles	  do	  not	  pass	   through	  stages	  of	  decay,	  as	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the	   naturalistic	   outlook	   on	   art	   believed,	   but	   transform	   and	  metamorphose	   into	   new	   forms.	  He	  found	  beauty	  and	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  truth	  in	  this	  force	  of	  forms	  to	  re-­‐form.	  Forms	  and	  contents	  of	  works	  of	  art,	  because	  the	  two	  are	   inseparable,	  are	  not	  static	  structures,	  but	  ones	  that	  structure	  and	   generate	   other	   structures.	   For	   Riegl,	   it	   was	   the	   task	   of	   the	   art	   historian	   to	   describe	   the	  existence	   of	   such	   transformational	   changes	   a	   “record	   of	   self-­‐consciousness	   and	   self-­‐reflection	  within	   a	   self-­‐determined	   causal	   chain	   (Ostrow	   2001:	   {5}).”	   In	   this	   sense,	   for	   Riegl,	   art’s	  development	   and	   effect	   within	   a	   certain	   social	   group	   and	   time	   is	   not	   arbitrary,	   art	   is	   not	   a	  superior	   knowledge,	   nor	   a	   negativity	   towards	   reason	   and	   it	   is	   not	   materialistically	   or	  metaphysically	  determined.	  However,	  art	  has	   the	  ability	   to	   subvert	   instrumental	   reason	  and	   in	  this	  lies	  it’s	  sovereignty.	  
‘Kunstwollen’	  (translated	  as:	  e.	  g.	  what	  art	  wants,	  art	  drive,	  will	  to	  make	  art,	  will	  of	  art,	  artistic	  intention,	  art’s	  volition)	  is	  the	  concept	  that	  Riegl	  introduces	  and	  elaborates	  to	  name	  the	  force	  that	  drives	   and	   structures	   the	  metabolic	   changes	   in	   forms,	   styles	   and	   contents	   over	   a	   certain	   time	  period.	  When	  Riegl	  speaks	  about	  style	  he	  refers	  to	  an	  idea	  and	  not	  to	  a	  class,	  to	  something	  that	  can	  be	  grasped	  only	   intuitively,	   that	  only	   communicates	   itself	   in	   concrete	   terms	  –	   style	   cannot	  communicate	   itself	   through	   other	   concepts.	   The	   external	   character	   of	   a	   particular	   form	   can	  communicate	  a	  style.	  What	  drives	  changes	  in	  style	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘Kunstwollen’,	  a	  drive,	  impulse,	  tendency	   or	   need.	  Not	   a	   conscious	  will.	   A	   force.	   The	  medium	  or	   vehicle	   through	  which	   such	   a	  drive	   or	   force	   is	   carried	   is	   given	   for	   Riegl	   by	   a	   specific	   group	   of	   people	   of	   variable	   size	   (by	   a	  system).	   This	   specific	   group	   of	   people	   of	   a	   variable	   size	   at	   a	   certain	   period,	   this	   system,	   has	   a	  super-­‐individual,	  collective	  	  “objective	  will”	  that	  individuals	  belonging	  to	  this	  group	  encounter	  as	  a	   “normative	   force”	   and	   that	   is	   borne	   by	   this	   group	   of	   people	  —	   this	   is	  what	   Riegl	  means	   by	  ‘Kunstwollen’	  (Sedlmayer	  2001:	  {16},	  in	  Ostrow	  2001).	  
A	  change	   in	   forms	  or	  styles	   in	  a	  group	  over	  a	  period	  of	   time	  makes	  manifest	  a	  change	   in	   the	  ‘Kunstwollen’	   of	   the	   same	   group,	   in	   their	   spirit	   (‘Kunstwollen’	   behaves	   in	   a	  way	   like	   a	   spirit).	  However,	  what	  exactly	  is	  or	  drives	  this	  change,	  is	  according	  to	  Sedlmayer	  on	  Riegl,	  given	  by	  the	  inherent	  structural	  principles	  of	  the	  work	  itself.	  Works	  of	  art	  are	  sensuous	  formations.	  The	  parts	  of	  these	  formations	  are	  determined	  at	  any	  particular	  place	  in	  the	  whole,	  by	  structural	  principles	  that	  govern	  the	  whole.	  Riegl	  claims	  that	  in	  works	  of	  art,	  which	  are	  sensuous	  formations,	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐causal,	   non-­‐deterministic	   relation	   between	   the	   stylistic	   appearance,	   that	   is	   the	   formal	  external	  character	  of	  a	  work,	  and	  its	  internal	  laws	  of	  composition	  or	  structuring	  principles,	  and	  an	   inner	   necessity	   between	   the	   work	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   in	   its	   parts.	   In	   other	   words,	   surface	  appearance	  and	  inner	  structure	  are	  interdependent	  from	  each	  other,	  the	  two	  faces	  of	  one	  aspect.	  	  
If	  Riegl	  defines	  ornament	  as	   ‘pattern	  against	  background’	  this	  refers	  not	  to	  two	  distinct	  parts	  placed	   one	   on	   top	   of	   the	   other,	   but	   two	   interdependent	   parts	   that	   cannot	   exist	   on	   their	   own.	  Morphological	  changes	  in	  an	  ornament	  refer	  equally	  to	  formal	  changes	  and	  to	  necessary	  internal	  relations	  between	  parts.	  In	  this	  sense,	  ornaments	  cannot	  be	  simply	  add-­‐ons.	  Their	  exclusion	  from	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a	   particular	   work	   will	   severely	   transform	   the	   work	   itself.	   Equally,	   the	   gesture	   of	   rendering	   a	  work	  in	  simple,	  minimal	  forms	  is	  a	  style	  and	  morphological	  change	  that	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  change	  in	  spirit	   in	  a	  particular	  group	  at	  a	  certain	  period,	  and	  not	  a	  sign	  of	  decay	  of	  a	  particular	  style	  or	  form.	  
The	   experience	   he	   gathered	   as	   a	   curator	   of	   textiles	   led	   him	   to	   write	   his	   first	   major	   work,	  
Antique	  Oriental	  Carpets	  (1891).	  In	  1893,	  he	  published	  his	  second	  book,	  Grundlegungen	  zu	  einer	  
Geschichte	  der	  Ornamentik	  (Problems	  of	  Style:	  Foundations	  for	  a	  History	  of	  Ornament),	  which	  will	  gain	  him	  his	  reputation	  as	  an	  art	  historian.	  Riegl’s	  aim	  was	  to	  establish	  Grundlegungen	  zu	  einer	  
Geschichte	  der	  Ornamentik	  (The	  Fundamentals	  for	  a	  History	  of	  Ornaments)	  that	  would	  refute	  “die	  
materialistische	  Auffassung	  von	  dem	  Ursprunge	  alles	  Kunstschaffens”	   (the	  materialist	   account	   of	  the	  origin	  of	  all	  art-­‐making).	  He	  believed	  that	   this	  was	  only	  a	   transfer	  of	  Darwinist	  principle	   in	  the	   field	  of	  Geisteslebens	   (the	   life	  of	   the	  spirit).	  A	  history	  of	  ornaments	  cannot	  be	   founded	  on	  a	  unilateral	  emphasis	  on	  materials	  and	  techniques,	  or	  on	  symbolic	  meanings.	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  
Problems	  of	  Style,	  he	  writes	  that	  a	  search	  for	  uniformity	  will	  deliberately	  becloud	  the	  look/sense	  for	  differences.	  He	  identifies	  the	  drive	  to	  adorn	  one’s	  body	  as	  a	  primary	  drive	  to	  decorate	  and	  one	  that	  is	  older	  than	  any	  other	  drive	  to	  protect	  or	  cover	  one’s	  body	  with	  textile	  materials.	  Thus	  he	  opposes	  arguments	  that	  stood	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  textile	  ornaments	  with	  surface	  decoration	  in	   general.	   Instead	   of	   classifying	   all	   surface	   decoration	   under	   a	   common	   denominator,	   textile	  ornaments,	   he	   positioned	   the	   drive	   for	   surface	   adornments	   as	   a	   primary	   drive	   and	   textile	  ornaments	   a	   result	   of	   this	   drive.	   His	   endeavour	   was	   to	   invent	   and	   recover	   the	   history	   of	  ornament	   as	   a	   continuous	   and	   autonomous	   endeavour.	   To	   this	   end,	   he	   traced	   back	   the	  development	   and	   formal	   transformation	   of	   plant-­‐ornaments	   from	   ancient	   near	   eastern	   to	  classical	  and	  up	  into	  early	  medieval	  periods	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  arabesque	  in	  Islamic	  art	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plant-­‐ornament.	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APPENDIX	  2:	  C-­‐TIN	  NOICA,	  TERMINOLOGY	  
Todetitis,	   catholitis,	   horetitis,	   atodetia,	   acatholia	   and	   ahoretia	   are	   neologisms	   coined	   by	   the	  Romanian	   philosopher	   Constantin	  Noica	   (1909–1987)	   from	   the	   terminology	   used	   by	  Aristotle.	  	  The	   translation	   process	   from	   Old	   Greek,	   to	   Latin,	   German,	   Romanian	   and	   English	   traverses	  several	   languages	   and	   cultural	   spaces,	   and	   is	   a	   process	   of	   complex	   exchanges	   both	   on	  etymological	  and	  philosophical	  level	  (Blyth	  2009	  in	  Noica	  2009:	  21-­‐27).	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  an	  ontological	  model	   that	  would	  exploit	   the	  ontology	  of	   the	  Romanian	  language,	   Noica	   coined	   six	   new	   words	   to	   translate	   the	   Aristotelian	   terms	   for	   the	   general,	  individual	   and	   determination,	   kathalou,	   tode	   ti	   and	   horos.	   	   Furthermore,	   Noica	   employs	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   Greek	   concepts	   via	   German	   philosophical	   terms	   used	   by	   Hegel	   and	   Goethe,	  
Allgemeinheit,	  Einzelheit,	  and	  Besonderheit.	  	  
The	  three	  forms	  of	  anxiety:	  engulfment,	  implosion,	  or	  petrification	  —	  and	  the	  three	  Aristotelian	  categories	   describing	   being:	   the	   general,	   the	   individual	   and	   Determinations	   can	   be	   related	   to	  each	   other.	   Noica	   analysed	   these	   categories,	   along	   with	   the	   ones	   describing	   non-­‐being,	   as	  ontological	   knots	   that	   produce	   6	   contemporary	   “maladies”	   or	   inflammations,	   deficiencies	   or	  rejections	  of	  one	  or	  more	  than	  one	  of	  these	  categories.	  They	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  productive	  and	  creative	  deficiencies	   that	  have	   the	  power,	  not	  only	   to	  make	  cultural	  structures	  porous,	  but	  also	  to	  provoke	  new	  cultural	  manifestations.	  These	  knots,	  these	  tumours,	  these	  excrescences	  are	  ontological	  forms	  generated	  by	  and	  produced	  out	  of	  forms,	  a	  proliferation	  of	  forms	  out	  of	  forms.	  They	  literally	  dis-­‐place	  and	  de-­‐place	  form	  –	  and	  presence.	  	  
Another	  key	  concept	  for	  Noica	  was	  the	  Romanian	  preposition	  întru,	  meaning	  ‘into’	  or	  ‘within’,	  from	  the	  Latin	   intro.	  For	  Noica	  the	  preposition	   întru	  expressed	  directly	  the	  unfolding	  of	  being’s	  manifestations	  into	  the	  spirit.	  	  
Non-­‐being	  was	  thought	  by	  Noica,	   in	  drawing	  on	  Kant31,	  as	  3	  different	   types	  of	  nothing:	  neant	  (nothingness),	  golul	  (void,	  emptiness),	  and	  nimicul	  (the	  nothing).	  Noica	  claims	  for	  nothingness	  an	  ontological	  fruitfulness,	  explaining	  that	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  nothing	  might	  be	  active	  within	  being	  and	  that	  they	  are	  directly	  related	  to	  three	  categories	  describing	  being:	  the	  general,	  the	  individual	  and	  determinations	  and	  to	  the	  ontological	  blockages	  of	  being.	  	  
With	   Noica’s	   ontology	   we	   can	   speak	   of	   the	   project	   of	   a	   tetradic-­‐thematic	   dialectic	   and	   of	   a	  model	   of	   being	   as	   a	   continuous	   transformation	   of	   relations	   between	   three	   categories	   that	  describe	   being:	   the	   individual,	   the	   general,	   and	   determinations.	   Noica	   reformulates	   Hegel’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  In	  the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  Kant	  gives	  us	  ‘the	  table	  of	  this	  division	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  nothing’:	  ens	  
rationis	  (empty	  concept	  without	  object),	  nihil	  privativum	  (empty	  object	  of	  a	  concept),	  ens	  imaginarium	  (empty	  intuition	  without	  an	  object),	  and	  nihil	  negativum	  (empty	  object	  without	  concept).	  (Kant,	  1998:	  383).	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metaphysical	  triadic	  dialectic	  into	  an	  ontological,	  tetradic	  and	  thematic	  dialectic:	  being-­‐becoming	  -­‐	  becoming	   into	  being	  –becoming	   into	  becoming.	  His	   thinking	  evolves	  not	  only	  around	  the	   idea	  that	  being	  continually	  transforms	  the	  concatenation	  of	  the	  three	  relations	  between	  the	  general,	  the	  individual	  and	  determinations,	  but	  also	  around	  the	  thought	  that	  this	  (ex)change-­‐condition	  of	  being	   may	   become	   blocked	   and	   provoke,	   while	   it	   manifests	   itself	   in	   the	   world	   (in	   individual	  humans,	  peoples,	  cultures,	  historical	  epochs,	  in	  the	  spirit…)	  ontological	  maladies,	  inflammations	  or	   deficiencies	   of	   one	   or	   another	   of	   these	   terms.	   These	   categories	   describing	   being	   and	   those	  describing	  non-­‐being,	  through	  their	   interrelations	  and	  the	  ontological	  and	  ontic	  structures	  they	  configure	  and	  form,	  they	  describe	  and	  present	  modalities	  in	  which	  being	  and	  beings,	  and	  images,	  can	  become	  blocked	   in	   a	  malady	  which	  enables	   the	   spirit	   to	   explore	  new	  cultural	  possibilities.	  These	  inflammations	  or	  deficiencies	  may	  induce	  thus	  what	  Noica	  called	  THE	  CREATIVE	  MALADIES	  OF	  THE	  CONTEMPORARY	  SPIRIT.	  In	  his	  book,	  with	  the	  same	  title,	  he	  gives	  examples,	  of	  mostly	  literary	  or	  historical	   figures,	   for	  each	  malady	  and	  interprets	  them	  from	  an	  ontologico-­‐cultural	  perspective,	  such	   as:	   Don	   Juan	   (Don	   Quixote),	   Dostoyevsky,	   Faust	   or	   Napoleon.	   (No	   female	   character	   is	  included	  as	  an	  example)	  	  
The	  General	  (The	  Universal/	  Kathalou	  /	  Allgemeinheit)	  
Aristotle	   sometimes	   identified	  kathalou,	  meaning	   ‘whole’	  with	  genos.	  And	  Noica,	   in	   following	  Aristotle,	  is	  using	  for	  kathalou—generalul	  (the	  general)	  and	  generaluri	  (generalia).	  Generaluri	   is	  Noica’s	   own	   coinage.	   English	   translations	   of	   Aristotelian	   texts	   were	   influenced	   by	   Latin	  translations	  and	  thus	  kathalou	  was	  usually	  translated	  with	  ‘universal’	  from	  the	  Latin	  universalis-­‐
universum	  meaning	  ‘combined	  into	  one’,	  from	  vertere	  (past	  participle	  versus),	  to	  turn,	  transform.	  The	   meaning	   of	   the	   adjective	   ‘general’	   overlaps	   with	   that	   of	   ‘universal’	   in	   both	   languages,	   in	  Romanian	  and	  in	  English,	  but	  the	  nouns	  ‘the	  general’	  (people	  as	  a	  non-­‐individuated	  whole)	  and	  ‘generals’	  (universal	  principle)	  has	  fallen	  out	  of	  use.	  
The	  Individual	  (Tode	  ti/	  Einzelheit)	  
The	   two	   terms	   used	   by	   Noica	   for	   the	   Greek	   tode	   ti	   are	   individualul	   (the	   individual)	   and	  
individualuri	  (individualia).	  This	  neuter	  plural	  form	  inspired	  by	  the	  Latin	  universalia	  is	  translated	  and	   coined	  by	  Noica	   in	   using	   a	   specific	   neuter	   non-­‐plural	   suffix	   in	  Romanian	   ‘–uri’	   in	   order	   to	  create	  an	  equivalent.	  Trough	  analogy,	  we	  can	  translate	  generaluri	  and	  individualuri	  as	  ‘generalia’	  and	  ‘individualia’	  in	  English.	  
To	  the	  English	  word	   ‘the	   individual’	  correspond	  three	  different	  terms	  in	  Noica’s	   terminology:	  
individual,	   individ,	   îns.	   The	   Romanian	   and	   English	   word	   individual	   derives	   from	   the	   Medieval	  Latin	  adjective	  individualis.	  The	  Romanian	  individ	  derives	  from	  the	  classical	  Latin	  noun	  individuus	  and	   has	   no	   equivalent	   in	   English.	   The	   third	   Romanian	   word	   îns	   is	   specifically	   Romanian	   and	  represents	  a	  key	  concept	  in	  Noica’s	  ontological	  system.	  In	  Romanian	  the	  etymology	  of	  the	  word	  
îns	   is	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   Latin	   ipsus-­‐ipse,	   meaning	   ‘self,	   in	   person’.	   However,	   Noica	   although	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recognizing	   the	   validity	   of	   ipsus,	   followed	   certain	   Romanian	   19th	   century	   philosophers,	   and	  claimed	  that	  it	  actually	  derives	  from	  the	  Late	  Latin	  particle	  ens,	  ‘being’.	  	  
The	  difference	   in	  which	  Noica	   is	   interested	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  whereas	   the	   individ	   is	  always	  already	  divided	  and	  thus	  it	  has	  a	  negative	  boundary,	  the	  îns	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  division,	  but	  rather	  by	   a	   positive	   boundary.	   Thus	   îns	   cannot	   be	   translated	   adequately	   either	   by	   ‘person’	   nor	  ‘individual’.	  In	  the	  ontological	  dialectic,	  Noica	  situates	  îns	  between	  atom	  and	  person:	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Greek	  atomos	  is	  referring	  to	  that	  that	  admits	  no	  further	  division,	  thus	  the	  individual,	  individ,	  is	  a	  material	  unit	  that	  cannot	  be	  further	  divided.	  In	  the	  Christian	  tradition	  person	  is	  a	  moral	  unit;	  whereas	  îns,	  is	  for	  Noica	  an	  existential	  unit	  that	  bears	  within	  it	  Being.	  	  
Determination	  (Horos/	  Besonderheit)	  
The	  literal	  meaning	  of	  the	  Greek	  word	  horos	  is	  that	  of	  ‘boundary,	  limit’.	  In	  Aristotle’s	  logic	  it	  is	  the	  term	  of	  a	  proposition,	  its	  definition,	  its	  species.	  (All	  variations	  attempt	  to	  become	  species).	  In	  Romanian,	   horos	   is	   translated	   as	   definiție,	   definition,	   however	   Noica	   prefers	   the	   term	  
determinație,	  from	  the	  Latin	  determinatio,	  which	  is	  a	  rather	  rare	  word.	  In	  English,	  the	  Romanian	  
determinație	  and	  the	  Greek	  horos	  can	  be	  translated	  as	   ‘determination’,	  a	  word	  derived	  from	  the	  same	  Latin	  and	  having	  the	  same	  meaning	  of	  ‘delimitation,	  definition’.	  	  
Concept	  of	  Nothingness	  
Golul	   (emptiness,	   void)	   derives	   from	   the	   Romanian	   adjective	   gol,	   meaning	   ‘naked,	   bare,	  uncovered,	  empty’.	  Noica	  also	  uses	  the	  idiomatic	  expression	  in	  gol,	  ‘pointlessly,	  futilely,	  in	  vain,	  in	  a	   void’.	  Neant	   comes	   from	   the	   French	  word	   néant,	   which	   is	   a	   philosophical	   term	   used	   by	   the	  French	  Existentialists	  (to	  which	  Noica	  was	  very	  critical	  and	  referred	  to	   in	  various	  texts).	  Neant	  presupposes	  for	  Noica	  something	  positive	  that	  is	  then	  transformed	  into	  nothingness.	  Nimicul	  is	  a	  specifically	  Romanian	  term	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Latin	  ne	  mica,	   ‘not	  a	  bit,	  not	  a	  crumb’.	  
Nimicul	   is	   autonomous	   and	   represents	   a	   beginning,	   whereas	   neantul	   was	   a	   result	   of	   a	  transformation,	  of	  a	  process	  of	  annihilation	  and	  thus	  it	  represents	  an	  end.	  Nimicnicie	   is	  another	  term	  used	  by	  Noica,	   from	  the	  adjective	  nimic	  and	  meaning	   literally	   ‘nothingness’,	  but	  signifying	  ‘futility,	   insignificance,	   worthlessness,	   pointlessness’	   in	   Noica’s	   texts.	   Nimicnicie	   might	   be	  translated	  as	  ‘vanity’	  in	  English.	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GLOSSARY	  
A L E T H E I A :	   (ἀλήθεια)	   in	   its	   Greek	  meaning	   refers	   to	   the	   state	   of	   not	   being	   hidden;	   of	   being	  evident;	   it	   means	   unconcealedness,	   unhiddenness.	   Heidegger	   refers	   to	   a-­‐letheia	   in	   relation	   to	  disclosure	   and	   truth	   and	   as	   the	   event	   of	   veiling-­‐unveiling	   of	   truth;	   as	   the	   fundamental	   trait	   of	  beings	  themselves.	  “[W]e	  must	  acknowledge,	  the	  fact	  that	  ἀλήθεια	  ,	  unconcealment	  in	  the	  sense	  of	   opening	   of	   presence,	  was	   originally	   only	   [sogleich	   und	   nur]	   experienced	   as	  orthotes,	   as	   the	  correctness	   of	   representations	   and	   statements.	   But	   then	   the	   assertion	   about	   the	   essential	  transformation	   of	   truth,	   that	   is	   from	   unconcealment	   to	   correctness,	   is	   untenable.	   	   Instead	   we	  must	   say:	   Aletheia,	   as	   opening	   of	   presence	   and	   presencing	   in	   thinking	   and	   saying,	   originally	  comes	  under	  the	  perspective	  of	  homoiosis	  and	  adaequatio,	  that	  is,	  the	  perspective	  of	  adequation	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  correspondence	  of	  representing	  with	  what	  is	  present	  (Heidegger	  in	  Malabou	  2011:	  29).”	  “Only	  the	  essence	  of	  truth	  understood	  in	  the	  original	  Greek	  sense	  of	  ἀλήθεια	  —	  the	  unhiddenness	   that	   is	   related	   to	   the	  hidden	   (to	   something	  dissembled	  and	  disguised)	  —	  has	  an	  essential	   relation	   to	   this	   image	   of	   an	   underground	   cave.	  Wherever	   truth	   has	   another	   essence,	  wherever	   it	   is	   not	   unhiddenness	   or	   at	   least	   is	   not	   co-­‐determined	   by	   unhiddenness,	   there	   an	  “allegory	  of	   the	  cave”	  has	  no	  basis	  as	  an	   illustration.	  And	  yet,	   even	   though	  ἀλήθεια	   is	  properly	  experienced	  in	  the	  “	  allegory	  of	  the	  cave”	  […]”	  (Heidegger	  1998:	  172).”	  
A R A B E S Q U E :	  ornamental	  form,	  Islamic	  idea	  and	  literary	  figure;	  the	  genus	  of	  vegetal	  ornament	  of	   the	  Saracen	  art,	   that	   is,	  of	   Islamic	  art	   in	  medieval	  and	  modern	  time;	  the	   ‘stylized	  form	  of	  the	  forked	   rinceaux’:	   an	   interference	   of	   twine	   elements	   with	   new	   ones	   in	   which	   no	   leaf	   or	   stem	  endings	  run	  down	  freely,	  each	  end	  beginning	  a	  new	  convolute	  of	  curls	  and	  fringes;	  musical	  piece,	  dancing	  figure	  in	  classical	  ballet.	  	  
A T H E N A E U M :	   title	   of	   the	   literary	   and	   philosophical	  magazine	   published	   by	   August	  Wilhelm	  and	  Friedrich	  Schlegel.	  Between	  1798	  and	  1800,	  the	  two	  brothers	  published	  6	  issues.	  Athenaeum	  is	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  manifestation	  of	  Early	  Jena	  Romanticism.	  To	  the	  circle	  of	  friends	  that	   contributed	   to	   the	   journal	   belonged:	  Dorothea	   Schlegel,	   Caroline	   Schlegel,	  Novalis,	   August	  Ferdinand	  Bernhardi,	   Sophie	  Bernhardi,	  Friedrich	  Daniel	  Ernst	  Schleiermacher,	  August	  Ludwig	  Hülsen	  und	  Karl	  Gustav	  Brinckmann.	  Published	  articles	  were	  either	  authored,	  collaborations	  or	  anonymous	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:23-­‐25).	  
A U R A :	  Benjamin:	  “We	  can	  say:	  what	  shrinks	  in	  an	  age	  where	  the	  work	  of	  art	  can	  be	  reproduced	  by	  technological	  means	  is	  its	  AURA.	  The	  process	  is	  symptomatic;	  its	  significance	  points	  beyond	  the	  realm	   of	   art.	   Reproductive	   technology,	   we	   might	   say,	   in	   general	   terms,	   removes	   the	   thing	  
reproduced	   from	  the	  realm	  of	   tradition.	   In	  making	  many	  copies	  of	   the	  reproduction,	   it	   substitutes	  
for	  its	  unique	  incidence	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  incidences.	  And	  in	  allowing	  the	  reproduction	  to	  come	  closer	  
to	  whatever	  situation	  the	  person	  apprehending	  it	  is	  in,	  it	  actualizes	  what	  is	  reproduced	  (Benjamin	  2009:	  233;	  italics	  by	  the	  author;	  emphasis	  my	  own).”	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The	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  word	  in	  Benjamin’s	  work	  rests	  mainly	  on	  a	  reductive	  reading	  of	   his	   essay,	   The	  Work	   of	   Art	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   its	   Technological	   Reproducibility	   (1936):	   “(1)	   Aura	  understood	   as	   “a	   strange	   weave	   of	   space	   and	   time:	   the	   unique	   appearance	   [apparition,	  semblance]	   of	   a	   distance,	   however	   near	   it	   may	   be”	   (or,	   “however	   close	   the	   thing	   that	   calls	   it	  forth”);	  and	  (2)	  aura	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  perception	  that	  “invests”	  or	  endows	  a	  phenomenon	  with	  the	  “ability	  to	  look	  back	  at	  us,”	  to	  open	  its	  eyes	  or	  “lift	  its	  gaze”	  (Benjamin	  cited	  after	  Hansen	  2008:	  339).	  
An	   in-­‐depth	   critical	   analysis	   that	   opens	   up	   the	   elaboration	   of	   the	   concept	   in	   Benjamin’s	  work	  (and	  does	  not	   limit	   it	   to	   this	  essay)	   is	  proposed	   in	   the	  essay,	  Benjamin’s	  Aura,	  by	  Miriam	  Bratu	  Hansen	  (2008).	  
A U T H E N T I C I T Y :	  Benjamin:	   “the	  here	  and	  now	  of	   the	  original	  constitute	   the	  abstract	   idea	  of	  genuineness	   [authenticity]”	   and	   “the	   whole	   province	   of	   genuineness	   [authenticity]	   is	   beyond	  technological	   (and	  of	   course	  not	  only	   technological)	   reproducibility.	  But	  whereas	   in	   relation	   to	  manual	   reproduction	   	   (the	   product	   of	   which	   was	   usually	   branded	   a	   forgery	   of	   the	   original)	  genuineness	  [authenticity]	  retains	  its	  full	  authority,	  in	  relation	  to	  reproduction	  by	  technological	  means	   that	   is	   not	   the	   case.”	   Authenticity	   cannot	   be	   reproduced.	   “Even	   with	   the	   most	   perfect	  reproduction,	  one	  thing	  stands	  out:	  the	  here	  and	  now	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art	  —	  its	  unique	  existence	  in	  the	  place	  where	  it	  is	  now.	  But	  it	  is	  on	  that	  unique	  existence	  and	  on	  nothing	  else	  that	  the	  history	  has	   been	   played	   out	   to	   which	   during	   the	   course	   of	   its	   being	   it	   has	   been	   a	   subject.”	   “The	  genuineness	  [authenticity]	  of	  a	  thing	  is	  the	  quintessence	  of	  everything	  about	  it	  since	  its	  creation	  that	  can	  be	  handed	  down,	  from	  its	  material	  duration	  to	  the	  historical	  witness	  that	   it	  bears.	  The	  latter	   (material	   duration	   and	   historical	   witness)	   being	   grounded	   in	   the	   former	   (the	   thing’s	  genuineness),	   what	   happens	   in	   the	   reproduction,	   where	   the	   former	   has	   been	   removed	   from	  human	  perception,	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   also	   starts	   to	  wobble.	  Nothing	   else,	  what	   starts	   to	  wobble	  thus	  is	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  thing	  (Benjamin	  2009:	  231-­‐233).”	  
A U T H O R :	   the	   author	   function	   is	   characteristic	   of	   the	   mode	   of	   existence,	   circulation,	   and	  functioning	   of	   certain	   discourses,	   which	   are	   objects	   of	   appropriation,	   within	   a	   society.	  Traditionally	   and	   ideologically	   the	   author	   functions	   as:	   a	   constant	   level	   of	   value,	   as	   a	   field	   of	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  coherence,	  as	  stylistic	  unity	  and	  as	  a	  historical	  figure	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   events;	   the	   author	   function	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   juridical	   and	   institutional	  system	   that	   encompasses,	   determines,	   and	   articulates	   the	   universe	   of	   discourses;	   it	   does	   not	  affect	  all	  discourses	  in	  the	  same	  way	  at	  all	  times	  and	  in	  all	  types	  of	  civilization;	  it	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  series	  of	  complex	  operations;	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  purely	  and	  simply	  to	  a	  real	  individual,	  since	  it	  can	  give	   rise	   simultaneously	   to	   several	   selves,	   to	   several	   subject-­‐positions	   that	   can	  be	  occupied	  by	  different	   classes	   of	   individuals.	   For	   Foucault,	   the	   author	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   thrift	   in	   the	  proliferation	   of	   meaning	   because	   it	   allows	   a	   limitation	   of	   the	   cancerous	   and	   dangerous	  proliferation	  of	  significations	  within	  a	  world	  where	  one	   is	   thrifty	  not	  only	  with	  one’s	  resources	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and	   riches	   but	   also	  with	   one’s	   discourses	   and	   their	   significations;	   the	   author	   is	   thus	   a	   certain	  functional	  principle,	  by	  which,	  in	  our	  culture,	  one	  limits,	  excludes,	  and	  chooses;	  in	  short,	  by	  which	  one	  impedes	  the	  free	  circulation,	  the	  free	  manipulation,	  the	  free	  composition,	  decomposition,	  and	  recomposition	  of	  fiction	  (Foucault	  1994:	  205-­‐222).	  
Copyright’s	  existence,	  I	  believe,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  assumptions	  or	  sentences:	  An	  author	  is	  the	  only	  person	  who	  has	  written	  her	  or	  his	  own	  work;	  an	  author	  owns	  her	  or	  his	  work.	  Now	   in	   the	   first	   sentence	  —	  an	  author	   is	   the	  only	  person	  who	  has	  written	  his	  or	  her	  own	  work	  —	  the	  assumed	  definition	  of	  identity	  is	  questionable.	  For	  instance,	  I	  do	  not	  write	  out	  of	  nothing,	  or	  from	  nothing,	  for	  I	  must	  write	  with	  the	  help	  of	  other	  texts,	  be	  these	  texts	  written	  ones,	  oral	  ones,	  those	  of	  memory,	  those	  of	  dreams	  etc.	  In	  the	  second	  sentence,	  an	  author	  owns	  her	  or	  his	  work,	  the	  verb	  to	  own	  must	  be	  questioned.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  writers	  we	  depend	  economically	  on	  copyright,	  its	  existence,	  because	  we	   are	   living	   in	   a	   bourgeois-­‐industrialist,	   in	   a	   capitalist	   society,	   a	   society	   based	   on	  ownership.	  One	  needs	  to	  own	  in	  order	  to	  survive,	   in	   fact,	   in	  order	  to	  be	  (Acker	  1997:	  100-­‐101).	  
B O D Y :	  is	  defined	  most	  commonly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  human	  body,	  the	  material	  frame	  of	  man,	  viewed	  as	   an	   organic	   entity.	   But	   it	  may	   also	   refer	   to	   a	   series	   of	   organized	   units,	   a	   collective	  whole,	   of	  things	  or	  persons.	  Within	  science	  it	  refers	  to	  any	  substance,	  simple	  or	  compound,	  solid,	  liquid	  or	  gaseous.	  Within	  Christian	  texts	  the	  body	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  sacrament,	  the	  metaphorical	  body	  of	  Christ.	   Traditionally,	   the	   body	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   signifying	   or	   symbolic	   entity	   and	   a	   way	   to	  express	  and	  articulate	  cultural	  identity	  and	  meaning,	  and	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  material	  or	  corporeal	  being.	   In	   opposing	   these	   views,	   Nancy’s	   thinking	   of	   the	   body	   turns	   towards	   its	   materiality,	   its	  matter	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  certain	  technicity	  or	  to	  a	  technical	  apparatus.	  
Nancy’s	  figure	  of	  the	  ‘body’	  is	  similar	  and	  related	  to	  Heidegger’s	  Dasein.	  In	  both	  cases,	  ‘body’	  and	  
Dasein	   have	   no	   pre-­‐existing	   signification,	   because	   they	   are	   always	   already	   in	   an	   excess	   of	  signification,	   and	   both	   are	   used	   for	   naming	   or	   referring	   also	   to	   ‘sense’	   or	   ‘being’.	   They	   ‘make’	  sense	   and	   sense	   ‘takes	   place’	   in	   both,	   in	   a	   singular	   way.	   However,	   Nancy	   sees	   Dasein	   as	   a	  corporeal	  materiality,	  so	  he	  uses	   ‘body’	  with	   the	  aim	  to	  stress	  and	  to	  expose	   its	  bodily	  aspects,	  the	   embodied	   materiality	   of	   existence.	   The	   way	   Nancy	   looks	   at	   the	   body	   is	   in	   a	   manner	   of	  engaging	  with	  its	  immediate	  materiality,	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  touching	  or	  contact	  at	  the	  limit,	  in	  which	  sense	   and	   signification	   and	   the	   material	   are	   thought	   together.	   There	   are	   two	   key	   ideas	   that	  characterizes	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  body:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  he	  aims	  to	  overturn	  the	  traditional	  thinking	   of	   the	   body	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	   Christian	   tradition	   and	   from	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	  mind/body	  relation,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Nancy’s	  close	  link	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  thought.	  In	   his	   attempt	   to	   think	   the	   body,	   Nancy	   makes	   use	   of	   the	   figure	   of	   “touch”,	   which	   has	   been	  analysed	  by	  Derrida	  in	  his	  book	  “On	  Touching,	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy”	  (2000).	  
Body	  is	  for	  Nancy	  the	  place,	  which	  is	  “the	  taking	  place	  of	  sense”	  –	  in	  and	  as	  matter,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	   matter	   —	   and	   bodies	   are	   those	   who	   articulate	   it	   in	   first	   place.	   The	   body	   is	   the	   limit,	   the	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touching	  point,	  where	  sense	  and	  matter	  touch	  and	  come	  into	  contact.	  At	  this	  limit	  and	  touching	  point,	   occurs	   the	   opening	   of	   a	   world	   and	   of	   the	   event	   of	   being	   (Ereignis).	   The	   body	   discloses	  existence	  at	  the	  point	  of	  contact	  between	  discourse	  and	  matter,	  but	  Nancy	  insists,	  that	  they	  take	  place	  neither	  in	  discourse	  nor	  in	  matter	  (Nancy	  2008:	  17).	  Bodies	  take	  place	  at	  the	  limit,	  as	  the	  limit	  at	   the	   intersection	  of	   the	  unknown/unseen/untouchable	   to	   the	  continuity	  of	   sense	  within	  the	  continuity	  of	  matter.	  The	  body	  as	   the	  corporeal	   is	   thought	  as	  an	  event	  at	   the	   limit	  of	  sense	  and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   also	   as	   a	   rupture	   and	   discontinuity	   within	   the	   continuity	   of	   sense	   and	  within	  the	  continuity	  of	  matter.	  Body	  for	  Nancy	  is	  a	  finite	  corporeal	  existence	  that	  is	  and	  makes	  sense	   and	   discloses	   a	   world	   not	   through	   gathering	   of	   its	   own	   identity	   and	   self-­‐identity,	   but	  through	  a	  movement	  of	  dispersal	  and	  dissemination,	  of	  passage.	  
Bodies	   touch	   each	   other	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   touch	   the	   limit	   of	   signification	   and	  make	  sense	   in	   terms	  of	   and	  as	  a	   ‘transgression’:	   they	   cross	  each	  other,	  while	  keeping	   the	  distinction	  and	  by	  not	  establishing	  continuity;	  they	  leap	  into	  each	  other	  without	  being	  interlinked.	  As	  Nancy	  writes	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  image,	  bodies’	  touch	  is	  a	  “shock”,	  a	  “confrontation”,	  a	  “tête-­‐a-­‐tête”	  and	  a	  “rapport.”	  Bodies	  are	  distinct	  and	  heterogeneous,	  the	  “unbindable	  just	  at	  the	  distance	  of	  touch.”	  He	   writes:	   “The	   body	   is	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   soul	   to	   the	   extremities	   of	   the	   world	   and	   to	   the	  confines	  of	   the	  self,	  each	   intricated	  [intriqué]	  with	  the	  other	  and	  indistinctly	  distinct,	  extended,	  stretched	   [étendue	   tendue]	   to	   the	   point	   of	   rupture.”	   Thus,	   Ian	   James	   explains:	   “The	   spatial	  temporal	  event	  of	  being,	  as	   the	  extension	  or	  exposure	  of	  sense	  to	   impenetrable	  matter,	   (that	   is	  the	  body)	  does	  not	  permit	   the	  world	   to	  be	  seen	   in	   terms	  of	  substances,	  or	  of	   the	  presence	  and	  self-­‐presence	  of	  things,	  rather	  it	  must	  always	  be	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  separation	  and	  distancing	  of	  sense,	  which	  is	  also	  an	  event	  of	  touch,	  spacing,	  sharing,	  position,	  and	  disposition.”	  
Bodies	   are	   “finite	   bodily	   sense”	   that	   ‘make’	   sense.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   ‘Being’	   is	   for	   Nancy	   in	  following	  Heidegger’s	  thinking,	  not	  to	  be	  thought	  as	  a	  constant	  presence,	  but	  rather	  as	  “coming	  into	   presence”	   or	   “presentation”.	   The	   “event	   of	   being”	   is	   always	   a	   “coming”	   and	   a	   “borne	   into	  presence”.	   And,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   “Being”	   is	   for	  Nancy	   always	   a	   radicalisation	   of	  Heidegger’s	  “Mitsein”:	   it	   is	   always	   a	   “being-­‐with”,	   as	   the	   transcendental	   condition	   of	   “Being”.	   Being	   is	   or	  makes	  sense	  only	  as	  “being-­‐with”,	  which	  is,	  that	  sense	  is	  or	  makes	  sense	  only	  as	  a	  “sharing	  of	  a	  simultaneous	  time-­‐space.”	  Sense	  may	  take	  place	  only	  “in”	  and	  “between”	  us	  and	  it	  takes	  place	  in	  bodies	  only	  “in”	  and	  “between”	  a	  community	  of	  bodies	   that	  are	  exposed	  to	   themselves,	  sharing	  and	  making	  this	  sense.	  
Nancy	   is	   interested	   in	   appearance,	   when	   it	   forges	   ahead	   and	   discloses	   a	   world,	   a	   moment	   of	  creation	  without	  ground	  and	  without	  purpose.	   In	   this	   context,	  body	  or	  bodies	  and	  sense	  space	  themselves	   in	  a	   total	  exposure	  to	  each	  other,	  by	  remaining	   in	  contact	  with	  each	  other,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  keeping	  a	  distance	  from	  each	  other.	  There	  is	  no	  overall	  structure	  to	  support	  them	  into	  subjects	  or	  other	  identities.	  The	  relation	  between	  these	  parts	  outside	  parts	  is	  thus	  a	  relation	  of	  exteriority	  and	  ‘effraction’	  —	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  material	  body	  exist	  always	  also	  outside	  of	  each	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other	   and	   are	   never	   in	   the	   same	   place.	   Bodies	   are	   of	   impenetrable	  matter	   and	   they	   gain	   their	  meaning	  only	  from	  the	  outside	  –	  they	  are	  touched,	  seen,	  sensed	  from	  this	  exteriority	  with	  which	  they	  are	  in	  touch	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  at	  distance.	  
Nancy	  appropriates	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  partes	  extra	  partes	   from	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  who	  invoked	  this	  phrase	   in	   the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	   explains	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  partes	  
extra	  partes	  as	  an	  object	  that	  takes	  up	  only	  an	  exterior	  and	  mechanical	  relation	  between	  his	  parts	  and	  in	  connection	  to	  other	  objects.	  This	  relation	  can	  either	  be	  transmitted	  or	  received,	  or	  it	  can	  be	   a	   variable	   relation	   or	   function.	   So,	   for	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	   this	   relation	   is	   an	   exterior	   and	  mechanical	  one.	  However,	  Nancy	  will	  adopt	  the	  phrase,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  will	  develop	  it	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Greek	  term	  techné,	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  know-­‐how	  and	  practical	  labour,	  to	  craft.	  	  For	  Nancy,	  the	  ‘original	  technicity’	  of	  our	  world	  is	  the	  sharing	  of	  embodied	  existence	  that	  opens	  thus	  a	  world.	  The	  partes	  extra	  partes	   is	   the	   technical-­‐mechanical	   relation	  of	   sense	  between	  material	  bodies,	  which	  expose	  material	  bodies,	   in	  their	   ‘contact-­‐separation’	  relation	  between	  matter	  and	  sense.	  Material	  bodies	  exist	  as	  techné,	  as	  the	  interconnection	  and	  ‘co-­‐	  articulation’	  of	  a	  technical	  apparatus.	   The	   structure	   of	  partes	  extra	  partes	   is	   not	   thought	   anymore	   as	   a	   pre-­‐theoretical	   or	  pre-­‐scientific	  dimension	  of	  experience	  (as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  other	  phenomenological	  attempts).	  It	  is	  not	  thought	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  opposition	  between	  an	  original	  disclosure	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  realm	  of	   the	   scientific	   and	   technical	  knowledge	  of	   the	  world.	   It	   is	  more	  an	  originary	   technicity	  that	   is	  an	  embodied	   ‘effraction’	   that	   takes	  place	  as	  a	   touch	   in	   the	  distance	  of	   sense	  and	  matter	  (James	  2006:	  115-­‐151;	  Cojanu	  2009:	  66-­‐69). 
B O D Y B U I L D I N G 	   P R A C T I C E S :	   I	  am	  using	  this	  expression	  rather	  than	  simply	   ‘bodybuilding’	  in	  order	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  heterogeneity	  and	  complexity	  of	   this	  phenomenon	  with	  respect	   to	  its	  history,	  development,	  to	  social	  and	  gendered	  aspects;	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  practices	  that	  are	  involved	  in	   bodybuilding:	   training,	   nutrition	   and	  diet,	   posing	   technics,	   competition	   and	   a	   specific	   visual	  vocabulary:	  such	  as	  self-­‐tan	  application,	  ‘stage	  costume’,	  etc.;	  as	  well	  as	  a	  gendered	  specific	  visual	  vocabulary:	  one	  that	  connotes	  femininity	  —	  theatrical	  make-­‐up,	  false	  nails,	  breast	  implants,	  wigs,	  high	  heels	  —	  and	  one	  that	  connotes	  masculinity	  —	  rough	  boots	  and	  the	  use	  of	  other	  male	  specific	  props.	  
I	  imagine	  starting	  a	  text	  about	  	  building	  a	  body	  with	  the	  following	  quote	  by	  Barthes:	  
Once	  I	  feel	  myself	  observed	  by	  the	  lens,	  everything	  changes:	  I	  constitute	  myself	  in	  the	  process	  of	  ‘posing,’	  I	  instantaneously	  make	  another	  body	  for	  myself,	  I	  transform	  myself	  in	  advance	  into	  an	  image.	  …	  I	  feel	  that	  the	  Photograph	  creates	  my	  body	  and	  mortifies	  it,	  according	  to	  its	  caprice.	  …	  The	  photograph	  is	  the	  advent	  of	  myself	  as	  other,	  a	  cunning	  dissociation	  of	  consciousness	  from	  identity.	  [By	  thus	  being	  transformed	  from	  a	  subject	  into	  an	  object,	  by	  becoming	  a	  specter	  of	  myself]	  I	  have	  become	  a	  Total-­‐Image,	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  Death	  in	  person.	  […]	  (Jay	  1994:	  452).	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C H A N G E 	   (ontological):	   as	   elaborated	   by	   Malabou	   in	   The	   Heidegger	   Change,	   refers	   to	   the	  ontological	  metabolism	  of	  the	  triad	  Wandel,	  Wandlung,	  Verwandlung,	   to	  the	  intermediary	  space	  between	  change,	  exchange	  and	  substitution.	  	  
[…]	  Tracking	  Heidegger’s	  thinking	  of	  change	  necessarily	  leads	  one	  to	  take	  account	  of	  an	  exchange.	  An	  exchange,	   first	  of	  all,	  of	  a	  centre	  of	  gravity.	  […]	  An	  almost	  imperceptible	  but	  nonetheless	  vertiginous	  difference	  has	  begun	   to	  open	  up	   right	  on	   the	  ontological	  difference.	   This	   self-­‐difference	   of	   difference	   is	   nothing	   but	   its	   ontological	   dimension.	  […]	   Henceforth,	   you	   will	   no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   keep	   in	   focus	   the	   difference	   between	  being	  and	  beings	  but	  only	  the	  difference	  between	  differing	  and	  changing.	  […]	  You	  have,	  without	   realizing	   it,	   exchanged	   difference	   for	   exchange.	   […]	   The	   difference	   between	  differing	  and	  changing	  directs	  your	  gaze	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  being	  and	  essence	  —	   for	   to	   behold	   essence	   is	   to	  witness	   change.	   […]	   Difference,	   then,	   presupposes	   the	  exchangeability,	   and	   thus	   the	   nondifferentiation,	   of	   instances	   that	   differ.	   Ontological	  difference	   therefore	  remains	  unthinkable	  outside	   the	  very	  possibility	  of	   its	  occlusion;	  that	   is	  to	  say,	  outside	  the	  originary	  possibility	  of	  being	  and	  beings	  changing	  into	  each	  other.	  […]	  The	  essence	  of	  a	  thing	  is	  effectively	  what	  in	  it	  does	  not	  change.	  This	  exchange	  of	  mutability	  for	  its	  opposite	  is	  exactly	  what	  originally	  gives	  change	  [donne	  le	  change]	  in	  philosophy,	  throwing	  it	  off	  the	  trail.	  […]	  The	  problematic	  of	  change	  brings	  to	  light	  a	  differing	  that	  is	  not	  the	  alternative	  ontological	  difference,	  but	  which	  constitutes	  the	  site	  of	   Heidegger’s	   thinking	   of	   change.	   […]	   There	   are	   effectively	   two	   (ex-­‐)changes.	   One	  where	   essence	   doubles	   being	  —	   is	   given	   for	   it	  —	   and	   another	  where	   essence	   is	   the	  coming	  and	  advent	  of	  being	  itself.	  Each	  of	  these	  (ex-­‐)changes	  also	  shelters	  a	  metabolic	  regime	   that	   is	   proper	   to	   it	   […].	   The	   dividing	   line	   between	   the	   two	   (ex-­‐)changes	   is	  nonetheless	  decisive	  —relentlessly	   imprinting	  and	  affacing	   itself,	   threatens	   to	  appear	  and	  disappear	  (Malabou	  2011:	  1-­‐30).	  
C O N J O I N T U R E 	   —‘B E L L E 	   C O N J O I N T U R E ’:	   technical	   term	   in	   literary	   theory	   (Macrobius)	  describing	  the	  harmonious	  mélange	  of	  multiple	  traditions	  and	  text	  registers.	  	  
C O N T E X T I O :	  technical	  term	  in	  literary	  theory	  (Macrobius),	  referring	  to	  the	  order	  of	  relations	  	  and	  designing	  the	  structure	  of	  content	  in	  a	  story.	  	  
D A I M O N :	  δαίμων	  —	  From	  Proto-­‐Indo-­‐European	  deh-­‐i	  (to	  divide,	  to	  cut),	  whence	  also	  δαίομαι	  (daíomai,	  to	  divide)	  (Wiktionary	  &	  Henry	  George	  Liddell,	  Robert	  Scott,	  A	  Greek-­‐English	  Lexicon	  [online]).	   God	   –Godess:	   divine	  power,	   guardian	   spirit,	   fate	   destiny,	   fortune;	   departed	   soul;	   evil	  spirit;	  semi-­‐divine	  being,	  inferior	  to	  Gods;	  good	  or	  evil	  genius	  of	  a	  person	  or	  family.	  
D A R S T E L L U N G : 	   Kant:	   presentation	   —	   the	   pure	   presentation	   is	   only	   the	   mathematical	  presentation	  because	  in	  the	  formal-­‐logical	  language	  of	  mathematics	  there	  is	  an	  exact	  adequation	  between	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  respective	  concept	  or	  intuition	  and	  the	  concept	  or	  the	  intuition	  itself,	   thus	   a	   mathematical	   presentation	   demonstrates	   the	   existence	   or	   truth	   of	   something	  without	  the	  need	  of	  anything	  else	  as	  proof	  and	  through	  using	  its	  own	  language	  to	  ground	  itself	  as	  such;	   but	   the	   philosophical	   presentation	   is	   different	   from	   pure	  mathematical	   presentation;	   its	  relation	   to	   truth	   and	   foundation	   or	   ground	   is	   different	   and	   the	   correspondence	   between	   the	  presentation	  of	  concepts/intuition	  and	  the	  concept/intuition	  itself	  cannot	  unfold	  in	  the	  manner	  of	   a	   proof	   or	   equation,	   but	   only	   in	   discourse;	   Kant	   specifically	   chose	   to	   call	   this	   mode	   of	  presentation	  EXPOSITION(Nancy	  2008:	  32-­‐33).	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D E C O R A T I O N :	   “anything	   applied	   to	   a	   structure	   or	   an	   object	   that	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   the	  stability,	   use,	   or	   understanding	   of	   that	   structure	   or	   object	   (Grabar	   1992:	   xxiv)”;	   “a	   generic	  descriptor	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  things	  mainly	  pertaining	  to	  pleasure	  (Brett	  2005:	  4).”	  
D É C O R :	  Latin	  ‘decet-­‐decorum’;	  means	  to	  comply,	  to	  become,	  to	  acquiesce.	  
D E C O R U M :	  Latin	  ‘decet-­‐decorum’;	  suitability	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  a	  style	  for	  the	  subject;	  an	  appropriate	   measure;	   may	   refer	   to:	   a	   behaviour	   in	   keeping	   with	   good	   taste	   and	   propriety,	  etiquette,	   to	   the	   suitability,	   to	   the	   requirements	  of	   a	  person,	   rank,	  or	  occasion,	  or	   to	  particular	  requirements	  of	  good	  taste	  and	  propriety;	  the	  theory	  of	  decorum	  implies	  very	  often	  a	  doctrine	  of	  taste	  and	  represents	  in	  essence	  the	  platonic	  theory	  of	  beauty.	  	  
D I F F E R E N C E 	   (ontological):	  see	  ‘change’.	  
D I F F É R E N C E 	   – 	   D I F F É R A N C E :	   “différence”	   as	   “différentiation”	   and	   “différenciation”	   in	  Deleuze	   and	   “différance”	   in	   Derrida:	   Not	   the	   difference	   between	   two	   (or	   more)	   distinct	   and	  completed	  termini,	  ideas	  or	  concepts,	  but	  the	  infinite	  game	  played	  out	  by	  the	  difference	  differing	  itself;	   the	   two	   ways	   of	   reading	   Hegel:	   understanding	   the	   passage	   as	   result,	   the	   “dialectical	  synthesis”,	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  opposites,	  or	  understanding	  the	  result	  as	  a	  passage	  that	  doesn’t	  pass,	  as	  a	  result	  without	  result	  (Nancy	  and	  Schérer	  2008).	  	  
E N T W U R F :	   German	   for	   project,	   scheme,	   concept,	   draft,	   design,	   or	   plan;	   technical	   term	   and	  theoretical	  concept	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  architecture.	  
E X P E R I E N C E :	  “To	  undergo	  an	  experience	  with	  something,	  […]	  be	  it	  a	  person,	  a	  thing,	  or	  a	  god,	  means	  that	  this	  experience	  befalls	  us,	  strike	  us,	  comes	  over	  us,	  overwhelms	  us	  and	  transforms	  us	  [daß	   es	   uns	   widerfährt,	   daß	   es	   uns	   trifft,	   über	   uns	   kommt,	   uns	   umwirft	   und	   verwandelt].”	  (Heidegger,	  Malabou	  2011:	  28)	  
F A N T A S T I C 	   (philosophical):	   In	  The	  Heidegger	  Change,	  Malabou	  speaks	  of	   the	   fantastic	  as	   the	  point	  of	   access	   in	   the	   “ontological	  metabolism”	  and	   in	   “the	   triad	  of	   change”	   given	  by	   the	   three	  forms	   of	   change:	  Wandel	  (change),	  Wandlung	  (transformation),	  Verwandlung	  (metamorphosis)	  
(Malabou	  2011:1).	  	  
Both	   the	   mode	   of	   visibility	   of	   ontological	   metabolism	   and	   the	   intelligibility	   and	  evidence	   of	   the	   never	   seen,	   the	   fantastic	   ‘in	   philosophy’	   designates	   at	   once	   a	   kind	   of	  approach	  to	  change	  and	  the	  very	  strangeness	  of	  what	  changes	  and	  is	  going	  to	  change.	  It	  also	   manifests,	   by	   consequence,	   the	   uncanniness	   of	   the	   fantastic	   to	   itself:	   its	  irreducibility	   to	  a	  genre	  or	  category	  of	  discourse,	   its	   resistance	   to	  every	  relegation	  of	  itself	  to	  a	  conventional	  domain,	  to	  what	  Roger	  Caillois	  calls	  ‘the	  fantastic	  of	  principle	  or	  obligation’.	   The	   philosophical	   fantastic	   is	   contemporary	  with	   the	   bringing	   to	   light,	   in	  the	   twentieth	   century,	   of	   the	   ontological	   difference	   and,	   by	  way	   of	   consequence,	   the	  possibility	  of	  thinking	  being	  without	  beings.	  It	  never	  designates	  ‘an	  element	  exterior	  to	  the	   human	   world’	   (that	   of	   ‘composite	   monsters,	   infernal	   fawns,	   the	   irruption	   of	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demonic,	   grotesque	   or	   sinister	   creatures’),	   but	   describes	   THE	  FOREIGNER	  ON	  THE	   INSIDE,	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  metabolic	  force	  that	  sleeps	  without	  sleeping	  in	  what	  is,	  THE	  VERY	  FACE	  OF	  BEING	  THAT	  CONCEPTS	  CANNOT	  SAY	  WITHOUT	  LOSING	  FACE.	  	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	  mutability	   of	   being	   is	   not—not,	   that	   is,	   a	   being—its	   reality	   is	  necessarily	   imaginary,	   if	   by	   imaginary	   we	   understand,	   as	   Heidegger	   invites	   us	   to,	   a	  nonobjective	   modality	   of	   presence	   free	   of	   every	   reference	   and	   referent.	   […]	   As	   an	  imaginary	   production	  without	   a	   referent	   and	   pure	   ontological	   creation,	   the	   fantastic	  characterizes	   the	   apprehension	   and	   the	   regime	   of	   existence	   of	   what	   cannot	   be	  presented,	  of,	   that	   is,	  what	   can	  only	  ever	   change	   (Malabou	  2011:12-­‐13;	   italics	  by	   the	  author,	  emphasis	  my	  own).	  	  
F I C T I O N :	  What	  is	  not.	  “What	  is	  fiction	  is	  that	  which	  will	  become	  actual	  (Acker	  1997:	  3).”	  
First,	   in	   fiction,	   there	   is	  no	  “true”	  or	   “false”	   in	  social-­‐realist	   terms.	  Fiction	   is	   “true”	  or	  real	  when	  it	  makes.	  Second,	   if	   there	   is	  a	  self,	   it	   isn’t	  Hegel’s	  subject	  or	  the	  centralized	  phallic	  “	  I/eye.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  self,	  it’s	  probably	  the	  world.	  All	  is	  real.	  When	  I	  placed	  “true”	  autobiography	   next	   to	   “false”	   autobiography,	   everything	   was	   real.	   Phallic	   identity	   is	  another	  scam	  that	  probably	  had	  to	  do	  with	  capitalistic	  ownership.	  Fiction	  is	  magic	  because	  everything	  is	  magic:	  the	  world	  is	  always	  making	  itself.	  When	  you	  make	  fiction	  you	  deep	  into	  this	  process.	  […](Acker	  1997:	  10).	  Fiction	   is	   our	   life.	   As	   we	   live,	   we	   are	   continually	   producing	   fictions.	   …	   You	   are	   at	  present	   thinking	   of	   the	   longed-­‐for	  moment	   when	   I	   shall	   finished	   speaking.	   …	   It	   is	   a	  fiction!	   We	   live	   only	   by	   fictions,	   which	   are	   our	   projects,	   hopes,	   memories,	   regrets,	  thoughts	  etc.,	  and	  we	  are	  no	  more	  than	  their	  perpetual	   invention.	  Note	  well	  (I	   insist!)	  —	  that	   all	   these	   fictions	   necessarily	   relate	   to	  what	   is	  not,	   and	   are	   no	   less	   necessarily	  opposed	  to	  what	  is;	  besides,	  which	  is	  curious,	  it	  is	  what	  is	  that	  gives	  birth	  to	  what	  is	  not,	  and	  what	  is	  not	  that	  constantly	  responds	  to	  what	  is.	  You	  are	  here,	  and	  later	  on	  you	  will	  no	   longer	  be	  here,	  and	  you	  know	  it.	  What	  is	  not	   corresponds	   in	  your	  mind	  to	  what	  is.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  power	  over	  you	  of	  what	  is	  produces	  the	  power	  in	  you	  of	  what	  is	  not;	  and	  the	  latter	  power	  changes	  into	  a	  feeling	  of	  impotence	  upon	  contact	  with	  what	  is.	  So	  we	  revolt	  against	   facts;	  we	  cannot	  admit	  a	   fact	   like	  death.	  Our	  hopes,	  our	  grudges,	  all	  this	   is	   a	   direct,	   instantaneous	   product	   of	   conflict	   between	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   not	  (Valéry	  1989:	  227).	  The	   purpose	   of	   fiction:	   […]	   Writing	   must	   break	   through	   the	   representational	   or	  fictional	  mirror	  and	  be	  equal	  in	  force	  to	  the	  horror	  experienced	  in	  daily	  life.	  […]	  (Acker	  1997:	  68).	  
G A Z E :	   is	   used	   in	   this	   text	   mainly	   as	   a	   translation	   of	   the	   German	   word	   ‘Blick’	   or	   look;	   as	   a	  psychoanalytical	   term	   it	  was	   introduced	   by	   Jacques	   Lacan	   to	   describe	   the	   anxious	   state	   of	   the	  awareness	   that	  one	  can	  be	  viewed.	  Lacan	  argues	   that	   through	   the	  awareness	   that	  one	   is	  being	  looked	  at,	  the	  subject	  loses	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  upon	  realizing	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  visible	  object.	  This	  concept	  is	  bound	  with	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  mirror	  stage,	  in	  which	  a	  child	  encountering	  a	  mirror	  realises	   that	  he	  or	   she	  has	   an	  external	   appearance.	   Lacan	   suggests	   that	   any	   conceivable	  object	  such	  as	  a	  chair	  or	  a	  television	  screen	  can	  similarly	  produce	  this	  gaze	  effect.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  object	  behaves	  optically	  as	  a	  mirror;	   instead	   it	  means	   that	   the	  awareness	  of	  any	  object	  can	  induce	  an	  awareness	  of	  also	  being	  an	  object.	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But	   slits,	   holes,	   and	   zones	   do	   not	   present	   things	   to	   be	   seen,	   do	   not	   reveal	   anything:	  vision	  does	  not	  penetrate,	  but	  glides	  along	  swerves	  and	  follows	  along	  departures.	  It	  is	  a	  touching	   that	   does	   not	   absorb	   but	   moves	   along	   lines	   and	   recesses,	   inscribing	   and	  exscribing	  the	  body.	  A	  mobile,	  unstable	  caress,	  seeing	  the	   image	   in	  slow	  motion,	   fast-­‐forwarded,	   or	   frozen,	   seeing	   as	   well	   with	   touches	   from	   other	   senses,	   smells,	   tastes,	  timbres,	   or	   even,	   with	   sounds,	   from	   the	   senses	   of	   words	   (the	   “sure”	   that	   yields	  “pleasure”)	  (Nancy	  2008:	  45-­‐47).	  See:	  the	  chapter	  The	  Gaze	  and	  the	  Glance	  in:	  Vision	  and	  Painting,	  Bryson	  (1983).	  
The	  logic	  of	  the	  Gaze	  is	  therefore	  subject	  to	  two	  great	  laws:	  the	  body	  (of	  the	  painter,	  of	  the	   viewer)	   is	   reduced	   to	   a	   single	   point,	   the	  macula	   of	   the	   retinal	   surface;	   and	   the	  moment	   of	   the	   Gaze	   (for	   the	   painter,	   for	   the	   viewer)	   is	   placed	   outside	   duration	   [as	  against	   the	  visual	  perception	  required	  and	  produced	  by	   the	  arabesque].	  Spatially	  and	  temporally,	  the	  act	  of	  viewing	  is	  constructed	  as	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  space	  in	   time,	   as	   the	   disappearance	   of	   the	   body:	   the	   construction	   of	   an	   acies	   mentis,	   the	  punctual	  viewing	  subject	  (Bryson	  1982:	  96).	  […]	   We	   must	   shift	   our	   perspective	   from	   the	   image,	   the	   imago,	   the	   spectre,	   to	   the	  painting,	   to	   the	   carved	   sheet	   of	   pigment,	   to	   the	   stroke	   of	   brush	   on	   canvas	   [in	  bodybuilding	  practices	  body	  and	  image	  coincide	  here!]:	  despite	  its	  obsession	  with	  the	  body’s	  endless	  variability,	  with	  the	  spectacular	  and	  protean	  transformations	  of	  a	  body	  under	  constant	  visibility	  and	  display	  (no	  tradition	  of	  the	  Nude,	  outside	  Europe	  [—and	  maybe	  that’s	  why	  bodybuilding	  practices	  are	  specific	  to	  Western	  culture	  first	  of	  all,	  and	  then	   especially	   to	   the	   American	   culture	   and	   the	   post-­‐fordist	   and	   liberal	   society],	   the	  image	   finally	  knows	  the	  body	  only	  as	  a	  picture.	  To	  dissolve	   the	  Gaze	   that	  returns	   the	  body	  to	  itself	  in	  medusa	  form,	  we	  must	  willingly	  enter	  into	  the	  partial	  blindness	  of	  the	  Glance	  and	  dispense	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  form	  as	  con-­‐sideration,	  as	  Arrest,	  and	  try	  to	  conceive	   form	   instead	   in	   dynamic	   terms,	   as	   matter	   in	   process,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	  original	  pre-­‐Socratic	  word	   for	   form:	   rhuthmos,	   rhythm,	   the	   impress	  on	  matter	  of	   the	  body’s	  internal	  energy,	  in	  the	  mobility	  and	  vibrancy	  of	  its	  somatic	  rhythm;	  the	  body	  of	  labour	   [that	   actually	   becomes	   obsolete	   and	   that	   gets	   lost	   once	   more	   through	   its	  replacement	  by	  the	  machine	  —	  in	  this	  sense	  bodybuilding	  practices	  are	  an	  enactment	  and	  an	  embodiment	  of	  this	  absent	  BODY	  OF	  LABOUR],	  of	  material	  practice	  (Bryson:	  131).	  	  See	   also	   Jay,	  M.	   (1994)	  Downcast	  Eyes.	  The	  Denigration	  of	  Vision	   in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  French	  
Thought.	  	  
G I F T 	   (J.-­‐L.	  Marion):	   The	   gift	   interpreted	   from	   the	   horizon	   of	   givenness	   itself,	   is	   the	   ‘gift	   that	  gives	  itself	  by	  giving	  its	  giving’,	  the	  ‘gift	  that	  gives	  itself	  by	  giving	  its	  reception’,	  that	  ‘gives	  itself	  here	  without	  limit,	  without	  return,	  outside	  of	  commerce’	  (Marion	  2008:	  92-­‐99).	  
I M A G E :	   See	   Nancy	   (2005);	   the	   presentation	   of	   presentation;	   exists	   at	   the	   vanishing	   point	   of	  signification	  and	  systematic	  structures;	  the	  image	  images	  and	  presents	  into	  the	  one	  of	  the	  image	  (Ein-­‐bild-­‐ung)	  an	  unseen	  (by	  the	  eye	  and	  by	  the	  ‘I’)	  formation	  of	  possible	  presence,	  a	  new	  world,	  “a	  singular	  variation	  on	  the	  totality	  of	  distinct	  sense”	  (Nancy	  2005:12).	  
I M A G I N A R Y :	   “a	   non-­‐objective	   modality	   of	   presence	   free	   of	   every	   reference	   and	   referent	  (Heidegger	  in	  Malabou	  2011:	  11).”	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I N F I N I T E 	   R A P P O R T :	   infinite	  pattern	  of	  non-­‐geometric	  configuration	   (Riegl:	  ein	  decoratives	  Compositionsgesetz	  —“es	   beruht	   auf	   der	   Verwendung	   eines	   aus	   zwei	   symmetrischen	   Hälften	  componierten	   Ornamentmotives	   (oder	   mehrerer	   solcher)	   in	   reihenweiser	   Abwechslung	   als	  Streumuster	   in	   der	   Ebene,	   wobei	   längst	   der	   abschließenden	   Ränder	   der	   Gesamtcomposition	  immer	  jene	  Hälfte	  des	  Motives	  (in	  den	  Ecken	  je	  ein	  Viertel	  desselben)	  angebracht	  erscheint;	  der	  Beschauer	  wird	   dadurch	   veranlaßt,	   sich	   die	   fehlende	  Hälfte	   (oder	   ein	   Viertel)	   in	   Gedanken	   zu	  ergänzen	  und	  die	  Reihe	  in	  der	  Ebene	  ins	  Unendliche	  fortzusetzen	  (Riegl	  1901:	  42).”	  
K U N S T W O L L E N :	   translated	  as:	  what	  art	  wants,	  art	  drive,	  will	   to	  make	  art,	  will	  of	  art,	  artistic	  intention,	  art’s	  volition;	   it	   is	  the	  concept	  that	  Riegl	   introduces	  and	  elaborates	  to	  name	  the	  force	  that	  drives	  and	  structures	  the	  metabolic	  changes	  in	  forms,	  styles	  and	  contents	  over	  a	  certain	  time	  period.	  When	  Riegl	  speaks	  about	  style	  he	  refers	  to	  an	  idea	  and	  not	  to	  a	  class,	  to	  something	  that	  can	  be	  grasped	  only	   intuitively,	   that	  only	   communicates	   itself	   in	   concrete	   terms	  –	   style	   cannot	  communicate	   itself	   through	   other	   concepts.	   The	   external	   character	   of	   a	   particular	   form	   can	  communicate	  a	  style.	  What	  drives	  changes	  in	  style	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘Kunstwollen’,	  a	  drive,	  impulse,	  tendency	  or	  need,	  a	  force	  and	  not	  a	  conscious	  will.	  	  
All	  human	  will	  is	  directed	  towards	  a	  satisfactory	  shaping	  of	  man's	  relationship	  to	  the	  world,	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  individual.	  The	  plastic	  Kunstwollen	  regulates	  man's	  relationship	  to	  the	   sensibly	   perceptible	   appearance	   of	   things.	   Art	   expresses	   the	   way	  man	   wants	   to	   see	  things	  shaped	  or	  coloured,	  just	  as	  the	  poetic	  Kunstwollen	  expresses	  the	  way	  man	  wants	  to	  imagine	  them.	  Man	  is	  not	  only	  a	  passive,	  sensory	  recipient,	  but	  also	  a	  desiring,	  active	  being	  who	  wishes	  to	  interpret	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  (varying	  from	  one	  people,	  region,	  or	  epoch	  to	  another)	  that	  it	  most	  clearly	  and	  obligingly	  meets	  his	  desires.	  The	  character	  of	  this	  will	  is	  contained	   in	   what	   we	   call	   the	   worldview	   (again	   in	   the	   broadest	   sense):	   in	   religion,	  philosophy,	  science,	  even	  statecraft	  and	  law	  (Wood	  2000:	  94-­‐96).	  
L I M I T :	  see	  peras.	  
L I T E R A R Y 	   A B S O L U T E :	   “theory	   itself	  as	   literature”;	   it	   is	   the	  concept	  the	   Jena	  group	  used	  to	  name	   the	   ‘something'	   of	   the	   constant	   horizon	   of	   their	   project:	   “the	   production	   of	   something	  entirely	   new”;	   the	   literary	   absolute	   is	   also,	   and	   perhaps	   above	   all,	   this	   absolute	   “literary	  operation”.	  “For	  the	  literary	  Absolute	  aggravates	  and	  radicalizes	  the	  thinking	  of	  totality	  and	  the	  Subject.	   It	   infinitizes	   this	   thinking,	   and	   therein,	   precisely,	   rests	   its	   ambiguity.	   Not	   that	  romanticism	  itself	  did	  not	  begin	  to	  perturb	  the	  Absolute,	  or	  proceed,	  despite	  itself,	  to	  undermine	  its	  Work	  [Oeuvre].	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  carefully	  distinguish	  the	  signs	  of	  this	  small	  and	  complex	  fissuring	  and	  consequently	  to	  know	  how	  to	  read	  these	  signs	  in	  first	  place—as	  signs	  of	  a	  romantic,	  not	  romanesque,	  reading	  of	  romanticism	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:	  15).”	  
M A S S 	   O R N A M E N T : 	  Kracauer:	   is	   formed	  by	  the	  masses	  of	  thousand	  of	  bodies,	  sexless	  bodies	  in	  bathing	  suits	   that	  move	   in	  regular	  patterns,	  of	  geometrical	  precision,	   in	  a	  packed	  stadium	  in	  
	   151	  
front	  of	  cheering	  masses,	  themselves	  arranged	  as	  another	  ‘mass	  ornament’	  by	  the	  stands	  in	  tier	  upon	  ordered	  tier.	  This	   type	  of	  ornament	   is	  of	   the	  mass,	  and	  not	   the	  people	  and	   it	   is	  an	  end	   in	  itself.	   	   It	   per-­‐forms	   figures,	   but	   the	   participating	   bodies	   are	   no	   longer,	   free	   autonomous,	  individuals,	  but	  parts	  of	  the	  mass	  and	  only	  as	  such,	  can	  they	  become	  fractions	  of	  the	  figure.	  	  
M E D I A T I O N : 	  Mersch	  (2009):	  mediation	  is	  a	  referential	  relation	  (and	  any	  relational	  structure	  such	   as	   scission,	   split,	   partition	   is	   implying	   or	   presupposing	   an	   heterogeneous	   other)	   whose	  possibility	   is	   already	   preceding	   and	   determining	   the	   mediation.	   If	   one	   has	   to	   break	   with	   any	  as/qua/als-­‐relation,	  then	  one	  has	  to	  invert	  the	  constitutive	  direction	  implied	  in	  the	  relation:	  the	  relation	   is	   not	   towards	   the	   other/distinct	   and	   thus	   to	   difference	   and	   partition,	   but	   one	   has	   to	  start	  from	  the	  other/distinct,	  or	  through	  the	  other/distinct,	  so	  that	  the	  mediation	  is	  not	  making	  alterity	   possible,	   but	   ALTERITY	   ITSELF	   MAKES	   MEDIATION	   POSSIBLE.	   Thus,	   alterity	   and	   difference	   is	  already	  and	  passively	  given	  and	  only	  as	  such	  is	  it	  difference;	  if	  we	  think	  difference	  as	  difference	  than	  we	  remain	  in	  metaphysical	  presence.	  …	  And	  aura	  is	  one	  such	  concept	  that	  rest	  at	  the	  limit	  between	  “praesentia	  in	  absentia”	  (presence	  of	  what	  is	  not	  visible,	  what	  is	  hidden)	  with	  “absentia	  in	   praesentia”	   (presentness	   of	   what	   withdraws	   itself	   from	   a	   reprehension	   of	   existence,	   from	  presence.	  ‘What	  refuses	  to	  give	  evidence'.	  
M E T H O D :	  from	  old	  Greek:	  ‘meta’	  (after)	  and	  ‘hodos’	  (way,	  a	  traveling),	  after-­‐a-­‐traveling,	  after-­‐way,	  processual	  —how	  one	  goes	  about.	  
M E T H O D O L O G Y :	  a	  reproducible	  framework.	  
M O V E M E N T 	   (change):	   “All	   movement	   involves	   three	   factors,	   (1)	   that	   which	   originates	   the	  movement,	   (2)	   that	   by	   means	   of	   which	   it	   originates	   it	   and	   (3)	   that	   which	   is	   moved.	   The	  expression	  ‘that	  which	  originates	  movement’	  is	  ambiguous:	  it	  may	  mean	  either	  something	  which	  itself	   is	   unmoved	   or	   that	  which	   at	   once	  moves	   and	   is	  moved.	   Here	   that	  which	  moves	  without	  itself	  being	  moved	  is	  the	  realizable	  good,	  that	  which	  at	  once	  moves	  and	  is	  moved	  is	  the	  faculty	  of	  appetite	   (for	   that	  which	   is	  moved	   is	  moved	   insofar	   as	   it	   desires,	   and	   appetite	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  actual	   appetite	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   movement),	   while	   that	   which	   is	   in	   motion	   is	   the	   animal.	   The	  instrument	  which	  appetite	  employs	  to	  produce	  movement	  is	  bodily:	  hence	  the	  examination	  of	  it	  falls	  within	   the	  province	   of	   the	   functions	   common	   to	  body	   and	   soul.	   […]	   (Aristotle,	   1995:	   689,	  433b1,	  10-­‐15).”	  
N O V E L 	   O F 	   M A N N E R S :	   is	   a	   literary	   term	   used	   to	   categorize	   traditional	   genre	   novels	   that	  emerged	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  in	  England,	  most	  of	  which	  appeared	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  A	  novel	  of	  manners	  is	  a	  work	  of	  prose	  fiction	  that	  represents	  a	  social	  world	  and	   deals	   with	   aspects	   of	   behaviour,	   the	   language,	   customs,	   and	   values	   characteristic	   for	   a	  particular	   class	   of	   people	   in	   a	   specific	   historical	   context.	   Plot	   and	   structure	   evolve	   around	   a	  conflict	  between	  individual	  aspirations,	  desires	  and	  accepted	  social	  codes	  of	  behaviours,	  and	  are	  dominated	  by	  how	  the	  characters	  uphold	  the	  standard	  level	  of	  social	  etiquette.	  A	  vital	  symbiosis	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grows	  out	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  manners,	  social	  behaviour	  and	  character,	  which	  is	  usually	  the	  nucleus	  of	  the	  novel,	  while	  physical	  appearances	  are	  being	  less	  emphasized.	  Outcome	  is	  usually	  positive,	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  morals.	  Because	  of	  changes	  taking	  place	  during	  that	  time	  in	  the	  English	   society,	   which	   were	   destabilizing	   class	   boundaries,	   this	   period	   showed	   almost	   an	  obsession	   with	   proper	   social	   behaviour,	   the	   standard	   markers	   determining	   an	   individual’s	  position	   in	   society	   and	   indicating	   good	  morals.	   The	   idea	   of	  manners	   implied	   not	   only	   a	   social	  signification,	   but	   also	   a	  moral	   one	   that	   preceded	   the	   social	   one.	   Two	  distinct	   operative	   sets	   of	  codes	  defined	  gender	  differences	  in	  accepted	  behaviour	  between	  men	  and	  women.	  On	  the	  whole	  all	  manners	  were	  constructed	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  pleasing.	  These	  novels	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐establish	   the	   class	   order	   through	   a	   naturalistic	   and	   realistic	   representation	   of	   how	   classes	  have	  to	  behave	  in	  different	  settings,	  public	  or	  private,	  in	  rural	  or	  urban,	  and,	  of	  course,	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  differences.	  Codes	  of	  conduct	  were	  described,	  but	  also	  prescribed.	  Women	  dominated	  the	  genre	  as	  authors,	  subjects	  and	  intended	  audience,	  and	  the	  novels	  were	  considered	  for	  a	  long	  time	  trivial	  literature.	  	  
O B J E C T :	   an	   entity	   perceptible	   or	   intelligible	   by	   the	   mind;	   from	   the	   Latin	   objectus	   (pp.	   of	  
obicere)	  meaning	   to	   throw,	   or	   to	   put	   before	   or	   against,	   from	  ob-­‐(pref.)	   and	   jacere,	   "to	   throw";	  objects	   conform	   to	   the	  mind	   of	   the	   subject	   and,	   in	   turn,	   become	   products	   of	   human	   cognition	  (Kant’s	  Copernican	  Turn).	  
O R N A M E N T :	   	   ancient	   Greek	   ‘orno-­‐ornare’;	   Latin	   ‘ornere’	   –	   to	   fit	   out	   or	   to	   complete;	   “any	  decoration	   that	   has	   no	   referent	   outside	   of	   the	   object	   on	  which	   it	   is	   found,	   except	   in	   technical	  manuals	  (Grabar:	  1992,	  xxiv)”;	  what	  carries	  beauty	  in	  itself	  and	  is	  a	  form	  of	  mediation.	  	  
O R N A M E N T A L :	  “the	  ‘becoming	  essential	  of	  accident’	  and,	  at	  once,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  in	  the	  same	   time,	   the	   ‘becoming	   accidental	   of	   essence’	   (Malabou	   2005:	   XII)”;	   daimonic	   force,	   an	  intermediary,	  movement.	  	  
O R N A M E N T A T I O N :	  Ornamentik,	   an	   art	   historical	   discipline	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   ornament;	   the	  state	  of	  being	  ornamented;	  something	  used	  to	  beautify;	  the	  act	  of	  ornamenting;	  something	  with	  which	  a	  thing	  is	  ornamented;	  ornaments	  collectively.	  
O R N A T U S :	   In	  ancient	  Greece	   rhetoric	  was	  employed	   in	  public	   speech	  and	  political	   forums	  as	  civic	  art.	  Ornatus	  was	  part	  of	  the	  elocutio	  (speech	  art,	  elocution).	  Rhetoric	  is	  the	  art	  and	  skill	  to	  employ	  a	  number	  of	  stylistic	  mechanisms	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	   the	  desired	  persuasive	  effect	  and	  
Ornatus	  was	  the	  set	  of	  such	  stylistic	  devices	  and	  linguistic	  forms	  that	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  a	  certain	  effect	  through	  a	  beautiful,	  but	  appropriate	  form.	  
P H A N T A S M :	   in	   its	   ancient	   Greek	   sense,	   “etwas	   überhaupt	   im	   Modus	   einer	   bewussten	  Vorstellung	   vor	   sich	   haben”:	   “oudépote	   [irreducible	   feature,	   outline	   (Grundzug)]	   noeîn	   (acts)	  
aneu	  phantásmatos	  he	  psyche	  [soul]	  (Böhler	  2005:	  16)”	  —“To	  the	  thinking	  soul	  images	  serve	  as	  if	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they	  were	  contents	  of	  perception	  (and	  when	  it	  asserts	  or	  denies	  them	  to	  be	  good	  or	  bad	  it	  avoids	  or	  pursues	  them).	  That	  is	  why	  the	  soul	  never	  thinks	  without	  an	  image.	  […]	  (Aristotle,	  1995:	  685,	  431ª1,	  16).”	  
Although	   I	   am	   using	   phantasm	   in	   its	   Greek	   sense	  —	   is	   this	   even	   possible?	   (I	   wonder)	  —	   the	  following	  quotation	  presents	  in	  a	  short,	  structured	  and	  clear	  way	  the	  complexity	  of	  its	  meaning	  and	  how	  it	  changed	  in	  time,	  and	  why	  is	  it	  relevant	  in	  the	  present.	  
Originally,	   in	   the	   philosophy	   following	   Plato,	   phantasms	   denote	   the	   CONCEPTS	   OF	   AN	  OBJECTIVE	  REALITY	  AS	   IT	   IS	  PERCEIVED	  AND,	  THUS,	  DISTORTED	  BY	  THE	  SENSES.	   And	   in	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  states:	  “‘never	  does	  the	  soul	  think	  without	  phantasm”	  [quoted	  in	  Zizek	  (2008:	  22)	   in	   reference	   to	   Castoriadis	   critique	   of	   Heidegger’s	   reading	   of	   the	   Kantian	  schematism	   (in	  The	  Ticklish	  Subject].	   From	   there	   it	   travels	   into	   European	  philosophy	  and	   reappears	   in	   Thomas	   Aquinas’s	   epistemological	   writings,	   above	   all	   in	   his	  commentaries	  on	  Aristotle.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  13th	  century	  scholastic	  style	  of	  writing	  in	  general,	  the	  chaotic	  situation	  of	  Aristotle	  editions	  (INDEED,	  THERE	  WERE	  VERY	  DIFFERENT	  ARISTOTLES	  UNTIL	  THE	  EMERGENCE	  OF	  THE	  PRINTING	  PRESS	  AND,	  WITH	  IT,	  THE	  EMERGENCE	  OF	  THE	  NOTION	   OF	   THE	   AUTHOR)	   it	   is	   not	   quite	   easy	   for	   non-­‐specialists	   to	   discern	   which	   is	  Aquinas’s	  thought,	  which	  is	  Scholastic	  dogma,	  and	  which	  is	  comment	  on	  or	  depiction	  of	  Aristotle.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  notion	  of	  phantasm	  in	  one	  conceptual	  form	  or	  another	  was	  continued	   through	  Aquinas’s	  works,	   and	   it	  was	   an	   Aristotelian	   rather	   than	   Platonian	  notion.	  Its	  use	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  is	  less	  consequential	  until	  the	  rise	  of	  psychoanalysis	  (and	   its	   critique,	   in	   particular	   by	   Lacan).	   Respectively,	   when	   rising	   its	   head	   in	   the	  works	  of	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  or	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  it	  is	  often	  ascribed	  to	  be	  a	  remnant	  of	  the	  psychoanalytic	  discourse.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  process	  of	  concept	  formation	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  Deleuze	  or	  Derrida	  who	  were	  both	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  contemporary	  discourses,	  such	  as	  the	  critique	  of	  psychology	  and	  psycho-­‐analysis,	  but	  who	  were	  extremely	  well-­‐trained	  in	  the	  classics	  and	  made	  little	  secret	  of	  being	  intertwined	  with	  the	  conceptual	  worlds	  of	  those	  (not	  to	  mention	  that	  the	  same	  “training	  in	  the	  classics”	  was	  still	  somewhat	  mandatory	  for	  the	  19th	  century	  founders	  of	  psycho-­‐analysis).	  In	  short,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  derive	  a	  clear	  and	   present	   definition	   of	   “what	   a	  phantasm	  is”	   that	   these	   different	   scholars	   would	  seem	  to	  share.	  There	   is	   little	  “essence”	   that	   they	  could	  all	  relate	   to,	  and	  that	  makes	   it	  decidedly	  difficult	  to	  place	  it,	  for	  example	  with	  Derrida	  in	  books	  such	  as	  Dissemination,	  
Glass	  or	   Specters	   of	   Marx,	   where	   the	   concept	   is	   used	   rather	   in	   supposition	   of	   self-­‐evidence	  with	   little	   introduction	  or	  definition.	   Freud	   is	   considerably	   a	  populariser	   of	  the	   notion	   of	   the	   phantasm,	   which	   has	   an	   illustrious	   career	   today:	   “A	  phantasm	  is	   a	  strong	  and	  very	  basic	  perceptual	  pattern,	  a	   sort	  of	   idee	   fixe	   that	  organizes	  our	  world	  view”,	   says	   Philipp	   Sarasin	   in	   Anthrax	   (page	   9),	   whose	   cultural	   studies	   approach	  suggests	   the	   very	   provocation	   that,	   indeed,	   images	   and	   phantasies	   shape	   actual	  realities,	  which	  he	   illustrates	  on	   the	  Phantasm	  of	   “bioterror”	  and	   its	   fulfilment	   in	   the	  existence	   of	   anthrax.	   Once	   faced	   with	   such	   problem-­‐complexes	   in	   the	   productive	  meaning	  of	  phantasm	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Sarasin,	  of	  course,	  neither	  the	  Platonic	  nor	  the	  ghostly	  meaning	  of	  phantasm	  apply	  to	  them.	  At	  a	  first	  glance,	  Zizek	  and	  Deleuze	  might	  seem	  “too	  contemplative”	  to	  reach	  such	  a	  level	  of	  application	  and	  pragmatism,	  but	  this	  is	  merely	  a	  superficial	  judgment.	  After	  all,	  for	  phantasms	  to	  be	  efficacious,	  dynamic,	  and	  procedural	  social	  actants,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  they	  need	  to	  be	  more	  fundamentally	  materialistic	   (or,	   at	   least	   teleological	   in	   regard	   to	   practice)	   than,	   say,	  metaphors,	   yet	  have	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   constructive	   force	   as	   have	   the	   “metaphors	   we	   live	   by”	  (Lakoff/Johnson).	   After	   all,	   the	   phantasms	   I	   deal	  with	   in	  my	   research	   (or	   rather	   the	  “how”	  of	   their	  emergence	  and	   their	  subsequent	  career)	  are	   the	  control	  phantasm	  and	  the	   regionalization	  phantasm,	   referring	   to	   a	   process	   that	  we	   can	   identify	   in	   the	  19th	  century	   leading	   up	   until	   today	   that	   have	   grave	   structurational	   power	   over	   our	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individual	  and	  collective	  lives	  and	  institutions.	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  realised	  I	  needed	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  a	  more	  applicable	  concept	  of	  phantasm,	  and,	  via	  the	  study	  of	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  works	  of	  Freud’s	  supposed	  rival	   (and	  predecessor	   in	  Charcot’s	  grace)	  Pierre	  Janet	  on	  William	  James,	  the	  history	  of	  psychology	  and	  Harvard’s	  Human	  Relations	  Movement,	  I	  rediscovered	  Ernst	  E.	  Boesch,	  a	  student	  of	  Jean	  Piaget	  and	  Oskar	  Pfister.	  Boesch	   created	   a	   very	   robust	   and	  very	  useful	   understanding	  of	   phantasm:	  At	  the	  centre	  of	  some	  of	  his	  work	  is	  the	  “myth	  of	  lurking	  chaos”	  that	  rules	  much	  of	  human	  civilization	   in	   general	   and	   the	   development	   of	   the	   individual	   child	   (sociogenesis	   and	  psychogenesis,	  phylogeny	  and	  ontogeny).	  A	  myth,	  he	   says,	   is	   a	  pre-­‐structural	  guiding	  pattern	  and,	  therefore,	  not	  even	  a	  theory	  or	  precise	  idea;	  it	  is	  an	  “unspecified	  ‘mould’	  of	  receptivity	   and	   evaluation”	   [quoting	   from	   Boesch	   in:	   Keller,	   Heidi	   el,	   eds.	   Between	  
Biology	   and	   Culture,	   Cambridge	   UP,	   2002].	   There	   are	   different	   ways	   of	   dealing	   with	  myths	  (the	  myth	  of	   lurking	  chaos	  being	  one	  of	   the	  most	  primal	  and	  most	   influential),	  and	  phantasms	  comprise	  one	  of	   them.	  Though	  Boesch	  sees	  phantasms	  emerge	   in	   the	  individual	   development	   of	   children	   through	   selection	   and	   amalgamation,	   his	   general	  description	  works	   rather	   nicely	   to	   describe	   the	   kind	   of	   patterns	   that	   phantasms	   are,	  whether	  emerging	  individually	  or	  proceeding	  collectively.	  We	  can	  paraphrase	  as	  such:	  WHAT	  WE	  CALL	  PHANTASMS	  ARE	  THE	  PERCEIVING,	  TRANSFORMING	  AS	  WELL	  AS	  ANTICIPATING	  IMAGES,	  BOUND	  UP	  WITH	  THE	  ACTING	  PARTY	  (OR	  ACTOR).	  Boesch	  also	  declares,	  and	  we	  do	  well	  to	  follow	  him	  in	  this	  regard,	  that	  “phantasms	  are,	  of	  course,	  ‘over-­‐determined’”:	  They	  provide	  a	  way	  in	  which	  	  “culture	   certainly	   influences	   the	   way	   we	   [	  also	   us	   scientists	   and	   scholars;	   A.S.]	  think	  and	  evaluate,	  	  shapes	  our	  action	  interaction.	  However,	  it	  acts	  no	  less	  below	  the	  surface,	  in	   those	  mythical	   dispositions,	  which	  we	   now	   hardly	   notice.	   Culture,	   then,	  makes	   us	  form	   phantasmatic	   orientations	   of	   which	   we	   recognize	   the	   more	   ‘rational’	  manifestations	   –	   our	   goals	   and	   fears,	   affections	   and	   antipathies	   –	   but	   which	  nonetheless	  act	  at	  a	  depth	  that	  we	  will	  hardly	  ever	  be	  able	  to	  reflect	  on.”	  (ibid.)	  […]	  With	  control	  and	  regionalization	  as	  two	  guiding	  phantasms	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  predigital	  process	   of	   virtualization,	   a	   dynamic	   process	   of	   restructuring	   information	   orders	   into	  forms	   of	   knowledge	   that	   inherently	   fail	   to	   represent	   concrete	   	  cases	   that	   require	  decision-­‐making.	  For	  example,	   running	   rampant	   in	  biomedical	   science	  and,	   above	  all,	  biomedical	   science	   administration	   and	   governance	   over	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   this	  type	  of	  	  virtualization	  has	  resulted	  in	  regimes	  of	  diagnostic	  and	  therapeutic	  knowledge	  that	   have	   created	   patient	   trajectories	   in	   bureaucratized	   systems	   that	   no	   longer	  correspond	  with	   individual	  patients’	  needs	  nor	  are	   their	  concrete	  bodies	  represented	  in	   the	  data	   these	   systems	  produce	  and	  process.	   […]	   (Stingl	   (2011)	   [online].	  Available	  from	   URL	   http://alexstingl.wordpress.com/2011/09/21/what-­‐is-­‐a-­‐phantasm-­‐second-­‐approach-­‐towards-­‐tackling-­‐this-­‐travelling-­‐concept/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013]).	  
P L A S T I C I T Y :	  As	  elaborated	  by	  Malabou	  in	  The	  Future	  of	  Hegel.	  Plasticity,	  Temporality,	  Dialectic	  (2005:	  1-­‐20).	  And:	  	  	  
Plasticity	   refers	   to	   the	   spontaneous	   organization	   of	   fragments.	   […]	   As	   a	   concept,	  plasticity	   is	   also	   endowed	   with	   a	   “dithyrambic	   gift	   for	   synthesis,	   enabling	   me	   to	  perceive	  the	  form	  of	  fragmentation	  and	  find	  my	  spot	  in	  the	  movement	  (Malabou	  2010:	  7).	  […]	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  second	  major	  advantage	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  plasticity	  —	  discovered	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  Hegel’s	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  —	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  concept	  can	  signify	  both	  the	  achievement	  of	  presence	  and	  its	  deflagration,	  its	  emergence	  and	  its	  explosion.	  It	  is	  therefore	  able	  to	  situate	  itself	  perfectly	  in	  the	  in-­‐between	  of	  metaphysics	  and	  its	  other,	  playing	  to	  perfection	  the	  part	  of	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  mediator	  or	  smuggler.	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As	   Hegel	   says,	   “	   only	   a	   philosophical	   exposition	   that	   rigidly	   excludes	   [streng	  
ausschlösse]	  the	  usual	  way	  of	  relating	  the	  parts	  of	  a	  proposition	  could	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  plasticity	   [dasjenige	  philosophische	  Exposition	  würde	  es	  erreichen	  plastisch	  zu	  sein].”	  In	   the	   light	   of	   these	   comments,	   plasticity	   appears	   as	   a	   reconquering	   of	   presence,	  starting	  from	  the	  separation	  and	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  proposition’s	  membra	  disjectæ	  —	  subject-­‐copula-­‐predicate.	   The	   idea	   that	   subjectivity	   can	   only	   constitute	   itself	   by	  
returning	  to	  itself,	  never	  by	  announcing	  itself	  in	  the	  naïve	  movement	  of	  a	  birth	  without	  history,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   reformed,	   re-­‐formed	   subject,	   seemed	   to	   me	   to	   be	   the	   fullest	  expression	   of	   presence.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   according	   to	   a	   more	   current	   meaning,	  anticipated	   in	   many	   respects	   by	   Hegel,	   plasticity	   signifies	   the	   disruption	   and	  deflagration	   of	   presence,	   the	   “explosive	   side	   of	   subjectivity.”	   Furthermore,	   the	  speculative	   proposition	   also	   proceeds	   from	   a	   prior	   dissolution	   of	   all	   form.	   Plasticity	  thus	  appeared	  to	  me	  from	  the	  outset	  as	  a	  structure	  of	  transformation	  and	  destruction	  of	  
presence	  and	  the	  present	  (Malabou	  2010:	  7).”	  
P O I E S I S :	  poiein,	  ‘to	  pro-­‐duce’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  bringing	  into	  being;	  passing	  from	  non-­‐being	  into	  being.	  
P O T E N T I A T I O N :	  ‘ridicarea	  la	  putere’,	  the	  potentiation	  of	  an	  element	  to	  the	  potency	  of	  a	  set,	  or	  whole	  (Noica	  2007:	  28,	  251;	  1987:	  307-­‐375).	  
P R O J E C T :	   is	   the	   subjective	   seed	   of	   a	   nascent	   (becoming)	   object.	   An	   accomplished	   project	  should	   be	   at	   the	   same	   time	   entirely	   subjective	   and	   entirely	   objective,	   an	   indivisible	   animated	  (living)	  individual.	  In	  its	  origin,	  the	  project	  is	  completely	  subjective,	  original,	  and	  just	  in	  this	  spirit	  possible;	   in	   its	   character	   purely	   objective,	   physical	   and	   a	   moral	   necessity.	   The	   meaning	   of	  projects	  which	  we	  may	  also	  call	  fragments	  from	  the	  future	  differs	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  fragments	  of	  the	   past	   only	   in	   its	   orientation	   arrow,	   which	   for	   the	   latter	   is	   regressive	   and	   the	   former	  progressive.	  What	   is	   important	   and	  what	   counts	   is	   the	   skill	   to	   simultaneously	   realise,	   idealise,	  complement	  and	  present	  things	  instantly.	  […]	  (Schlegel	  1988:	  107).	  	  
P E R A S :	  ancient	  Greek,	  a	  limit	  that	  doesn’t	  limit;	  its	  meaning	  was	  a	  direct	  expression	  of	  a	  way	  of	  life	   that	   often	   involved	   peregrination	   and	   traversing	   the	   sea	   and	   that	   reflected	   the	   symbolic,	  magical	  and	  mythological	  meaning	  and	  force	  of	  the	  sea’s	  other	  shore.	  The	  word	  was	  initially	  used	  by	  Homer	  in	  the	  Iliad	  in	  relation	  to	  entities	  whose	  limits	  were	  outside	  human	  perception,	  such	  as	  the	   earth,	   the	   sea,	   the	   sky,	   or	   Gods,	   and	   referred	   thus	   to	   a	   limit	   that	   had	   to	   be	   imagined,	  presupposed	  and	   inferred	   (not	  deduced,	   as	   it	  was	  not	   the	   result	  of	   a	   causal	   logical	  deduction).	  Peras	  became	  a	  poetic	  index	  for	  distance	  and	  displacement,	  and	  a-­‐conceptual	  sense	  given	  in	  and	  by	   the	   projection	   and	   plunge	   into	   the	   unknown	   of	   dis-­‐place	   and	   di-­‐stance;	   such	   a	   limit	   is	   an	  ontological,	  orientational,	  directional	  sense-­‐function.	  	  	  
R E A D Y -­‐ M A D E :	  art-­‐historical	   term;	  referring	  to	  an	   industrially	  manufactured	  everyday	  object	  that	  was	  removed	  in	  an	  act	  of	  artistic	  decision	  making	  from	  its	  context	  and	  proclaimed	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  Marcel	  Duchamp	  is	  considered	  its	  ‘inventor’.	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R O M A N T I C I S M :	   “Romanticism	   is	   one	   of	   those	   ‘classifications	   that	   are	   bad	   enough	   as	  classifications,	  but	  that	  have	  nonetheless	  dominated	  entire	  nations	  and	  epochs’.	  Its	  meaning	  can	  be	  that	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  category	  that	  evokes	  “a	  flowing	  sentimentality	  or	  foggy	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  past”,	  but	  it	  may	  refer	  also	  to	  a	  historical	  category	  in	  opposition	  to	  classicism,	  as	  much	  as	  it	  could	  be	  a	   ‘theoretical	   romanticism’	   that	  points	  at	   the	   inaugural	  moment	  of	  a	   theoretical	  project	  and	  speculative	   thinking,	  also	  known	  as	   the	  early	   Jena	  romanticism,	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  18th	  century.	  “Romantic	  —especially	  in	  its	  English	  provenance	  is	  the	  landscape	  before	  one	  feels	  the	  sentiment	  of	  nature,	  or	  the	  epic	  grandeur	  of	  the	  past,	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  both:	  ruins	  in	  wilderness.	  But	  romantic,	  as	   well,	   is	   the	   sensibility	   capable	   of	   responding	   to	   this	   spectacle,	   and	   of	   imagining,	   or	   better,	  recreating	  —	  phantasieren	  —	  what	  it	  evokes	  (Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:1).”	  	  
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N :	   In	   conventional	   sense	   in	   relation	   to	   art:	   depiction;	   to	   look	   like	   or	  resemble;	   to	   stand	   in	   for	   something	   or	   someone,	   to	   present	   a	   second	   time;	   to	   re-­‐present;	   "to	  bring	  to	  mind	  by	  description,"	  or	  "to	  symbolize,	  to	  be	  the	  embodiment	  of."	  From	  O.	  Fr.	  representer	  (12c.),	   from	  L.	  repraesentare,	   from	  re-­‐,	   intensive	  prefix,	  +	  praesentare	   "to	  present,"	   lit.	   "to	  place	  before".	  Nancy:	  	  
The	  re-­‐	  of	  the	  word	  representation	   is	  not	  repetitive	  but	   intensive	  (to	  be	  more	  precise,	  the	  initially	  iterative	  value	  of	  the	  prefix	  re-­‐	   in	  Latinate	  languages	  is	  often	  transformed	  into	  an	   intensive	  or,	  as	  one	  says,	   “frequentative”	  value).	  The	  Latin	  representatio	   is	  an	  accentuated	  presentation	  (highlighted	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  its	  line	  and/or	  in	  its	  address:	  destined	  for	  a	  specific	  gaze).	  The	  word	  also	  takes	  on	  its	  first	  meaning	  from	  its	  use	  in	  the	  theatre	  (where	  it	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  number	  of	  performances	  [représentations]	  and	  where	   it	   is	   clearly	  distinguished	   from	  “rehearsal”	   [répétition]	  and	   from	   its	  use	   in	  the	  ancient	  judiciary	  —	  the	  production	  of	  a	  paper	  or	  document	  —	  or,	  as	  well,	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  “to	  make	  observable,	  to	  expose	  with	  insistence.”	  The	  Latin	  word	  translates	  the	  Greek	  hypotyposis,	  which	  designates	  a	  sketch,	  a	  scheme,	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  figure	  in	  the	  largest	  possible	  sense	  without	  any	  suggestion	  of	  repetition	  or	  rehearsal,	  (in	   rhetoric,	   the	  word	  designates	   the	  mis-­‐en-­‐scène	   of	  people	  or	   things	  as	   if	   they	  were	  alive	  before	  us:	  once	  again,	  it	  is	  almost	  a	  question	  of	  the	  theatre	  …).	  The	   psychological	   and	   philosophical	   usage	   of	   the	   term	   arises	   here	   as	   well.	   At	   the	  intersection	   of	   the	   image	   and	   the	   idea,	   mental	   or	   intellectual	   representation	   is	   not	  foremost	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  thing	  but	  is	  rather	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  object	  to	  the	  subject	  (to	  say	  this	  otherwise:	   it	   involves	  the	  constitution	  of	   the	  object	  as	  such,	  recalling	  that	  some	  of	   the	  greatest	  debates	  of	  modern	   thought	  are	  crystallized	  around	   this	  nucleus,	  those	   of	   empiricism	   and	   idealisms,	   those	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   sensory	  consciousness,	   of	   political	   representation	   and	   artistic	   presentation,	   etc.).	  Representation	   is	   a	   presence	   that	   is	   presented,	   exposed,	   or	   exhibited.	   It	   is	   not,	  therefore,	   presence	   pure	   and	   simple:	   it	   is	   precisely	   not	   the	   immediacy	   of	   the	   being-­‐posed-­‐there	  but	  is	  rather	  that	  which	  draws	  presence	  out	  of	  its	  immediacy	  insofar	  as	  it	  puts	  a	  value	  on	  presence	  as	  some	  presence	  or	  another.	  Representation,	  in	  other	  words,	  does	  not	  present	  something	  without	  exposing	  its	  value	  or	  sense	  —	  at	  least,	  the	  minimal	  value	   or	   sense	   of	   being	   there	   before	   a	   subject	   (Nancy	   2005:	   35-­‐36;	   italics	   by	   the	  author).	  
S I G N :	  that	  which	  denotes	  something	  and	  can	  usually	  be	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  correctly	  or	  falsely	  identified	  or	  understood	  (Grabar	  1992:	  xxiv).	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S E N S E 	  (J.-­‐L.	  Nancy):	  Nancy	  uses	  the	  entire	  semantic	  field	  of	  the	  word	  sense,	  referring	  at	  sense	  in	  all	   its	   five	   senses:	  meaning,	  direction,	   five	   senses,	   reason,	  and	   intuition.	  When	  Nancy	  speaks	  of	  sense	  he	  refers	  to	  something	  that	  takes	  place	  before	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  sensible	  and	  the	  intelligible.	  Sense	  takes	  place,	   it	   is	   in	  our	  sharing	  of	  simultaneous	  time-­‐space	  and	   in	  being	  with	  one	   another.	   Sense	   is	   pre-­‐linguistic	   and	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   symbolic	   order;	   as	  transimmanence,	   it	   is	   that	   which	   is	   or	   opens	   wordly	   existence	   per	   se—it	   is	   always	   an	   excess	  (James	  2006:	  218);	  it	  is	  being	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  word;	  an	  immediate	  way	  of	  making	  sense;	  an	   embodied	   sensory	   materiality;	   it	   is	   a	   sensible,	   touchable,	   intelligible	   immediacy	   —	   that	  “exceeds	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  phenomenon	  itself	  (Nancy	  1997:	  17).”	  
S U B J E C T :	  "the	  unmoved	  which	  is	  also	  self-­‐moving	  (Aristotle)";	  an	  autonomous	  being	  who	  has	  a	  consciousness	  of	  itself,	  an	  identity	  and	  the	  will	  or	  power	  to	  act	  freely;	  in	  modern	  sense:	  a	  subject	  is	  constituted	  by	  "the	  process	  of	  reflectively	  mediating	  itself	  with	  itself	  (Hegel,	  Phenomenology	  of	  
Spirit);	   "self-­‐restoring	   sameness"	   or	   else	   as	   "reflection	   in	   otherness	   within	   itself",	   that	   is	   thus	  subjected	  to	  subjection.	  	  
The	   subject	   is	   a	   body:	   “I’d	   like	   to	   show	   that	   the	   body,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   bodily	   something,	   is	   not	  substantial	  but	  a	  subject	  (Nancy	  2008:	  122).”	  	  
S U B J E C T I V I T Y :	  ‘Sub-­‐iectivität	  eines	  Subjekts’,	  the	  determining	  ground	  of	  representation,	  is	  the	  underlining	  system	  of	  transcendental	  and	  historical	  rules	  that	  constitutes	  the	  subject.	  
S U B -­‐ I E C T U M :	   Latin,	   hypokeimenon	   in	   Old	   Greek,	   Aristotle;	   what	   lies	   underneath,	   “das	   zu	  
Grunde	   Liegende,	   das,	  was,	   als	   Grund	   vorliegt,	   nämlich	   für	   die	   Aussage	   darüber	   (Heidegger,	  Der	  
Satz	  vom	  Grund,	   in	  Böhler	  2005:	  15);”	   it	  names	  that	  which	  precedes	  (from	  before)	  and	  grounds	  any	  imaginary	  act,	  any	  representation,	  and	  which	  determines,	  from	  before	  any	  representation	  in	  general.	  	  
But	  Nancy	  also	  writes	  in	  On	  the	  Soul,	  that	  the	  impenetrable	  mass	  is	  “the	  absolute	  ground,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  ground	  and	  only	  there,	  grounded	  on	  its	  ground	  completely.”	  This	  mass	  or	  absolute	  ground	  was	  thought	  in	  a	  philosophical	  tradition	  as	  substance:	  “[…]	  the	  name	  is	  substance,	   that	  which	  is	  
under	  something	  and	  no	  longer	  belongs	  to	  anything	  else.	  This	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  substantia,	  itself	  a	  term	  that	  translates	  Aristotle’s	  hypokaimenon:	  what’s	  under	  something	  and	  what,	  underneath	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  attributes	  or	  accidents,	  no	  longer	  belongs	  to	  anything	  other	  than	  itself	  (Nancy	  2008:	  123).”	  
S Y M B O L :	  a	  term	  that	  connotes	  meanings	  that	  are	  often	  tied	  to	  a	  time,	  a	  place,	  or	  a	  category	  of	  patronage,	  even	  possibly	  a	  single	  individual,	  and	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  acceptable	  to	  all	  (Grabar	  1992:	  xxiv).	  	  
T E K H N E / T E C H N I C S / 	   E C O T E C H N I C A L :	  Greek,	  art,	  craft,	  or	  technical	  labour;	  Nancy:	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“Creation	   is	   the	   the	   techné	  of	   bodies.	   Our	  world	   creates	   the	   great	   number	   of	   bodies,	  creates	   itself	   as	   the	  world	   of	   bodies	   […].	   Our	  world	   is	   the	  world	   of	   the	   “technical’,	   a	  world	   whose	   cosmos,	   nature,	   gods,	   entire	   system	   is,	   in	   its	   inner	   joints,	   exposed	   as	  “technical”:	   the	   world	   of	   the	   ecotechnical.	   The	   ecotechnical	   functions	   with	   technical	  apparatuses,	   to	  which	  our	  every	  part	   is	  connected.	  But	  what	   it	  makes	   are	  our	  bodies,	  which	  it	  brings	  into	  the	  world	  and	  links	  to	  the	  system,	  thereby	  creating	  our	  bodies	  as	  more	  visible,	  more	  proliferating,	  more	  polymorphic,	  more	  compressed,	  more	  “amassed”	  and	  “zoned”	  than	  ever	  before.	  Through	  the	  creation	  of	  bodies	  the	  ecotechnical	  has	  the	  
sense	  that	  we	  vainly	  seek	  in	  the	  remains	  of	  the	  sky	  or	  the	  spirit	  (Nancy	  2008:	  89).	  
T R U T H :	   A.	   Badiou:	   “I	   call	   it	   an	   event.	   A	   truth	   appears	   in	   its	   newness	   because	   an	   eventful	  supplement	  interrupts	  a	  repetition.”	  It	  is	  linked,	  as	  an	  event,	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  undecidable.	  It	  refers	  to	  something	  that	  has	  taken	  place,	  but	  that	  I	  can	  neither	  demonstrate	  nor	  calculate,	  but	  to	  which	   I	   shall	   be	   faithful.	   Nothing	   regulates	   its	   choice;	   it	   happens	   by	   chance	   and	   is	   a	   choice	  without	   a	   concept.	   Truth	   is	   infinite	   and	   incomplete	  —	   a	   completed	   truth	   is	   a	   fiction,	   a	   strong	  fiction,	  and	  a	  hypothesis	  (Badiou	  2002).	  
U N A 	   J O C :	  Una	  Joc	  is	  an	  anagram	  of	  Cojanu.	  In	  Romanian	  language	  una	  is	  an	  indefinite	  pronoun	  of	  gender,	  feminine	  and	  singular.	  As	  a	  pro-­‐noun,	  una,	  stands	  for	  a	  noun	  or	  a	  noun	  phrase	  to	  which	  it	  may	  but	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  refer	  back.	  It	  is	  a	  pro-­‐form.	  Examples:	  the	  phrase	  una	  zic,	  alta	  fac	  (I	  am	  saying	  something,	  but	  am	  doing	  something	  else)	  or	  una	  peste	  alta	  (one	  above	  the	  other,	  in	  total,	  in	   sum,	   in	   conclusion).	   Joc	   is	   a	   noun,	   in	   singular	   form	  here,	  meaning	   game.	  Una	   Joc	  may	  mean	  ‘one/a	  game.	  	  
V E L U M :	  technical	  term	  in	  literary	  theory	  referring	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  stories	  used	  to	  represent	  truth	  in	  the	  macrobian-­‐platonic	  paradigm.	  
W E I M A R E R 	   K L A S S I K :	  literary	  period,	  from	  1786-­‐1805,	  in	  German	  literature	  referring	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Goethe,	  Schiller,	  Herder,	  Wieland,	  the	  four	  writers	  who	  were	  writing	  and	  living	  in	  Jena	  and	  Weimar	  at	   that	   time,	  but	  who	  were	  not	  part	  of	   the	  Early	   Jena	  Romanticism	  group	   (Fichte,	  Schelling,	  Schleiermacher,	  F.	  Schlegel,	  A.	  W.	  Schlegel,	  Tieck,	  Novalis).	   	  
	   159	  
LIST	  OF	  REFERENCES	  
A	  —	  (1868),	  Arabesque	  &	  other	  ornaments	  :	  in	  typographical	  use	  at	  Zürich	  in	  1559.	  Imperatorum	  Romanorum	  omnium	  orientalium	  et	  occidentalium,	  London:	  Privately	  Printed.	  	  Acker,	  K.	  (2006),	  Against	  Ordinary	  Language:	  The	  Language	  of	  the	  Body,	  from:	  The	  Last	  Sex:	  Feminism	  and	  
Outlaw	  Bodies	  (1993),	  in:	  Bodies	  of	  Work,	  London:	  Serpent’s	  Tail,	  pp.	  143-­‐151.	  	  Agamben,	  G.	  (2000),	  Means	  Without	  End,	  Binetti,	  V.	  and	  Casarino,	  C.	  (trans.),	  London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  Albers,	  A.	  (2000),	  Selected	  Writings	  on	  Design,	  Danilowitz,	  B.	  (ed.),	  Middletown,	  Connecticut:	  Wesleyan	  University	  Press.	  Arnoldi,	  Katie	  (2001),	  Chemical	  Pink,	  Woodstock	  &New	  York:	  The	  Overlook	  Press,	  2001.	  B	  de	  Balzac,	  H.	  (2001),	  The	  Unknown	  Masterpiece,	  Howard,	  R.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books.	  Barthes,	  R.	  (2011),	  The	  Preparation	  of	  the	  Novel,	  Briggs,	  K.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (1975),	  The	  Pleasure	  of	  the	  Text,	  Miller,	  R.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang.	  Benjamin,	  W.	  (1999),	  The	  Work	  of	  Art	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Mechanical	  Reproduction,	  in:	  Illuminations,	  Zorn	  H.	  (trans.),	  Arendt,	  H.	  (ed.),	  London:	  Pimlico.	  	  Böhler,	  A.	  (2005),	  Singularitäten.	  Vom	  zu-­‐reichenden	  Grund	  der	  Zeit.	  Vorspiel	  einer	  Philosophie	  der	  Freundschaft,	  Wien:	  Passagen	  Verlag.	  Brett,	  D.	  (2005),	  Rethinking	  Decoration.	  Pleasure	  and	  Ideology	  in	  the	  Visual	  Arts,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  C	  Carlswell,	  J.	  (1956),	  Coptic	  Tattoo	  Designs,	  Jerusalem:	  privately	  printed,	  V&A	  Museum	  Library.	  	  D	  David,	  F.R.	  (Winter	  2009),	  The	  Iditorial	  Issue,	  Dieter	  Roelstraete,	  Amsterdam:	  de	  apple	  arts	  centre.	  ____,	  (2000),	  The	  Instant	  of	  My	  Death.	  Maurice	  Blanchot.	  Demeure.	  Fiction	  and	  Testimony,	  Rottenberg,	  E.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  F	  Ocón-­‐Fernández,	  M.	  (2004),	  Ornament	  und	  Moderne.	  Theoriebildung	  und	  Ornamentdebatte	  im	  deutschen	  
Architekturdiskurs	  (1850-­‐1930),	  Bonn:	  Reimer	  Verlag.	  
____,	  (1994),	  Aesthetics.	  Essential	  Works	  of	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984,	  Volume	  2,	  Faubion,	  J.	  D.	  (ed.),	  London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  pp.	  205-­‐222.	  Frank,	  I.	  and	  Hartung,	  F.	  (ed.)	  (2001),	  Die	  Rhetorik	  des	  Ornaments,	  München:	  Fink	  Verlag.	  Frueh,	  J.	  (2001),	  Monster	  Beauty.	  Building	  the	  Body	  of	  Love,	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  G	  Gombrich,	  E.	  H.	  (1964),	  Moment	  and	  Movement	  in	  Art,	  in:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Warburg	  and	  Courtauld	  Institutes.	  
____,	  (2006),	  The	  Sense	  of	  Order.	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Decorative	  Art,	  London:	  Phaidon	  Press.	  Grabar,	  O.	  (1973,	  1987),	  The	  Formation	  of	  Islamic	  Art,	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  (1992,	  1995),	  The	  Mediation	  of	  Ornament,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  (2001),	  Mostly	  Miniatures.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Persian	  Painting,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  (2006),	  Islamic	  Visual	  Culture,	  1100-­‐1800.	  Constructing	  the	  Study	  of	  Islamic	  Art,	  Vol.	  II	  and	  Vol.	  III,	  Hampshire:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Limited.	  Greber,	  E.	  (2003),	  Textile	  Texte.	  Poetologische	  Methaphorik	  und	  Literaturtheorie.	  Studien	  zur	  Tradition	  des	  
Wortflechtens	  und	  der	  Kombinatorik,	  Köln:	  Böhlau	  Verlag.	  
H 
Heidegger, M.	  (1997),	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  Taft,	  R.	  (trans.),	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  Hetzer,	  Th.	  (1987),	  Das	  Ornamentale	  und	  die	  Gestalt,	  (Schriften	  Th.	  Hetzers,	  Bd.	  3),	  Berthold,	  G.	  (ed.),	  Stuttgart:	  Urauchhaus.	  J	  James,	  I.	  (2006),	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  K	  Kant,	  I.	  (2000),	  Kritik	  der	  reinen	  Vernunft,	  Frankfurt	  a.	  M.:	  Suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  
____,	  (2008),	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Krauss,	  R.	  E.	  (1994),	  The	  Optical	  Unconscious,	  London:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  Kühnel,	  E.	  (1976),	  The	  Arabesque.	  Meaning	  and	  Transformation	  of	  an	  Ornament,	  Graz:	  Verlag	  für	  Sammler.	  L	  Liiceanu,	  G.	  (2000),	  The	  Păltiniș	  Diary.	  A	  Padeic	  Model	  in	  Humanist	  Culture,	  Budapest:	  CEU	  Press.	  ____,	  (2007),	  Despre	  Limită,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  
	   160	  
Loos,	  A.,	  Opel,	  A.,	  and	  Mitchell,	  M.	  (1998),	  Ornament	  and	  Crime:	  Selected	  Essays	  (Studies	  in	  Austrian	  
Literature,	  Culture,	  and	  Thought	  Translation	  Series),	  Riverside,	  California:	  Ariadne	  Press.	  M	  Malabou,	  C.	  (1996),	  The	  Future	  of	  Hegel.	  Plasticity,	  Temporality	  and	  Dialectic,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Changing	  Difference,	  Shread,	  C.	  (trans.),	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Ontology	  of	  the	  Accident.	  An	  Essay	  on	  Destructive	  Plasticity,	  Shread,	  C.	  (trans.),	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2010),	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  Shread,	  C.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2011),	  The	  Heidegger	  Change,	  trans.	  Peter	  Skafish,	  New	  York:	  Suny	  Press.	  
____,	  (2012),	  The	  New	  Wounded.	  From	  Neurosis	  to	  Brain	  Damage,	  Miller,	  S.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  Marion,	  J.-­‐L.	  (2002),	  Being	  Given.	  Toward	  a	  Phenomenology	  of	  Givenness,	  Kosky,	  J.	  L.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  The	  Visible	  and	  the	  Revealed,	  trans.	  Gschwandter,	  C.	  M.,	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  Mersch,	  D.	  (2009),	  Negative	  Präsenz,	  S.	  99-­‐117,	  in:	  Arno	  Böhler,	  Susanne	  Granzer	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  Ereignis	  
Denken.	  TheatRealität,	  Performanz,	  Ereignis,	  Wien:	  Passage	  Verlag.	  N	  Nabokov,	  V.	  (2011),	  Pale	  Fire,	  London:	  Penguin	  Books.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe,	  P.	  (1988),	  The	  Literary	  Absolute.	  The	  Theory	  of	  Literature	  in	  German	  
Romanticism,	  Barnard,	  P.	  and	  Lester,	  C.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  (1996),	  The	  Muses	  I,	  Kamuf,	  P.	  (trans.)	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____, (2003),	  A	  Finite	  Thinking,	  Sparks,	  S.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2005),	  The	  Ground	  of	  The	  Image,	  Fort,	  J.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2006),	  Being	  Singular	  Plural,	  Hamacher,	  W.	  and	  Wellbery,	  D.	  E.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  California	  Press.	  	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  (2006),	  Multiple	  Arts.	  The	  Muses	  II,	  Sparks,	  S.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  und	  Ferrari,	  F.	  (2006),	  Die	  Haut	  der	  Bilder,	  Schulz	  S.	  und	  Wolf,	  J.	  (trans.),	  Zürich:	  diaphanes	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (2007),	  The	  Birth	  To	  Presence,	  Hamacher	  W.	  and	  Wellbery,	  D.	  E.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  California	  Press.	  
____,	  (2007),	  Porträt	  und	  Blick,	  Stuttgart:	  Jutta	  Legueil.	  
____	  (2008),	  The	  Discourse	  of	  the	  Syncope.	  Logodaedalus,	  Anton,	  S.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  	  (2008),	  Corpus,	  Rand,	  R.	  A.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  (2008),	  An	  Exempting	  from	  Sense,	  in:	  Dis-­‐enclosure.	  The	  Deconstruction	  of	  Christianity,	  Bergo,	  B.,	  Malenfant,	  G.	  and	  Smith,	  M.	  B.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  
____,	  (2008),	  Die	  Annäherung,	  Nördlingen:	  Salon	  Verlag.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  und	  Scherer,	  R.	  (2008),	  Ouvertüren.	  Texte	  zu	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Zürich:	  diaphanes	  Verlag.	  Noica,	  C.	  (1981),	  Devenirea	  întru	  fiintă,	  Bucuresti:	  Editura	  stiintifică	  si	  enciclopedică.	  ____,	  (2007),	  Jurnal	  de	  Idei,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Six	  Maladies	  of	  the	  Contemporary	  Spirit,	  Blyth,	  A.	  (trans.),	  Cornwall:	  University	  of	  Plymouth	  Press.	  
____,	  (2009),	  Povestiri	  despre	  om	  după	  o	  carte	  lui	  Hegel,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  P	  Plath,	  S.	  (2008),	  The	  Collected	  Poems,	  New	  York:	  Harper	  Collins	  Publsihers.	  R	  Richardson,	  B.	  (1992),	  Brice	  Marden	  -­‐	  Could	  Mountain	  (exhib.	  cat.),	  Texas:	  Houston	  Fine	  Art	  Press.	  	  Riegl,	  A.	  (1975),	  Stilfragen:	  Grundlegungen	  zu	  einer	  Geschichte	  der	  Ornamentik,	  Hildesheim:	  Georg	  Olms	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (1966),	  Historische	  Grammatik	  der	  bildenden	  Künste,	  Swoboda,	  K.M.	  and	  Pächt,	  O.	  (ed.),	  Graz.	  Ross,	  A.	  (2007),	  The	  Aesthetic	  Paths	  of	  Philosophy.	  Presentation	  in	  Kant,	  Heidegger,	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe,	  and	  
Nancy,	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  S	  Schlegel,	  F.	  (1988),	  Kritische	  Schriften	  und	  Fragmente	  [1798-­‐1802],	  Studienausgabe	  Bd.	  2,	  Behler,	  E.	  and	  Eichner,	  H	  (ed.),	  Paderborn:	  Ferdinand	  Schöningh.	  Schroeder,	  K.	  A.	  (2004),	  Egon	  Schiele.	  Eros	  und	  Passion,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  	  Scraton,	  S.	  and	  Flintoff,	  A.	  (2002)	  Gender	  and	  Sport:	  A	  Reader,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &Francis	  Group.	  Shapiro,	  G.	  (2003),	  Foucault	  and	  Nietzsche	  on	  Seeing	  and	  Saying.	  Archaeologies	  of	  Vision,	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Stich,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (1991),	  Rosemarie	  Trockel,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  T	  	  Trilling,	  J.	  (2003),	  Ornament:	  A	  Modern	  Perspective,	  Washington:	  Washington	  Univ.	  Press.	  Trockel,	  R.	  (1999),	  Bodies	  of	  work	  1986-­‐1998,	  Whitechapel	  Gallery,	  London:	  The	  Whitechapel.	  ____,	  (2006),	  Post-­‐Menopause,	  Köln:	  Walther	  König	  Verlag.	  Tomaselli,	  F.	  (2004),	  Monsters	  of	  Paradise,	  Edinburgh:	  The	  Fruitmarket	  Gallery.	  	  
	   161	  
	  V	  Valéry,	  P.	  (1989),	  The	  Art	  of	  Poetry,	  Mathews,	  J.	  (ed.),	  Bollingen	  series	  XLV	  7,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  	  W	  Wood,	  C.	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2003),	  The	  Vienna	  School	  Reader.	  Politics	  and	  Art	  Historical	  Method	  in	  the	  1930s,	  New	  York:	  Zone	  Books.	  Woolf,	  V.	  (2000),	  A	  Room	  of	  one’s	  Own,	  London:	  Penguin.	  	  Online	  Articles:	  Afloarei,	  Ș.	  (2009),	  Neutral	  Reason	  and	  Oriented	  Reason	  (Constantin	  Noica:	  a	  Distinct	  Project	  on	  the	  
Phenomenology	  of	  Reason),	  No.	  5	  July,	  Journal	  for	  Interdisciplinary	  Research	  on	  Religion	  and	  Science	  [online].	  Available	  from:	  URL	  http://www.jirrs.org/jirrs_nr_5/09-­‐04-­‐jirrs5-­‐afloroaei.pdf	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Alloa,	  E.,	  Bare	  Exteriority:	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Image	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  Philosophy	  in	  Martin	  Heidegger	  and	  
Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Hyatt,	  M.	  (trans.),	  in:	  Colloquy	  text	  theory	  critique	  10/2005	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://	  www.arts.monash.edu.au/ecps/colloquy/issue10/issue10.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  von	  Graevenitz,	  G.,	  Contextio	  und	  conjointre,	  Gewebe	  und	  Arabeske.	  Über	  Zusammenhänge	  mittelalterlicher	  
und	  romantischer	  Literaturtheorie	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.	  kops.ub.uni-­‐konstanz.de/.../Contextio_und_conjointure.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  Greenberg,	  C.	  (1961),	  Modernist	  Painting	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/wittgenstein/files/2007/10/Greenbergmodpaint.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Heikkilä,	  M.,	  Community,	  the	  Political	  and	  the	  Indecidable:	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Shared	  Origin	  of	  Art,	  p.1-­‐18,	  in:	  International	  Yearbook	  of	  Aesthetics.	  Ontology,	  Art,	  and	  Experience:	  Perspectives	  from	  West	  and	  East,	  Vol.	  9,	  2005,	  Haapala,	  A.	  (ed.),	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  htpp://www.2.eur.nl/fw/hyper/IAA/Yearbook/iaa9/Yearbook9.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  ____,	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Intimate	  Distance	  of	  Art.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.corpus-­‐aesthetics.net/.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  Alanko-­‐Kahiluoto,	  O.	  (2007)	  Writing	  otherwise	  than	  Seeing.	  Writing	  and	  Exteriority	  in	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Thesis	  (Ph.	  D.)	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://ethesis.helsinki.fi.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Hansen,	  M.	  B.	  (2008),	  Benjamin’s	  Aura,	  in:	  Critical	  Inquiry,	  Winter	  2008	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/uploads/pdf/Hansen,_Benjamins_Aura.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013.]	  Kirves,	  M.	  (2012)	  Ornament	  als	  Erkenntnisform.	  Die	  episthemische	  Entwurfstheorie	  der	  South	  Kensington	  
School	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.dgae.de/downloads/Martin_Kirves.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013).	  Krauss,	  R.	  (1979),	  Grids	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/778321?uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21102754458581.	  [Accessed	  2013].	  Levit	  R.	  (2008),	  Contemporary	  Ornament.	  The	  Return	  of	  the	  Symbolic	  Repressed	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/5/553249/28-­‐Levit.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Mark,	  T.	  (2004)	  Die	  Arabeske.	  Ein	  islamisches	  Stilprinzip?	  –	  und	  ihr	  Stellenwert	  in	  der	  Kunst	  des	  20.	  
Jahrhunderts	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/05_14/mark15.htm.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Masheck,	  J.	  (2009)	  The	  Carpet	  Paradigm.	  Integral	  Flatness	  From	  Decorative	  to	  Fine	  Art	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.josephmasheck.com/BIOgraphy_files/carpet.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  (2008),	  The	  Being-­‐with	  of	  Being-­‐there	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.springerlink.com:	  Continental	  Philosophy	  Review,	  Vol.	  41/1,	  p.	  1-­‐15.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  Roelstraete,	  D.	  (2009)	  What	  is	  Not	  Contemporary	  Art?:	  The	  View	  from	  Jena,	  Journal	  #11,	  2009	  [online],	  e-­‐flux.	  Available	  from:	  URL	  http://www.e-­‐flux.com/journal/what-­‐is-­‐not-­‐contemporary-­‐art-­‐the-­‐view-­‐from-­‐jena/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Vahanian,	  N.	  (2011),	  A	  Conversation	  with	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  in:	  Journal	  for	  Cultural	  and	  Religious	  Theory,	  9	  (2008):	  1–13.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catherine_Malabou,	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Zambrano,	  M.	  (2008)	  Philosophy	  and	  Poetry	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.webshells.com.	  [Accessed	  September	  2008].	  Lectures,	  Talks,	  Conferences	  and	  Symposia:	  	  Badiou,	  A	  (2002)	  On	  the	  Truth-­‐Process:	  An	  open	  lecture	  by	  Alain	  Badiou	  [online],	  The	  European	  Graduate	  School,	  August	  2002.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-­‐badiou/articles/on-­‐the-­‐truth-­‐process/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	   	  
	   162	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  
A	  Acker,	  K.	  (1991),	  Hannibal	  Lecter,	  My	  Father,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2006),	  Against	  Ordinary	  Language:	  The	  Language	  of	  the	  Body	  (from	  The	  Last	  Sex:	  Feminism	  and	  Outlaw	  
Bodies,	  1993),	  in:	  Bodies	  of	  Work,	  London:	  Serpent’s	  Tail,	  pp.	  143-­‐151.	  	  Agamben,	  G.	  (2000),	  Means	  Without	  End,	  Vincenzo	  Binetti	  and	  Cesare	  Casarino	  (trans.),	  London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  ____,	  (2009),	  The	  Coming	  Community,	  Michael	  Hardt	  (trans.),	  London:	  University	  Minnesota	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (1999),	  Potentialities,	  Daniel	  Heller-­‐Roazen	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  Alanko-­‐Kahiluoto,	  O.	  (2007),	  Writing	  Otherwise	  Than	  Seeing.	  Writing	  and	  Exteriority	  in	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Helsinki:	  Helsinki	  University	  Press.	  Albers,	  A.	  (2000),	  Selected	  Writings	  on	  Design,	  Brenda	  Danilowitz	  (ed.),	  Middletown,	  Connecticut:	  Wesleyan	  University	  Press.	  Alloa,	  Emmanuel	  (2011),	  Das	  Durchscheinende	  Bild,	  Zürich:	  Diaphanes	  Verlag.	  Arnoldi,	  Katie	  (2001),	  Chemical	  Pink,	  Woodstock	  &New	  York:	  The	  Overlook	  Press,	  2001.	  	  B	  Bachelard,	  G.	  (1994),	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Space.	  The	  Classical	  Look	  at	  How	  We	  Experience	  Intimate	  Places,	  Boston:	  Beacon	  Press.	  
____,	  (2004),	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Reverie.	  Childhood,	  Language	  and	  the	  Cosmos,	  Boston:	  Beacon	  Press.	  Bailey,	  C.	  B.	  (ed.)	  (2001),	  Gustav	  Klimt:	  Modernism	  in	  the	  Making,	  New	  York:	  Harry	  N.	  Abrahams.	  de	  Balzac,	  H.	  (2001),	  The	  Unknown	  Masterpiece,	  trans.	  Richard	  Howard,	  New	  York:	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books.	  Barthes,	  R.	  (2011),	  The	  Preparation	  of	  the	  Novel,	  trans.	  Kate	  Briggs,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (1975),	  The	  Pleasure	  of	  the	  Text,	  Miller,	  R.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang.	  ____,	  (2005),	  The	  Neutral,	  trans.	  Rosalind	  E.	  Krauss	  and	  Denis	  Hollier,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Mythologies,	  trans.	  Annette	  Lavers,	  London:	  Vintage	  Books.	  Benjamin,	  W.	  (1999),	  The	  Work	  of	  Art	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Mechanical	  Reproduction,	  in:	  Illuminations,	  trans.	  Harry	  Zorn,	  ed.	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  London:	  Pimlico.	  	  Benjamin,	  R.	  (1997),	  Orientalism;	  Delacroix	  to	  Klee,	  Art	  Gallery	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  Bernstein,	  J.	  M.	  (2006),	  Against	  Voluptous	  Bodies.	  Late	  Modernism	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Painting,	  Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  Beuys,	  J.	  (2004),	  What	  is	  Art,	  Harlan,	  V.	  (ed.),	  West	  Sussex:	  Clairview	  Books.	  Birrell,	  S.	  and	  Cole,	  C.	  L.	  (ed.)	  (1994)	  Woman,	  Sport	  and	  Culture,	  Leeds:	  Human	  Kinetics.	  Blanchot,	  M.	  (2008),	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  trans.	  By	  Susan	  Hanson,	  London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  	  ____,	  	  (1989),	  Madness	  of	  the	  Day,	  trans.	  L.	  Davis,	  Barrytown,	  NY:	  Station	  Hill	  Press.	  ____,	  (1998),	  Death	  Sentence,	  trans.	  Lydia	  Davis,	  Barrytown:	  Station	  Hill,	  1998.	  Blanchot,	  M.	  (1989),	  The	  Space	  of	  Literature,	  trans.	  Ann	  Smock,	  Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska.	  ____,	  (1995),	  The	  Writing	  of	  the	  Disaster,	  trans.	  Ann	  Smock,	  Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska.	  Bois,	  Y.-­‐A.	  (1993),	  Painting	  as	  Model,	  Massachusetts:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  Bordo,	  S.	  (2003)	  Unbearable	  Weight.	  Feminism,	  Western	  Culture	  and	  the	  Body,	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  Böhler,	  A.	  (2005),	  Singularitäten.	  Vom	  zu-­‐reichenden	  Grund	  der	  Zeit.	  Vorspiel	  einer	  Philosophie	  der	  
Freundschaft,	  Wien:	  Passagen	  Verlag.	  Böhler,	  A.	  /Ganzer,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  ThearReales	  Denken,	  Wien:	  Passagen	  Verlag.	  Böhler,	  A.	  /Kruschkova,	  K.	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  Dies	  ist	  kein	  Spiel,	  in:	  Maske	  und	  Kothurn,	  Internationale	  Beiträge	  zur	  
Theater-­‐,	  Film-­‐,	  und	  Medienwissenschaft,	  55	  Jahrgang	  (2009),	  Wien:	  Böhlau	  Verlag.	  Brauner,	  H.	  (1993),	  Natürlich	  ist	  das	  Dekoration.	  Perspektiven	  eines	  Begriffes	  in	  der	  Kunst	  des	  20ten	  
Jahrhundert	  ausgehend	  von	  H.	  Matisse,	  Philos.	  Diss.,	  Frankfurt	  a.	  Main.	  Braidotti,	  R.	  (2002),	  Metamorphoses.	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming,	  Malden:	  Polity	  Press.	  ____,	  (1994),	  Nomadic	  Subjects.	  Embodiment	  and	  Sexual	  Difference	  in	  Contemporary	  Feminist	  Theory,	  New	  York:	  Columbian	  University	  Press.	  Brett,	  D.	  (2005),	  Rethinking	  Decoration.	  Pleasure	  and	  Ideology	  in	  the	  Visual	  Arts,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Broeker,	  H.	  and	  Adams,	  B.	  (2008),	  Philip	  Taaffe.	  The	  Life	  of	  Forms.	  1980-­‐2008,	  München:	  Hatje	  Cantz	  Publishers.	  Brüderlin,	  M.	  (Ed.	  &	  curator)	  (2001),	  Ornament	  und	  Abstraktion,	  Fondation	  Beyerle,	  Basel,	  Köln:	  DuMont	  Verlag.	  Bryson,	  N.	  (1983),	  Vision	  and	  Painting.	  The	  Logic	  of	  the	  Gaze,	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  Butler,	  Judith	  (1999),	  Foucault	  and	  the	  Paradox	  of	  Bodily	  Inscriptions,	  in:	  The	  Body,	  Donn	  Welton	  (ed.),	  London:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  pp.307-­‐313.	  	  
	   163	  
C	  Carlswell,	  J.	  (1956),	  Coptic	  Tattoo	  Designs,	  Jerusalem:	  privately	  printed,	  V&A	  Museum	  Library.	  Celant,	  G.	  (2010),	  Louise	  Bourgeois.	  The	  Fabric	  Works,	  London:	  Thames	  and	  Hudson.	  	  Choi,	  P.	  Y.	  L.	  (2000)	  Femininity	  and	  the	  Physically	  Active	  Woman,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  Cixous,	  H.	  (2008),	  The	  Last	  Painting	  or	  the	  Portrait	  of	  God,	  p.	  583-­‐597,	  in:	  The	  Continental	  Aesthetics	  Reader,	  edit.	  Clive	  Cazeaux,	  London:	  Routledge.	  ____,	  (1991),	  Coming	  to	  Writing	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  ed.	  Deborah	  Jensen,	  London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Comer,	  S.	  (2009),	  Film	  and	  Video	  Art,	  London:	  Tate	  Publishing.	  Connor,	  S.	  (2004),	  The	  Book	  of	  Skin,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Costello,	  D.	  and	  Willsdon,	  D.	  (ed.)	  (2008),	  The	  Life	  and	  Death	  of	  Images,	  London:	  Tate	  Publishing.	  	  Curtis,	  R.	  and	  Koch,	  G.	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  Einfühlung.	  Zu	  Geschichte	  und	  Gegenwart	  eines	  ästhetischen	  Konzepts,	  München:	  Wilhelm	  Fink	  Verlag.	  	  D	  Damisch,	  H.	  (2002),	  A	  Theory	  of	  /Cloud/.	  Toward	  a	  History	  of	  Painting,	  Lloyd,	  J.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  David,	  F.R.	  (Winter	  2009),	  The	  Iditorial	  Issue,	  Dieter	  Roelstraete,	  Amsterdam:	  de	  apple	  arts	  centre.	  Deleuze,	  (1988),	  Spinoza.	  Practical	  Philosophy,	  San	  Francisco:	  City	  Lights	  Books.	  ____,	  G.	  (1993),	  The	  Fold.	  Leibniz	  and	  the	  Baroque,	  Conley,	  T.	  (trans.),	  London:	  Bloomsbury	  Publishing	  Plc.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Kant’s	  Critical	  Philosophy,	  London:	  Continuum.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Francis	  Bacon,	  London:	  Continuum.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  London:	  Continuum.	  Deleuze,	  G.	  and	  Guattari,	  F.	  (2004),	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia,	  London:	  Continuum.	  ____,	  (2011),	  Anti-­‐Oedipus.	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia,	  London:	  Continuum.	  Derrida,	  J.	  (2005),	  On	  Touching	  –	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Irrizary,	  C.	  (trans.)	  .Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Die	  Wahrheit	  in	  der	  Malerei,	  Engelmann,	  P.	  (ed.),Wien:	  Passagen	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (2000),	  The	  Instant	  of	  My	  Death.	  Maurice	  Blanchot.	  Demeure.	  Fiction	  and	  Testimony,	  Rottenberg,	  E.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  Dittmann,	  L.	  (1984),	  Arabeske	  und	  Farbe	  als	  Gestaltungselemente	  bei	  Matisse.	  Der	  Begriff	  der	  Arabeske	  in	  
Matisse’s	  schriftlichen	  ¨Äusserungen,	  in:	  Behrens,	  V.,	  Mass,	  C.,	  Ronig,	  F.	  (ed.)	  (1984),	  Florilegium	  Artis.	  Festschrift	  für	  Wolfgang	  Goetz.	  Saarbrücken,	  pp.	  28-­‐34.	  Dreyer,	  O.	  (1993),	  Die	  Arabeske,	  ein	  Strukturprinzip	  der	  Romantik,	  in:	  Henri	  Matisse,	  Zeichnungen	  und	  
Gouaches	  Découpées	  (exhib.	  cat.),	  Stuttgart:	  Staatsgalerie	  Stuttgart,	  pp.	  298-­‐303.	  Dürfeld,	  M.	  (2008),	  Das	  Ornamentale	  und	  die	  architektonische	  Form.	  Systemtheoretische	  Irritationen,	  Bielefeld:	  transcrip	  Verlag.	  	  	  E	  Eco,	  U.	  (1994),	  The	  Limits	  of	  Interpretation,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  ____,	  (2006),	  On	  Literature,	  London:	  Vintage	  Books.	  ____,	  (2006),	  Cum	  se	  face	  o	  teză	  de	  licență,	  Iasi:	  Polirom.	  	  F	  Ocón-­‐Fernández,	  M.	  (2004),	  Ornament	  und	  Moderne.	  Theoriebildung	  und	  Ornamentdebatte	  im	  deutschen	  
Architekturdiskurs	  (1850-­‐1930),	  Bonn:	  Reimer	  Verlag.	  Franc,	  M.	  (2008),	  Verborgene	  Ähnlichkeiten	  –	  Die	  Arabeske	  als	  Medium	  des	  Absoluten	  (Studienarbeit),	  München:	  Grin	  Verlag.	  Forty,	  A.	  (1986),	  Objects	  of	  Desire:	  Design	  and	  Society	  1750-­‐1980,	  London:	  Thames	  and	  Hudson.	  Foster,	  H.	  (2003),	  Design	  and	  Crime	  (And	  other	  Diatribes),	  London:	  Verso.	  Foucault,	  M.	  (2009),	  Manet	  and	  the	  Object	  of	  Painting,	  London:	  Tate	  Publishing.	  ____,	  (1994),	  Aesthetics.	  Essential	  Works	  of	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984,	  Volume	  2,	  Faubion,	  J.	  D.	  (ed.),	  London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  pp.	  205-­‐222.	  Frank,	  I.	  and	  Hartung,	  F.	  (ed.)	  (2001),	  Die	  Rhetorik	  des	  Ornaments,	  München:	  Fink	  Verlag.	  Frueh,	  J.	  (2001),	  Monster	  Beauty.	  Building	  the	  Body	  of	  Love,	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  G	  Gombrich,	  E.	  H.	  (1964),	  Moment	  and	  Movement	  in	  Art,	  in:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Warburg	  and	  Courtauld	  Institutes.	  ____,	  (2006),	  The	  Sense	  of	  Order.	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Decorative	  Art,	  London:	  Phaidon	  Press.	  Grabar,	  O.	  (1973,	  1987),	  The	  Formation	  of	  Islamic	  Art,	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (1992,	  1995),	  The	  Mediation	  of	  Ornament,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2001),	  Mostly	  Miniatures.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Persian	  Painting,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2006),	  Islamic	  Visual	  Culture,	  1100-­‐1800.	  Constructing	  the	  Study	  of	  Islamic	  Art,	  Vol.	  II	  and	  Vol.	  III,	  Hampshire:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Limited.	  Greber,	  E.	  (2003),	  Textile	  Texte.	  Poetologische	  Metaphorik	  und	  Literaturtheorie.	  Studien	  zur	  Tradition	  des	  
Wortflechtens	  und	  der	  Kombinatorik,	  Köln:	  Böhlau	  Verlag.	  Godfrey,	  M.,	  Biesenbach,	  K.	  and	  Greenberg,	  K.	  (ed.)	  (2010),	  Francis	  Alÿs.	  A	  Story	  of	  Deception,	  London:	  Tate	  Publishing.	  
	   164	  
Gygax,	  R.	  and	  Munder,	  H.	  (curators)	  (2010),	  While	  Bodies	  Get	  Mirrored.	  An	  Exhibition	  about	  Movement,	  
Formalism	  and	  Space,	  Zürich:	  Migros	  Museum.	  Graw,	  I.,	  Birnbaum,	  D.	  and	  Hirsch,	  N.	  (ed.)	  (2011),	  Art	  and	  Subjecthood.	  The	  Return	  of	  the	  Human	  Figure	  in	  
Semiocapitalism,	  Berlin:	  Sternberg	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Under	  Pressure.	  Pictures,	  Subjects,	  and	  the	  New	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism,	  Berlin:	  Sternberg	  Press.	  Grosz,	  E.	  (1994),	  Volatile	  Bodies.	  Toward	  a	  Corporeal	  Feminism,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  ____, (1995), Space,	  Time	  and	  Perversion.	  Essays	  on	  the	  Politics	  of	  Bodies,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  	  Guattari,	  F.	  (2009),	  Chaosophy.	  Texts	  and	  Interviews	  1972-­‐1977,	  Lotringer,	  S.	  (ed.),	  Los	  Angeles:	  Semiotext(e).	  ____,	  (2011),	  The	  Machinic	  Unconscious.	  Essays	  in	  Schizoanalysis,	  Adkins,	  T.	  (trans.),	  Los	  Angeles:	  Semiotext(e).	  	  H	  Haber,	  Honi	  Fern,	  Foucault	  Pumped:	  Body	  Politics	  and	  the	  Muscled	  Women,	  in:	  Feminist	  Interpretations	  of	  
Michel	  Foucault,	  Susan	  J.	  Hekman	  (ed.),	  Pennsylvania:	  The	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  137-­‐156.	  Haiku,	  R.	  (2010),	  The	  Absence	  of	  the	  Work.	  Marcel	  Broodthaers,	  1964-­‐1976,	  October	  Book,	  London:	  MIT	  Press.	  Hekman,	  S.	  J.	  (ed.)	  (1996)	  Feminist	  Interpretation	  of	  M.	  Foucault,	  University	  Park	  Pennsylvania:	  The	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press.	  	  Hegel,	  G.	  W.	  F.	  (1979),	  Introduction	  to	  Aesthetics,	  trans.	  T.	  M.	  Knox,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon.	  Heidegger,	  M.	  (1980,	  1962),	  Being	  and	  Time,	  trans.	  John	  Macqarrie	  and	  Edward	  Robinson,	  Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell.	  ____,	  (1992),	  Was	  heißt	  Denken?,	  Stuttgart:	  Reclam.	  ____,	  (1997),	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  Taft,	  R.	  (trans.)	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  Hetzer,	  Th.	  (1987),	  Das	  Ornamentale	  und	  die	  Gestalt,	  (Schriften	  Th.	  Hetzers,	  Bd.	  3),	  Berthold,	  G.	  (ed.),	  Stuttgart:	  Urauchhaus.	  Heywood,	  Leslie	  (1998),	  Bodymakers:	  A	  Cultural	  Anatomy	  of	  Women’s	  Body	  Building,	  New	  Jersey:	  Rutgers	  University	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2000),	  Pretty	  Good	  For	  A	  Girl,	  Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  ____,	  (2012),	  Building	  Otherwise:	  Bodybuilding	  as	  Immersive	  Practice,	  in:	  Critical	  Readings	  in	  Bodybuilding,	  Adam	  Locks	  and	  Niall	  Richardson	  (ed.),	  London:	  Routledge,	  pp.	  122-­‐139.	  Hiller,	  S.	  (1996),	  Thinking	  about	  Art.	  Conversations	  with	  Susan	  Hiller,	  Einzig,	  B.	  (ed.),	  Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press.	  Didi-­‐Hubermann,	  G.	  (2005),	  Confronting	  Images,	  Pennsylvania:	  The	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press.	  Husslein-­‐Arco,	  A.	  and	  Weidinger	  A.	  (ed.)	  (2008),	  Gustav	  Klimt	  und	  die	  Kunstschau	  1908	  (exhib.	  cat.),.	  München:	  Prestel.	  Huysmans,	  J.-­‐K.	  (2003),	  Against	  Nature,	  London:	  Penguin	  Books.	  	  J	  James,	  I.	  (2006),	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  Jones,	  O.	  (1856),	  The	  Grammar	  of	  Ornament,	  London:	  Day	  and	  Sons.	  Jay,	  M.	  (1994),	  Downcast	  Eyes.	  The	  Denigration	  of	  Vision	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  French	  Thought,	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  K	  Klein,	  A.	  M.	  (1993)	  Little	  Big	  Men,	  New	  York:	  State	  University	  Of	  New	  York	  Press.	  Klein,	  J.	  (2010),	  Grayson	  Perry,	  London:	  Thames	  and	  Hudson.	  Kant,	  I.	  (2000),	  Kritik	  der	  reinen	  Vernunft,	  Frankfurt	  a.	  M.:	  Suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  Krauss,	  R.	  E.	  (1994),	  The	  Optical	  Unconscious,	  London:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  Kuhl,	  I.	  (2006),	  Egon	  Schiele,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  Kühnel,	  E.	  (1976),	  The	  Arabesque.	  Meaning	  and	  Transformation	  of	  an	  Ornament,	  Graz:	  Verlag	  für	  Sammler.	  	  L	  Laing,	  R.	  D.	  (2010),	  The	  Divided	  Self,	  London:	  Penguin	  Books.	  de	  Lauretis,	  T.	  (2007),	  Figures	  of	  Resistance.	  Essays	  in	  Feminist	  Theory,	  Urbana	  and	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press.	  Lévinas,	  E.	  (1969),	  Totality	  and	  Infinity.	  An	  Essay	  on	  Exteriority,	  Lingis	  A.	  (trans.),	  Pittsburgh,	  Pennsylvania:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press.	  	  Liiceanu,	  G.	  (2000),	  The	  Păltiniș	  Diary.	  A	  Padeic	  Model	  in	  Humanist	  Culture,	  Budapest:	  CEU	  Press.	  ____,	  (2007),	  Despre	  Limită,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  Lingis,	  A.	  (1994),	  Foreign	  Bodies,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  ____,	  (1998),	  The	  Imperative,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  Lispector,	  C.	  (1992),	  The	  Hour	  of	  the	  Star,	  trans.	  Giovanni	  Pontiero,	  Manchester:	  Carcanet	  Press	  Ltd.	  
	   165	  
____,	  (1989),	  The	  Stream	  of	  Life,	  trans.	  Elizabeth	  Lowe	  and	  Earl	  Fitz,	  London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  	  List,	  L.	  (curator	  &	  ed.),	  (2006),	  The	  Imagery	  of	  Chess	  Revisited,	  New	  York:	  George	  Braziller	  Publishers.	  Lloyd,	  J.	  and	  Witt-­‐Döring,	  Ch.	  (curators)	  (2011),	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern:	  Style	  and	  Identity	  in	  Vienna	  1900,	  Neue	  Galerie,	  New	  York.	  Locks,	  A.	  and	  Richardson	  N.	  (ed.)	  (2012),	  Critical	  Readings	  in	  Bodybuilding,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  Loos,	  A.,	  Opel,	  A.,	  and	  Mitchell,	  M.	  (1998),	  Ornament	  and	  Crime:	  Selected	  Essays	  (Studies	  in	  Austrian	  Literature,	  Culture,	  and	  Thought	  Translation	  Series),	  Riverside,	  California:	  Ariadne	  Press.	  Luhmann,	  N.	  (1997),	  Die	  Kunst	  der	  Gesellschaft,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (1987),	  Soziale	  Systeme,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  	  M	  Malabou,	  C.	  (1996),	  The	  Future	  of	  Hegel.	  Plasticity,	  Temporality	  and	  Dialectic,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Changing	  Difference,	  Shread,	  C.	  (trans.),	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Ontology	  of	  the	  Accident.	  An	  Essay	  on	  Destructive	  Plasticity,	  Shread,	  C.	  (trans.),	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2010),	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  trans.	  by	  Carolyn	  Shread,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2011),	  The	  Heidegger	  Change,	  trans.	  Peter	  Skafish,	  New	  York:	  Suny	  Press.	  
____,	  (2012),	  The	  New	  Wounded.	  From	  Neurosis	  to	  Brain	  Damage,	  trans.	  Steven	  Miller,	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  Marion,	  J.-­‐L.	  (2002),	  Being	  Given.	  Toward	  a	  Phenomenology	  of	  Givenness,	  Kosky,	  J.	  L.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  The	  Visible	  and	  the	  Revealed,	  Gschwandter,	  C.	  M.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  Marks,	  L.	  U.	  (2010),	  Enfoldment	  and	  Infinity.	  An	  Islamic	  Genealogy	  of	  New	  Media	  Art,	  Cambridge	  Massachusetts:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  Mauss,	  M.	  (2002),	  The	  Gift.	  The	  form	  and	  reason	  for	  exchange	  in	  archaic	  societies,	  London:	  Routledge.	  Mersch,	  D.	  (2009),	  Negative	  Präsenz,	  S.	  99-­‐117,	  in:	  Böhler,	  A.,	  Granzer,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2009),	  Ereignis	  Denken.	  
TheatRealität,	  Performanz,	  Ereignis,	  Wien:	  Passage	  Verlag.	  McKenzie,	  L.	  (2009),	  Chêne	  de	  Weekend.	  2006-­‐2009,	  Köln:	  Walter	  König	  Verlag.	  Müller,	  M.	  (1977),	  Die	  Verdrängung	  des	  Ornaments.	  Zum	  Verhältnis	  von	  Architektur	  und	  Lebenspraxis,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  	  N	  Nabokov,	  V.	  (2011),	  Pale	  Fire,	  London:	  Penguin	  Books.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe,	  P.	  (1988),	  The	  Literary	  Absolute.	  The	  Theory	  of	  Literature	  in	  German	  
Romanticism,	  Barnard,	  P.	  and	  Lester,	  C.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  (1996),	  The	  Muses	  I,	  Kamuf,	  P.	  (trans.)	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2003),	  A	  Finite	  Thinking,	  Sparks,	  S.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2005),	  The	  Ground	  of	  The	  Image,	  Fort,	  J.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2006),	  Being	  Singular	  Plural,	  Hamacher,	  W.	  and	  Wellbery,	  D.	  E.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  ____,	  (2006),	  Multiple	  Arts.	  The	  Muses	  II,	  Sparks,	  S.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  und	  Ferrari,	  F.	  (2006),	  Die	  Haut	  der	  Bilder,	  Schulz	  S.	  und	  Wolf,	  J.	  (trans.),	  Zürich:	  diaphanes	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (2007),	  The	  Birth	  To	  Presence,	  Hamacher	  W.	  and	  Wellbery,	  D.	  E.	  (ed.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2007),	  Porträt	  und	  Blick,	  Stuttgart:	  Jutta	  Legueil.	  ____,	  (2008),	  The	  Discourse	  of	  the	  Syncope.	  Logodaedalus,	  Anton,	  S.	  (trans.),	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Corpus,	  Rand,	  R.	  A.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  An	  Exempting	  from	  Sense,	  in:	  Dis-­‐enclosure.	  The	  Deconstruction	  of	  Christianity,	  Bergo,	  B.,	  Malenfant,	  G.	  and	  Smith,	  M.	  B.	  (trans.),	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press.	  ____,	  (2008),	  Die	  Annäherung,	  Nördlingen:	  Salon	  Verlag.	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  und	  Scherer,	  R.	  (2008),	  Ouvertüren.	  Texte	  zu	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Zürich:	  diaphanes	  Verlag.	  Naumann,	  F.	  M.	  and	  Bailey,	  B.	  (2009),	  Marcel	  Duchamp.	  The	  Art	  of	  Chess,	  New	  York:	  readymade	  Press.	  Nesbitt,	  J.	  (ed.)	  (2010),	  Chris	  Offili,	  Tate	  Modern,	  London:	  Tate	  Publishing.	  Neret,	  G.	  (2007),	  Klimt,	  Köln:	  Taschen	  Verlag.	  	  Noica,	  C.	  (1981),	  Devenirea	  întru	  fiintă,	  Bucuresti:	  Editura	  stiintifică	  si	  enciclopedică.	  ____,	  (2007),	  Jurnal	  de	  Idei,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Six	  Maladies	  of	  the	  Contemporary	  Spirit,	  Blyth,	  A.	  (trans.),	  Cornwall:	  University	  of	  Plymouth	  Press.	  ____,	  (2009),	  Povestiri	  despre	  om	  după	  o	  carte	  lui	  Hegel,	  București:	  Humanitas.	  	  	  O	  Ostrow,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2001),	  Framing	  Formalism:	  Riegl’s	  Work,	  Amsterdam:	  G+B	  Arts.	  
	   166	  
Offner,	  E.	  (1969),	  The	  Granjon	  arabesque	  :	  thirty	  arrangements	  of	  the	  ornaments	  with	  type	  and	  an	  
introduction,	  Northampton,	  Mass.:	  Rosemary	  Press.	  	  P	  Pächt,	  O.	  (1995),	  Methodisches	  zur	  Kunsthistorischen	  Praxis,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  Parker,	  R.	  (2010),	  The	  Subversive	  Stitch.	  Embroidery	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Feminine,	  London:	  I.B.	  Tauris.	  Pfabigan,	  A.	  (ed.)	  (1985),	  Ornament	  und	  Askese	  im	  Zeitgeist	  des	  Wiens	  der	  Jahrhundertwende,	  Wien:	  Christian	  Brandstätter.	  Pitts,	  Victoria	  (2003),	  In	  The	  Flesh.	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Body	  Modification,	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillian.	  Plath,	  S.	  (2008),	  The	  Collected	  Poems,	  New	  York:	  Harper	  Collins	  Publsihers.	  	  R	  Raulet,	  G.	  and	  Schmidt,	  B.	  (ed.)	  (2001),	  Vom	  Parergon	  zum	  Labyrinth.	  Untersuchungen	  zur	  kritischen	  Theorie	  
des	  Ornaments,	  Wien:	  Böhlau	  Verlag.	  	  Richardson,	  B.	  (1992),	  Brice	  Marden	  -­‐	  Could	  Mountain	  (exhib.	  cat.),	  Texas:	  Houston	  Fine	  Art	  Press.	  	  Riegl,	  A.	  (1975),	  Stilfragen:	  Grundlegungen	  zu	  einer	  Geschichte	  der	  Ornamentik,	  Hildesheim:	  Georg	  Olms	  Verlag.	  ____,	  (1966),	  Historische	  Grammatik	  der	  bildenden	  Künste,	  Swoboda,	  K.M.	  and	  Pächt,	  O.	  (ed.),	  Graz.	  Ross,	  A.	  (2007),	  The	  Aesthetic	  Paths	  of	  Philosophy.	  Presentation	  in	  Kant,	  Heidegger,	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe,	  and	  
Nancy,	  Stanford	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  	  S	  Sartre,	  J.-­‐P.	  (2000),	  Nausea,	  Baldick,	  R.	  (trans.),	  London:	  Penguin	  Classics.	  	  Scarry,	  E.	  (2006),	  On	  Beauty	  And	  Being	  Just,	  London:	  Duckworth	  &	  CO.	  Ltd.	  Schafter,	  D.	  (2003),	  The	  Order	  of	  Ornament.	  The	  Structure	  of	  Style.	  Theoretical	  Foundation	  of	  Modern	  Art	  and	  
Architecture,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Schlegel,	  F.	  (1988),	  Kritische	  Schriften	  und	  Fragmente	  [1798-­‐1802],	  Studienausgabe	  Bd.	  2,	  Behler,	  E.	  and	  Eichner,	  H.	  (ed.),	  Paderborn:	  Ferdinand	  Schöningh.	  Schroeder,	  K.	  A.	  (2004),	  Egon	  Schiele.	  Eros	  und	  Passion,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  	  Scraton,	  S.	  and	  Flintoff,	  A.	  (2002)	  Gender	  and	  Sport:	  A	  Reader,	  London:	  Routledge	  Taylor	  &Francis	  Group.	  Shapiro,	  G.	  (2003),	  Foucault	  and	  Nietzsche	  on	  Seeing	  and	  Saying.	  Archaeologies	  of	  Vision,	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Stich,	  S.	  (ed.)	  (1991),	  Rosemarie	  Trockel,	  München:	  Prestel	  Verlag.	  	  T	  	  Trilling,	  J.	  (2003),	  Ornament:	  A	  Modern	  Perspective,	  Washington:	  Washington	  Univ.	  Press.	  Trockel,	  R.	  (1999),	  Bodies	  of	  work	  1986-­‐1998,	  Whitechapel	  Gallery,	  London:	  The	  Whitechapel.	  ____,	  (2006),	  Post-­‐Menopause,	  Köln:	  Walther	  König	  Verlag.	  Tomaselli,	  F.	  (2004),	  Monsters	  of	  Paradise,	  Edinburgh:	  The	  Fruitmarket	  Gallery.	  	  	  V	  Valéry,	  P.	  (1989),	  The	  Art	  of	  Poetry,	  ed.	  Jackson	  Mathews,	  Bollingen	  series	  XLV	  7,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  Vogel,	  S.	  B.	  (ed.	  &	  curators)	  (2009),	  Die	  Macht	  des	  Ornaments,	  Unteres	  Belvedere,	  Wien:	  Belvedere.	  Vogt,	  M.	  (2000),	  Zwischen	  Ornament	  und	  Natur.	  Edgar	  Degas	  als	  Maler	  und	  Photograph,	  New	  York:	  Olms.	  Vogt,	  T.	  (2012),	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Ready-­‐Made,	  trans.	  Gerrit	  Jackson,	  in:	  Texte	  zur	  Kunst,	  Art	  History	  Revisited,	  22.	  Jahrgang,	  Heft	  85,	  März	  2012,	  p.	  38-­‐54.	  	  W	  von	  Wersin,	  W.,	  Müller-­‐Grah,	  W.	  (1940),	  Das	  Elementare	  Ornament	  und	  seine	  Gesetzlichkeit,	  Ravensburg:	  Otto	  Maier	  Verlag.	  	  Wittgenstein,	  L.	  (2001),	  Tractatus	  logico-­‐philosophicus.	  Logisch-­‐philosophische	  Abhandlung,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Suhrkamp	  Verlag.	  Wollheim,	  R.	  (2000),	  Art	  and	  Its	  Objects,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Worringer,	  W.	  (1911),	  Abstraktion	  und	  Einfühlung,	  München:	  R.Piper	  &	  CO.	  Verlag.	  Wood,	  C.	  S.	  (ed.)	  (2003),	  The	  Vienna	  School	  Reader.	  Politics	  and	  Art	  Historical	  Method	  in	  the	  1930s,	  New	  York:	  Zone	  Books.	  Woolf,	  V.	  (2000),	  A	  Room	  of	  one’s	  Own,	  London:	  Penguin.	  —	  (1868),	  Arabesque	  &	  other	  ornaments	  :	  in	  typographical	  use	  at	  Zürich	  in	  1559.	  Imperatorum	  Romanorum	  omnium	  orientalium	  et	  occidentalium,	  London:	  Privately	  Printed.	  	  	  Y	  Young,	  Iris	  Marion	  (2005),	  Throwing	  Like	  a	  Girl,	  in:	  On	  Female	  Body	  Experience.	  “Throwing	  Like	  a	  Girl”	  and	  
Other	  Essays,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  27-­‐45.	  
	   167	  
Online	  Articles:	  Afloarei,	  Ș.	  (2009),	  Neutral	  Reason	  and	  Oriented	  Reason	  (Constantin	  Noica:	  a	  Distinct	  Project	  on	  the	  
Phenomenology	  of	  Reason),	  No.	  5	  July,	  Journal	  for	  Interdisciplinary	  Research	  on	  Religion	  and	  Science	  [online].	  Available	  from:	  URL	  http://www.jirrs.org/jirrs_nr_5/09-­‐04-­‐jirrs5-­‐afloroaei.pdf	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Alloa,	  E.,	  Bare	  Exteriority:	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Image	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  Philosophy	  in	  Martin	  Heidegger	  and	  
Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Hyatt,	  M.	  (trans.),	  in:	  Colloquy	  text	  theory	  critique	  10/2005	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://	  www.arts.monash.edu.au/ecps/colloquy/issue10/issue10.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  von	  Graevenitz,	  G.,	  Contextio	  und	  conjointre,	  Gewebe	  und	  Arabeske.	  Über	  Zusammenhänge	  mittelalterlicher	  
und	  romantischer	  Literaturtheorie	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.	  kops.ub.uni-­‐konstanz.de/.../Contextio_und_conjointure.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  Greenberg,	  C.	  (1961),	  Modernist	  Painting	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/wittgenstein/files/2007/10/Greenbergmodpaint.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Heikkilä,	  M.,	  Community,	  the	  Political	  and	  the	  Indecidable:	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Shared	  Origin	  of	  Art,	  p.1-­‐18,	  in:	  International	  Yearbook	  of	  Aesthetics.	  Ontology,	  Art,	  and	  Experience:	  Perspectives	  from	  West	  and	  East,	  Vol.	  9,	  2005,	  Haapala,	  A.	  (ed.),	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  htpp://www.2.eur.nl/fw/hyper/IAA/Yearbook/iaa9/Yearbook9.pdf.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  ____,	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Intimate	  Distance	  of	  Art.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.corpus-­‐aesthetics.net/.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  	  Alanko-­‐Kahiluoto,	  O.	  (2007)	  Writing	  otherwise	  than	  Seeing.	  Writing	  and	  Exteriority	  in	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Thesis	  (Ph.	  D.)	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://ethesis.helsinki.fi.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Hansen,	  M.	  B.	  (2008),	  Benjamin’s	  Aura,	  in:	  Critical	  Inquiry,	  Winter	  2008	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/uploads/pdf/Hansen,_Benjamins_Aura.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013.]	  Kirves,	  M.	  (2012)	  Ornament	  als	  Erkenntnisform.	  Die	  episthemische	  Entwurfstheorie	  der	  South	  Kensington	  
School	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.dgae.de/downloads/Martin_Kirves.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013).	  Krauss,	  R.	  (1979),	  Grids	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/778321?uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21102754458581.	  [Accessed	  2013].	  Levit	  R.	  (2008),	  Contemporary	  Ornament.	  The	  Return	  of	  the	  Symbolic	  Repressed	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/5/553249/28-­‐Levit.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Mark,	  T.	  (2004)	  Die	  Arabeske.	  Ein	  islamisches	  Stilprinzip?	  –	  und	  ihr	  Stellenwert	  in	  der	  Kunst	  des	  20.	  
Jahrhunderts	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/05_14/mark15.htm.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Masheck,	  J.	  (2009)	  The	  Carpet	  Paradigm.	  Integral	  Flatness	  From	  Decorative	  to	  Fine	  Art	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.josephmasheck.com/BIOgraphy_files/carpet.pdf.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Nancy,	  J.-­‐L.	  (2008),	  The	  Being-­‐with	  of	  Being-­‐there	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.springerlink.com:	  Continental	  Philosophy	  Review,	  Vol.	  41/1,	  p.	  1-­‐15.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  Roelstraete,	  D.	  (2009)	  What	  is	  Not	  Contemporary	  Art?:	  The	  View	  from	  Jena,	  Journal	  #11,	  2009	  [online],	  e-­‐flux.	  Available	  from:	  URL	  http://www.e-­‐flux.com/journal/what-­‐is-­‐not-­‐contemporary-­‐art-­‐the-­‐view-­‐from-­‐jena/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Vahanian,	  N.	  (2011),	  A	  Conversation	  with	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  in:	  Journal	  for	  Cultural	  and	  Religious	  Theory,	  9	  (2008):	  1–13.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catherine_Malabou,	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Zambrano,	  M.	  (2008)	  Philosophy	  and	  Poetry	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.webshells.com.	  [Accessed	  September	  2008].	  Films	  &	  Videos:	  Brakhage,	  S.	  (1993)	  Stellar	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8r9t135_xY.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  ____,	  	  (2000)	  Water	  for	  Maya	  –	  Span	  style	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVNWq3gOBl4.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Fischinger,	  O.	  (1938),	  An	  Optical	  Poem,	  for	  MGM,	  7	  min.,	  music	  F.	  Liszt,	  Turner	  Entertainment	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=they7m6YePo.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  ____,	  (1946-­‐57)	  Early	  Abstractions	  [online].	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RrZxw1Jb9vA&list=TLLQRQnD4iGlbDeZ4-­‐fJiQx8moU0Yhyfp7.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  Kubelka,	  P.	  (1958)	  Schwechater	  [online],	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1S0aoQQxzwk.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  ____,	  (1957)	  Adebar	  [online].	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1S0aoQQxzwk.	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1S0aoQQxzw.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  
	   168	  
Menken,	  M.,	  Arabesque	  for	  Kenneth	  Anger	  (1958-­‐61),	  16	  mm,	  colour,	  sound,	  4	  min.	  Original	  score	  by	  Teiji	  Ito.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.ubu.com/film/menken_arabesque.html.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  Reininger,	  Lotte	  (1926),	  The	  Adventures	  of	  Prince	  Achmed,	  France:	  Comenius-­‐Film	  Gmbh,	  [animated	  film].	  Available	  from	  URL	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mulqoZ2LXeM.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  	  List	  of	  Shows:	  
Ornament	  und	  Abstraktion.	  Kunst	  der	  Kulturen,	  Moderne	  und	  Gegenwart	  im	  Dialog,	  Brüderlin,	  Markus	  (curator),	  Fondation	  Beyerle,	  Riehen	  bei	  Basel,	  10	  June	  –	  7	  October	  2001.	  
Ornament,	  Schönheit	  und	  Verbrechen.	  Mariella	  Moser	  –	  Silke	  Radenhausen	  –	  Jochen	  Twelker	  –	  Ekrem	  Yalcindag	  (artists),	  Kunsthalle	  Wilhelmshaven,	  Wilhelmshaven,	  26	  June	  –	  31	  August	  2003.	  Ornament	  –	  oder	  die	  neue	  Lust	  am	  Verbrechen	  in	  der	  zeitgenössischen	  Kunst,	  Luitpolt	  Block,	  München,	  26	  June	  –	  30	  August	  2003.	  	  
The	  Imagery	  of	  Chess	  Revisited,	  List,	  L.	  (curator),	  The	  Isamu	  Noguchi	  Museum,	  New	  York,	  20	  October	  2005	  –	  5	  March	  2006.	  
Die	  Macht	  des	  Ornaments,	  Vogel,	  Sabine	  B.	  (curator),	  Belvedere,	  Wien,	  20	  January	  –	  17	  May	  2009.	  
Visual	  Delight:	  Ornament	  and	  Pattern	  in	  Modern	  and	  Contemporary	  Design,	  Diane	  Minnite	  (curator),	  Philadelphia	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  Philadelphia,	  16	  May	  –	  20	  September	  2009.	  	  
The	  Mass	  Ornament,	  John	  Rasmussen	  (curator),	  Gladstone	  Gallery,	  New	  York,	  25	  June	  –	  13	  August	  2010.	  
While	  Bodies	  Get	  Mirrored.	  An	  Exhibition	  about	  Movement,	  Formalism	  and	  Space,	  Gygax,	  R.	  and	  Munder,	  H.,	  6.	  March	  2010	  –	  30.	  May	  2010,	  Zürich:	  Migros	  Museum.	  
Grammar	  of	  Ornament,	  Adam	  Ball,	  Janne	  Malmros	  and	  Mathew	  Tom	  (artists),	  Hoxton	  Gallery,	  London,	  14	  October	  –	  17	  November	  2011.	  
Deep	  Surface:	  Contemporary	  Ornament	  and	  Pattern,	  CAM	  Raleigh,	  Raleigh,	  24	  September	  2011	  –	  2	  January	  2012.	  
A	  Bigger	  Splash.	  Painting	  after	  Performance,	  Wood,	  C.	  (curator	  &	  ed.),	  Tate	  Modern,	  London,	  14	  November	  2012	  –	  1	  April	  2013.	  Websites	  URLs:	  http://eikones.ch/projekte/uebersicht.html.	  [Accessed	  September	  2011].	  	  http://www.pattern-­‐project.org/links/.	  [Accessed	  March	  2011].	  	  http://www.duerfeld.de/ornamentalesentwerfen/.	  [Accessed	  16	  September	  2011].	  http://www.altertuemliches.at/termine/ausstellung/ein-­‐dialog-­‐durch-­‐die-­‐jahrhunderte-­‐albrecht-­‐duerer-­‐%E2%80%93-­‐sigmar-­‐polke.	  [Accessed	  October	  2012].	  http://alexstingl.wordpress.com/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013).	  	   Lectures,	  Talks,	  Conferences	  and	  Symposia:	  	  Badiou,	  A	  (2002)	  On	  the	  Truth-­‐Process:	  An	  open	  lecture	  by	  Alain	  Badiou	  [online],	  The	  European	  Graduate	  School,	  August	  2002.	  Available	  from	  URL	  http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-­‐badiou/articles/on-­‐the-­‐truth-­‐process/.	  [Accessed	  October	  2013].	  	  Adamson	  G.,	  Jacob,	  S.	  and	  Perry,	  G.	  (2011),	  What	  is	  the	  Use	  of	  Ornament	  in	  Contemporary	  Art	  and	  
Architecture?,	  ICA,	  London,	  1	  September	  2011.	  
Falten-­‐Muster:	  Texturen	  der	  Bildlichkeit,	  eikones	  NFS	  Bildkritik,	  Basel,	  31	  May	  –	  1	  June	  2013.	  	   	  
	   169	  
INDEX	  
(The	  page	  numbers	  in	  italics	  indicate	  illustrations.)	  	  Agamben,	  23,	  37,	  87,	  88,	  90.	  Acker,	  23,	  60,	  62,	  108,	  112.	  	  Albers,	  55,	  57.	  Ambiguity,	  47.	  Arabesque,	  23,	  33,	  34,	  39-­‐50;	  36,	  46,	  47,	  49,	  50,	  51,	  52,	  53,	  54,	  56,	  57,	  58,	  59,	  64,	  72.	  Ardabil	  Carpet,	  89,	  47.	  Athenæneum,	  15,	  20,	  25,	  26,	  47,	  106.	  	  Aura,	  83.	  Authenticity,	  83.	  Author,	  80,	  81,	  117.	  Badiou,	  86.	  Barthes,	  69,	  71.	  Benjamin,	  83.	  Bild/Abbild/Vorbild,	  19.	  Blick/Anblick,	  19.	  Body,	  25,	  59,	  60-­‐62,	  108-­‐109;	  74.	  Bodybuilding	  practices,	  52-­‐61;	  75,	  76,	  77.	  Brett,	  63,	  66-­‐69,	  78-­‐80.	  Carpet	  Paradigm,	  63-­‐71.	  Character,	  20.	  Characterisation,	  20.	  Daimon,	  72,	  91,	  95,	  97.	  Darstellung,	  25,	  26,	  78,	  91.	  	  Décor,	  75,	  86-­‐87.	  Decoration,	  75.	  Decorum,	  23,	  75,	  78,	  79,	  90.	  Derrida,	  22,	  27,	  37,	  84,	  89.	  	  Determination,	  106.	  Dichtung,	  25,	  26,	  37,	  78,	  91.	  Différence-­‐différance,	  84-­‐85.	  Duchamp,	  127,	  134.	  Dürer,	  45,	  47,	  87;	  60,	  61,	  62.	  Dürfeld,	  30,	  49,	  50.	  Entwurf,	  49.	  Face,	  88,	  90.	  Fantastic,	  21.	  Fiction,	  20,	  37,	  29.	  General,	  the,	  105.	  Gift,	  84,	  88-­‐90.	  Goethe,	  39.	  Grabar,	  41,	  42-­‐45,	  52,	  53,	  55,	  64,	  66,	  69,	  71,	  73,	  89;	  36,	  49,	  50,	  51,	  52,	  53,	  91,	  92,	  93,	  98,	  102,	  103.	  Great	  Mosque	  of	  Damascus,	  69,	  70;	  98,	  99.	  Greenberg,	  67.	  Grid,	  71-­‐74.	  Heidegger,	  19,	  21,	  26,	  28,	  36,	  93,	  96.	  Image,	  19,	  93-­‐96,	  98-­‐99.	  Imaginary,	  21.	  Individual,	  the,	  105.	  Infinite	  rapport,	  65,	  66,	  72,	  114.	  Invention,	  23.	  Jena	  Romanticism,	  15,	  25,	  26.	  Kant,	  19,	  20,	  23,	  63,	  68,	  93-­‐94.	  Kirves,	  37,	  72.	  Kracauer,	  54,	  81,	  82;	  73.	  Krauss,	  62,	  67,	  71-­‐74.	  Kühnel,	  39-­‐40,	  42-­‐44,	  46,	  47;	  56,	  59.	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe,	  15,	  22,	  25,	  26.	  	  Le	  Corbusier,	  79,	  80;	  111.	  Lévi-­‐Strauss,	  49,	  50,	  52,	  53,	  88;	  69,	  69.	  Levit,	  30.	  
	   170	  
Limit,	  91-­‐95.	  Literary	  Absolute,	  114.	  Literature,	  20,	  27.	  Loos,	  54,	  79;	  110,	  113.	  Malabou,	  21,	  23,	  36,	  50,	  52,	  53,	  56-­‐60,	  68,	  70,	  71,	  73,	  93,	  110,	  111.	  Marion,	  84,	  88,	  89,	  90.	  Marden,	  56;	  79.	  Masheck,	  54,	  63-­‐68.	  Mass	  ornament,	  81-­‐82,	  73.	  Method,	  36.	  	  Mondrian,	  93.	  Morphogenesis,	  30.	  Nancy,	  15,	  22,	  25-­‐27,	  58,	  62-­‐68,	  70,	  71,	  73,	  89,	  91-­‐94,	  118,	  119.	  Noica,	  23,	  37,	  49,	  73,	  75,	  87,	  89,	  93,	  95,	  98,	  100,	  102-­‐105.	  Novel	  of	  manners,	  20,	  22,	  23,	  115,	  116.	  Ocón-­‐Fernández,	  78.	  Ornament,	  30,	  35,	  54,	  75-­‐79.	  Ornamental,	  67,	  70,	  75.	  Ornamentation,	  75.	  Ornatus,	  75,	  79.	  Peras,	  95-­‐96.	  Ph.	  D.	  by	  project,	  18,	  25,	  26,	  27,	  51.	  Phantasm,	  36,	  37.	  Plasticity,	  30,	  31,	  68,	  70,	  116-­‐117.	  Plath,	  127.	  Polke,	  45,	  46,	  47;	  63.	  Project,	  49.	  Presentation,	  25,	  26,	  94.	  Representation,	  118,	  119.	  Riegl,	  39,	  40-­‐42,	  44,	  45,	  47,	  67,	  69-­‐72,	  78,	  99-­‐101;	  47,	  57,	  72,	  100.	  Romanticism,	  15,	  25,	  26.	  Romantic,	  15.	  Ross,	  22,	  26,	  27.	  Schlegel,	  20,	  25,	  47-­‐49.	  Sense,	  22.	  Sub-­‐iectum,	  85,	  115.	  Subjectivity,	  30,	  87,	  115,	  155,	  156.	  Subject-­‐work,	  25.	  Transformational	  masks,	  50,	  52,	  53,	  68,	  69.	  Truth,	  86,	  88,	  95,	  97,	  107.	  Una	  Joc,	  24.	  Valéry,	  24,	  37,	  38,	  51,	  53,	  56,	  59,	  61,	  112.	  Weimarer	  Klassik,	  78.	  
